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**THE METROPOLIS IN ITS NATIONAL AND REGIONAL CONTEXT**

by

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In recent decades remarkable changes have taken place both in global, national and regional patterns of urbanisation and in the structure of large cities, changes which call for reassessment of the concept of urbanisation as a process and of the sequential evolution of the urban form resulting from the urbanisation process.

Traditional views of the evolution and the importance of cities are perhaps too well known to require elaboration.<sup>1</sup> Cities have been seen as playing vital roles in several aspects highly important both to regional and to national development, and inherent in most concepts has been the reduction in distance, or the elimination of the friction of space, which is implied in urban concentration. Indeed, the progressive concentration of population has been seen as being fundamental to the importance of cities. In the economic sense, it is under such conditions of urban space that the external economies associated with business enterprises can most easily be made available to neighbours. For this reason, and because of other less particularly economic characteristics outlined below, the city has been acknowledged as the principal centre of change and growth in industry and commerce. The Industrial Revolution experienced in today's economically advanced countries was essentially urban based, although, of course, concomitant change in the countryside was vital to its accomplishment.

The urbanisation of previously non-urban areas has also been seen as, and undoubtedly is, the mainspring of regional development. The economic history of today's more economically advanced nations shows their economic growth to have been led in spatial terms by rapidly developing

regions associated with thriving urban centres, which at some stages of growth have stood in marked contrast to lagging regions in those nations: lagging regions essentially associated with poorly developed urban systems. At certain periods, counter-balancing forces, sometimes impelled by direct government policy, have acted in favour of equalisation and the more even spread of growth. Such official policies have usually involved the creation of new urban centres in the more backward regions, or the strengthening of existing ones, and this kind of approach has become an important feature of regional planning in both the economically advanced and the less economically advanced countries. Further, within the developing countries, the desired industrial take-off on a national scale is being sought almost wholly through city-oriented policies.

A second aspect of the advantages of population concentration traditionally held to accrue under urban circumstances lies in the role of cities as centres of change and catalysts intellectually, socially and politically. As Meier has pointed out,<sup>2</sup> flows of information and ideas can achieve their highest acceleration only under conditions of maximum accessibility, that is within urban centres. Cities have therefore been designed, consciously or unconsciously, not only to provide better physical access to goods and services through concentration but also as communication centres and storehouses of information. The number of face-to-face contacts possible in a given time at urban population densities is of a markedly higher order than that possible at rural population densities. Because of their function as collecting places for the most advanced information, and also because of the concentration

within their boundaries of people of diverse origins, cities have also traditionally functioned as vital social melting-pots in the development of states. The concentrated nature of heterogeneous populations has in this sense further enhanced the catalytic role of cities.

As Berry has pointed out,<sup>3</sup> and as the above paragraphs indicate, concentration was the key note of the urbanisation process in what might be called a period of industrial urbanisation, that is, the period of rapid urban growth which was a feature of the Industrial Revolution as experienced in today's economically advanced countries. For Hope Tisdale, writing in 1942, urbanisation principally implied "a movement from a state of less concentration to a state of more concentration".<sup>4</sup> Europe, of course, figured prominently in terms of such population movements. In 1890 there were perhaps 20 agglomerations throughout the world of more than 500,000 population, and of these nine were in Europe (with another two in European Russia) compared with three in the U.S.A. By the beginning of the twentieth century, two-thirds of the world's urban population was located in Europe, North America and Australasia. The distribution of the world's metropoli was highly correlated with that of industrialisation, and the urban areas themselves were highly characterised by various aspects of concentration. Within the nineteenth century city, it was the central city that was the greatest point of concentration both for inhabitants and for work places. As Cherry has stated, "the largest cities grew territorially by the absorption of outlying smaller settlements with the economic heart being decisively at the centre".<sup>5</sup> Sometimes such urban areas coalesced and formed what Geddes came to call conurbations

