

**Committee II**  
Ethnocentrism vs. World Unity:  
Impacts on Socialization and  
Education

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**ETHNOCENTRISM IN EDUCATION  
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EASTERN AND WESTERN  
PROBLEMS IN EUROPE**

by

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1. By way of introduction I should like to refer to the historical dimensions of the problem; to the fact that education in Europe, and so consequently in Eastern Europe, was universalist in character. It means that universal phenomena were explained in terms of one coherent value system, generally from the point of view of religion and ideology. Interest in specific national characteristics first awoke during the Enlightenment, then next during the development leading to the establishment of bourgeois nations, that is, the 19th century, parallel with the emergence of a universalist view in education. In an important study Eric Hobsbawm gives a thorough analysis of the "large scale production of traditions" and of the way national signs and symbols were mass produced and elevated into the sacred. By the latter half of the century political power and public opinion had paved the way for education to become more national in character, for national identity to become stronger, and for the newly created traditions to be handed down in a way almost to appear everlasting.<sup>1</sup>

It seems that values such as national tradition and national characteristics pervaded all education as a general principle in the middle of the 19th century; partly in countries where the creation of a new type of national identity became the order of the day /Germany, Italy/ and, to a lesser extent, in countries which sought their own national identity within a multi-national state. But also even in countries with a royal dynasty or some other collective group

the national, having become a new state religion, was destined to serve as a cohesive force. As early as the second half of the 19th century ethnocentrism became rather strong and pronounced in the Prussian educational system, especially after the Franco-Prussian War of 1871. The slogan "The German schoolmasters have won the war" was very real indeed. When, after the First World War, multi-national countries like the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Turkey and, to some extent, Russia disintegrated or had some of their parts splintered off and frontiers were redrawn, the importance of ethnocentrism in education began to grow by leaps and bounds. Each country considered it vital to recreate its own past, as it were, to overemphasize its nation's specific features and to thrust its national excellence into the foreground, doing all this quite often at the expense of devaluing other national communities and rewriting their histories. I observe in passing that between the two wars in political thinking, in the culture, the philosophical essay, and in literary criticism "national characterology" flourished, providing a multiplicity of answers to the question "What are ... /Germans, Spaniards, Hungarians/ ... like?" /Cf. Ortega y Gasset, Unamuno, Salvador de Madariaga, Eduard Spranger, the Hungarian Lajos Prohászka, etc./ Naturally, national images had different characteristics not necessarily marked by depreciation of others but the way the question is posed shows that the issues of social life and even private life, appeared in a "national garb" in this period.

After the Second World War it seemed for some time that ethnocentrism would give place to several types of universalisms

in quick succession; first mankind, then the free community of nations liberated from under fascism became the ideal /underlined, among other things, by the establishment of the United Nations and its specialized agencies/, later - in these regions - the idea of a socialist national community with a system of values assumed to be universally socialist in nature. In the late 20th century, however, in the 70s and even today, ethnocentrism strengthened apparently unexpectedly but in fact not without any antecedents; national identity and national differences became important once again in Eastern Europe and in many other parts of the world, too.

2. Very briefly now about the causes of the resurgence of nationalism and of the search for a new national identity. They involve protest, the elements of all the three types of universalisms being felt to be bankrupt; it seems that the idea of universal peace and brotherhood has become obsolete and failed, the system of values called socialist have not fulfilled expectations, because of its becoming deformed in reality, while the supranational order of capitalism has also failed to present a true alternative. /"Limits to growth."/

The prevalence of a technological civilization, abuses of modernization, the excessive uniformity as the effect of global transport and media increase the individual's sense of isolation and once again render the smaller and greater communities, including ethnic identity, more highly valued. The use of the local traditions of minor groups seems more attractive and interesting.

