



THE PRAXIS VALUE OF UNIFICATION ONTOLOGY

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ICUS paper abstract
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The praxis value of a philosophy is the inspiration and guidance it provides for improving the world. Ontology, generally, means the base level of a philosophy or worldview wherein it is grounded and/or conceptually integrated. The first part of the paper argues that, in this general sense, Unification ontology has a distinctive praxis value in that it seeks to offer a standpoint of responsible freedom while realistically recognizing the perverse distortion of freedom and also maintaining hope for restoration and fulfilment. A look at competing worldviews finds ~~none~~ none so seemingly intent, in principle, on a comparably wholistic and hopeful outlook.

The current manual of Unification Thought uses the term "ontology" in the more limited sense of the theory of created being prior to the distinction of personal and impersonal. The second part of the paper focusses therefore on this more specific ontological discussion. The comprehensive and open ended character of the Unification approach is affirmed with regard to the attributes and mode of being, subject and object, individuation and connection. Translations and parallels are suggested for key terms like sungsang and hyungsang. Numerous particular points are appreciated and criticized, with constructive proposals, as on the gender issue. Evolution and evil are found to need further exposition, in a wider ecumenical and critically progressive setting.

The Praxis Value of Unification Ontology

by Durwood Foster

I

By the praxis value of a system of thought I mean its significance for the transformation of the world. At least since the 60s most of us have paid lip service to Marx's dictum that "the point is not to understand the world but to change it." This enduringly true if now trite slogan is of course overdrawn. The mentor of modern class upheaval should have said that the point of understanding the world is to change it. Instead his dictum creates an antithesis between insight and practice. But not to try with all scientific rigor to understand the world makes no sense and would eventually wreck everything, as the Club of Rome, ICUS and other global parliaments continue to reiterate. Their effort to reform present praxis in the light of sound understanding is our best hope to avert worldwide disaster. Moreover, in the last analysis, it is antihuman not to appreciate understanding as an end in its own right. As was already clearly thematized by Aristotle, the contemplative virtues are under the aspect of eternity more ultimate than the practical, since the latter find their end in the former. Yet we find ourselves plunged into the guilt, threat and duty of a common history, and so cannot evade the exigency, to be recognized in our theory too, of transforming things. Within history it is never the main thing just to construe the world, for it sorely

needs saving--that is, setting free and making whole. When that is attained, in company with the owl of Minerva which comes at the close of day, there will forever be time to savor the pure delights of understanding.

Ontology, as the theory of being, is generally understood to be the most fundamental level of philosophy. It is the conceptual base upon which all other thought is grounded, or at least the most general system of coherence in which it is integrated. Now it happens that this is not, in fact, the meaning assigned to the term in Unification Thought, where ontology is said rather to denote "theory concerning the beings created by God" [Fundamentals of Unification Thought, 1991, p. 59]. Not only would Unification Thought thus restrict ontology to "created" beings. It also proposes to treat human being, which is a species of the created (and indeed the most interesting one), "in a chapter apart, namely, 'Theory of Original Human Nature'" [Ibid.]. As a matter of fact, Unification Thought does not strictly carry through this express intention. In Chapter 2, entitled "Ontology," of Dr. Lee's current revision of the manual [FUT, pp. 59-108] there is a great deal of discussion of human being and some of the divine or creating reality. Nevertheless, the intention to exempt God and human being from general ontology, and so to limit the latter to "things," or to reality per se without regard to either the "I-Thou" or the "Creator-creature" distinction is interesting and implicitly highly significant. A parallel move has been made in classical

and modern Western theology--with Eastern analogues as well-- wherever, as e. g., with Duns Scotus or Ritschl, or with Kant for that matter, the most central and peculiar content of theology (or a philosophical surrogate thereof) has been methodically differentiated from metaphysics, from nature, or from the structure of being in general. This differentiation remains, of course, highly problematic, as in the themes of the analogia entis and the creatio ex nihilo, wherein the issue of an ultimate limit to human inquiry is explored. Against the background of such an issue the idea of revelation might then be made intelligible. The cognate Eastern problematic inheres in such notions as the nirguna Brahman, the "Tao without name," and sunyata. One is reminded, in accosting this problematic, even in the subdued form in which it appears in Unification Thought, of how much fundamental work really does cry out to be undertaken in the ontological arena. Hopefully Unification Thought itself, which seems to be just on the threshold here of a truly primordial theme, will in years to come launch more deeply into the problematic thus adumbrated. I would personally stress how urgently the enterprise needing to be pursued here is a philosophically ecumenical one in which all world traditions might be invited to engage in creative co-thinking. To sponsor a world "think tank" of philosophers to get at this core aporia of historical thought would be a most worthy unification project.