(remarking in doing so that this was an ugly word for a very ugly phenomenon). As is well known, continuing population concentration not only implied the spatial growth of cities, sometimes into conurbations, but also excessive crowding and the growth of social problems which gave rise to a large nineteenth century protest literature. The great cities usually had the worst records but for Britain at least the decade of the 1890s seems to have constituted a watershed since during this period death rates fell and the life expectancy of urban dwellers started to rise.<sup>6</sup>

### Counterurbanisation

Even by the beginning of the twentieth century, however, processes were well under way which during the 1970s culminated in the undermining of the concept of urbanisation as essentially implying a process of continuous population concentration. A long term re-sorting process seems to have been occurring, implying essentially the rejection of congested urban areas and of further population concentration in favour of greater dispersal, initially through suburban development. As early as the last decades of the nineteenth century, the large industrial towns and cities were witnessing significant outward movement of population as a result of changes in urban transport, particularly tramway electrification and the subsequent development of suburban railways. The growth of what became known in the United States as "streetcar suburbs", as Cherry has pointed out, essentially reversed an urban locational pattern which had persisted since the Middle Ages and within which slums were located at the city gates and elite areas at the city centre.<sup>7</sup> In the streetcar era of industrial urbanisation, the central districts of the metropolis remained congested

and concentrated but they were increasingly surrounded by less congested, more dispersed suburbs of higher social status. These trends were accelerated by the impact upon personal mobility made by the motor car, which permitted the development of even less concentrated urban environments, most notably in the United States. The greatest volume of suburbanisation followed the Second World War, and by 1970 the majority of the urban population of North America resided in the suburbs. Even so, however, there continued to be growth in the populations of the central cities of North America until the most recent period: that which can be most properly characterised as the period of counterurbanisation.

According to Berry, the originator of the term, counterurbanisation "is a process of population deconcentration: it implies a movement from the state of more concentration to a state of less concentration".<sup>8</sup> Berry sees the 1970s as a turning point in the urban experience of the economically more advanced countries, as characterised most clearly by the American urban experience, that of the world's most economically advanced country. Since 1970, Berry observed, U.S. metropolitan areas have grown more slowly than has the population of the nation as a whole, and substantially less rapidly than the populations of non-metropolitan America. This is a development that stands in contrast to all preceding decades as far back as the early nineteenth century. Further, on a net basis metropolitan areas in the United States have started losing migrants to non-metropolitan areas. The overall decline in metropolitan growth has largely been accounted for by the largest metropolitan areas, particularly those located in the old industrial heartlands of the United States, that is in the North East. The large cities in this area

have tended to have lost most heavily but meanwhile not only has rapid growth taken place in some smaller metropolitan areas but this growth has been particularly concentrated into what has become known as the Sun-belt, that is the south and west of the U.S.A. A further feature of counter-urbanisation trend is that although the central areas of the nation's metropoli grew until 1970 (but only at modest rates compared with growth in outer urban rings) since then inner area population has started to decline. Because this decline has involved a considerable exodus of white population, the inner areas have become much more homogeneous in terms of being characterised particularly by black population.

These recent changes have led Berry to observe that, given the fact that only 5 per cent of the United States' population - less than ten million people - was left on farms in 1970, urban growth in the United States now largely consists of the transference on a regional and on a more local basis of already urbanised populations, and that consequently the concentrative migration process resulting from industrial urbanisation has ended. Migration in the world's most economically advanced country now takes place between metropolitan areas on an inter-regional scale and also intra-regionally through an accelerating dispersion of people and jobs outwards beyond metropolitan boundaries. Population mobility continues to increase - at least a fifth of all Americans move at least once a year - but largely within and between urban regions. Counties adjacent to the largest metropolitan areas now receive the most net migration and counties adjacent to the smallest the least. Urban Americans increasingly prefer the suburbs, the smaller towns, the more

pleasant and the less dense environments. Declining central cities lost more people during the decade of the 1970s than did declining rural counties. At the national scale, there has been a transition to the post-industrial phase, one characterised by the creation of a service economy; the pre-eminence of the professional and technical class; and the emergence of new technology, particularly in information processing; leading to a significant growth of a quaternary sector in the economy.<sup>9</sup> Unlike the constituents of the older industrial economy, new post-industrial enterprises tend to be markedly footloose, and insofar as they use high grade, high priced labour, the residential choices of such labour are often critical in the location of post-industrial economic activity. The most striking characteristic of this new locational matrix is the rapid rise of the Sunbelt cities.