Looked at from a broader perspective it seems that in many countries and communities we have to do with new conflicts caused by modernization. Reawakening nationalism revolts against modernization playing havoc with established values, destroying long-standing communities, and rendering former customs senseless, and it seeks for values in the past. Therefore it carries progressive and retrograde elements at the same time. For naturally we have to make a distinction between the necessary and justifiable elaboration of national identity on the one hand, and exaggerated pride, hybris and conceitedness and complacency on the other. Each community, old and new, preserves and cherishes its own traditions, fosters its national culture, transmitting it in its educational process. This is important not only for the larger community but also for the individual; belonging to a community is necessary for his self-affirmation and his full development. However, contempt for, and an overbearing, aggressive attitude towards, others on the one hand, and the excessive, almost mystical exaggeration of one's own national identity and of one's real or imagined good qualities on the other, distort both the community and the individual. It is difficult - especially in education - to separate constructive from destructive national pride because the dividing line is often rather tenuous.

Finally, one must not ignore the fact that the explosive resurgence of ethnic consciousness is in many places simply a means to openly express political and economic interests.

3. I propose to illustrate this series of problems in education. Two approaches present themselves. One is the study of school textbooks, they being relevant sources in countries with a centralized educational system or with a tradition of this kind still alive. As the syllabuses and textbooks are the most objectified products of the educational process, their examination may be the most illuminating. The traditionally strongest carriers of ethnocentrism are the subjects history and national literature /to a lesser degree, geography and, possibly, to the least extent the natural sciences representing universal laws/.

Having looked through the textbooks of half of Europe, our team has found that each textbook regarded Europe and the world primarily from its own specific point of view. The times are long gone when the Catholic and Protestant universitas prevailed in the teaching of history. Falling into this type were the 18th century Jesuit textbooks used with some varying degree of adaptation not only in the German-speaking countries but also in Hungary, Poland and Russia, or Sleidanus's "Four Monarchies", the first history textbook widely taught in Europe to be introduced into Hungary. National viewpoints came to the foreground in history textbooks and so in education, too, and the European outlook was pushed into the background in proportion in the 19th century, especially in the later years of the century in Hungary. The struggle between these two views was reflected in Hungary in the first History Teaching Conference held in 1885. The process

begun in the last century has not ended yet.

There is little tolerance to be found in the textbooks towards other nations and countries. It is not a deliberate distortion /though there are some cases of this too/ but generally a deficient understanding of the history of other peoples. What causes the greatest problem of all is a self-centred perspective of universal history, an interpretation of others through one's own point of view. What is perhaps the most difficult to eliminate is the contradictions arising from a self-centred view, yet this is typical of most of the European textbooks. One instance of these contradictory views is the evaluation of the anti-Habsburg Hungarian freedom fights /"rebellions"/. To understand these opposing views it is necessary to go further back into the past.

The Austrians, like any other nation, whose structure as a state in the past is uncertain or missing, are creating their national-historical traditions as the historical basis of national identity through much struggle, soul-searching and crises. Austria, unlike Hungary, had never been a state before 1918. The present territories of Austria once constituted the provinces of the German Empire, partly of Babenberg and then of the Habsburg Empire. The cohesive force in the Holy Roman Empire was the consciousness of the German nation, as in the Habsburg Empire it was that of its subjects. What the population of Austria, which had the first chance in history to form a state, had to decide in 1918 was which tradition to identify with. Initially the identification

with Germany seemed predominant until the Nazi shock had become overwhelming. Particularly after the Second World War, falling back on the Habsburg heritage became increasingly apparent as the only historical basis of identification for the Austrian nation independent of Germany. This is how the Habsburg heritage became identical with the history of the Austrian nation.

It is understandable that the historical perspective identifying with the Habsburgs can ill afford to tolerate any anti-Habsburg movements. For the Austrians' self-identification ties them to the Habsburg Empire as a unified whole rather than to particular provinces and peoples integrated within it. In their eyes the interest of the Empire is paramount and is above all local interests. When judging historical processes and events, what is of primary importance to them is how much those matters lay in the interest of the Empire, considering any local interest negligible even if it was at the time the interest of a nation, such as the Hungarian nation, within the Empire. Therefore, naturally, they differ in their judgements and assessments as regards the interests and actions of emperors who were also Hungarian kings. An emperor always had to consider the interest of the whole of the Empire as first and foremost, even if he happened to be a king of Hungary, too. And anyone who acted against these overall interests was to be condemned. On this view every Hungarian anti-Habsburg fight for independence can only be negatively evaluated as rebellions. The Hungarian 1848-49 revolution and freedom fight is naturally no exception.