Be that as it may, I shall turn next, in addressing the

subject assigned me, to a wholistic or perspectival appraisal of "Unification ontology" in the more general sense of the fundamental conceptuality or metaphysics of Unificationism. In spite of the likelihood of some overlap with the paper focusing on Chapter 1 of our manual ("Theory of the Original Image"), it seems important to begin with an overall perspectival assessment of Unification metaphysics in order to put out on the table what I most want to say. For I believe there is something saliently valuable in the basic philosophy, worldview or theology of Unificationism--something valuable precisely for praxis. This is its character as an ontology of responsible freedom. Perhaps one should immediately add: responsible freedom that is also realistically perceived to be ontologically fallen or deranged, and nevertheless capable--this being truly pivotal--of being rehabilitated and fulfilled. The whole package as thus sketched has, as I see it, inestimable significance for a relevant praxis in our contemporary world.

For we sorely need a praxis today in which the titanic creative energies of diverse humankind can be meaningfully and harmoniously engaged. That calls for an ontology in which human freedom is woven into the basic texture of being. No worldview in which freedom is denied or somehow explained away can satisfy the requirements of a praxis that enlists and honors human commitment and creative achievement. If at bottom the truth about reality makes human responsibility null or unintelligible, that will inevitably sap and subvert any ethics and polity in

which responsibility is called on to play a role. Surely this is a major reason why the polity and economy of the social systems predicated upon Marxism have sickened and disintegrated. The materialistic metaphysics of Marxism excludes human freedom a priori, and that, I would argue, is intrinsically suicidal to the long term success in praxis of any system of thought.

A constructive social praxis is also gravely threatened in the capitalist or modified-capitalist world so far as here too a meaningful ontological base for responsible human engagement has been increasingly eroding. Scientific rationalism in democratic societies is deeply allied with a mechanistic determinism that eschews freedom. This is not always made as explicit as it was in Jacques Monod's classic statement Chance and Necessity. Yet it works away implicitly, nurtured for example in the psychology and sociology departments of American academia where the heritage of J. B. Watson and ~~and~~ B. F. Skinner holds sway, and aided and abetted by all those philosophical fashions that content themselves with semantic analysis or with phenomenological bracketing of ontological issues, or alternatively impugn concern with the "foundations" of thought, as do Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam, to mention two of the current leading names. Existentialism and more recently Deconstructionism were significant protests against the dehumanizing--or we might as readily say, the "defreedomizing"--tyranny of modern scientific ontology, though their violent reversal toward normless autonomy has unleashed an equal and opposite conceptual chaos no

more supportive of responsible and creative human liberty.

As a luminous exception to the general trend in modern metaphysics, Whiteheadian or Process Thought commands appreciation because it is a philosophy of responsible freedom. In Whitehead's ontology spontaneity is one of the primordial factors entering into the constitution of everything. As in Buddhist metaphysics, a dependent co-origination (pratitya samutpada) characterizes the world. But, as is not the case in classical Buddhism, this is plausibly embraced and normed in the Whiteheadian perspective by the reality of selves, objective values, and God. Thus every individual self is limited and framed within a network of responsibility. There is deep congruency between the Whiteheadian philosophy and Unification ontology, stemming from the Judaeo-Christian roots they share, and also from the disposition of each to respond positively to contemporary knowledge. Whether Unification Thought is able to espouse the panentheistic vision of ultimacy that Process Theology has pioneeringly developed is somewhat unclear, but in any case they both salutarily transcend that traditionalist Judaeo-Christian ontology that hardened long ago into a conception of divine determinism inimical to genuine human responsibility. Newly appearing texts in Christian theology continue to propound this determinism, even if in a more sotto voce manner than Calvin would have, as for instance the very recent Theology Primer of Robert Neville [SUNY Press, 1991, especially pp. 83-4]. Against this ontological mechanism the

Existentialist revolt has retrieved a radical human freedom at the expense of God in whom meaningful responsibility might be grounded and integrated. Deconstructionism, more extremely, has tended to dissolve totally the rational order or Logos that might have served as a surrogate for God.