#### Decentralisation Without End?

A more recent paper by Hall has updated and extended Berry's analysis.<sup>10</sup> For the United States, Hall observes, there now appear to be negative returns to urban scale in as much as the larger urban areas are either increasing much more slowly than smaller ones or else are actually declining. Hall confirms most of the processes observed by Berry but through the analysis of the most recent data he asserts that it is not true that non-metropolitan areas are gaining in population at the expense of metropolitan areas. Between 1970 and 1978, the cutoff point for his data, he observes that 41 new areas were added to the United States metropolitan statistics on the basis that they satisfied the criteria for metropolitan area definition. When these new areas are included in



the analysis, it is found that from 1970 to 1978 the United States metropolitan areas grew in population whilst non-metropolitan areas actually declined. But nearly half of the net metropolitan increase in population came from the 41 newly designed areas, and these were mostly in the southern and western Sunbelt, further evidence of the powerful inter-regional shift in metropolitan population that is in process in the United States.

On the other hand, the 1980 Census Report of the United States, as reported by Hall, confirms the progressive net loss of population experienced by the central parts of the metropoli. The 32 largest Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas show the same trend for the entire intercensal decade 1970-1980 in as much as they have recorded striking reductions in their rate of population gain after 1970. Some of the large metropolitan areas of the North East have lost population considerably, including New York, which lost nearly one million people during the 1970s, Buffalo, Pittsburg and Cleveland. Most other metropolitan areas in the North East and Mid-West were stagnant in population. Overall, there has been a striking reduction in growth rates in the very largest metropoli, whilst the 32 largest as a group also experienced an almost 5 per cent loss of population from their central cities. In general terms, central cities almost everywhere in the United States have tended to be declining or at best stagnating; however in the South and West the vigorous growth of the suburbs more than compensated. Overall, the larger metropolitan areas are now growing much more slowly than the smaller ones, or even declining; and in as much as, except in the case of California, the largest metropoli

tend to be located in the North East or Mid-West, the inter-regional comparison is now between, to use Hall's terminology, the still developing Sunbelt cities and the stagnant, or even declining, cities of the Frostbelt.

As to the causes of these trends, Hall agrees with Berry that in very large measure they stem from the fact that to a greater extent than any other nation, the United States is now post-industrial; as he points out, more than 65 per cent of all workers are now in the tertiary-quaternary sectors. By the same token, the manufacturing base, though immensely productive, needs fewer and fewer workers to maintain a given volume of output. But even so, changes in the geography of manufacturing account in part for the trends already noted. The older manufacturing cities of the North East and Mid-West have for some time not only been faced with very severe industrial competition both from other parts of the United States and from overseas but also have tended to benefit relatively less from the emergence of important new industries, for example the electronic industry, which are much more footloose in character. These new footloose industries have tended to be associated with highly skilled work forces enjoying high incomes, and the concentration of such incomes, particularly in certain of the new cities of the Sunbelt, has in turn reinforced regional shifts in metropolitan distribution through the attraction of service industries.

According to Cherry, the European countries today exhibit a continuum of metropolitan development from centralisation to decentralisation.<sup>11</sup> However, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium and Great Britain are now

exhibiting many of the same features of decentralisation as have been observed in the United States. In Britain, for example, the 1981 Census gave ample evidence of significant change especially in respect of the central cities. Between 1971 and 1981 inner London decreased in population by almost 18 per cent, and similarly sharp losses of population were recorded in respect of the inner areas of Glasgow, Manchester and Liverpool. In general, Britain's city regions are gaining at the expense of the non-urban areas but, as in the United States, there is most significant extension of commuting hinterlands taking place and also considerable decentralisation of jobs to match the dispersal of people. As Cherry has noted, "metropolitan changes continue to confirm that the pattern of urban growth is away from the largest cities and in favour of intermediate sized and smaller cities": as far as the British metropolises are concerned, "The period of vigorous reconstruction and growth has now ended. Cities have run out of money, land and political support. As their cores have lost both people and jobs they have inevitably become preoccupied with the problems of decline."<sup>12</sup>