Of course they realize that every uprising /even if a "rebellion"/ has its own causes. Therefore they have to account for the series of "rebellions". The explanation offered is twofold: first, the Hungarians are of a sanguinary nature; second, the Hungarian nobility and aristocracy tried to protect their selfish interests against the central authority which represented progress and wished to extend popular rights at the expense of the nobility. Until 1848 it was really the case that the interests of the nobility and the rights of the national independence had coincided. Here the Austrians distort the optics of the matter by emphasizing the one while ignoring the other. It is difficult to use this argument in 1848 when it is once again the forever restless, discontented "Hungarians taking advantage of the uprising in Vienna" and of the difficult plight of their monarch to get away from the Empire. They regard the pre-revolutionary reforms in Hungary with incomprehension. They explain the Hungarians' conduct from the Austrian point of view rather than from that of the Hungarian situation.

In the course of discussions with the Austrians a mutual and bilateral view was agreed upon: a joint evaluation taking account of both the European constellation of the Empire and also the Hungarian point of view. It must be admitted in all fairness that the tone of the Austrian textbooks dealing with Hungary softened appreciably between 1960-1985.

What we have to do with here is only an apparent contradiction between universalism and nationalism; rather it

is a clash between a pseudo- or obsolete universalism and a national point of view. In Hungarian history, incidentally, the antinomy of "progress and country" has often been an issue where "progress" means joining a larger unity and acceptance of its system of values.

There have not been any textbook coordinating talks with any of the federal republics of Yugoslavia. We have surveyed, however, the textbooks published in Slovenia and Voivodina. In the latter they use versions of the Slovenian textbooks. This series of textbooks is characterized by the conception of treating the histories of each of the peoples in Yugoslavia separately in a very objective, truthful, detailed and factual manner. Hungarian being one of the ethnic groups in Voivodina their history textbook contains the entire history of Hungary and Croatia. The former is palpably based on Hungarian source material. The textbook carefully avoids hurting national sensibilities of any of the peoples in Yugoslavia /including the Hungarians!/.

For the average Hungarian the problem concerning the role of the Turks is even more striking. As a background: in the course of its expansion the Ottoman Empire reached the Hungarian frontiers in the early 16th century, and in 1526 the Turks annihilated the medieval Hungarian state in a decisive battle and penetrated deep into Hungarian territory, becoming in this way a close neighbour of the Habsburgs' Austrian provinces. This state of affairs, i.e., the Turkish occupation of Hungary lasted 150 years; during this time the

previously flourishing Hungarian state became a frontier zone and a row of besieged fortresses. It is true that in this frontier area the Turks did not strive to transform Hungarian society as they did in their provinces further inside the Empire, thus, e.g., they did not seek to impose Muslim religion and culture, yet Hungarian public opinion to this day feels that those 150 years represent a sharp caesura in national history: devastation and depopulation on vast tracts of land. Not so the Turkish historians and educators.

There is still a strong sympathy felt by the Turks for the Hungarians. They look upon us as a nation with whom they share ethnic origin and have bonds of kinship, 150 years of coexistence and fighting against the common enemy, the Habsburgs. Therefore they deliberately foster these ties and sympathy, interpreting and evaluating the 150 year long Turkish occupation of Hungary from a point of view different from ours.

In their opinion,

- /1/ they rescued us from forcible Germanization;
- /2/ they allowed us to preserve our native language, national religions and customs; and
- /3/ they joined us in a common fight against <sup>German</sup> expansion.

