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Committee IV
Developmental Experiences in
East Asia and Latin America

Draft-for Conference
Distribution Only

Discussion Paper

by

Arifin Bey
Visiting Professor of
International Politics
Tsukuba University
Japan/Indonesia

on

Stuart William Greif's

INDONESIA'S NEW ORDER, PANCASILA AND DEVELOPMENT

The Twelfth International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences
Chicago, Illinois November 24-27, 1983

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COMMENTS ON
"INDONESIA'S NEW ORDER, PANCASILA AND DEVELOPMENT"

A Paper Presented by
Prof. Stuart Willian Greif

F o r e w o r d

I feel greatly honored to be invited to this Conference as I deeply appreciate the opportunity to comment on the paper of Prof. Greif. I must say, however, that I have never been placed in such a "dilemma-tic" position as I am today. The following may describe how I exactly feel.

A very good friend introduced to me one of his close acquaintances. As soon as we shook hands, he said in a rather exciting tone: "I have met your father. He is a great fellow: handsome and able!" Upon which my friend quickly added: "Now, please tell us all you know about your father to prove that this is not the case."

Prof. Greif has written a very sympathetic paper about Indonesia and the present government. He stressed that it was his very intention to compensate for "the lack of charity, understanding and balance" in the writings of "a large crop of political scientists, particularly in Australia and at Cornell University." 1)

I wonder, as an Indonesian and diplomat who had served under both the Sukarno and Suharto periods, I would be able, in all honesty to do a better job. The paper, written in such a stimulating way, so much so, that one was tempted to comment on almost every paragraph if not every sentence. Space limitation had prevented me from doing so. In commenting on the paper, I could have provided additional materials in support of Crouch, McVey and others. 2) Such a way would not bring us anywhere. I would rather 'compare notes' with Prof. Greif about the developments in Indonesia. By doing so, perhaps, one may be able to throw some reflection on the treatment of the subject concerned and whether "charity, understanding and balance" - to borrow the words of Prof. Greif - 3) have been equally distributed among those who deserved them, on the basis of their respective contributions to the making of Indonesia what it is today from a legacy produced by a colonial policy characterized, in the words of the author, as "cruel and rapaciousness of divide and rule." 4)

I would not be honest with myself, if I were to persuade myself to accept the positive views about the present government, without expression exceptions to the negative evaluations reserved to the preceding one. Pancasila and a policy of being true to national traditions, for which the present government has been given so much

praise ...

praise, had been introduced, formulated and consolidated during the Sukarno period.

One more point! As a country which had struggled to preserve this identity in the midst of the Cold War years, no discussion about Indonesia - or any other emerging nation around that time - can be balanced without taking into full considerations, the intricate international situation then prevailing.

On the basis of the above considerations, I would like to present my comments in the following order.

1. The Roots of Pancasila
2. The International Situation
3. Comparing Notes
4. Minor Remarks
5. C o n c l u s i o n

1. The Roots of Pancasila

Prof. Greif explained that Sukarno expounded Pancasila in order to draw away attention from Panca Dharma, which he introduced during the Japanese occupation. 1) Dharma and Sila cannot be placed at the same plane. "Dharma" means "actions", while Sila means "philosophy or ideology" as pointed out by Prof. Greif himself. 2) It is my considered view that instead of relegating an explanation of Pancasila to a mere footnote (3), full analysis should precede any discussion on development policies of Indonesia, past, present and future.

A casual reading of the writings of Sukarno as compiled in book form under the title: "Dibawah Bendera Revolusi" 4) would reveal that the seeds of this ideology were already present in Sukarno's mind as early as 1927. However, it was at the sessions of "Dokuritsu Jumbi Choosa Kai" (Research Commission for the Preparations of Indonesia's Independence) that Sukarno systematized his thoughts. The Commission, which met late in May and beginning July, 1945 under the Chairmanship of Dr Radjiman, stressed from the outset that the task of the Commission was to formulate the basic concept for independent Indonesia.

Three speakers volunteered to present their respective views. The first to speak was Prof. Mohammad Yamin, later to become Minister of Education, and Chairman of the "Overall National Development Board." The second speaker was Prof. R. Supomo, later to become Minister of Justice, while the third speaker was Ir Sukarno, later to become the first President of the Republic.