The Whiteheadian philosophy, then, along with Unification ontology, stands out as a notable exception to the general trend of modern philosophies either to opt out of relevance for human praxis or to contribute directly to undermining the intelligibility of the same. Of course, in a complete inventory one would need to note as well the protesting and/or liberating ontological contributions of such towering individual figures as Buber, Tillich, and Polanyi--or even Barth, for that matter. Rather unfortunately, all of these demurred, however, to undertake constructive ontology as such. On the other hand, Eastern thinkers have launched encouraging new ontological ventures, as in the neo-Hindu synthesis of Sri Aurobindo and the neo-Buddhist historico-ontological consciousness of Hisamatu Shin Ichi and Masao Abe. For present purposes we must restrict ourselves to registering the promise of these initiatives for the ecumenical co-thinking in ontology we so much hope the Unification Thought movement will incite and sponsor in the years ahead.

If in the West Process Philosophy has by and large led the way, at least for large circles, toward a more adequate ontology that, while in no way anti-rational or anti-scientific,

would also enfranchise responsible freedom in the charter of being, nevertheless this movement has shown a serious weakness in failing to provide an adequate ontology of sin and guilt. Like Western philosophy Überhaupt, Whiteheadianism has shied away from tackling iniquity. But iniquity, or sin, has to be tackled by any worldview that proposes to offer a credible account of experience. Moreover, when we are considering the bearing of ontology upon praxis, sin and guilt are all the more unavoidable. Doubtless one of the reasons ontology is widely suspected of being hopelessly impractical is its shunning by and large of human deviance, or of the split, as Tillich liked to put it, between essence and existence. Unification Thought in this respect is a striking exception. Not only has it provided an analysis of reality in which contradiction of "original nature" is thinkable and possible. It has also, in an axial way, recognized the actuality of sin and guilt. It thus attains a healthy degree of philosophical realism, which certainly enhances its potential clout with respect to praxis. Reinhold Niebuhr and the Neo-orthodox theology were credited by some intellectuals in America with reintroducing into serious discussion such a realism. But, especially in this respect, they were construed (and that meant, widely in academia, dismissed) as theologians; they were not accorded the pure cognitive sanctity of philosophers. Sin and philosophy, even by those who wanted to think realistically, continued to be regarded as strange if not grossly incompatible bedfellows. Thus

Unification Thought, because it does make guilty fallenness a fundamental part of its theory, achieves a notable ontological breakthrough.

By the same token history is brought front and center in the purview of being--the heritage that Aurobindo, Nishida and other great Eastern minds have so admired in the West and sought rather futilely to emulate. Alas, if history is a stock in trade of Western consciousness, that has been basically due to theology, or to the primal Judaeo-Christian myth, rather than to philosophical ontology. If Western ontology has moved as in Hegel to incorporate history, this has been by way of logical ingestion in which freedom, contingency and genuine struggle--the pith whereby history remains itself--were annulled (aufgehoben) in a supra-historical logical schematism (the System that so provoked Kierkegaard). Most ontologies, Western, Eastern or whatever, have, as ontologies, either ignored history or spurned what was not logically assimilable in it as irrelevant accident. This is not to suggest that any system of thought has resolved the tension between history and eternity--anymore than contemporary physics has been able to comprehend the actuality of time or synthesize it with the formalism of mathematics and law. The point to be made here, in attempting to appraise the overall Unification worldview, is that the reality and importance of history are envisaged --staked out as central for ontological understanding. It is pertinent to note that in this regard Unification Thought can

presently be said only to have encamped on the threshold of its task. The current manual thus remains, we would take it, a provisional worksheet. And, yes, a certain danger needs to be recognized that the seduction of a kind of Hegelian pan-logism might cloy the whole enterprise with a premature schematic sclerosis. Our own mission, in the Committee, is surely to help prevent that.