Textbooks in the Federal Republic of Germany-- like those in many other countries-- view the Hungarians through the perspective of German history. They do so beginning with the Magyar Conquest of the Carpathian basin and the foundation of the Hungarian state down to the 20th century. In the German Federal Republic there are numerous and varied textbook series

available. Each deals at length with the Conquest, the Magyar raids into Europe and the foundation of the state. Generally they treat the Carpathian basin as lying within the German sphere of interest even after the Hungarian Conquest. One textbook says: "The border of the eastern territory of Frank influence was the Danube."<sup>2</sup> After the enforced ending of the incursions the Hungarians were compelled to settle down and German missionaries introduced and spread Christianity. /In this account there is no word of Slavic or Byzantine influence!<sup>3</sup>/ The influence of Henry III spread from Poland through Bohemia and Hungary as far as Ghent.<sup>4</sup> According to these textbook writers Stephen I, "who received a crown from the pope, subjected himself as a friend and ally to the imperial and papal supremacy".<sup>5</sup>

It is an indisputable fact of history, in contradiction to what the German textbooks assert, that St Stephen's Hungary was a vassal to neither the pope nor the emperor, even though Peter, the second king of Hungary, swore an oath of allegiance once when he found himself in a predicament (for which he was later banished by the Hungarian tribal chiefs). This sort of perspective gave rise to the statement that the archbishopric of Esztergom was founded by the bishop of Passau, Pilgrim.<sup>6</sup> As is commonly known, the archbishopric of Esztergom was founded by St Stephen and not by Otto III /as one of the West-German textbooks asserts/, neither by Pilgrim.

The German textbooks give a great deal of attention to Hungarian history but they tend to select whatever is of some

interest to them. This is how great space is given to the repeated German settlements and trade routes across Hungary, and this is how the role of Hungary defending the West against the Turks finds no place in the books. And even that defence is "elevated", by way of the Habsburgs, to a German cause, and a story of sacrifice and success.

Perhaps one more characteristic example from West-German textbooks. Quite understandably they give a detailed discussion of the First World War. The textbooks blame the Monarchy, and by implication Hungary, for the outbreak of the war, with Germany doing nothing but "fulfilling her obligation as an ally".<sup>7</sup> The war was waged to "prevent the Slavs from subverting and breaking up the Empire".

4. Another series of examples can be drawn from literature. As a tradition in Eastern Europe literature, par excellence lyric poetry, is given, at the expense of political theory and philosophy, a leading role in awakening national consciousness and giving expression to national identity; at times even in disparaging neighbouring or more distant peoples. It is always difficult to draw a line between where the natural right and duty to cultivate the mother tongue begins and where it turns into an exaggerated cult. It is true that the major representatives of these national literatures, mainly from the last century onwards, have advocated tolerance, the understanding of other nations and a universal system of values.

It is in school education that the problem becomes particularly acute when, in order to break the hegemony of national literature, foreign literatures are incorporated in the syllabuses and textbooks. /With the obvious drawback that it is difficult really to appreciate a work of literature in translation./

In Hungarian secondary grammar schools over the past few years, new literature textbooks have been introduced in which, experimentally, the proportion of world literature has been increased by allotting about a third of the available space to extracts from world literature. It must be noted here that in these textbooks world literature covers both the literatures of the neighbouring countries as well as those further afield, including the great traditional European literatures and also the great literatures beyond Europe.

After the publication of these new reform textbooks and syllabuses, extensive and heated discussions took place in the press and the specialized journals with many of the participants accusing the authors of an "antinational" stance and some of them even insinuating a betrayal of national culture because of the increased proportion given to world literature. Yet recognizing otherness, i.e. knowing other nations' culture is one possible approach to universalism. Underlying this phenomenon is the fact, among others, that the study of national literatures is pursued in the most traditional framework of the 19th century; the departments of universal literature and comparative literature are both

relegated to the periphery of the structure of our universities.

5. Apart from the conclusions to be drawn from the survey of school textbooks can any other investigations, like those of attitude and public opinion, provide any information on the issue of ethnocentrism/universalism? Only in a very indirect way.