According to Mohammad Hatta, later to become Vice President,
there ...

there were no basic differences in the ideas presented by the three speakers, but the presentation of Sukarno "attracted the attention of the Commission and was received with a thunderous applause." 5) Later, a 9-man Committee was established to re-edit and formulate systematically, the said presentation. According to Hatta: "The nine-man Committee changed the order of principles and placed Belief in the One-ness of God as the first. The second principle, which in Sukarno's wording was called 'internationalism or humanism' was re-worded into 'humanism which is just and civilized', while the third principle was renamed 'the unity of Indonesia' to replace 'Indonesian nationalism'. The fourth principle was called 'kerakyatan' (people's principle), instead of 'Mufakat or Demokrasi' as originally used by Sukarno." 6) This re-worded formulation was embodied into the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, which served as the provisional basic law of the Republic to-be.

The term 'Pancasila' itself was not specifically mentioned in the Preamble, while Indonesian intellectuals did not have sufficient time to take a deeper look into the implications of the meaning of the respective principles. When the Indonesian Communist Party began to introduce interpretations more suited to its ideology, Sukarno ordered the publication of a booklet entitled: "The Birth of Pancasila", a re-rendering of the speech delivered by Sukarno before the Commission. In the following years, Sukarno himself elaborated on the meanings of the respective five principles.

In 1955, Indonesia elected a Parliament and a Constituent Assembly. The latter had the duty to draft a permanent constitution to replace the 1945 provisional constitution. It was bogged down in lengthy debates. No consensus was reached even after three years of deliberations. It was then that Sukarno intervened. He dissolved the Assembly and proclaimed the 1945 Constitution as permanent. This constitution is still in force today.

Divergent interpretations by various political parties, however, continued unabated. The Indonesian Communist Party, for instance, taking advantage of the original term "internationalism" as introduced by Sukarno, was able to present itself as the "defender" of Pancasila. Such a situation continued until the outbreak of the 30 September Movement in 1965.

In order to prevent further confusion, the People's Consultative
Assembly ...

Assembly in March 1978, reiterated that the correct wording of Pancasila was that which had been introduced into the Preamble of 1945 Constitution. Even so, up to today, the controversy about Pancasila has not yet ended. It cannot be said that all political parties, having divergent cultural pulls, have reached a sincere concensus on the role of Pancasila in this highly religious oriented nation. President Suharto, in his address before Parliament on the eve of Indonesia's Independence Day, saw the need to deny that Pancasila was to be installed as a state secular religion. 7)

Looking back, we can say that Indonesia had been put on the right ideological track, when it began as an independent nation. It was this contribution of Sukarno which had moved Willian L. Holland to give to Sukarno, next to Gandhi, the credit for having recognized rather early the ideological need of a new nation. 8)

Sukarno's vital contribution was also noted by an Australian scholar, Dr J.F. Cairns, who pointed out that:

"Indonesia will some day have to do without Sukarno. But she cannot do without Sukarnoism. She needs Sukarnoism plus practicable plans and the application that is needed to build them into results."

In other words, as we observe it today, Sukarno had built the basic foundations, enabling Suharto today to erect a building upon it.

2. The International Environment

The Cold War came to envelop the international situation soon after Indonesia had proclaimed its independence. Following the Roundtable Conference at the Hague in 1949, the Netherlands recognized Indonesia's sovereignty over the former Dutch East Indies, with the exception of West Irian. The ultimate status of this area was to be decided, within one year, through negotiations. This West Irian dispute was destined to poison the relationship, not only with the Netherlands, but with the United States as well.

It is interesting to note the observation made by Prof. Greif that Sukarno fared badly from 1957. This is a significant point. The previous year, namely in 1956, Sukarno paid a visit to Washington at the invitation of President Eisenhower. The Secretary of State then was John Foster Dulles, so famous for his words: "Fence setting (in the Cold War) is immoral. If you are not with us, you are against us!" Apparently, the invitation was meant to make sure, where Sukarno stood. Sukarno, for his part, where the US stood in the conflict between national independence movement and colonialism.

In ...