A final pivotal asset of the Unification worldview in general cannot be left unmentioned here. This is its character as an ontology of hope. It is not only a theory of original being in which freedom is potential, or a theory of distorted being, in which freedom is fallen, but also a theory of new being in which freedom is restored and fulfilled. This horizon of a redemptive futurity is, I submit, absolutely decisive for the praxis value of Unification ontology. As Ernst Bloch thoroughly documents in his bulky tome Das Prinzip Hoffnung, it is the hope of transformation that has shaped the positive achievements of humanity, individual and social, throughout history. Was it not the hopeful vision of a better world that fueled the amazing spread of Marxism to almost dominate the earth within a single century? Just as it was the cruel deception of that vision that ordained the eventual collapse of communist systems, leaving us with, if anything, the exacerbated urgency of discovering a valid hope for the human future, a hope that is truly grounded in the foundations of being? Again in this respect, it is the thematic scope of Unification

ontology that one first of all commends, rather than the content of the program that Unificationism has been propounding in the world, or even the specific details of the ontology as they have been spelled out up to this point in time. Our next step, then, is to examine ^{some of} those details, as they appear in Chapter 2 of the current manual of Unification Thought.

II

Unification ontology in the narrower sense, as the theory of created beings without regard to the specific difference of human beings (which is considered in a chapter apart), has the purpose of "confirming in visible terms the attributes of the invisible God" [FOUT, p. 59]. Unlike fallen humanity, "things themselves have remained as originally created" and thus offer an undistorted mirror of the Original Image or the Divine Nature as it may be known by us [ibid., p. 60]. This thought, which coincides with the classical Christian theme of the vestiges of God in creation, prompts right at the outset the question of evolution. This question is in fact one of the most portentous in the entire interface of Unification Thought with modern knowledge. For while there is in the former, as noted in the previous section, a wholesome commitment in principle to history, that is to say, to human history, there appears to be no recognition of the continuing development of nature. The Big Bang theory is cited [p. 98], and we read that the universe has "been developing in a definite direction." Yet it seems that with human being that development has now reached its terminus.

"The human being is the ultimate fruit of the universe" [ibid., p. 99]. This thought corresponds to that of Teilhard and others that evolution of species (a "history of nature") has gone on for eons but with the advent of homo sapiens has been sublated into human history, through which the drama of creation thenceforth continues. Even Tillich, by positioning his "historical dimension" as the climax of the inorganic, organic, psychic and spiritual, retains what has implicitly been the classic Judaeo-Christian model, devolving from the Priestly creation story of Genesis, Chapter One. While therefore this idea of Unification Thought may not be as "far out" (or as pre-scientifically fundamentalist) as might first appear, it does cry out for a more thoroughgoing thematization vis-a-vis evolutionary theory than has apparently yet been targeted by Dr. Lee and his associates. It is noticeable in the same connection that the current manual (FOUT) devotes no chapters to biology or cosmology. Modern thought, however, without being locked into a tight Darwinian orthodoxy or any one cosmogonic model, is thoroughly steeped in an evolutionary conception of nature. It would seem clear that the future work of Unification Thought should include a more intensive Auseinandersetzung with Darwin, the post-Darwinian controversies, and with current astrophysics. It seems a pity, in fact, that ICUS itself, with the participation of so many eminent theoreticians from the natural sciences, has not hitherto intermeshed more earnestly and in detail with the concerns of Unification Thought. There have been very distinguished ICUS committees that focussed on themes of

current physics and biology, but to my knowledge no attempt has been made so far to integrate their findings into the ongoing program of Unification Thought.

Since the aim of our inquiry is to discuss the praxis value of Unification ontology, it behooves us to lift up again the announced purpose [FOUT, p. 59] of confirming the attributes of the invisible God. In other words, there is at bottom a pious-contemplative intention of corroborating the faith vision of Unificationism and nurturing a devotional attitude. At the same time, the breach between objectivistic scientism and faith (one of the great banes of modernity) might be healed and the basis laid for a new cultural reintegration of science, religion and humanistic values. No one can dispute that such an intentionality is worthy, and that the praxis value of any such achievement would be momentous. One is reminded of the traditional Christian idea of the "two books" of divine truth: the Bible on the one hand, and Nature on the other. Galileo and Newton still piously intoned the unitary witness, in principle, of these two revelatory sources. But the impact of the scientific revolution has, in fact, led very pervasively to their apparent antagonism. Dare we aspire to put the Humpty Dumpty (the primal egg) of our culture together again? One of the exhilarating things about the Unification movement is its unabashed courage in this respect. Or is it a rash and presumptuous naivete? Our labors in this committee of ICUS distill our efforts, I take it, to decide such matters. Or hopefully they manifest

some kind of commitment to the goal, even if various degrees of scepticism about the result are quite palpable.