It cannot be asserted that a full picture exists of what the Hungarian youth of school age think of their own Hungarian identity, of the country they live in, and of ideas they form about the world in general and in particular about Europe cut into two halves by a well recognizable sharp dividing line. Little is known about the answer because the question has not been asked yet. Nevertheless something can be inferred analytically about their way of thinking beyond informal everyday experience. To do this there are two ways open to research.

One, there exist surveys inquiring into the attitudes of the adult population concerning the interesting questions involved. These surveys take into account the qualifications of the persons asked and also their place in the division of labour, i.e., whether they are white- or blue-collar workers and if the latter, whether they are skilled or not. As anywhere in the world in Hungary, too, there is an unmistakable correlation between qualification and the place occupied in the division of labour: individuals with low qualifications are found on the lower stretches of the

continuum, while those with high qualifications fill the more prestigious posts. Naturally, it is impossible to equate the opinions of adults of certain qualifications with those of schoolboys and schoolgirls attending the same type of school. Still there may be a direct correlation: if the differences between adults can be delineated along their school qualifications, then the given types of school might have a considerable indirect role in maintaining or even deepening differences of opinions. On the other hand, the results of the surveys on adult opinion can be, with some caution, extrapolated to those of "young people". There is a survey on this topic which asked the same questions of the 14-29 year olds as had been asked of adults four years before. The difference was not appreciable; still there were some considerable divergences.

What is the extent of the feeling of spontaneous national identity in Hungary today? What answers do adults give to the question "Who I am"? 90% of those asked said Hungarian in the first place with only 70% of them putting "white" in the second place and half of them mentioning last the broader context of being "European", i.e., belonging to a larger cultural entity. The respondents evinced a strong feeling of national identity this being a decisive factor in the image they form of themselves which is definitely distinct from a European identity. Perhaps precisely because Hungary



lies in the middle of Europe and is therefore exposed to competing influences from both East and West. To the question "Looking back over the country's one thousand year long history, would you classify Hungary as belonging rather to the East or rather to the West?" in the 80s slightly less than half /49,0%/ of those asked gave the East as their answer and barely a quarter /24,2%/ thought that Hungary was part of the Western development. Within this global picture the nicer details show lack of homogeneity. In almost direct proportion with the level of academic qualifications the answers tend to place Hungary in the Western way of development and consider it to be part of West European culture. Different categories of physical workers unequivocally classify the Hungarians among the Eastern peoples. Intellectual and physical workers seem to turn in opposing directions but there is a definite division along this line among the people of higher qualifications as well with over half of them /54,9%/ turning to the East and less than half /45,1%/ to the West.

How would you classify the Hungarian nation?

answers broken down to professional groups

	unskilled and semi-skilled workers	skilled workers	intellectual workers	Total
	%			
Predominantly Western	17,7	22,2	35,6	24,2
Predominantly Eastern	49,1	53,8	43,3	49,0
Depending on point of view /or either way/	6,1	6,1	9,1	7,0
Does not know/ Refuses to answer	27,1	17,9	13,9	16,1
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Who then is a Hungarian? The surveys show that those between the ages of 14-29 regarded as the principal criterion of belonging to the Hungarian nation their attachment and allegiance to Hungary, /75%/ and merely 10% of them thought that affinity with the Hungarian language and culture was decisive. This conviction appears also from the responses to the question "Thinking of the nation today do you include in it other nationalities living in Hungary?" 72% of the young people asked answered in the affirmative while the majority excluded the Hungarians living outside the present borders and even more those living scattered in Western Europe.

It is worth noting that the concept of the nation is treated as a political entity by those whose schooling is below the average level and come from the social group who mostly thought that the Hungarians were "a people of the East".

Thinking of the Hungarian nation today ...

answers according to schooling

do you include ...	primary education	secondary vocational as highest % level of schooling	secondary	higher
Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries	46	49	54	66
Hungarians living in the Western countries	22	21	26	32

It can be observed that the better qualified one is the more he tends to think in terms of the nation rather than in those of the state, regarding those living outside the country as Hungarians.

