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JUSTIFIED WARFARE AND THE RELATIVE VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE

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Warfare, like some other social institutions and practices which have a direct bearing on human life, has a long history - in fact, the oldest history we have is that which records the waging of war, which is not surprising since 'history began as tales of martial exploits written down by court chroniclers to immortalise the glory of their masters' (1). Reflection on the ethical dimensions of this particular practice, including speculation on the justification for the sacrifice of human life thus exacted, has a less extended history which starts at the latest with the emergence of the great religions in East and West and which promulgated general rules affecting various social practices and behavior, including war. In the Western world,we can consider as milestones in the debate on this subject the teachings of the Church Fathers (especially St. Augustine) and of Thomas Aquinas; the further development of the theory of the Just War by 16th-century Spanish theologians (culminating in the 1625 treatise on international law by Grotius); the social doctrines and practices of certain churches which emerged in the Reformation period and afterwards (especially Anabaptists or Mennonites and Quakers); and the Christian-based peace movement which arose in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars in America and England.

A considerable body of literature on the ethics of war thus exists; it can

broadly be summarised in two distinct schools of thought: a qualified acceptance of war (the 'Just War' doctrine) has traditionally prevailed over an absolute rejection of it ('pacifism'). Changes in the nature of modern weapons and warfare, particularly since 1945, have brought about a marked shift in the relative acceptance of both points of view. In fact, a new division has arisen within the larger framework of a general rejection of war (at any rate between the main powers) and in which the retention of the tools of war (in their most developed form) has become the issue. While there is widespread agreement that nuclear war is indefensible (and that conventional war may escalate into nuclear war), there is great argument concerning the best means to prevent the outbreak of war, revolving around the moral acceptability of nuclear deterrence. The paradox contained in the traditional maxim, Si vis pacem, para bellum, has assumed an almost unbearable poignancy because of the nature of the preparation for war and the price - not least in moral terms - which is likely to be paid in the event of deterrence failing.

On such vital questions as that of the value, preservation and integrity of human life it is tempting to look for, and expect to find, consistency in the attitude which an individual person or social group (be it a political party, religious organisation, or even an entire culture), holds on such diverse life-and-death matters as infanticide, capital punishment, euthanasia, duelling, and war. However, consistency is often lacking, allowing, for instance, a critic of the current peace movement to write of its members: 'Their ethical eclecticism, indeed opportunism, entangles them sometimes in contradictions: some Green Peace fighters, for instance, praise life as the highest good and at the

same time defend abortion' (2), or a leading British anti-nuclear campaigner, Monsignor Bruce Kent, to write of his church that he 'cannot see why a church that holds views of such certainty and clarity on issues like abortion is not just as unequivocal about the sin inherent in the ownership of weapons capable of destroying the world' (3). Equally, one could refer to the 'Moral Right' today whose 'pro-life' agenda includes both a condemnation of abortion and a strong commitment to deterrence, including a willingness to go to war - and hence to kill not one potential life but potentially all life. A curious case of inconsistency in ethical reasoning and behavior which has arisen in recent years is presented by the extreme wing of the animal rights movement which has, quite literally, declared war on vivisectors. In Britain, the Animal Liberation Front, with its hard, terrorist edge, believes that direct action, involving not only the destruction of property but even of human life, is morally justified in a war to free the animals which are now being used and abused for reasons of food, sport, and medical research (4).

Such inconsistencies, however, glaring as they may be, are not new and can be found throughout history - what changes are the concrete issues and causes but not the anomaly or inconsistency in the thinking about them. Just as in previous eras those who condemned slavery, the death penalty, or the duel, but not war, were invited to re-consider their acceptance of this practice (and vice-versa: there were those who condemned war but not some of the other practices which involved the taking of life), so today attitudes on war are often juxtaposed to those on abortion or euthanasia - as an argument to persuade others of the error of their ways. The uneven, erratic, development of the moral sensibilities of individuals, societies, and entire civilizations or

epochs and the way this is reflected in their social customs and institutions can, in a general sense, be regarded as an illustration of Mannheim's notion of the 'contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous' (5), which is a characteristic of probably all societies, not only in the moral but also, e.g., in the intellectual and material fields.

In his History of European Morals, the great Irish historian Lecky has observed: 'There are in human nature, and more especially in the exercise of the benevolent affections, inequalities, inconsistencies, and anomalies ... We have a much greater power than is sometimes supposed of localising both our benevolent and malevolent feelings ... Our affections are so capricious in their nature that it is continually necessary to correct by detailed experience the most plausible deductions' (6). He relates how, during the Roman Empire with its gladiatorial combats, 'The very men who looked down with delight when the sand of the arena was reddened with human blood, made the theatre ring with applause when Terence, in his famous line, proclaimed the universal brotherhood of man' (7). Another popular spectacle in ancient Rome was rope-dancing, high above the ground. When, in the reign of Marcus Aurelius, an accident occurred the emperor ordered that henceforth no rope-dancer should perform without a net or a mattress being spread out below. 'It is a singularly curious fact', Lecky writes, 'that this precaution, which no Christian nation has adopted, continued in force during more than a century of the worst period of the Roman Empire, when the blood of captives was poured out like water in the Colosseum' (8). The difficulty of making 'plausible deductions' regarding an individual's attitude to life Lecky also abundantly illustrates with respect to what is now called 'speciescism'. Animal liberationists would not have approved of

Spinoza, 'one of the purest, most gentle, most benevolent of mankind, of whom it is related that almost the only amusement of his life was putting flies into spiders' webs, and watching their struggles and their deaths' (9). On the other hand, 'It has been observed that a very large proportion of the men who during the French Revolution proved themselves most absolutely indifferent to human suffering were deeply attached to animals' (10).

We may stay with Lecky for another moment and report his views on the impact of Christianity on the question of the sanctity of human life. He writes: 'The first aspect in which Christianity presented itself to the world was as a declaration of the fraternity of men in Christ ... the first and most manifest duty of a Christian man was to look upon his fellowmen as sacred beings, and from this notion grew up the eminently Christian idea of the sanctity of all human life' (11). Lecky emphasises the novelty of this notion since 'nature does not tell man that it is wrong to slay without provocation his fellowmen ... it is an historical fact beyond all dispute that refined, and even moral, societies have existed in which the slaughter of men of some particular class or nation has been regarded with no more compunction than the slaughter of animals in the chase' (12). Christianity set a new standard, higher than any which then existed in the world, and its influence affected a whole range of social practices, starting with the very earliest stage of human life and including, at the other end of the spectrum, war. Christians denounced abortion in the strongest terms 'not simply as inhuman, but as definitely murder' (13). Lecky similarly documents the beneficent influence of the new religion on infanticide, slavery, war (14), gladiatorial shows, suicide. As regards the latter, virgins were permitted to commit suicide in order to avoid rape

although Augustine disapproved of this exception and with him the doctrine of the absolute sinfulness of suicide became generally accepted by Catholic theologians. But as Lecky points out, 'by a glaring though very natural inconsistency, no characters were more enthusiastically extolled than those anchorites who habitually deprived their bodies of the sustenance that was absolutely necessary to health, and thus manifestly abridged their lives' (15). The doctrine of the sanctity of human life seemed to be infringed not only by these 'slow suicides' but also by the self-torture which was a distinguishing characteristic of the 'ascetic epidemic' which affected Christianity in the 4th and 5th centuries (16).