#### A General Model

As part of the analysis previously referred to, Hall has proposed a general model of sequential urban evolution which, he claims, fits the circumstances of most cities in most countries reasonably well.<sup>13</sup> This may be summarised (in parts verbatim) as follows:

1. During the early stages of industrialisation and the rationalisation of agriculture, population begins to migrate to cities. In many cases, local towns cannot absorb the migration flows completely and

longer distance migration develops towards larger urban places, for example the national capital or provincial capitals. One city, or a very few cities, grows more rapidly than the rest and thereby comes to dominate the urban hierarchy. A primate pattern of urban size thus develops. In this early stage of urbanisation work opportunities are highly concentrated in the central cities, as they were during the early part of the Industrial Revolution in today's economically advanced countries. Population therefore tends to concentrate in the central cities.

2. In time, the rural outflow from the peripheral regions begins to exhaust itself, and the cities in these regions begin to develop as local manufacturing and service centres and also to intercept more of the local rural migrants. The domination of the system by the primate city or cities therefore begins to weaken. In addition, within individual metropolitan areas central city growth is very vigorous and although, because of the weakness of suburban development at this stage, the surrounding urbanised ring on balance loses population, in terms of the metropolitan area as a whole the system grows because the central city growth is greater than the loss in the outer areas. This circumstance Hall terms absolute centralisation.
3. In the third stage vigorous suburban out movement begins, a process which is experienced first in the larger metropolitan areas which have experienced very rapid growth in stages 1 and 2. The outer urbanised ring is now increasing in population but the population of the central city is increasing at still greater rate. Hall therefore

calls this stage relative centralisation.

4. The fourth stage reverses this process in as much as the rate of suburban growth exceeds that of the central city. This is relative decentralisation.
5. Later the central city starts to decline in population and there is a marked fall in densities. The outer urban ring is continuing to develop rapidly and hence a phase of absolute decentralisation has set in. During this stage, Hall observes, the growth of the largest metropolitan areas begins to slow down relative to places lower down the urban hierarchy, and primate urban distributions begin to become substantially modified.
6. The process is completed by the large metropolitan areas going into actual decline. Their suburban rings are gaining people but the gain is insufficient to counterbalance the loss of population from the central cities. This stage is termed decentralisation during loss. Hall believes that it is never a general condition and that even in the most economically advanced and post-industrial countries like the United States and the United Kingdom it will represent the state of only a few very large metropolitan areas. There will be inter-regional forces at work elsewhere which will promote metropolitan growth in other locations.

Hall suggests that different nations are currently at different positions on this urban continuum. His data indicates, for example, that much of Europe has recently passed from stage 3 to stage 4 with some areas moving into stage 5. Eastern and southern Europe, in contrast, he

believes to be still in stages 1 and 2. Japan he sees as moving into stage 5 but stage 6 so far has been restricted to a very few large metropolitan areas in the United Kingdom and the United States, at least up to about 1975.

#### Urbanisation and Metropolitan Growth in the Developing Countries

Although Hall's model is conceptually elegant, a major problem in testing its usefulness - in terms of its predictive ability - lies in the paucity of comparative data on the world's great cities. Hall, Berry and other workers in recent years have assembled a great deal of formerly very scattered data, especially in relation to urban and metropolitan trends in the U.S.A. and Europe,<sup>14</sup> and it is clearly upon this data base that the model has been formulated. However, not only has the data situation been made immensely more complicated since the Second World War by metropolitan growth in the developing countries, during the same period the overall global urbanisation trend has shifted decisively towards those countries.

