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BEYOND SCIENTISM: SCIENCE
AND RELIGION IN DIALOGUE

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It was Alfred North Whitehead who predicted that the future of world history would be determined in large measure by the decision reached in his generation as to the relationship of science and religion (1925). Whitehead understood, perhaps better than most others of his time, that these two great expressions of human intellectual and spiritual experience were utterly crucial for the formation of human destiny. For Whitehead neither science nor religion should be underestimated in its significance for the human future, and, it seemed clear to him, that if the relationship between science and religion were to be ultimately defined by either indifference or antagonism, the consequences for humankind would be deeply destructive.

However the history of the interaction between science and religion is construed, there can be little doubt that the growth in scientific knowledge and the consequent creation of a scientific culture over the past three hundred years, phenomenae which constitute the very essence of modernity, have left the religious communities of Western culture in a profoundly disrupted state. If it is true, as Whitehead and others have asserted, that the Western religious tradition provided the conception of reality within which modern science as we now know it emerged, then surely one of the great ironies of this history, as Kenneth Cauthen has pointed out (1969), is the displacement of religion as the primary energizing force within Western society by a social instrument which could not have come into being without the very religious tradition it displaced. The irony becomes even more poignant when seen in the light of Richard Rubenstein's thesis that the Judeo-Christian tradition not only made the rise of science as a theoretical enterprise possible, but it also created inadvertently the secularized, rationalized, disenchanting ethos which led to that bureaucratic objectivity culminating in the technology of extermination represented by the Nazi death camps (1975).

If the history of the relationship between science and religion contains these implications, i.e., that the rise of science in the West has meant the gradual erosion of the structure of religious consciousness and its replacement by a

secularized consciousness whose logical expressions include not only the theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, and visions of an expanding universe, of man evolving, of matter transformed into energy and energy into matter, of the structure of the biological cell and the death of our sun 5 billion years in the future, but also of ecological pillage, human alienation from nature, a culture of waste and the design and execution of a technology of mass death, then it is possible that Whitehead's concern that we achieve a consensus in which the relationship of science and religion be defined in positive and constructive terms has even greater significance than he realized. Perhaps our very survival is in some way related to the dialogue between science and religion.

To say that the Judeo-Christian community has been disrupted by the rise of a scientific culture is not to imply a negative evaluation of the scientific enterprise. It is, however, to point to a fundamental crisis within the religious consciousness of the West which has been clearly precipitated by the extraordinary impact science has had upon our culture. Put quite simply the crisis is that modern science has created a model of truth and reality that has rendered the assertions of the Western religious traditions profoundly suspect. While it has been pervasive within the religious community, the response to this crisis has not been uniform. In fact, David Tracy⁽¹⁹⁷⁵⁾ has argued that within the contemporary Western Christian theological community one can find five basic types or models of theological inquiry, each of which has to some degree achieved its distinctive identity and methodological self-consciousness as it has sought to come to terms with the challenges of the scientific era. These he identifies as the orthodox, the liberal, the neo-orthodox, the radical and the revisionist models.

It is orthodoxy which has been least motivated to rethink the meaning of its theological assertions in the light of scientific knowledge. Although Tracy does not do so, if one includes Protestant evangelical theology within this model, one finds a vigorous insistence that the adequacy of all forms of knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is determined by the extent to which they are compatible with

the absolute truth of Christian revelation as given in inerrant biblical form. While most recent evangelical theology rejects Rudolph Bultmann's attempt to demythologize Christian assertions as a way of taking account of the scientific worldview, and argues that scientific knowledge can in no way affect the content of Christian truth, some evangelical theologians argue that theology is itself a scientific enterprise. Carl F. H. Henry (1976), for example, has argued that theology is a presuppositional system of axiomatic truths from which the whole structure of Christian doctrine is deduced. Christian revelation makes theology as a science possible because its truth is fully rational and fully capable of verification by whatever valid criteria of truthfulness the human mind has yet conceived. Furthermore Christian revelation, Henry seems to argue, by providing information that is objectively certain and literally true as to the nature of reality bestows upon theology a more complete scientific status than the actual scientific enterprise itself because of the tentativity and incompleteness of the latter's actual cognitive achievements. Empirical science is in no position to raise cognitive objections to Christianity, Henry asserts, because of the uncertainty of its own conclusions.