A history of moral thought and practice reveals, as the above has briefly sought to indicate, the presence of paradoxes and anomalies. We may now go on to address more specifically the question of war - the moral issues involved in its traditional practice and, conversely, in that of its complete renunciation. Some episodes from the history of pacifism - the doctrine which, in its extreme form, proclaims the absolute inviolability of human life - will serve as a starting point. The implications of such a doctrine, the difficulties inherent in its consistent application, and the arguments which have been put forward in opposition to it, will be briefly reviewed. The movement for the abolition of war was, for a considerable time, functioning in a society which fully accepted the institution of slavery. Even within Quakerism this inconsistency persisted for a long time. Peter Brock has commented that 'an awareness of inconsistency between Friends' principles and the practice of slaveholding only ripened slowly' (17). John Woolman (1720-1772) was one of those most responsible for launching the Society of Friends on its antislavery

path. He drew attention to 'the implicit hypocrisy of asserting the wrongfulness of all wars and at the same time holding in bondage fellowmen whose subjection was the result of armed force' (18). The French-born Quaker, Anthony Benezet, similarly asked in 1754 of his fellow Quakers, 'How can we, who have been concerned to publish the gospel of universal love and peace among mankind, be so inconsistent with ourselves as to purchase such who are prisoners of war..?' (19). Thomas Grimké, who was a leading figure in the absolutist wing of the American Peace Society (to the extent of even regarding the American Revolution as being 'utterly indefensible') was, at the time of his death in 1834, still an owner of slaves (Although Brock writes that he was just beginning to give the whole question of slavery his serious consideration and that, had he lived, he would have become an abolitionist like his two sisters) (20).

Among advocates of the abolition of war the demand for consistency, exemplified in the above, was, however, far from universally shared. It is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that a striking feature from the history of the opposition to war was the failure of the attempt to attach to war a unique moral stigma and thus to isolate it from other social customs and institutions which were considered wrong and evil. Such attempts were made in the organised peace movement of the 19th century in order to attract as many supporters as possible. If adherence to the causes of the elimination of slavery and of the death penalty was also to be implied in the movement to abolish war, the latter might not have attracted many sympathisers at a time when all three institutions were widespread and taken for granted - but when peace societies considered war to be the greatest abomination (21). George C. Beckwith, the long-serving secretary of the American Peace Society in the middle decades of the

19th century, expressed this view very clearly in his introduction to Thomas Upham's The Manual of Peace, the first edition of which was published 150 years ago in 1836: 'We wish the cause of Peace to be distinctly understood. It seeks only the abolition of a specific, well-defined custom, - the practice of international war, - and has nothing to do with any thing else ... This view of our cause relieves it from a variety of extraneous questions ... we [have] nothing to do with capital punishments, or the strict inviolability of human life, or the question whether the gospel allows the application of physical force to the government of states, schools, and families. We go merely against war; and war is defined by our best lexicographers to be "a contest by force between nations"' (22). Upham himself, however, writing within the rigid framework of the fundamentalist, literalist interpretation of the Bible, frequently referred in his book to the prohibition contained in the sixth commandment. God, he says, 'has made use of the most general terms, clearly asserting the inviolability of human life in all cases whatever' (23); 'the doctrine of the absolute inviolability of human life', he writes, is not yet victorious but will soon be (24).

Some ten years later, Beckwith wrote his own The Peace Manual, partly 'to counteract some dangerous notions to be found in the earlier Manual of Peace' (25). These dangerous notions concerned the views of absolute pacifists and nonresistants who denied not only the inadmissibility of defensive war (as Beckwith did), but also the right of governments to coerce in internal politics. These issues had deeply divided the American Peace Society in the previous years; under Beckwith's leadership the moderates established their authority. The essence of their argument is stated in Beckwith's preface to his own volume and which is very similar to the one he had contributed to Upham's

Manual: 'The cause of peace aims solely to do away the custom of international war; and I trust there will be found in this book nothing that does not bear on this object, nor anything that interferes with the legitimate authority of government. As a friend of peace, I am of course a supporter of civil government, with all the powers requisite for the condign punishment of wrong-doers, the enforcement of law, and the preservation of social order' (26).

The condemnation of defensive war (the most contentious issue between the moderates and radicals in the American Peace Society) by many Christian pacifists was based on an extension to international life of the teaching that it was morally wrong for Christians to quarrel and fight, instead of returning good for evil. That there were wars of aggression and wars of defense (or 'just' wars) they regarded as a delusion and a specious argument: all wars were wars of aggression. To the question what was to happen when a nation was under foreign attack their answer was: (a) obey God's command, i.e. resist from doing evil; (b) trust in his protection; (c) be ready to suffer martyrdom. Some, such as Grimké, made the familiar point that any justification of defensive war by drawing an analogy with the function of the magistrate in a nation's domestic affairs was misleading since no supranational community and no international code of law was in existence (27). Nations would be judge, jury and executioner in their own cause. With the growth of international law and organisation some pacifists have conceded the decreasing validity of Grimké's argument and have gone on to sanction the use of force in the hands of a legitimate 'international magistrate'. Brock correctly identifies one of the main reasons for the unconvincing nature of the rejection by most 19th-century pacifists of defensive war. Beckwith, like many peace advocates of his day, 'was

reasoning on the assumption that all wars (between civilised nations, at least) were, with a little patience and goodwill, avoidable ... the deeper implications raised by wars of national liberation or by ideological conflict or the will toward aggression ... were ... ignored' (28).