In general, it is true to say that the information published by the United Nations on population living in agglomerations of 20,000 persons or more is based on census returns or reliable estimates from almost all of the industrialised countries but that data of a similar quality is completely lacking for more than half the population of the developing countries.<sup>15</sup> As far as the data allows, however, it may be said that whilst at present 40 per cent of the world's population lives in urban places, that is in places with agglomerated populations of 5,000 or more persons, the transition to a fully urbanised world - that is one as urbanised in terms of population distribution as the United States or

Britain today - is proceeding so rapidly that it could be completed within less than a century given the continuation of present trends. In these circumstances, one of the most significant global happenings of recent decades has been the expansion of the revolutionary shift in the location of world population, from countryside to cities, which started approximately 200 years ago, from the presently industrialised countries into the developing countries.

Today, there are two distinct facets within the general urbanisation trend. The industrialised countries are showing declining rates but because they include only one-quarter of the world's population these declining rates have not been sufficient to retard the global urbanisation trend. The huge populations of the developing countries, in contrast, appear still to be in the earlier stages of an urbanisation more massive than any before. As a result, the balance of urban populations between the industrialised countries and the developing countries is currently in process of most significant change. Urban populations in the developing countries are growing twice as fast as those in the industrialised countries. They are also growing in numbers greatly exceeding those of the industrialised countries even during the period of the latter's most rapid growth. By the end of the present century the balance of global urban population will have very definitely tipped towards the developing countries, indeed during the early 1970s the point of equilibrium in urban population distribution between the industrialised and the developing countries was crossed. Whereas at the beginning of the present century two-thirds of the world's urban population was located in

Europe, North America and Australasia, by the end of the century two-thirds of the world's urban population will be located in the developing countries.

This massive shift within the global urbanisation trend presents immense challenges. As yet, there is not sufficient data to permit soundly based generalisations of the kind that would be necessary to extend to the developing countries the type of work on metropolitan change carried out by such workers as Berry and Hall within the industrially advanced countries. Nevertheless, it does appear that in many cases the large cities are sharing fully in the extremely rapid urban growth that is characterising contemporary developing countries. One recent contribution has claimed that in the developing countries the bigger the urban area, the faster it grows: "Thus, towns are growing more rapidly than villages, cities faster than towns; cities with a population more than a million are growing faster than cities with less than a million, and multi-million cities with over 2.5 million are growing fastest of all".<sup>16</sup> But this appears to be stretching the available evidence. Rather, the available United Nations figures (for the period 1950-1970) show that in the developing countries population has grown with similar speed in all urban size groups except that of more than five million persons, in respect of which it has been much slower in growth.<sup>17</sup> However, the observations for the five-million-plus urban size group are very much weighted by the figures for Shanghai and Calcutta. Population estimates for Shanghai are very uncertain, whilst the cities of India in general are relatively slow growing. In the circumstances, it is perhaps reasonable to reach the



conclusion that whilst the largest cities in the developing countries may not be growing as fast as those of the other size groups, nevertheless there is much less variation in urban growth by size group at present in the developing countries than in the industrially advanced countries and certainly nothing like the pattern which has evolved in the most highly developed industrialised countries of cities of a million people upwards showing significantly slower population growth than that in smaller cities.

#### Global Urbanisation: A Unitary Phenomenon?

These very basic macro-trends lead naturally into a consideration of the unity of the global process of metropolitan formation. In terms of his proposed model, Hall envisages what he calls "a continuum of industrialisation and urbanisation"<sup>18</sup>: that is, not only a very close coincidence between industrialisation and urbanisation but also, presumably, that if appropriate data existed it would prove possible to allocate every country to some point along the scale of his six stages. Conceptually, he embraces the idea of a single evolutionary urbanisation process with the developing countries being in the earlier stages of a cycle which has already become familiar through the previous metropolitan experience of today's economically advanced countries.