Albrecht Ritschl, Clifford Geertz and others have described how religion provides an axial construction of the world that undergirds the meaning and value of being human. Certainly the basal Judaeo-Christian myth seems to exemplify this function of religion, and the same may be said of the mainstream of classical Greek philosophy (embracing Platonism, Aristotelianism and Stoicism), wherein the notion of human being as the microcosm and measure of all things plays a central role. Eastern religions in varying measure exhibit parallels to this humanocentrism, as does modern philosophy of idealist as well as existentialist character. Unification ontology, therefore, is heir to a deep-seated historical consensus when it envisages the "human image as prototype" with reference to which "all things were created" [FOUT, p. 60; cf. pp. 82-3, passim]. Just as Karl Barth in his Kirchliche Dogmatik expounds how the covenant of redemption of human being in Christ, though coming ever so much later in time, is in eternity the foundation of the covenant of creation (and all the other covenants one may be led to distinguish), so Unification Thought maintains that "in creating the universe, what God first thought about was the human being; yet, the human being was the very last to be created" [FOUT, p. 83]. Biblical roots of such thinking that immediately come to mind are Proverbs 8:22f., John 1:3, and Colossians 1:15f.

However, in the biblical tradition, while a salient humanocentrism is indeed pervasively asserted, there are at the

same time reiterations of the unsearchable mystery of God. There is a continual dialectic in which the "humanity of God" is offset by the abysmal holiness of the Almighty, as notably in Job 40, or in Romans 11:33-4. In Christianity this is expressed in the trinitarian symbolism, and in Eastern traditions too there is characteristically a registering of the numinous ineffability of the Ultimate over against, as well as along with the human congruency of the personal God (or gods). The question arises as to whether in Unification ontology or theology there is anything corresponding to the apophatic theme, or the via negativa, that appears in most of the world's religions. We read that "every created being has the same attributes as those of the Original Image" [FOUT, p. 61]. How different this is from Spinoza's God, for example, who possesses infinite attributes, of which we are privy to only two (extension and thought)!

The raising of ecological consciousness in recent decades has triggered a reaction against religious and ontological humanocentrism. In this situation the transcendent ineffability of the biblical God (and classical Christian tradition) has been seen, for example by James Gustafson and Matthew Fox, as a factor which alleviates an otherwise oppressive exaltation of the human. Divine mystery is thus seen to have a quite positive function for ecologic or environmental praxis--a rather crucial front, many would hold, in today's struggle for a viable future. Appraising Unification Thought for its praxis value,

would we then need to ask if there is at this point a kind of deficit so far as ontological undergirding for desired praxis is concerned? Whatever the answer, it should be recognized in any case that Unification ontology does see the Original Image (God) reflected in every creature, a thought paralleled by the Buddhist theme of the "universal Buddha nature" and in various ways by other Eastern traditions. (E. g., the theriomorphism of Hinduism.) Christianity, contrastingly, in spite of the theme of the divine vestiges (which has been expressed, one must say, after Augustine all too diminuendo) has strongly tended to restrict the "divine image and likeness" (Genesis 1: 27) to humanity alone. In this regard, then, Unification Thought may well evince more praxis value for ecology than does orthodox Christianity.