In his address before the joint session of the Senate and House of Representatives, Sukarno made it clear that he would not trade Indonesia's national objectives in return for American economic aid. Marguerite Higgins of the New York Herald Tribune wrote that "the plain speaking Indonesian made a hit." 10) James Reston of the New York Times commented that Sukarno had warned the United States she would loose in the competition with the Soviet Union 'to win the hearts of the Asian people." 11) Walter Lippmann underlined Sukarno's call for 'a new relationship between the emancipated East and the democratic West." 12)

Sukarno in Washington was a man who was seeking American support for Indonesia's case on West Irian. America and Indonesia agreed to disagree. Indonesia was to going to get west Irian into the fold of the Republic, through negotiations, if possible, through force if necessary. America for its part, was determined to keep intact the Western security alliance of which the Netherlands was a member. In the meantime, efforts would be continued to try to persuade Sukarno to change his mind, by soft talk if possible, but by swinging the stick, if necessary.

Following the failure at Washington, Sukarno visited the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Upon his return, he embarked on a series of political reforms, coupled with a total rejuvenation of the political and military leadership. These steps were to culminate in the establishment of Guided Democracy. Strained relations with the United States were the result.

In the meantime, revolts broke out in Sumatra and Sulawesi, designed to oust Sukarno from power. American sympathy and support went to the former. This pushed Sukarno even further into the Soviet and later to the Chinese side. Earlier in Vietnam, American support for France drove Ho Chi Minh into the hands of the Chinese communists and later, the Soviets. 13)

Within this context, permit me to say a few words about the so-called "Jakarta - Phnom Penh - Peking Axis." As a diplomat who had the opportunity to watch the developments around those times from within, I would say that also in this case, the academic world is usually 20 to 50 years behind in knowing the whole story. What happened in those years and what were Sukarno's motivations, may be explained as follows.

(1) The "Axis" tactic was necessary to try to separate Peking from Moscow. Even as Sukarno was paying lip service to the "Axis",
actually ...

actually, he was appointing a Moscow-oriented communist by the name of Nyoto as a member of his Cabinet. Nyoto was a rival of Aidit, who was Peking-oriented.

(2) Through the "Axis", Indonesia was prepared to help facilitate China's wider participation in world affairs, provided it kept hands off Southeast Asia. It must be recalled that Sukarno's "Axis" policy came after the establishment of Maphilindo, intended to serve as an association between Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia. At that time, Chinese leaders referred to this grouping as "the product of the lackeys of imperialism", while Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew alleged that "it was designed to encircle Singapore." 14)

(3) In those years, President Sukarno despatched at least two missions abroad to check whether the apparent rift which began to show between Moscow and Peking was real or a mere stage-show. The Mission to Moscow was entrusted to a certain Mr Chow, who later described it in his book: "Daitooryoo no Tokushi" (Special Envoy of the President), published in Tokyo in 1980. A two-man mission, of which I was a member, was sent to the African countries. Part of the findings of the mission to Africa has been revealed in: "Ajia Kara no Nippon e no Chuukoku" (Advice of An Asian to Japan), also published in Japan in 1982.

(4) China was suspicious all the way about Sukarno's real intentions and would not go along with the idea of holding a "Conference of New Emerging Forces" scheduled to be held in Jakarta in 1965. Chinese leaders, however, have given lip service to the concept.

(5) The Nixon - Kissinger team was to pursue almost the same objectives only five years later.

3. "Comparing Notes"

1) Describing developments following the second military by the Dutch which succeeded to capture not only the capital of Yogyakarta but also Sukarno and Hatta, Prof. Greif pointed out that "With American connivance, the United Nations intervened and ordered the Dutch out of Indonesia." 1)

The Dutch armed forces carried out attacks along a wide front, including an air-borne attack on Yogya. Prior to the Dutch action, Washington had sent a note to the Indonesian government pressing it to accept the Dutch idea of an interim government as against the Indonesian insistence of an independent republic. The note promised

American ...

American economic aid in return. 2) Robert Alden of the New York Times then pointed out that Indonesians believed US pro-colonial policies were unchanging. 3) As if it was not yet enough to demonstrate its anti-independent position, the United States soon thereafter declared that the de facto Indonesian government it had previously recognized, had ceased to exist.