Beckwith's decided assertion of the inadmissibility of any war, combined with his equally firm rejection (in public, if not in private) of the principle of the inviolability of human life in domestic affairs, invited criticisms from both the conservative and the radical wings of the Society over which he presided. He regarded civil government as 'lawful, expedient and necessary' and in no way incompatible with the renunciation of force between nations. Civil government had been ordained by God, and as the instrument of his justice it must be endowed with the means of enforcing its will upon the refractory - and for this it was permissible to inflict even death itself. But if Beckwith could countenance the punishment, with death even, by the government of a Christian country of a score of pirates or of half a dozen murderers, and the suppression with armed force of an insurrection, why, conservative and moderate opponents asked, could it be wrong for such a government to repel by arms an invading army intent upon robbing and killing? His answer lacked conviction: 'God permits the taking of life in one case, but not in the other. He authorizes rulers to govern, but not to fight; to punish, but not to quarrel. Such acts, even if they were physically the same, would be morally different; and hence one may be permitted, while the other is forbidden' (29). Moreover, whereas civil government aimed at establishing justice among men, the outcome of war was quite different, since war was 'no more than a rencounter [sic] between tigers' (30).

Critics of Beckwith's position argued that it was inconsistent: for a Christian either life was held to be inviolable, in which case the use of coercive forde by a government stood also condemned and non-resistance was the only possible attitude, or it was not, and in that case both domestic force and defensive war were permitted. The arbitrary nature of the division between external and internal affairs which Beckwith had tried to argue was pointedly exposed by the Rev. John Lord who asked, in 1839, 'When does protection begin and end, and how many men does it take to make a mob, and where is the difference on the grand principle, between a foreign and domestic body of robbers and murderers? Do we not enforce the same principle in regard to a multitude of foreign enemies that we do of domestic ones? ... The doctrine that all war is opposed to the gospel does run into nonresistance. It is vain and trifling to deny it' (31). Twenty years earlier John Sheppard had made the same point by focussing on the difficulty caused by the word 'war'. His eloquent words may be quoted at some length since they go to the heart of the matter: 'The truth is, unless it be proved that every war has been unjust and criminal on both sides, war is a name adapted to produce confusion of ideas; because it includes contrary things, aggression and defense, crime and punishment. I grant the fact to be, that most wars have been unjust on both sides, which has led to this indiscriminate name, and that they have generally deserved to be stigmatized with a confounding appellation ... But still, while it is certain that there have been, and may be, wars in which the crime is as clearly on one side as in a riot or robbery, it is as unfit that the name war should be applied to both parties, as the name riot, or robbery, to the forcible acts of the civil power, which restrains or suppresses them. We cannot, however, change the language of mankind; but it is sophistical to avail ourselves of its ambiguity' (32).

A few words must be devoted to those who criticised Beckwith's position from an absolutist stance since interesting lessons can be drawn from their fate. The great abolitionist (of slavery, to be sure) William Lloyd Garrison (1805-1879) was the spokesman of those who came to believe that the logical outcome of Christian pacifism was a renunciation of all association with the state; the doctrine of nonresistance implied a renunciation of civil government altogether and the adoption of political anarchism. Garrison and his followers split from the American Peace Society in 1838 and formed the New England Non-Resistance Society which resolved 'that human life is inviolable, and can never be taken by individuals or nations without committing sin against God'. Not only the armed forces and the police but the whole apparatus of government was rejected as being incompatible with Christianity. When Civil War came, Garrison proved unable, however, to combine truthfully his advocacy of abolition with the maintenance of pacifism and non-resistance. His paper, The Liberator, vigorously supported prosecution of the war and opposed concessions to the South; the bellicosity and irreconcilable tone of the paper contrasted strangely with Garrison's theoretical pacifism and his insistence that he was in no way compromising his peace principles. He failed to see any incompatibility between theory and practice in his conduct, telling a friend who deplored what he regarded as Garrison's lapse from the spirit, if not the letter, of nonviolence: 'Although non-resistance holds human life in all cases inviolable, yet it is perfectly consistent for those professing it to petition, advise, and strenuously urge a pro-war government to abolish slavery solely by the war-power' (33).

The Grimké sisters, prominent Quakers, abolitionists, and one-time non-resisters, provide another illustration (among many others) of how the most

fervent apostles of nonviolence turned into the most rabid enthusiasts of slave revolt and civil war. 'You see how warlike I have become ... O, yes - war is better than slavery', wrote Angelina in 1862; and in a letter to Garrison in 1864 her sister Sarah spoke of 'This blessed war ... This war, the holiest ever waged, is emphatically God's war' (34). Their experience demonstrates the validity of Ralph Potter's observation that those who reject the just war theory in favor of an absolute pacifism are in danger of falling victim to the crusading mentality when they abandon their pacifism. Having never been accustomed to thinking in terms of the discriminating categories of just war, the *jus in bello* is unlikely to restrain those now zealous in a worthy cause. 'Those who adhere to the ethic of the saint must never, never indulge in war', he cautions, 'for they will then have no habitual modes of moral discrimination to guard them from committing barbarities under the guise of their presumed virtuous intent' (35). Yet, in Potter's felicitous phrase, 'force must always be restrained because its only legitimate function is to restrain' (36). He is right in stressing that the just war doctrine, which is the precipitate of moral reflection upon political experience in the West, is valid whenever violence is at issue, and provides an ethic for the policeman and the magistrate as well as the soldier (37). Through compromise the just war theory acknowledges what is best in the extreme attitudes of pacifism (the concern for life) and crusades (the protection of the innocent, of justice, etc.). Reinhold Niebuhr has similarly pointed out the dangers of moral absolutism in politics, arguing that 'The political order must be satisfied with relative peace and relative justice' (38).

If the Civil War had managed to turn ultra-pacifists into war-mongers it is

not surprising to find that the American Peace Society (which aimed to be a 'broad church') rallied to the support of the Northern war effort as soon as fighting began. The argument of the pro-war majority was simply that the conflict, which had broken out between the government and the Southern states, did not come under the heading of war and that, therefore, it did not come under the ban of the Society. It was a rebellion and the suppression of rebellion was a legitimate task of government and should have the full backing of the Society. If the use of armed force to put down the rebels were contrary to Christianity, the Advocate of Peace (the Society's organ) wrote in 1861, 'then all real, effective government is wrong, and society must be abandoned to a remediless, everlasting anarchy' (39). As Peter Brock has commented, the Society's reasoning - war is war between nations, civil war is not war but police action - was sophistical. In truth, war fever had swamped the American Peace Society, and only a handful of stalwarts opposed the war as being unchristian and incompatible with the aims and teachings of the Society (40).