Dr. Lee's current manual, in the chapter on ontology, proposes to deal with existing beings under two aspects: "the aspect of the image of existence and the aspect of the mode of existence" [FOUT, p. 60]. It is explained that "image of existence" refers to the attributes that existing beings possess, whereas "mode of existence" refers to the motion of existing beings. I personally find the nomenclature here rather cumbersome, and would like to hear a case made for its semantic efficiency. Nevertheless it seems to be generally translatable, or capable of being brought into alignment with established ontological terminology. We must recognize, of course, that there are no universal ontological paradigms that could be prescriptive

either for an intercultural audience or for any particular culture. Prominent models do, however, exist, and these serve as bench marks of general intelligibility. I take it, therefore, that Dr. Lee's basic division of "attributes" and "motion" is a version of Aristotle's "form" and "dynamics." "Structure" and "process" would be another way to say it. There is nothing new here so far, but it is reassuringly wholistic that both of the two aspects are enfranchised in an up front way. One would be suspicious of any ontology that wanted to run exclusively with either attributive essentiality (historically read here Parmenides) or with processive dynamism (read Heracleitus). Plato got Western ontology onto a good track by insisting on "being" and "becoming," as he put it. Right up to our time there have continued to be "one aspect only" ontologies that would either extirpate "logos" totally or swallow everything in it. Unification Thought, it appears, eschews such one-sidedness. That in itself is a "praxis value" of considerable moment, we believe, if harmonizing world visions has practical significance.

Another topic of traditional ontology reports itself in Dr. Lee's exposition of the "individual truth body" (read here "entity," "concrecence," or "anything in-itself") and the "connected body" (read "relationship," "belongingness," or "participation") [FOUT, p. 61, passim]. Again Unification Thought, helpfully I believe, affirms both sides of what could come asunder: that is individuation and participation, if I may follow here the phraseology of my own mentor Tillich. So,

individuals are real! That, as I argued at the Unification Thought Institute in Tokyo in 1990, is a tenet of enormous "praxis value," especially when applied at the level of persons and society, but reaching all the way down to the ontological bottom, as Aristotle saw. On the other hand, the connections are real too, because grounded in a Main Connector, the "Original Image" or God. This is equally important. Dr. Lee writes, as Plato already did (in the later dialogues), that everything partakes of the universal image while also instantiating its ownmost individual image. Under this contract, we shall not have to redo--hopefully--the medieval battle of "realism" and "nominalism." The solution, rather cryptically stated, seems to be essentially what Aquinas saw as Aristotle's, sometimes called "conceptualism." The universal is real in the particular. But this does not for Unification Thought, of course, compromise the aseity of God.

In spelling out the ontological attributes, Dr. Lee employs two basic conceptual models: "the dual aspects of sung-sang and hyungsang" and the "yang and yin characteristics" [FOUT, pp. 61, 66]. I wish I could offer a more thorough explanation of the first model, using Korean etymology, but unfortunately I have not yet been able to begin a serious study of that intriguing language. As often as some of us have sat through protracted lectures on sungsang and hyungsang, from Divine Principle itself, the Green Book, or whatever, I have never been able to unpack--or unify--precisely what the pair

of terms seems intended to mean. On the one hand the distinction strongly reminds me of the standing Western differentiation of mind and matter, perhaps in the more particular Cartesian version of res cogitans and res extensa. On the other hand, however, one ever and again gets the impression that what is more precisely intended is something like the dedans (interior) and dehors (exterior) which Teilhard finds so useful as a categorial duality. I suspect, actually, that sungsang and hyungsang are a kind of blend of these two distinctions. If so, confusion seems inevitable, for the one is basically a generic and the other a positional distinction. On page 62 of the manual we read that the "hyungsang unique to human beings is the physical mind," and then on the next page there is the statement that "in the physical person of human beings, the sungsang is the physical mind." The first instance does not appear to be a "typo." Yet, in the diagram on page 64, the human "physical mind" is clearly again placed within the sungsang. Perhaps the colleague writing on the Original Image (Chapter 1) will be able to clarify some of this, for it really gets complex in regard to God, who is said by Unification Thought to have both an "inner" and an "outer" hyungsang. I hope that in Seoul some further elucidation will be forthcoming, in any case from the Unification side.

While I feel that the "ontological alphabet" of Unificationism needs more rigorous explication at this juncture, I also believe it has merit, as before, in attempting to cover

both sides of the street; and the same may be said as well of the use of the yang-yin distinction.