It is correct to say, however, that the United Nations did seize the opportunity to help resume negotiations, but it was the effectiveness of the Indonesian armed forces which forced the Dutch to the negotiating table and later to withdraw from Indonesia. 4)

2) Prof. Greif criticized Sukarno's role for cooperating with the Japanese. He also said that Hatta's name remained unscathed until today. Another reference was made to Sukarno only when describing the action of a group of young revolutionaries, who had kidnapped Sukarno from Jakarta.

The reality was that Hatta too cooperated fully with the Japanese. For that reason, one cannot say that his name remained unscathed. When the kidnap took place, Hatta was also taken away.

As of 1945, until 1956, the Indonesian people referred to the two leaders as "Dwi-Tunggal" meaning "Two leaders as one mind and body." During the Japanese occupation, Sukarno-Hatta were to cooperate with the Japanese, while Sharifuddin-Syahrir were to lead the underground movements, preparing for independence. The Japanese military police later arrested Syarifuddin and sentenced him to death. With the intervention of Sukarno, this was commuted to life imprisonment. When independence was proclaimed, Syarifuddin walked out of the Japanese prison into a cabinet post.

Within this context, it is difficult to comprehend the evaluation given by Prof. Greif that the Sukarno administration 'served well' between 1949 - 1956. Reading the book by Adam Malik: "In the Service of the Republic" - a book recommended by the author of the paper under discussion - makes clear that if it was not for the Sukarno-Hatta leadership from 1945 - 1949, the successive cabinets would have remained ineffective. Adam Malik pointed out that time and again, when crisis upon crisis arose, the cabinet^{ts} turned to Sukarno-Hatta to bail them out. The decisive factor of Sukarno-Hatta leadership was demonstrated during the Madiun communist uprising followed only 3 months later by an all-out Dutch military action.

As to Sukarno's record after 1956, it is dealt with within the context of "International Environment", above.

Allow me to present my "notes" on the Economy.

3) Prof. Greif claimed he was no economist. Neither am I. Furthermore, I understand, Mr Aoki from Japan, has been given the assignment to concentrate his comments on the economic aspects of the paper. I would, therefore, confine myself to general observations.

(a) Here is an observation of Prof. Selo Sumarjan, formerly Secretary to Vice President Hamengku Buwono. "... the nations of Southeast Asia may be heading for relatively greater economic prosperity, but at the same time the clear signals on the wall predict social unrest of long duration...." 5) I share his view.

(b) The Indonesian constitution calls for an economy based on "azas kekeluargaan" which is neither capitalism nor Marxistic. Art. 33 of the Constitution calls for national ownership of vital industries and natural resources. The Suharto government, in order to facilitate foreign investment has 'to go slow' on this point. Hatta for his part has time and again called on strict implementation of this Article.

(c) Prof. Greif observed that "Suharto inherited a nation that an eminent economist had been forced to call the "chronic dropout". 6) This is of course a criticism towards the administrations preceding Suharto.

What economy did Sukarno inherit from the Dutch? The same author pointed out that "Both the long Dutch occupation and shorter Japanese one, while producing a generation of revolutionaries as a result, had left the country in a state of financial ruin and pitifully little in the way of an infrastructure." 7)

It must also pointed out that Indonesia had to pay for debts committed by Netherlands Indies Government, amounting to \$3,000 million when independence was recognized. In the field of education, the Dutch left a nation with only 6% literacy and a very thin layer of university graduates. The situation was such, that a medical doctor was appointed Minister of Economic Affairs and a civil engineer as Director General of the National Planning Bureau, just to give two examples. Because great attention had been paid to education during the pre-Suharto era, especially on teacher's training, today Indonesia is able to boast of 94% attendance at primary school level, while the number of physicians had increased almost five fold. 8)

President Suharto today can take advantage of the services of the technocrats or "Berkeley Mafia" in helping to formulate the nation's economic policies. These able economists did not grow up overnight.

They were educated during the Sukarno era.