The orthodox model constitutes one of the significant ways in which the religious mind within the Christian community has sought to deal with the crisis brought on by the rise of science. In its evangelical expression it asserts that divine revelation is given in objectively valid, univocal, i.e., literal propositional form in which cognitive information about God, man, and the world is communicated, the content of which is absolutely certain and which constitutes the epistemological matrix in relation to which every human claim to have truth, including the claims of science, must be evaluated as valid or invalid.

Obviously much more needs to be said about this theological model, especially when one considers the attention the evangelical movement is now receiving in our culture. Without attempting to assess the adequacy of this model here, the following observation is in order. The resurgence of evangelical theology represents a radical rejection of at least two fundamental assumptions which are to be found more

or less present within the remaining theological models Tracy identifies. Both of these assumptions emerged within the Christian theological community as direct outcomes of the religious encounter with modern science, and clearly represent the influence that science has had upon the religious mind.

Wolfhart Pannenberg (1976) has drawn attention to the first assumption. Pannenberg argues that as natural science destroyed the plausibility of the biblical-Aristotelian cosmology of the medieval Christian tradition by redefining the nature of physical reality, both philosophy and theology lost that cognitive access to God based upon the existence of the world. By asserting the principle of natural causation, natural science undercut the cognitive basis for asserting God as the unmoved first cause of the world or its final purpose. Neither philosophy nor theology could any longer assume that the world pointed beyond itself to the reality of God.

This defeat for theology in particular led to the development of a new foundation for the construction of knowledge of God. After some faltering attempts in the 18th century to renew cosmological arguments for the existence of God, theology, Pannenberg asserts, turned increasingly to the view that the internal structure of the human self is the basis for knowledge of God. This assumption finds expression in the liberal theological model through Schleiermacher's emphasis upon religious experience as the primary source of man's consciousness of God, in neo-orthodoxy in Bultmann's explicit appropriation of Heidegger, and in Barth's and Tillich's claim that faith is the precondition and the self-verifying center for the knowledge of God, in radical theology through the influence of Feuerbach's and Nietzsche's uniquely modern form of atheism, and in the revisionist attempt to rethink both Christian theological categories and the meaning of modernity in relation to the phenomenological field of human existence, especially in relation to such experiences as trust and the human encounter with limits.

The second assumption which has emerged from the encounter of the religious mind with modern science has been stated by Langdon Gilkey (1970). According to Gilkey's analysis the triumph of science over the last two hundred years led to an even more

fundamental development within the Christian theological community than the anthropocentric turn mentioned above. Gilkey reminds us that from the age of Galileo and Newton until early in the 19th century, it was widely believed by both scientists and theologians that science and religion were in fact complementary systems of truth and that the revealed knowledge of religion contained factual information about the structure of the universe within whose framework science could understand itself. This revealed knowledge included assertions concerning the origin of life forms and the catastrophic intervention of God within the formative processes of the earth in relation to which late 18th and early 19th century geologists made their fossil discoveries intelligible to themselves.

With the development of both geology and biology, however, this view that revealed knowledge contained empirical information that was continuous with and complementary of scientific knowledge and that religious language referred literally to factual states of affairs was thoroughly discredited. Hence, the second assumption developed within the theological community in its encounter with science, namely, that religious truth could no longer be defended as conveying information about or entailing any empirical matters of fact and thus must now be understood as a system of symbolic meanings which has no authoritative significance for the interpretation of factual states of affairs. In coming to see its most fundamental assertions as thoroughly symbolic, the Christian theological mind defined its relationship to science in a new way. Now it acknowledged that only science could provide valid information concerning the empirical order and it further recognized that theology had no basis for challenging properly scientific assertions. Furthermore, it gradually became clear to the theological community, Gilkey argues, that the validity of whatever empirical states of affairs might be presupposed in theological assertions, for example historical events, could not be established by theological assertions themselves but only by the deliverances of scientific inquiry. As is well known this situation has had radical implications for theology's subsequent career, as the debate over the historical Jesus, for example, has made clear.