The travails of the American Peace Society (and of the remnants of the New England Non-Resistance Society, its radical offshoot) during the American Civil War provide one illustration among many of the correctness of John Lewis's argument that 'Pacifism flourishes behind the lines, far from the battlefront ... Very many pacifists, perhaps most, would lose their pacifism in an instant if anything they seriously valued were threatened by violence' (41). Many of Lewis's contemporaries were quick to prove his point since they abandoned their pacifism when faced with the Nazi threat. Then they suddenly shared his opinion that circumstances 'may make some wars better than peace ... A bad peace may be worse than a good war' (42) - even though until recently they had

firmly endorsed Benjamin Franklin's opinion that 'there never was a good war, or a bad peace' (a sentiment already expressed by Cicero - 'I cease not to advocate peace: even though unjust it is better than the justest war') (43). They rejected a peace which, while avoiding war, was likely to result in the loss of liberty and the imposition of slavery. As John Oman wrote in the 1930s: 'To treat a man as a chattel is a much graver denial that he is an end in himself than to say to him: You must die, as I should be willing to die in like case, rather than live as the instrument for giving victory to an unrighteous cause. To enslave others is always an acuter opposition to the whole Christian order than fighting others, unless we are merely fighting to enslave them. To make life an end in itself and to make a man an end in himself are things so different that every good by which a man's soul is saved must be valued above life; and freedom, the condition of truly possessing a soul, no man can ever have except by setting it above life' (44). The fact that many, perhaps most, wars have been waged in causes which cannot be regarded as just, and that much blood has been spilt lightly and immorally, does not diminish the truth and enduring appeal of this insight. Equally, when the British Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Michael Hicks Beach, in a speech during the Fashoda Crisis (1898), said that if the outcome would be war it would be a great calamity - 'But there are greater evils than war' (thereby, apparently, popularising this maxim) - the truth contained in it is a matter altogether separate from its application (45). The relative fortunes of England and France in their bids for imperialistic hegemony in Africa at the turn of the century was definitely not a matter which would have justified the recourse to war.

It is not only the threat of an impending evil which can bring about the

sudden conversion which Lewis has noticed; the promise of removing an existing evil can have the same effect, as we have seen demonstrated above in the American Civil War. In such concrete circumstances the difficulties inherent in maintaining an absolute pacifism (one which judges the wrongfulness of war not by consequences but by eternal and absolute principles, or which proclaims that war is always evil and that good can never come out of evil) become evident, as does the ambiguous nature of 'war'. Echoing John Sheppard, Lewis writes: 'War, like every other evil, is not just of one kind ... a war [is] good or bad according to its purpose and result. It is therefore a complete fallacy to characterize war as either good or bad in itself' (46). In rejecting absolute pacifism and arguing instead for a utilitarian pacifism, Lewis takes as his supreme law not the inviolability of human life but the principle of love, the desire that we shall do men good rather than harm. This, he says, 'may involve us in the taking of human life. We cannot therefore say that violence in itself, or killing in itself, is invariably morally wrong, though it is, of course, always evil... War is an evil, as all admit, but it is right if the evil it avoids is a greater evil, and that has to be determined in each particular case' (47). He argues that 'violence, while it always remains evil, is not a moral wrong,but a moral duty, where it results in a balance of human welfare, as for instance where it is used to protect an innocent victim, to restrain anarchy and violence, or to maintain a just social order' (48). The moral character of a violent act has to be distinguished from its purely physical character: while the latter remains the same, the former depends on motive and purpose (49). It is this distinction which allows another one, commonly denied by pacifists, namely that between killing and murder. That in war 'killing is no murder' presupposes that both the resort to war and the manner of its

conduct are in strict accordance with the principles of the just war theory.

Augustine, writing that 'there are some exceptions made by the divine authority to its own law, that men may not be put to death', taught that persons who wage war at God's command (sic) or who slay evil men in their capacity as public officials 'have by no means violated the commandment "Thou shalt not kill"' (50). He justifies the existence of coercive powers ('the power of the king, the right of life and death exercised by the judge, the hooks of the executioner, the weapons of the soldier') as a means whereby 'evil men are held in check, and the good live more peacefully among the wicked' (51). For Augustine, as for Thomas Aquinas nine centuries later, the object of war was peace. In this context, it is also relevant to refer to Augustine's view that the real evil in war is not death but 'the love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance and the lust of power, and such like'. These are the things (rather than death) which make war evil because they bring death to the soul, not merely to the body. The fact that Augustine insisted on the principle that physical death is neither the end of life nor the greatest evil, and that he regarded war and the suffering of the innocent as inevitable, does not mean that he displayed a lack of concern over the death of innocent people in war (52).

The belief that 'killing is no murder' is not uniquely applied to the institution of warfare but also underlies other social practices which involve the deliberate taking of human life. Apart from the fact that such practices are (or have been) legally sanctioned, what are some of the social and psychological factors which account for the easiness with which individuals accept and act

upon this belief in warfare? The abrogation of the normal taboo on killing fellow human beings (and its replacement by a duty to kill them), is psychologically symbolised by the wearing of uniforms. Even in our age of sophisticated, technological warfare, the warrior's traditional war-paint and plumes survive in unobtrusive forms such as stars, chevrons, and buttons. Arnold Toynbee has commented that this dressing-up for war looks childish but that its continued survival reveals two important functions: the psychological one, already referred to, and the practical one of enabling a visual distinction between the soldier and the civilian (although the growth of total warfare has made the latter distinction increasingly difficult and irrelevant). 'The moral sense of mankind in general has been obtuse enough to regard the killer in war as being righteous - at least, so long as he keeps, more or less faithfully, to the recognised rules', writes Toynbee (53). He rightly refrains from making too categorical a statement as there are exceptions to the general rule he notes. Freud has pointed out, e.g., that the prohibition to kill, the result of mankind's awakening conscience, was gradually extended outwards and ultimately came to include unloved strangers and even enemies. Although this final extension is no longer experienced by civilised man, it is 'worthy of note that such primitive races as still inhabit the earth act differently in this respect; when (the savage) returns victorious from the war-path he may not set foot in his village nor touch his wife until he has atoned for the murders committed in war by penances which are often prolonged and toilsome. This may be presumed, of course, to be the outcome of superstition' (54). But behind this, Freud contends, 'lurks a vein of ethical sensitiveness which has been lost by us civilised men'.