There appears to be marked differences within the group aged 14-29 in judging the relevant criteria of Hungarian ethnicity. Although all of them agree that the surest criterion is professing oneself to be Hungarian, yet those with lower qualifications seem to attach a disproportionately

greater importance to criteria according to which to be a Hungarian is something given.

Scale of criteria of Hungarian ethnicity  
according to schooling /averages/

Criteria	primary education	secondary vocational as highest	secondary level of schooling	higher
Do you feel yourself to be Hungarian?	4,0	4,1	4,9	5,2
Were you born in Hungary? Are you a Hungarian citizen?	3,7	3,4	3,0	2,3
Were your parents Hungarian?	3,1	3,1	2,8	2,8

The above chart only goes to corroborate the results of a public opinion research conducted in Hungary earlier in 1974. Then as now it was found that for people with higher qualifications personal choice is of a decisive importance while for those of modest schooling or for village people and for the elderly in general national identification appears to be a matter of something given in which the nation as a state and as a cultural medium are inextricably merged. This fact helps to explain the phenomenon that "cosmopolitanism" as an antithesis to the national feeling is rejected mainly

by the elderly /aged over 51, old age pensioners/, villagers /agricultural labourers, housewives/ and those poorly qualified.

The state appears, mainly to the physical workers, as a power that strives to integrate the activities of the "people" but also as one that assumes a role in propagating new national and international values some of which are hard to fit into the set of traditional national viewpoints.

The confusion regarding state holidays in Hungary can be largely ascribed to the overly great role allotted to politics in public life; particularly when these holidays leave emotionally uneffected those who regard nation and state as one. In such cases the national and international holidays are tragi-comically confused.

After the Socialist Revolution of 7 November 1917 it was for the first time in Europe that a communist take-over of power occurred in Hungary on 21 March 1919. It is to this historical event that the present Hungarian government traces back its origins and in order to emphasize this fact it has declared it as a public holiday. The great majority /81,1%/ of intellectual workers regards this day as a national holiday while the unskilled and semi-skilled workers refuse to perceive its national character. /The ratio of overall acceptance is 73,9./ The difference is markedly more dramatic with regard to the judgement of 7 November /the date of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia/. Almost three fourths of untrained workers look upon this

holiday of international character as a national one. The same group of people regard May Day as a national holiday even though it is the holiday of the international labour movement. /Intellectuals and white-collar workers perceive the difference between national and international holidays definitely more precisely./

Hopefully, the foregoing has conveyed an idea of the extent to which Hungarian society and its various strata, including the young and the old, are divided in seeing the world and themselves. The differences are the more surprising as the Hungarian educational policy had, and perhaps still has, as one of its long-term aims to create ideological unity and to dissolve nationalism leading to the outbreak of the Second World War and replace it with a supranational or international <sup>system of</sup> values under the hegemony of the prestige of the Soviet Union. Despite the uniformity of textbooks and of primary public education and despite the continuing tight ideological control the differences are still considerable. Schools may be unable to cope with difficulties of this kind and carry out a job of this magnitude unless they are part of a political process aimed at resolving the tensions between nation and state.<sup>8</sup>

6. No one contributing to the discussion of this subject from Hungary can omit to call attention to <sup>the fact</sup> that one of the worst enemies of universalism and at the same time the chief instigator of every kind of national particularism in Eastern Europe is the unsettled nature of the nationalities issue.

The large minorities living in other countries are bound to stir up strong feelings and arouse national sensibilities if they do not receive the help and support they need and especially if they are oppressed. In Europe and Eastern Europe there are many multi-national states with different nations, groups and ethnic fragments coexisting almost like the strips in a multi-coloured rug. This state of affairs might result in national enmities and even eruptions of hatred as much as in mutual understanding and rapprochement, provided there is a satisfactory and balanced policy consistently pursued on both sides.