It was within the framework of these two basic assumptions, the primacy of the self in theological inquiry and the symbolic character of religious assertions, that liberalism and neo-orthodoxy worked out their theological programs, both deeply influenced, as Gilkey has shown, by the scientific age. Liberalism accepted the scientific culture as normative for theological construction and both subjected the Christian tradition to thorough criticism and worked out its own theological affirmations in relation to fundamental scientific constructs, especially the theme of cosmic and human evolution. Neo-orthodoxy, especially in the person of Karl Barth, rejected the liberal attempt to reconstruct Christian doctrine in the light of scientific knowledge and asserted theology's freedom from the scientific enterprise by virtue of its grounding in divine revelation. Science and religion cannot conflict because they deal with two entirely different orders of reality. Neo-orthodoxy accepted the authority of science over the empirical order and eschewed any appeal to science to support religious belief. Theological truth, it asserted, has no relationship to scientific truth, and while the object of theological assertions is fully real as disclosed in the biblical documents, it can be neither confirmed nor disconfirmed by scientific evidence. God's action in the world can be discerned only by the eyes of faith and asserted paradoxically "in spite of" the absence of scientific evidence that God is so acting.

It is widely agreed today that the liberal attempt to reconcile religion and science failed because of the inability of the liberal theologians to direct the critical drive they appropriated from the scientific enterprise toward science itself and the secular culture science made possible (Tracy, *op. cit.*). And, if Gilkey's argument is correct, neo-orthodoxy has lost its influence, in part, because, in seeking to free religious truth from both scientific inquiry or metaphysical thought it could find no way of rooting its assertions, especially the assertion that God acts in history, in reality except in the existential structure of faith. Religious assertions may thus have been rendered invulnerable to criticism but at the expense of intersubjective discourse. This is Pannenberg's criticism of both Barth and Tillich.

As many observers have pointed out one of the primary values of the radical movement in theology was its confronting the religious community with the full extent to which the scientific culture of the first half of the 20th century had rendered traditional religious assertions, especially assertions about the reality of God, profoundly problematic if not totally meaningless. Two assumptions about the scientific enterprise seem to have convinced the radical theologians that belief in and assertions about the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition are no longer possible. The first is the assumption, seen, for example, in Paul Van Buren's The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, that science constitutes the definitive paradigm of knowledge and truth. Thus, only empirical propositions have cognitive status and only that which can be known by scientific means can be said to be real in any meaningful sense. Since God, as traditionally conceived, is not an object within the spatio-temporal nexus, then at the very least He is beyond the reach of cognitive discourse and therefore a dead issue for the secular mind. The second assumption is that science has given persons such power and control over nature that it is impossible, out of their new sense of autonomy, for most contemporary men and women to conceive of themselves as either in need of or dependent upon God as limit to and ground of their own existence. This is a familiar theme in William Hamilton's reflections on the meaning of the death-of-God. Thus, for the radical theologians science has destroyed epistemologically and psychologically the grounds for meaningful religious assertions about the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Religious life may still be possible for Jews and Christians but certainly not in the service of God as their traditions have defined Him.

The last model Tracy identifies is the revisionist model, and it is the one he, himself, advocates. Since it is also the model that informs the perspective of this paper, its main features will be discussed briefly and the remainder of the paper will be an attempt to indicate the insights the revisionist approach makes available to the task of defining the relationship between science and religion.

While stressing the value of the pluralistic situation in theology today, the

revisionist model, as Tracy develops it, stands in creative tension with the other models discussed above. Perhaps this tension will become explicit when the basic program of revisionist theology is made clear.

With liberalism and radical theology, the revisionist model shares the assumption that something decisive has happened within the intellectual and spiritual life of western people within the last three hundred years which theology can afford neither to ignore nor underestimate. The creation of a secular consciousness through the agency of the scientific enterprise, a consciousness which has become increasingly anti-theistic and anti-Christian, is, as it is for liberalism and radical theology, the primary datum which Christian theology must analyze and interpret. In carrying out this task, however, the revisionist model rejects the attempt of orthodoxy to isolate itself from any critical interaction with the scientific culture, particularly those intellectual disciplines which undergird secularity, as well as the recent attempt of evangelical theology to interact with the scientific culture by reviving, albeit in a highly sophisticated form, the doctrine of God as a supernatural being who communicates to persons literal cognitive information about the nature of reality in propositional form as contained within the structure of an infallible body of scripture. At the same time it rejects the fideism of neo-orthodoxy, which sought, like orthodoxy to separate itself from science through asserting the inaccessibility of the Word of God to human reflection.