The earlier stages of the urbanisation cycle in today's economically advanced countries were undoubtedly ones of industrial urbanisation. This appears to be very far from the case in the developing countries, however. In cases where cities evolved during the colonial period, they were almost always not industrial cities. In the period of subsequent independence, of course, much more emphasis has been placed upon industrialisation in

national planning in the developing countries and undoubtedly a good deal of industrial development has, in general, been stimulated. The significant point in the present context is that virtually all of this industrial development has been carried out by means of technological transfer from the industrialised countries. Within the industrialised countries in recent decades there has been a massive replacement of industrial labour by capital in the form of ever more sophisticated machines, with the result that the industrial employment opportunities created by a given quantum of industrial development have progressively become less and less. As a result, contemporary industrial growth within the developing countries has in general been much less labour absorptive than was the case in the previous experience of today's industrially advanced countries.<sup>19</sup>

A further point of distinctiveness arises from the demographic circumstances of contemporary urban growth in the developing countries. It has become clear that a good deal of urban growth is in fact not related so much to the attractiveness of cities, and in particular to job opportunities (at least insofar as job opportunities have been understood within the context of the experience of the industrially advanced countries), as to the lack of opportunities - the abysmal lack of development - in the countryside. Urban populations are not being absorbed very fully into industrial job opportunities. As the United Nations has reported, "Although the Third World's industrial production increased by an average of 7 per cent per annum during the 1960-1972 period, it contributed very little to employment growth, especially in Africa".<sup>20</sup> In the case of Latin America, between 1960 and 1970 the urban

population grew by 4.2 per cent a year but manufacturing employment by only 2.8 per cent.<sup>21</sup> The general conclusion must be that in the vast majority of developing countries the rate of labour absorption by industry has fallen far below the rate of growth of urban populations.

Other considerations in a similar vein relate to the evolution of the form of the large cities in the developing countries. If the theme of the recent metropolitan experience of the most economically advanced countries has been decentralisation and a general lowering of urban population densities, it is as yet by no means clear that this experience is being, or will be, repeated in the developing countries. Smaller urban places in the developing countries have suffered from a marked lack of research interest to date,<sup>22</sup> but as far as the larger centres are concerned (cities of at least 100,000 people) certain relevant trends are apparent. The first is that rapid urban population growth has resulted in recent decades in the very significant areal expansion of such cities. Much of this expansion has not yet been properly recorded, particularly since it largely concerns unregulated residential building, for example by urban squatters.<sup>23</sup> In the case of Lima, the capital of Peru, for example, a mushrooming of squatter settlements began during the 1950s. The number of urban squatters increased from 120,000 in 1956 to 800,000 in 1970, and today's squatters constitute about 40 per cent of the total urban population. In all, the construction of squatter settlements probably accounted for more than four-fifths of the physical development of metropolitan Lima during the decade 1960-1970. Although such settlements are interdigitated with the more regular urban fabric even very close to the heart of the city, the

largest of them are of course on the periphery, some as far distant as 25 kilometres from the centre. This pattern of rapid and extensive spatial extension will probably remain the city's predominant means for accommodating further population growth for the foreseeable future since it has been estimated that by 1990 there may well be as many as 4.5 million people in Lima squatter settlements out of a total urban population of 6 millions.

In addition to these trends in the residential geography of the urban poor, who of course make up by far the majority of the populations of the metropolises of the developing countries, in many cases centrifugal tendencies have been experienced in terms of the spatial movement of elites. In general, it appears that upper income groups are rapidly leaving inner urban locations for destinations on urban peripheries, where they live at relatively low densities, well insulated from the poor of the city, surrounded by high walls and sometimes even guarded at the gates. Unlike the situation in the industrially advanced countries, however, these trends do not appear in most cases to imply the emptying of inner cities. Rather the reverse tends to be the case. As inner cities have been vacated by the rich so they have become progressively more and more densely occupied by the poor through the subdivision of living space to sizes which correspond with the economic capacity of the poor to afford them. Many empirical case studies in recent years have demonstrated the smaller and smaller subdivision of existing residential units in inner areas and the further deterioration of already low environmental standards.<sup>24</sup>