7. In conclusion allow me to pose some questions:

/a/ Educators and culture philosophers of the 19th century still held the view--which, to many of us today, seems naively committed to a belief in progress-- that the particular, the national, the way of the small communities are stepping stones to universalism; more specifically, only those can understand universal goals and values who have a profound knowledge of the age they live in, and national awareness makes one capable of attaining what is universal. Today, after so much bitter disappointment, one must ask whether these lofty ideas were true and can serve as stepping stones to genuine universalism. It may be asked now whether it is possible for an intermediate stage to exist? Is there room in education to foster double or treble identity? Is it possible for them to operate at all? It seems that there are examples in the United States of this type of multiple

attachment. And similar examples can be found elsewhere too, including Europe, particularly in "border areas". The relationship of dual ethnocentrism and universalism seems to hold out more promise.

/b/ Now for another, this time methodological issue. One reason why the ethnic, the small community, and the national function so effectively in education is that they are traditionally filled with emotions, including pathos, and their connotations are so strong that they can become effective almost in and by themselves. One wonders whether it is possible to impart such emotions and such colours to universal values, be they of a humanitarian, philosophical or supranational character. Could the appeal of the mother tongue, folk songs, home and landscape and customs be extended to other cultures, other languages and other peoples? One wonders. Every sociological investigation shows that even today national symbols /flags, arms, national anthems/ are "more familiar" and more readily recognized than the international ones and are emotionally closer to young people. Symbols carrying a general or universal meaning have scarcely developed /the red flag and the cross seem the only exceptions/, universal goals are much harder to formulate and to infuse with emotion: general symbols have not yet found their way sufficiently enough to education. Perhaps in the same way as music, a particular great classical composition carries a universal message, even though it was addressed to a certain audience. Let me close



on the note of this example: Mozart's Magic Flute, its finest melodies were inspired by Austrian national dances, Viennese street songs but today they represent, for each of us, universal values of human completeness and beauty. Perhaps we might succeed in achieving such a synthesis in some areas of education.

## Notes

1. Cf. Eric Hobsbawm's Mass-Producing Tradition: Europe, 1870-1914. In: Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger /eds./: The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. 263-307.
2. E.g. Fragen an die Geschichte, Bd. 1. Wiesbaden: Schöningh Verlag, 1984. 187.
3. Cf. Fragen die Geschichte, Bd. 2. Frankfurt: Hirschgraben Verlag, 1984. 43.
4. Cf. Zeiten und Menschen K. Serie Bd 2. Wiesbaden: Schöningh Verlag, 1984. 20.
5. Op. cit. 32.
6. Geschichte und Weltkunde, Bd. 2. Köln: Diesterweg Verlag, 1981. 50.
7. Die Reise in die Vergangenheit, Bd. 4. München: Westerman Verlag, 1982. 116.
8. Cf. Böhm, Antal, Nemzettudat /Egy szociológiai felvétel alapján/ [National Consciousness /Based on a sociological survey/]. Budapest: Manuscript, 1984. -- Dobossy, Imre -- Lázár, Guy, A fiatalok és a nemzeti kérdés /Közzvéleménykutatás a határokon túli magyarságról/ [Young People and the National Question /Survey of public opinion on Hungarians living outside the country/]. Budapest: Tömegkommunikációs Kutatóközpont [Mass Communication Research Centre]. Manuscript, 1986. -- Csepeli, György, The Social Construction of National Identity in Contemporary Hungary. Budapest: Manuscript, 1988. -- Lázár, Guy,

et al., Társadalmi-gazdasági fejlődésünk ideológiai kérdései a közgondolkodásban [The Ideological Issues of Our Social-Economic Development in Public Thinking]. Budapest: Tömegkommunikációs Kutatóközpont, 1986. -- Szabó, Dániel, Milyen is a magyar /Van-e a magyar lakosságnak nemzetkarakter képe?/ [What Are Hungarians Like? /Does the Hungarian population have a concept of national character?/] . Budapest: Manuscript, 1984. -- Szabó, Miklós, A magyar nemzettudat problémái a huszadik század második felében [Problems of Hungarian National Consciousness in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century]. Budapest: Manuscript, 1984.