The revisionist model accepts what is authentic within secular culture as a constitutive element within its own self-understanding, namely, the secular faith "which affirms the ultimate significance and final worth of our lives, our thoughts, and actions, here and now, in nature and in history" (Tracy, p. 8). This secular faith of our common humanity the revisionist theologian shares and thereby acknowledges in himself the radical demystification of the religious tradition it has been the destiny of the modern experiment to accomplish. But the revisionist model also commits the theologian to the view that, when properly interpreted, the Christian faith in its full theistic intention, is the most adequate structure of religious meaning within

which to make the secular faith of our common humanity fully intelligible and symbolically persuasive.

Revisionist theology, then, wishes to continue the dialogue with the scientific culture which liberalism began; however, it wishes to do so in full recognition that liberal theology must be transcended, that not only must the demystification of the religious tradition continue, thus continuing the liberal enterprise, but that, as Tracy puts it, there must be "disenchantment with disenchantment," that is, revisionist theology must also demystify the secular, scientific culture which the revisionist theologian, at the same time, wishes to affirm. This twofold task it seeks to accomplish by bringing philosophical, that is, metaphysical analysis to bear upon the structure of common human experience, thus continuing the "turn to the subject" common to theology's encounter with science, and by deriving from Christian texts the symbolic re-presentation of the human encounter with limits, thus challenging the secular attempt to eliminate the transcendent from the field of human experience.

The critical character of this two-fold commitment of the revisionist theologian to the secular enterprise and the Christian faith must be kept in mind. Revisionist theology is in tension with the orthodox and neo-orthodox models because it rejects literalism and supernaturalism in religion as well as the claim of an exclusively religious form of knowledge. It is in tension with liberal and radical theology because it does not exempt the scientific culture from critical scrutiny nor does it accept the conclusion that there can be no viable conception of the God of Jews and Christians once one understands the inherent meaning of secularity itself. With this obviously inadequate account of the revisionist program, let us explore the way science and religion are related within this model.

Van Harvey (1966) has cast considerable light upon the unfortunate history of the religious encounter with science by pointing out that theologians and scientists, in their disputes with each other actually experienced the collision of two conflicting moralities of inquiry. The theologian, on the one hand, approached the cognitive task from the perspective of the pre-established authority of the Bible and the reli-

gious tradition derived from it, and thus was committed to a morality of knowledge which celebrated the primacy of belief and faithfulness to the doctrinal consensus of the religious tradition. The scientific conception of inquiry, on the other hand, asserted the objectivity of knowledge and required that the knower be free of all forms of external authority in order to exercise his own judgments in accordance with public criteria of validity. This meant that scientific inquiry could not accept any proposition as true in advance of the radical process of inquiry itself, and every conclusion which emerged as true from this process must also be subjected to further criticism. Hence, scientific knowledge was defined as tentative, proximate and open to new evidence. Not only then, did science challenge the world-view of traditional religion, but it also confronted the theologian with a moral dilemma: either to subject the faith already believed to be true to critical scientific scrutiny thus entertaining uncertainty and doubt, or to be accused of sacrificing one's intellect in order to keep one's faith intact. Certainly the theologian, aware of the nature of the scientific enterprise, could not, in good conscience continue to hold that his faith was secure simply because it was believed by the religious community in which he stood.

In seeking to resolve this dilemma, revisionist theology makes explicit the critical character of its methodological commitment. It asserts in the first place its commitment to the morality of inquiry exemplified in the scientific paradigm of knowledge as an authentic and abiding achievement of the human mind and spirit. Revisionist theology, then, is morally obligated to defend the autonomy of the theologian, to examine the evidence for and against its own claims following the evidence wherever it leads and rethinking its own assertions accordingly always within the context of public criteria of meaning and validity. In making this commitment the revisionist theologian rejects the notion of Christian existence as assent to a body of absolute, immutable and final propositions as fallacious and illusory and a profound violation of the new morality of knowledge which has emerged from the scientific age.

Revisionist theology, then, finds itself in harmony with the scientific-secular culture of our time at the point of its affirming that culture's conception of truth and the modes of inquiry by which truth is achieved. And yet, it must face a serious objection which may be formulated as follows: is it not a violation of the demand for objectivity that the new morality of knowledge requires that the revisionist theologian comes to the task of the search for truth committed to the scientific mode of knowing and at the same time to the Christian paradigm? How are the revisionist theologian's secular faith and Christian self-understanding to be reconciled?