Although these and other case studies represent valid individual instances of the consequences of the continuing growth of large cities in the developing countries, unfortunately there is a dearth of overall statistical coverage particularly in respect of urban population densities. The kind of pioneering work carried out by Brush in the late 1960s on Indian urban population densities has unfortunately never been more widely followed up. Brush's work demonstrated repeated cases of progressive intra-urban concentration of population over the period of the present century and, in particular, found that in the great port metropoli - Bombay, Calcutta and Madras - that concentration in the central wards was increasing whilst at the same time population was also building up on the periphery. His analysis of the statistics for Bombay, which has unusually long and continuous records, showed that during the forty years 1881 to 1921 the increase in the metropolitan population from 773,000 to 1.17 millions was absorbed by population growth in both its central and its outlying parts. By 1961 population densities throughout the metropolis had risen to new high levels, even though large areas for urban development had been opened up on nearby Salsette Island since the late 1940s. The 1961 census recorded a gross density of 3300 persons per hectare (1329 per acre) in one of the central divisions of the city, at that time the apex of India's urban population concentration. "It is clear", states Brush of the period up to the mid-1960s, "that a large share of population growth in Indian cities has been absorbed into existing urban areas, resulting in the progressive congestion of previously occupied tracts".<sup>25</sup>

More recent United Nations statistics, though by no means complete, indicate the persistence of similar trends in many developing countries.

The Global Review of Human Settlements, prepared for the 1978 HABITAT conference, indicated that for cities in the developing countries for which there was comparable time series information that in all cases except two (Lima and Guayaquil in Latin America) the cities were becoming more densely populated, and that even in cases where municipal boundaries had expanded over time overall densities had increased.<sup>26</sup> One notable example was Mexico City which in 1950 had an area of 242 km<sup>2</sup> at a gross density of 118 persons per hectare and in 1970 an area of 433 km<sup>2</sup> at a gross density of 227. Madras had a gross density of 134 in 1961 and, over the same metropolitan area, 193 in 1971; whilst the developed area of Caracas was 42 km<sup>2</sup> in 1945 with a gross density of 120 and 100 km<sup>2</sup> in 1966 with a gross density of 175.<sup>27</sup> Clearly, in these circumstances concentration rather than decentralisation remains the theme for the metropolitan development of much of the Third World.

### Conclusion

It remains to be seen whether the existing differences in metropolitan development between the economically advanced and the developing countries represent only a stage feature that will ultimately prove to have been only temporarily distinctive within the context of an urbanisation phenomenon characterised by overall unity. In this respect a good deal will depend upon the future pace, characteristics and scale of industrial and (hopefully) post-industrial development within the less economically advanced countries.

At present, the prospect of change sufficient to alter radically the employment characteristics of the contemporary Third World metropolis

does not seem bright and the fact that a significant, and probably increasing, proportion of employment will continue to need to be found in the informal sector of metropolitan economies will probably only make for the very lengthy persistence of population concentration. Within Third World metropoli many more people are currently being supported than the economic base warrants (at least in terms of the economic experience of the industrially advanced countries) through what is essentially a shared poverty system: a type of urban employment - largely within the informal sector - that is an urban interpretation of an ethic that originally arose in response to agricultural circumstances, to allow a great number of people through a system of shared poverty each to claim a small part of the agricultural output from a given piece of land. In these circumstances job sharing and splitting can ensure an almost indefinite increase in a metropolitan population, one largely unrelated to the progress of "formal" secondary or tertiary development. The developing countries will thus in the near future see the emergence of metropoli of enormous size - a Mexico City of 31 millions by the year 2000, a Shanghai of 22 millions and a Bombay of 17 millions, for example - but these will be metropoli unrelated to industrialisation for the most part, and still less to the kinds of tertiary and quaternary development that have more recently characterised the metropoli of the industrially advanced countries. They will be metropoli characterised by extensive poverty and by occupations marginal to the relatively small core of "formal" ones. They will also be characterised by continued concentration, if only because of the inability of the vast majority of

their populations to pay for much intra-urban transport.


There are other reasons also why distinctiveness will probably persist. In part these reasons are social ones which involve consideration, in the migrational circumstances which strongly underpin much urban growth in the developing countries, of possibilities of alternatives to the automatic one-way adaptation of migrants to an absorptive urban culture that was characteristic of the phase of industrial urbanisation in today's economically advanced countries.<sup>28</sup> Overall, the tentative conclusion must be at present that urbanisation and metropolitan formation are not single, universally similar processes but rather assume different forms and meanings depending upon historic, economic, social and cultural conditions.



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