It is a virtue of the use of the yang-yin theme that it brings Oriental ontology prominently into the conversation. Not only Taoism but the Chinese spirit in general long ago became pervaded by this way of intuiting the world. Ontology in its taproots is meditative and aesthetic as well as scientifically logical, and yang-yin mentality deeply reminds us of that. Its quintessential expression, I became convinced on recently visiting China, is the dragon. This chromosonic side of ontology will always be elusive and exasperating to the ratiocinative side, but cannot be dispensed with. In Western ontology it is paralleled, to some degree, by the experience of "quality." No ontology has ever succeeded in offering a complete inventory of the qualitative categories of the world--consider, for example, the bare bones effort of Aristotle in the Prior Analytics or of Kant in his first critique. Nor does Unification ontology succeed. For we shall always need actual art, and literature and life to satisfy the hunger for a fullness of being. Nonetheless, the endeavor of our manual [see p. 67, e. g.] to bring such matters as "excitement," "carefulness," and "protrusions" and "holes" onto the ontological canvas should, in principle, be celebrated. Heidegger's existentialia (Angst, Mitsein, Sein-zum-Tode, etc.) are in this ball park, and surely they comprise some of the best of his philosophy.

It would fall within the scope of the Original Image

(Chapter 1) to comment on how negativity (yin) opens up rich panentheistic possibilities for a doctrine of God. One would want to explore the yin characteristic of God in relation to the denial [FOUT, p. 91] that there is motion in God, and also the assertion that God is formless, though able to appear in any form [ibid., p92]. Presumably the yin characteristic provides a latency whereby and/or wherein God creates and becomes variously manifest, in contrast to the prototypical perfectly round (or yang) character, which is so reminiscent of Aristotle's "unmoved mover" [ibid., p. 93]. A real tension appears to exist between this notion of the motionless deity and the much more dynamic (and panentheistic) God who creates, judges, and undertakes to restore the fallen crown of creation which is human being. It is the same tension, needless to say, that inheres in historic Christian (as well as Jewish and Muslim) theism.

It is interesting to ponder what happens to the yang-yin structure in the case of "heart" (shimjung), which is the "core of the attributes of God" [FOUT, p.32] and thus presumably in some way of every individual truth body or entity. In the diagram on page 67 there is no reference to heart, but one may reasonably speculate that it would have to be the unitary ground in which the antithesis of yang and yin is transcended as well as rooted. A pointer to such a union is given in the mentioned diagram under intellect. The yang character of intellect is said to comprise the "power of recall"

and the yin character the "power to absorb in memory" [loc. cit.]. These powers do not exhibit opposition but rather a co-constituting mutuality. Thus memory, like love, and like heart, is indifferent to the yang-yin distinction. This way of moving with the conceptuality helps with respect to a locus where conventional yang-yin thematization has invited big trouble from the conscientized feminist and womanist mentality of today. I mean the way in which the feminine has been represented as inferior or negative vis-a-vis the superior and positive masculine. I sense that Unification Thought has responded to the feminist conscientization in that Dr. Lee is at pains to note that [FOUT, p. 68] "both man and woman have yang and yin in the intellect, yang and yin in the emotion, and yang and yin in the will." But is the response yet adequate? A "qualitative" difference is said to exist also in intellect, emotion, and will, and this is "figuratively" illustrated by comparing tenor and soprano [p. 69]. However, the timbre of the voice would seem irrelevant here, since it is predicated upon the hyungsang and not the sungsang which is the focus of discussion. One fears the praxis value, or rather disvalue, of Unification ontology in this venue may be to conjure up the older Hollywood image of the hysterical woman awaiting rescue by the resolute male.

The issue of masculine/feminine distinctiveness is, of course, still under serious debate in the general culture. Recent upsurge of a neo-masculinism (Robert Bly, Sam Keen, et al.) has complexified things, and what has been called

"romantic" feminism is strongly espoused by some of the most radical women while impugned by liberals. What would seem imperative from a praxis value standpoint is that no ontological stereotypes be posited that would constrict the socio-economic function of women or undermine their individual freedom and self-esteem. In the theological and cultural mainstream today there is wide agreement that a one-sidedly male image of deity is an invidious stereotype that degrades women. Therefore I would reiterate that the gender-transcending idea of "heart" as the core of God has wholesome potential for the liberation of women (and thereby of men too), both in Western culture and throughout the world. Hopefully at a point like this Unification Thought, as an ongoing critical and constructive process, might not only be inspired by Divine Principle as basic scripture but also redound upon that text itself in a renovative or restorative way.