In 'Our Attitude towards Death', which forms the second part of the essay we have quoted from, Freud discusses the changes which war causes in the participant's attitude not only as regards the taking of life but also the giving up of his own life. Since war inevitably involves both phenomena, an enquiry concerning the relative value of human life in warfare cannot avoid considering the individual's motives for sacrificing his own life (as distinct from taking his opponent's). We shall confine ourselves to some observations which have commonly been made in this respect and which stress deep-seated psychological reasons (rather than the obvious and publicly-claimed ones, such as the preservation or achievement of such fundamental values as justice, liberty, freedom, and - less prominent today - honor and glory for oneself or one's country). Freud argues that death has been exorcised from normal life in the West, appearing as an accident rather than as an unavoidable necessity, and that this taboo has a powerful effect upon our lives: 'Life is impoverished, it loses in interest, when the highest stake in the game of living, life itself, may not be risked ... The tendency to exclude death from our calculations brings in its train a number of other renunciations and exclusions. And yet the motto of the Hanseatic League declared: "Navigare necesse est, vivere non necesse"! (It is necessary to sail the seas, it is not necessary to live)' (55). War, however, sweeps away this conventional attitude to death: it can no longer be denied and 'life has, in truth, become interesting again; it has regained its full significance' (56).

That war seems to offer an outlet for drives and emotions which are normally suppressed is confirmed by other psychologists, notably William James who believes that we will only be successful in our attempts to eliminate war

if we are aware of the basic functions which war apparently fulfils and if we can find a 'moral equivalent' for it. War enables those involved to experience feelings of community and comradeship which are seldom attained in normal life and for which, nevertheless, there is a deep longing. It seems that such feelings can only be attained as a result of some extreme experience, usually involving mortal danger. The American philosopher J. Glenn Gray, who has reflected on his own war experience, writes: 'How does danger break down the barriers of the self and give man an experience of community? The answer to this question is the key to one of the oldest and most enduring incitements to battle' (57). With James he believes that 'there are surely alternative ways more creative and less dreadful, if men would only seek them out' (58). (Later on, however, he is not so sure: 'The ways of peace have not found - perhaps cannot find - substitutes for the communal enthusiasm and ectasies of war') (59). Gray makes a distinction between external reasons for fighting, such reasons being to fight and die for one's country, or religion, or any other abstract good, and the concrete circumstances of battle which involve the decision to be killed. Here he observes that 'Numberless soldiers have died, more or less willingly ... because they realised that by fleeing their post and rescuing themselves, they would expose their companions to greater danger' (60). When Hannah Arendt writes in her introduction to Gray's book that the soldiers's basic credo is 'that life is <u>not</u> the highest good' (61), this does not always imply more than that he is sacrificing his life for the physical survival of his comrade. Gray adds that 'the assurance of immortality ... makes self-sacrifice at these moments so relatively easy' (62).

Self-sacrifice is found in war as in other spheres of life, in the first place

the religious one. The similarities between war and religion have frequently been commented on: just as war has been regarded as a religious activity - surrounded at it is by prayer, ritual, sacrifice, and purification (63) - and defended in terms of devotion and salvation, so religion has often adopted a military terminology and character (64).The true believer, whether he be a soldier (assuming that he has fully accepted the 'external' reasons for war) or a saint or martyr, must be ready to give up his life for the faith. 'And if he is a genuine saint he will regard this sacrifice as no loss, for the self has become indestructible in being united with a supreme reality' (65). This, Gray continues, 'is the mystical element that has been mentioned by nearly all serious writers on the subject'; it is the boundless capacity for self-sacrifice that is intoxicating about war.

Apart from what constitutes the 'enduring appeal of battle' (which, in Gray's analysis, includes next to comradeship, love of the spectacle and of destruction), Gray's reflections also touch on images of 'the enemy' - the abstractness of the term permitting the growth of abstract hatred. One of the many paradoxes of war is that the further a person is from dangerous contact with this image, the more he is consumed by it. Several common attitudes toward the enemy can be distinguished in wars of recent times; those in which the enemy is regarded as a creature which is not human but a species of animal pest, or that which depicts the enemy as the devil or devil-possessed, obviously reduce any inhibitions about killing him. In fact, such killing may be profoundly satisfying, since war assumes the character of a mission, a holy cause (66). A different factor which enables killing is the drugged state so common in combat, the result of training and fatigue, which makes soldiers act as automatons (67).

Denis Winter, describing the experiences of soldiers in the first World War, also frequently refers to the 'self-drugged state' in which they advanced and fought, and which was partly caused by the upset in body chemistry produced by a state of high fear long sustained (68). He quotes one soldier who observed, 'God is merciful and it almost seems as though he chloroforms us on these occasions'; another one felt he had gone through the battle 'like a sleepwalker'. Winter adds: 'There are incidents recalled beyond number in memoirs in which men wondered if it was really themselves who gouged, clawed, clubbed and bayoneted. How could they have behaved so wildly?' (69).

Some of the above observations by Freud and Gray lose their meaning and import when the context is 'nuclear death'. This possibility has reduced to absurd clichés the fine words of the past when men proposed to die with honor rather than to live in shame because there would be nobody left to honor the dead. A defense of freedom and civilization at the price of destroying them is similarly absurd. In his essay 'Death in the Nuclear Age', Morgenthau has written that it is 'this contrast between our consciousness and the objective conditions in which we live, the backwardness of our consciousness in view of the possibility of nuclear death, that threatens us with the actuality of nuclear death' (70). This is the unique predicament of our age which faces the double challenge of totalitorian encroachment and nuclear devastation. Richard Falk has perceptively noted that 'The risks of the age burden us with the moral necessity to meet both challenges, although meeting one too ardently leads to an increased vulnerability to the other' (71). Indeed, this challenge cannot be resolved by believing that there is an easy way out of this dilemma, or by asking 'whether war is a greater or lesser evil than the imposition ...

of hostile values which the present anarchic world, with its attendant threat of war, allows ... to keep at a distance' (72). Assuming the impossibility of a meaningful victory and survival following a major nuclear war, such a war is a greater evil than any conceivable alternative since it would destroy mankind and civilization (73).