But perhaps the most important thing which must be pointed out here is the fact that Suharto is in the position to concentrate on economic development because the second pillar of Pancasila, the unity of Indonesia, had been materialized under the Sukarno era. Local uprisings, with support at home and abroad or secessionists from the right and left, had been suppressed. In the process, Pancasila had been widely understood among the people at large. It was left to Suharto to re-iterate Pancasila as the guiding philosophy or state and nation building, in the political, economic and cultural sectors.

d) Statistics may show that GNP-wise, the country may have prospered. This does not automatically mean that the per capita income has increased with it. It has been officially noted that Indonesia's per capita income has reached US\$510. But the daily Berita Buana reported on June 1978, one of the better years of Indonesia, that more than one third of Indonesia's population, namely 43,737,900 were still under the poverty line, of which 26% were very, and 40% utterly poor. The Indonesian Rupiah has depreciated from 420 to the dollar to 1000 in the past five years. Another case of increasing GNP and decreasing real income can be seen in the Philippines. 9)

This is one reason why Hatta has been calling for firmer implementation of Art. 33 of the Constitution, the source of Pancasila economy.

4. Minor Remarks

1) The paper observed on page 12 that the Indonesian is known for his tolerance. Sukarno was also guilty of this Indonesian character. Like Hatta in 1926, Sukarno too tried to include the Communists as part of the overall nationalist movement. 1) with the connivance of Communist China, however, PKI tried to take over power in 1965. 2) The paper criticized Sukarno by employing the wayang in his effort to cynically manipulate the largely uneducated masses - or rather - the manipulation of the masses educated only in the rich folklore and drama of wayang, etc. This type of manipulation, to borrow the words of Prof. Greif, was addressed only to the uneducated, indeed, especially in Java. What else could he resort to but to the only cultural base understood by the masses?

On the other hand, when Sukarno talked to Sumatrans, for instance, he would talk within the context of Islam. To the elite, he would quote Lincoln, Renan, Marx, etcetera. 2)

3) On the basis of the above explanation, the division of the people into ...

into 'santri', 'priayi' and 'abangan' is applicable only to central Java, or J a v a at the most.

4) The Muslims have been labeled 'fundamentalists' (apparently in a disapproving observation) or extremists. The only 'moderate' Muslims are those who cooperate with the New Order government, such as Nahdatul Ulama and Parmusi.

A wider glance at the political map of Indonesia, would place the Masyumi (ordered dissolved by Sukarno) as the moderate and modernist political organization in Indonesia. 3) As to the term 'fundamentalism', if it means rejection of Descartes, then all Muslims are fundamentalists.

5) There is a Dutch proverb which says: "Als je een hond will slaan, je kunt altijd een stokje vinden." In criticizing Sukarno's like for acronyms, the author found a stick with which to beat him.

As a lecturer teaching Southeast Asian Politics, I must say, I find it very hard to keep up with the kind of new acronyms and abbreviations popping up in the Indonesian political scene until today.

Japan is also 'notorious' in this respect. "wa-pro", "ungramoney", "kara-oke" and what have you. As I see it, certain expressions lend themselves well to acronyms, others do not. That's all what's to it! The term GESTAFU, for instance, was coined by Major General Gandhi, in effort to bring home to the people the seriousness of the "30 September Movement." GOLKAR, of course, is a New Order copy-right, as is PARMUSI, and last but not least, REFELITA, which stands for Five Year Development Plan, INFRES, etc., etc.

6) 'Ramah Tamah' on page 18 should read "Kekeluargaan" or "azas kekeluargaan" (family-society); OLEFOS on page 28 should read OLDEFCS. -

5. C o n c l u s i o n

Indonesia's nationalism and nation-building should be evaluated in its totality. Third world nationalism, especially in the case of Indonesia, embodies three major objectives. (1) independence with national unity; (2) cultural re-affirmation or national identity; (3) economic viability with social justice.

The first two objectives have been established for the most part under the leadership of Sukarno. On the basis of this inheritance, it is the duty of the New Order government to materialize the third objective. --

Dr Arifin BEY
University of Tsukuba
Area Studies

10 October 1983



N O T E S

Foreword

- 1) p. 2
- 2) Reports on and criticisms about continuing corruption do appear in Indonesian mass media until today.
- 3) Only a broader treatment of the Indonesian political, economic and cultural scenes would make such a distribution possible.
- 4) p. 5

1. The Roots of Pancasila

- 1) p. 25
- 2) p. 4
- 3) p. 25
- 4) Published by Gunung Agung, Jakarta, 1960. The first entry is entitled: "Nationalism, Islam and Marxism."
- 5) Nugroho Notokusanto in: "Proses Perumusan Pancasila Dasar Negara" (Proses of Formulation of Pancasila the Basic Concept of the State), Jakarta, 1981, p. 60
- 6) Ibid, p. 60
- 7) Suharto: Address to Parliament, 16 August 1983.
- 8) Here is part of Holland's observation in "Asian Nationalism and the West", New York, 1953, pp. 9-10.