Although at the outset of Chapter 2 the current manual tells us [p. 60] that it will deal with existing beings from two aspects, the actual arrangement of the material introduces along with attributes and motion three other co-ordinate topics, namely "Subject and Object" [pp. 70f.], "The Individual Image of the Individual Truth Body" [pp. 81f.], and "The Connected Body" [pp. 85f.]. This shows, I take it, the ongoing revision which all will surely endorse as healthy, though the tidiness of the text will inevitably leave something to be desired.

Since we have already commented briefly on the image

of the individual truth body (the entity in itself) and the connected body (relation, universals), I want to focus my remaining comments--trying to stay within the allotted 25 pages--on motion and on subject and object.

It is under the topic of motion, or mode of existence, that we encounter the paradox (as it seems to me) that God is both motionless and the locus of give-and-receive action between the Original Sungsang and the Original Hyungsang. "In the world of God, there exists no time or space, and therefore no motion. However, even though there is in God no such thing as mode of existence, or circular motion" [FOUT, p.91] --here I would suggest that (following Spinoza) the "mode" should be construed as either motion or rest--"there must exist in the Original Image some prototype of the circular motion that exists in the created world" [loc. cit.] The argument here does not conform to Whitehead's rule that the Divine Nature should exhibit all the essential features of reality, but it is in line with the classical Christian analogy of proportion: there must be in God some analogous base for whatever we find in creation. Nevertheless, Tillich does better, I believe, to affirm that there is in God a time and space that correspond to the divine nature. This is in accord with what was classically called the "analogy of proportionality," and is being variously followed in the new wave of Christian trinitarian theologizing (already in Barth, but freshly in Moltmann, Pannenberg, Jenson, and

others). In this way, it seems to me, the praxis value of a vision of Divine and human work toward and fulfilment in God's Realm (the Kingdom) could be enhanced through greater symbolic and rational consistency.

The last comments I will essay re the section on motion concern evil, the perennial enigma. While Part I of this paper commended Unification Thought's realism on sin, I must also say that the thematization of evil, as distinct from sin, seems seriously deficient. It is hinted that, since time, space and motion are the occasion of a distortion of God's perfect roundness (à là the Greeks), then time, space and motion may be the cause of "natural" evil [cf., p. 91]. There is long standing Western and Eastern precedent for this thought, and it does not lack plausibility (in the version for example of Leibniz). But surely more explication is called for. No ontology can hope to float (in the market of "praxis value") that does not give a penetrating account of evil. In the same connection the (very anti-Darwinian) position that there is no strife in the "law of the universe" [cf. FOUT, pp. 104f.] seems extremely questionable empirically. This standpoint is taken very determinedly over against Marxism. No one doubts that Darwin and Marx overdid "nature red in tooth and claw." but a more balanced formula needs to be reflected (I believe) in an integrative ontology.

On subject and object, since I have no time left, I can only commend the inclusion at this point of a Confucian sense of order and place--and yet also warn that the specter

will loom fulsomely here of an oppressive "hierarchy"--that bugaboo perjoration in so much of today's liberation rhetoric. In detail some of the assertions seem to me far too "dominance/submission" oriented: e. g., the idea that in a classroom the teacher is the subject and the students the objects [p. 78]. But I agree that the world and society could not operate without a right order, along with a right freedom; and thus I am glad the whole matter is on the ontological agenda. As with many other things, I suspect the more intense discussions of this to occur, in Seoul, in the scope of the appropriate epigonous disciplines, like in this case ethics and education.

Dr. Lee explains [p. 74] that in Unification Thought "subject and object" bear a different meaning from the philosophically conventional one. That is, shall we say, "o. k." But I would add in parting that the problematic that exists for ontology in the conventional meaning of the "subject-object relation" (and the "self-world" relation) is a very profound one that is not really treated in the current manual (though the chapter on epistemology gives it somewhat more attention).

Being overtime, and having in my mind's eye (from the pre-ICUS) the "original image" of our chairperson, I can only reiterate in breaking off my commendation of the inclusiveness and promise of the Unification Thought program, and look forward to the ongoing clarification of many points that remain challenging.

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