In dealing with this objection revisionist theology argues that the conception of objectivity which requires the complete and total emptying of the knowing subject of any concrete perspective before the truth can be known is inconsistent with the actual process of inquiry. What objectivity does require, however, is the willingness of the knower to subject to sustained critical analysis whatever perspective is brought to the task of knowing such that the concept of warranted belief stands as a constant corrective over one's will to believe. It is this latter conception of objectivity to which the revisionist theologian is committed and which he believes makes an authentic dialogue between religion and science possible as two distinctive communities of inquiry and interpretation which are both committed to a common morality of knowledge.

This assertion of methodological and epistemological unity between science and religion at the level of a common morality of knowledge leads to the further delineation of their relationship to each other. From the revisionist perspective the structural similarity between science and religion seen, in the first instance, in their commitment to a common morality of knowledge, means that both science and religion seek to make cognitive assertions about the nature of reality. As Ian Barbour (1974) has persuasively argued it is a mistake, once the logic of models and paradigms is understood, to assert that the fundamental difference between science and religion is that the assertions of the former are cognitive and impersonal and

those of the latter noncognitive and self-involving. Barbour argues that both science and religion carry out their cognitive tasks with the help of theoretical models in relation to their own peculiar paradigm traditions, and while these theoretical models are not literal or pictorial representations of reality, but rather symbolic conceptual entities, they are, none the less, genuinely cognitive structures, which claim to assert something true about the nature of reality. While it is true that religious language does perform important non-cognitive functions which scientific language does not, thus constituting a major difference between science and religion, revisionist theology is deeply restless with the view that religious language can make no cognitive claims.

In stressing this unity between science and religion, however, revisionist theology does not wish to ignore their obvious differences. Yet it does not want to interpret these differences to mean that science and religion are totally unrelated; however, it is willing to grant that while there are significant similarities between them, they do, in fact, serve different ends. Thus, revisionist theology does not seek to derive a natural theology from scientific constructs nor does it seek to continue the liberal program of making the scientific worldview normative for theological construction.

Rather revisionist theology thinks it sees within the scientific enterprise a genuinely religious dimension, which, while present there only implicitly, points to a universal religious dimension within the whole of human experience which it is the task of religion to make as explicit as possible through its own symbolic language, models and paradigm traditions. This approach fully affirms the freedom of science and at the same time suggests how religious life is possible in a scientific culture.

There is no one way to understand the religious dimension of our common experience. David Tracy has argued that it can best be seen in our encounter with a sense of limit, a sense of limit-to our existence given in the experiences of finitude and contingency and a sense of limit-of our existence given in the awareness of the horizon that transcends us. These experiences are religious in the fundamental sense

that they confront us with the question of the ultimate meaning of our lives and of the cosmic matrix of which we are a part. The religious dimension within the scientific enterprise becomes visible wherever this limit experience becomes real in terms that are intrinsic to science itself.

It should be clear that the concept of limit as it is used here does not refer to what is ordinarily called the limits of science; that is, those methodological boundaries within which science carries out its legitimate tasks. Rather the concept of limit as the religious dimension of science refers to those transcendental elements which often lie hidden in any given human activity and which constitute the conditions that make the particular activity possible. As these transcendental elements are made explicit through analysis, revisionist theology argues, they point to a dimension of ultimacy within science itself.

Revisionist theologians recognize these limit experiences at a number of points within the scientific enterprise. In the formulation of scientific questions, the scientist transcends himself toward a world of meaning outside himself. This world of meaning acts as limit-to the scientist's own subjectivity and can lead the scientist to ask the question of the totality of meaning which stands as limit and ground of the particular meanings which science discovers. In making scientific judgments the scientist must establish a determinant conclusion in the face of an indeterminant realm of possibilities. He discovers that he has achieved what Bernard Lonergan (1970) calls a "virtually unconditioned affirmation," that is, a conditioned judgment whose conditions are fulfilled to such a degree of probability that no further questions remain and thus virtual certainty has been attained. But, as Tracy points out, this judgment is not the ultimate ground of itself but merely an instance of the possibility of such judgments. In reflecting upon the structure of scientific judgments, then, the scientist might be led to ask how such judgments are possible without an unconditioned ground of judgment which stands as both limit-to and limit-of the act of scientific judgment. Finally, the scientist is inevitably involved in ethical questions about the nature and scope of scientific inquiry. Not only must