F.S. Northedge is confusing the issue when he writes that it is not clear whether Bertrand Russell 'really wishes to pay the price of global despotism in return for peace' since 'elsewhere, he writes that a new war would be preferable to a universal communist empire' (74). Russell's case in an exceedingly interesting one which, as in this quote, has often been mis-understood. In 'The Future of Mankind', an essay written shortly after the end of the Second World War and of the failure of the Baruch plan, Russell suggested that the U.S. use the threat of force, and if need be actual force, in order to bring about a world government as the only means to monopolize atomic power and thus prevent the end of civilization in a future atomic world war. In this bold, timely, and far-sighted essay he wrote that 'beyond the difficulties and probable tragedies of the near future there is the possibility of immeasurable good, and of greater well-being than has ever before fallen to the lot of man. This is not merely a possibility, but, if the Western democracies are firm and prompt, a probability' (75). This suggestion was not acted upon and when, in 1949, the Soviet Union exploded a nuclear device, the genie was out of the bottle, and Russell's idea had become obsolete. In the late 1950s Russell became a prominent figure in the British nuclear disarmament campaign and was accused by some of inconsistency. But as he wrote, 'My critics seem to think that, if you have once advocated a certain policy, you should

continue to advocate it after all the circumstances have changed. This is quite absurd' (76). In an age of nuclear proliferation, in which nuclear war spells suicide, the most elementary freedom is the freedom to choose survival, he wrote, criticising those who argued that 'No World' was preferable to a communist or a capitalist world. Those who held the latter opinion he advised to question their right 'to impose their opinion upon those who do not hold it by the infliction of the death penalty upon all of them'. This was, he concluded, an extreme form of religious persecution, never witnessed in human history (77).

What Russell advocated briefly at one time could be regarded as 'aggressive' war and one, moreover, in which the Americans were presumably entitled, if need be, to use the atomic weapon. Even such a war Russell would have regarded as 'justified' in order to avoid later a much greater catastrophe which he thought very likely (78). It is pertinent to point out that in this respect (the possible justification of offensive war), Russell shared the views of his main opponent (79) in the celebrated exchange on the morality of war which took place largely in the pages of the International Journal of Ethics during 1915. Russell initiated this debate with his article 'The Ethics of War' in which he justified his 'pacifist' stand and argued that none of the combatants in the war then taking place had a just cause. He admitted that war was not always a crime: what was important and decisive was not whether treaties had been broken and whether, on paper, a war was justified but whether there was a real justification for it 'in the balance of good which it is to bring to mankind'. This was the only valid criterion, and applying it to the past, he found that wars had taken place in which the good of mankind outweighed all

the evils of war; the present war was not among them (80). Ralph Barton Perry, professor of philosophy at Harvard, criticised Russell's non-resistance for being incompatible with his desire to preserve what is valuable in national life. Perry argued that 'to try out this principle of non-resistance one must imagine the greatest conceivable good to be attacked with a deliberate intent to destroy it; or the greatest conceivable evil to be threatened with a deliberate and implacable intent to perpetrate it' (81). To believe, as Russell did, that all things British - its civilization, democracy, language, manufacture - could survive defeat and occupation was unrealistic. Later, Russell was implicitly to concede this when he wrote, 'When, in 1940, England was threatened with invasion, I realised that, throughout the First War, I had never seriously envisaged the possibility of utter defeat. I found this possibility unbearable, and at last consciously and definitely decided that I must support what was necessary for victory in the Second War' (82). He had, he now recognised, allowed a larger sphere to the method of non-resistance than later experience (also in his personal life) seemed to warrant. Still, he could rightly claim that 'the practical difference, between [my] opposing the First War and supporting the Second, was so great as to mask the considerable degree of theoretical consistency that in fact existed' (83). The difference between Perry and Russell was, likewise, not one of principle but of its application. They both hated war, and to Perry's claim that 'the one cause for which one may properly make war is the cause of peace', Russell replied, in agreement, 'that it is legitimate to make war in order to end war' (84).

The initial enthusiasm for the Great War on the part of the peoples in the Allied countries was the belief that, in the words of H.G. Wells, this 'is not just another war - it is the last war' (85). The title of his book, <u>The War</u>

that will End War, is symptomatic of the inflated moral idealism with which the British, and later the Americans, justified their participation in the war. In a stimulating (but not always balanced) essay on 'War and the Philosopher's Duty', Warren Steinkraus has argued that one duty of the philosopher is precisely to clear up the confusing and misleading language of politics and of value which surrounds war (86). The unending talk of freedom in World War II contrasts sharply, he writes, with the practice of the 'free world' which, as in the case of Britain, maintained a colonial empire that denied freedom to millions of people. Another duty is to examine anew the standard arguments that have been used to justify war; the argument that wars are fought out of necessity, in particular, raises the question of alternatives; this, Steinkraus maintains, has rarely been adequately investigated. The problem of human values is another one which needs scrutiny; modern war, he argues, violates all personal values, as does the very preparation for war.

Steinkraus is certainly right in wanting to redress the balance since all too often philosophers have, as he demonstrates, fallen in with the rest of society in praising the virtues of war instead of exercising a moderating influence by not letting their emotions and passions prevail over reason and common sense. In the end we must, however, reflect upon the extraordinary range of individual human attitudes which contribute to the continued tolerance of war - which, in terms of the personal ends of the individual, is a demand that he convert the drive to preserve his own life into a drive to sacrifice it. As Julius Stone has commented, 'merely rational motives of economic interest and the like are obviously ineffective to produce such alchemy; the deepest emotional convictions and the most firmly held ideals, however misguided, also

obviously play their part. And the perplexities of men's age-old and ever-changing search for the good and the true and the holy are thus also close to the heart of the so-called "problem of war"' (87).

Notes

(1) Stanislav Andreski, 'Pacifism and Human Nature', in Peter van den Dungen, ed., West European Pacifism and the Strategy for Peace (London: Macmillan, 1985), p. 5.

(2) Armand Clesse, 'The Peace Movements and the Future of West European Security', in ibid., p. 60.

(3) Paul Vallely, 'Walking the Warhead Road', The Times (July 11, 1986), p. 14. The fact that Kent refers to weapons, not war, is indicative of the evolution referred to. Kent's interlocutor continues: 'Indeed, he feels as strongly about the perils of peaceful nuclear power. That, too, he sees as some kind of perversion of the natural order'. One may well query both the reality of the existence, and the alleged beneficence, of 'the natural order'. Several practices which are now regarded as barbaric were once defended as belonging to that order. It is not long ago either that war itself was held to be a divine judgment and an integral part of that order.

(4) See, e.g., David Henshaw, 'Animal Liberationists Declare War on their own Species', The Listener (June 19, 1986), pp. 4-5.

(5) Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (London: Kegan Paul, 1941), p. 41.

(6) W.E.H. Lecky, History of European Morals, 2 vols., (London: Watts, 1930 ed.),

vol. 1, p. 121.

(7) Ibid., p. 122.

(8) Ibid.

(9) Ibid. The observation that amusement, rather than learning about death, was Spinoza's intention seems to be borne out by the fact that in all his writings there is only one short sentence on death. Cf. Panos D. Bardis, History of Thanatology: Philosophical, Religious, Psychological, and Sociological Ideas Concerning Death from Primitive Times to the Present (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981), pp. 1 & 66. It is perhaps not surprising that in less than a hundred pages, Bardis is unable to do justice to his subject: the title promises much more than the book delivers.

(10) Lecky, History, vol. 1, p. 122.

(11) Ibid., vol. 2, p. 8.

(12) Ibid.

(13) Ibid., p. 10. He observes that the reforms of Christianity in this sphere were powerfully sustained by a doctrine 'which is, perhaps, the most revolting in the whole theology of the Fathers'. They taught that at the moment when the foetus in the womb acquired animation it became an immortal being which, in its unbaptised state, was doomed to be excluded for ever from heaven. This doctrine is somewhat similar to the argument frequently used by early Quakers and some later non-Quaker pacifists that it was better to be killed by an assailant than to kill him. The reasoning, in the words of Thomas Chalkley, an 18th-century English Quaker, being as follows: 'That I being innocent, if I was killed in my body, my soul might be happy; but if I killed him, he dying in his wickedness, would, consequently, be unhappy; and if I was killed, he might live to repent; but if

I killed him, he would have no time to repent; so that if he killed me, I should have much the better, both in respect to myself and to him'. Cf. Peter Brock, Pacifism in the United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 79, note 102. After having quoted a similar view, Brock comments: 'a curious argument, perhaps, to us today but one quite frequently urged by pacifist writers of the evangelical age' (p. 492).

(14) Although Christianity is one of the most pacifistic of faiths, Christian peoples have a record of military activity second to none. See, e.g., John Ferguson, War and Peace in the World's Religions (London: Sheldon Press, 1977), p. 122.

(15) Lecky, History, vol. 2, p. 21.

(16) Ibid.

(17) Brock, Pacifism, p. 52.

(18) Ibid.

(19) Ibid., p. 94, note 37.

(20) Ibid., p. 504. Grimké was, however, opposed to capital punishment. When William Penn started his 'Holy Experiment' in Pennsylvania in 1683, neither he nor his fellow Quakers held a testimony against capital punishment. It is only fair to point out that this penalty was retained, however, for only two offenses, murder and treason, at a time when in the mother country a multitude of offenses were punished by death.

(21) The struggle between 'compartmentation' and 'inclusiveness' - and the resulting prevarication - as regards the agenda of the emerging peace movement can be followed, e.g., in the pages of The Herald of Peace, the organ of the London Peace Society. See, e.g., the editorial comment justifying the publication of an article entitled 'On the Abolition of

the Punishment of Death' in the April-June 1824 issue (p. 89). Another essay on the same topic was published in the October-December issue (p. 245).

(22) George C. Beckwith in Thomas C. Upham, The Manual of Peace (Boston: American Peace Society, 1842 ed.), pp. 7-8.

(23) Ibid., p. 100.

(24) Ibid., pp. 152-153.

(25) Brock, Pacifism, p. 650.

(26) George C. Beckwith, The Peace Manual (Boston: American Peace Society, 1847), Preface.

(27) Brock, Pacifism, p. 505.

(28) Ibid., pp. 621-622.

(29) Ibid.

(30) Ibid.

(31) Ibid., p. 620.

(32) John Sheppard, An Inquiry on the Duty of Christians with Respect to War; Including an Examination of the Principles of the London and American Peace Societies (London: T. Hamilton, 1820), pp. 54-55, note. More recently, the same point has been made thus: 'Strictly speaking ... in spite of the fact that the term "war" is applied to both aggressive activity and the activity of self-defense, an analysis of the respective activities will reveal that the two are contrary in most respects ... if an instance of violence is a case of self-defense, then it is "war" only in an incidental sense. Strictly, a "war of self-defense" implies a contradiction in terms'. Cf. A.C. Genova, 'Can War be Rationally Justified?' in Robert Ginsberg, ed., The Critique of War: Contemporary Philosophical Explorations (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1969), p. 213.

(33) Brock, Pacifism, p. 699.

(34) Ibid., p. 696.

(35) Ralph B. Potter, War and Moral Discourse (Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1969), p. 60. This is an excellent little volume with a substantial bibliographical essay (pp. 87-123).

(36) Ibid., p. 61.

(37) Ibid., pp. 61-66.

(38) Love and Justice: Selections from the Shorter Writings of Reinhold Niebuhr (Cleveland, Ohio: World Publ. Comp./Meridian, 1967 ed.), ed. D.B. Robertson, pp. 266-267. In another essay in the same collection, writing on pacifism and the use of force, Niebuhr comments: 'The writer abhors consistency as a matter of general principle because history seems to prove that absolute consistency usually betrays into some kind of absurdity' (p. 248). I fail to remember the author of the saying that consistency leads to the devil.

(39) Brock, Pacifism, pp. 690-691.

(40) Ibid.

(41) John Lewis, The Case against Pacifism (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1940), p. 62.

(42) Ibid., p. 40.

(43) It would be wrong to believe, however, that Franklin or Cicero were pacifists. Once Franklin had put the responsibility for the war of 1776 firmly on Great Britain, his denunciations of the war shifted from considerations of its inhumanity to those of its injustice, and peace as such ceased to be the ultimate goal of his actions. In 1778, e.g., he wrote: 'Assure yourself, that nobody more sincerely wishes perpetual Peace among Men than I do; but there is a prior Wish, that they would be equitable

and just, otherwise such Peace is not possible, and indeed wicked Men have no right to expect it'. It was better to continue the War than 'to submit to any base Conditions that may be offered us'. Justice in international relations, then, might require the subordination of peace to its demands. See Gerald Stourzh, Benjamin Franklin and American Foreign Policy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed. 1969), pp. 186-190. Gerardo Zampaglione discusses Cicero's ideas on war and peace under the significant heading 'Ciceronian Eclecticism': Cicero condemned war in the abstract but accepted and indeed extolled it in cases of legitimate defense, retaliation, or revenge. A more accurate expression of his view is that 'the only excuse ... for going to war is that we may live in peace unharmed'. Cf. The Idea of Peace in Antiquity (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), pp. 148-151.

(44) John Oman, The War and its Issues, quoted in Lewis, Case, p. 89.

(45) Alan and Veronica Palmer, Quotations in History (Brighton: Harvester, 1976), p. 108.

(46) Lewis, Case, p. 30.

(47) Ibid., pp. 78-84.

(48) Ibid., p. 85.