he ask whether a particular scientific procedure should be carried out, but under what conditions and to what purpose. In having to ask the question of the larger good to be served or thwarted by his work, the scientist cannot escape the moral dimension of the scientific enterprise. But such moral questions can lead the scientist to question not only the ethical rules for conducting scientific research but the very value of science itself, that is, whether the values of intelligent inquiry, belief based upon evidence alone, rational discussion with one's colleagues, honesty in reporting one's findings and the hope that the order and pattern of the world can be discovered by scientific means are themselves of value and whether they are supported by an intelligent and rational source of value in which the values of science are grounded.

These limit questions are not imposed upon science by religion. Rather they seem to be implied within the scientific enterprise itself and when they are explored the religious dimension within science as a human activity is made manifest. It is the task of religion to articulate this common religious dimension within human experience and activity, since it can only be brought to full expression through myth and symbol and reflected upon through the conceptual structures religion generates.

Revisionist theology seeks to carry out the dialogue with science by calling attention to this dimension of ultimacy and by resisting the drive within science to deal with this dimension by developing its own myths and claiming an ultimacy for science which it does not itself possess but only manifests when it reflects upon its own foundations. This dialogue has led thinkers like Theodore Roszak, E. F. Schumacher, Frederick Ferré, Harold Schilling and Huston Smith, among others, to challenge the tendencies within modern science toward reductionism, materialism, an alienating attitude toward man and nature, a worship of technology and a willingness to define as unreal those levels of reality that lie outside the reach of science. These thinkers have seen with significant clarity that the profound cultural crisis which has begun to overtake us is directly related to the impact of modern science

upon us, especially its deeply ambiguous capacity to generate a mythic structure in relation to which the religious needs of large numbers of moderns find fulfillment. This crisis has led these same thinkers to call for the development of a post-modern consciousness in both science and religion as the basis of our salvation from the most aversive consequences of science in its modern form. Revisionist theology shares this emerging consensus and argues that it is precisely in its dialogue with the scientific community that the Judeo-Christian tradition can articulate the grounds, along with the other major religious traditions of mankind, for the emergence of this new consciousness. It is a consciousness which must take us beyond scientism.

But this task cannot be carried out if science alone receives our criticism. The Judeo-Christian tradition must also undergo profound criticism, especially the classical conceptions of God, revelation, and the nature of the religious life. Our secular faith in the worthwhileness of our lives here and now and the freedom and responsibility we human beings now possess for ourselves and our planet cannot find expression in a God who is unmoved by our suffering, unaffected by our decisions, and invulnerable to our destiny, in a doctrine of revelation that requires a sacrifice of our intellects or a surrender of our autonomy to a heteronomous authority, and in a conception of the religious life that lures us away from the pursuit of justice and peace for our global village. Thus, we must also achieve a consciousness that takes us beyond orthodoxy and literalism while finding the resources within the religious traditions through which a new clarification of values and a genuine sense of transcendence may become a possibility for our age.

This last comment invites one final, though far too brief, observation. This paper has focused rather exclusively upon the Christian community in its attempt to understand the relationship between science and religion. In doing so, however, it has not been my intention to assert a superior role for the Christian faith in the dialogue between science and religion. Revisionist theology welcomes the insights that the other religious traditions have to contribute to this dialogue, but it also

wishes to transcend the tendency within liberalism to obscure the very real and crucial differences which obtain among the world religions.

Recognizing that religious truth is expressed in symbolic form, revisionist theology sees in this recognition the possibility of genuine tolerance among the world religions; and yet, it would also bring to bear its own methodology upon the analysis of the other religious traditions in seeking to explicate the resources they possess that might further the dialogue between science and religion, that is, revisionist theology would seek to discover the forms through which the limit experience is articulated within the other world religious traditions and what they may tell us about the authentic place of science within the larger human enterprise itself. At the same time revisionist theology seeks to be open to the criticism of its approach which the other religious traditions are in a position to offer.

Such dialogue between the world religions and science has only just begun but its promise should not be underestimated.

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