(49) Ibid., p. 123. In his cogently argued book, Lewis takes issue with the views underlying a rational, secular pacifism. He argues, e.g., that violence does not always increase the sum of wickedness; that war does not always lead to more war; that one can extirpate evil with evil without becoming evil oneself. Only his chapters on the causes of war and on Russia reveal Lewis's marxist bias. The attempt by Carl Marzani in his introduction to a modern reprint to stand the book on its head

and use its arguments to make a case for pacifism is only partially successful. But Marzani is obviously right in asserting that 'thermonuclear war strengthens the case for pacifism' since such a war would be self-defeating and 'there isn't anything more evil than the extermination of the species' (New York: Garland, 1973), p. 9.

(50) Louis J. Swift, 'Augustine on War and Killing: Another View', Harvard Theological Review (66:3, July 1973), p. 375.

(51) Ibid., p. 377.

(52) Ibid., p. 382.

(53) Arnold Toynbee, 'Death in War', in Arnold Toynbee et. al., Man's Concern with Death (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1968), p. 146.

(54) Sigmund Freud, 'Thoughts for the Times on War and Death' (1915) in his Civilization, War and Death, ed. John Rickman (London: The Hogarth Press, 1939), p. 21.

(55) Ibid., pp. 16-17.

(56) Ibid.

(57) J. Glenn Gray, The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle (New York: Harper and Row, 1967 ed.), p. 43.

(58) Ibid., p. 45.

(59) Ibid., p. 216.

(60) Ibid., p. 40.

(61) Ibid., p. XIV.

(62) Ibid., p. 46.

(63) Cf. John Ferguson, War and Peace, p. 17.

(64) Lecky has drawn the following analogy between the monastic and the military spirit: both 'promote and glorify passive obedience, and therefore prepare

the minds of men for despotic rule; but, on the whole, the monastic spirit is probably more hostile to freedom than the military spirit, for the obedience of the monk is based upon humility, while the obedience of the soldier coexists with pride. Now, a considerable measure of pride, or self-assertion, is an invariable characteristic of free communities' (Lecky, History, vol. 2, p. 79). This seems, in a more general context, to be a case of standing Bernard Mandeville's fable on its head, since private virtues result in public vices. Earlier in his book, Lecky says as much when he observes: 'Not unfrequently ... by a curious moral paradox, political crimes are closely connected with national virtues. A people who are submissive, gentle, and loyal, fall by reason of these very qualities under a despotic government' (Ibid., vol. 1, p. 64). The moral ambiguity of obedience - a virtue which tends to become a vice - is well demonstrated in Stanley Milgram's classic study, Obedience to Authority (London: Tavistock, 1974). See also Alex Comfort, Peace and Disobedience (London: Peace News, 1946) and Francis Tuker, The Pattern of War (London: Cassell, 1948). Tuker quotes Robert G. Ingersoll's contention that history shows, again and again, that we have been saved by disobedience (and led to ruin by obedience). According to Sir Basil Liddell Hart, 'We learn from history that the critics of authority have always been rebuked in self-righteous tones - if no worse fate has befallen them - yet have repeatedly been justified by history. To be "agin the government" may be a more philosophic attitude than it appears'. Why Don't We Learn from History? (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1944), p. 17. He goes on to relate this to the nature of governments which have an inherent tendency 'to infringe the standards of decency and truth'. Liddell Hart,

and others, have shown that this adage applies with particular force to a country's defense establishment.

(65) Gray, Warriors, pp. 47-48.

(66) Ibid., pp. 141-166.

(67) Ibid., p. 102.

(68) Denis Winter, Death's Men: Soldiers of the Great War (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 181.

(69) Ibid., pp. 181, 189, 210.

(70) Hans J. Morgenthau, 'Death in the Nuclear Age', in his Politics in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971 abr. ed.), p. 202.

(71) Richard A. Falk, Law, Morality and War in the Contemporary World (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 45.

(72) F.S. Northedge, 'Peace, War, and Philosophy', in Paul Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 6 (New York: Macmillan Comp. & The Free Press, 1967), p. 66.

(73) However, the 'better red than dead' option, the belief that the values of freedom and liberty can be traded in for a war-free future existence, is unlikely to be available: a more likely outcome of unilateral abandonment by the West of its military potential is a world of warring totalitarian powers in which many people will find themselves both 'red and dead'. See, e.g., Alexander Shtromas, 'Pacifism and the Contemporary International Situation', in Peter van den Dungen, ed., West European Pacifism, pp. 34-50.

(74) Edwards, ed., Encyclopedia, p. 66. Northedge's inaccurate presentation of Russell's views appears to be the result of a careless use of his sources.

(75) Bertrand Russell, Unpopular Essays (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970 ed.), p. 45.

(76) Bertrand Russell, Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1959), p. 90 (cf. appendix II, 'Inconsistency?').

(77) Ibid., p. 88.

(78) The view that it is always wrong for a government to start a war, and always right for it to meet external aggression with force, is simplistic. A preventive war against Nazi-Germany in the 1930s might have been morally right, just as a defensive war in Czechoslovakia in 1968 might have been morally wrong (the latter because of the absence of a prospect of success). Cf. Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 269. The chapter 'War', pp. 251-285, is an excellent exposition of the moral issues involved.

(79) Cf. Ralph Barton Perry, 'What is Worth Fighting for?', in Atlantic Monthly (December 1915), esp, p. 830, and reprinted in The Ethics of War: Bertrand Russell and Ralph Barton Perry on World War I, ed. Charles Chatfield (New York: Garland, 1972).

(80) Bertrand Russell, 'The Ethics of War', in International Journal of Ethics (January 1915), pp. 127-142, and contained in his Justice in War-Time (London: Open Court Publ., 1917), pp. 19-37 (this volume is also reprinted in Chatfield, ed., The Ethics of War).

(81) Ralph Barton Perry, 'Non-Resistance and the Present War: A Reply to Mr. Russell', in International Journal of Ethics (April 1915), pp. 307-316, and reprinted in Chatfield, ed., The Ethics of War. The quote is at p. 311.

(82) The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, 1914-1944 (vol. II) (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968), p. 191.

(83) Ibid., p. 192.

(84) Perry, 'Non-Resistance', p. 310; Bertrand Russell, 'The War and Non-Resistance: A Rejoinder to Professor Perry', in International Journal of Ethics (October 1915), pp. 23-30, and reprinted in Chatfield, ed., The Ethics of War. The quote is at p. 26.

(85) H.G. Wells, The War that will End War (London: Frank and Cecil Palmer, 1914), p. 11.

(86) Warren E. Steinkraus, 'War and the Philosopher's Duty', in Ginsberg, ed., Critique of War, pp. 3-29.

(87) Julius Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict (New York: Rinehart, 1954), pp. XXXV-XXXVI.

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