"What is often puzzling and alarming to the outside observer is the fact that most of the political leaders (in the new Asian countries) are decidedly westernized in their thinking and methods and it is very hard to find examples of where they have found effective ways of communicating these western institutions and practices to well-known and respected traditional social forms.

"No doubt this gap will gradually be reduced with the spread of elementary education and by such devices as cheap radios and newspapers. For the present, however, the ordinary villager throughout Southern Asia must sometimes feel that the nationalist governments are almost as remote and alien to the institutions and traditional codes of conduct which govern his daily life as were the former colonial regimes.

"The new political leaders, therefore, face an urgent task in deliberately and quickly creating new symbols, slogans, precepts, patriotic ceremonies, by which the masses can more readily identify themselves with their new government.

"In many ways, India was fortunate in having part of this task performed by Gandhi, whose distinctive way of life and set of values made a deep impression on the ordinary Indian citizen as well as on India's nationalist movement. It is hard, however, to find any real equivalent to Gandhi's role in the other new nations of Asia. President Soekarno's effort to expound the so-called Five Virtues (Pantja Sila) represents a recognition of this need in Indonesia."

2. The ...

2. The International Environment

- 1) The New York Herald Tribune, May 17, 1956.

"President Sukarno of Indonesia bluntly told Congress today that the United States must recognize nationalism and anti-colonialism as the mainspring of Asian and African governments or see American aid, 'even if it be a Niagara of dollars create only bitterness and disappointment.' And the plain speaking of the Indonesian made a hit! His appearance before a joint session of Congress drew an usually large audience of Senators, Representatives and Government officials and an unusually warm response."

- 2) The New York Times, May 19, 1956.

"Washington was told in no uncertain terms that it was now in competition with the Soviet Union for the hearts of the people of Asia, that the Soviet Union was backing Indonesia's claim to West New Guinea, and that America was the victim of guilt by association with the British, the French, the Dutch and other colonial powers. In other words, President Sukarno did not hesitate to invite the United States to abandon its allies and to weaken its defence in Asia in order to 'win the hearts of the Asian people' and to imply that, if we did not, communism would gain in Asia regardless of what else Washington did to help newly independent peoples."

- 3) "Today and Tomorrow", May 23, 1956.

"The revolution which Dr Sukarno was proclaiming is running from Morocco to Tunis through the Middle East ... to Singapore and Indonesia, probably Formosa and Japan. The western nations among whom we belong, are on the defensive throughout this vast area, and all the key positions remaining to them are under attack. One has the feeling that the western nations are fighting rear guard actions

"We must begin to ask ourselves questions to which we cannot expect to find quick and certain answers. A new relationship between the emancipated East and the democratic west will have to be found. Where shall we look for the end of the thread by which we can find our way through the labyrinth?"

- 4) See: "How Wrong Basic Premise Led to America's Big Viet Blunder", by Stanley Karnow, Japan Times, 4 May 1981. (American policy)"decisions lacked any appreciation of a basic reality. The communist-led Vietnamese nationalists were not Chinese pawns, but China's traditional enemies. Their aim has always been, as it is now, to check Chinese ambitions. Thus, the United States, in its effort to restrain China, backed the wrong side. The mistake was costly."
- 5) Ganis Harsono, "Recollections of an Indonesian Diplomat in the Sukarno Era", Edited by C.L.M. Penders and B.B. Hering, Univ. of Queensland Press, 1977, p. 253.

3. "Comparing Notes"

- 1) p. 7
- 2) Dorothy Woodman in "The Republic of Indonesia", 1955, p. 234, commenting on the American Memorandum that it was faulty on two counts.

First: ...

Note: 3

First: it was sent to the wrong address. American pressure was needed most where the desire for war was strongest.
Second: it was sent with the assumption that Indonesia would be willing to trade their independence for promised financial and economic aid.

- 3) "In the view of many Indonesians, the United States, pre-occupied with European problems, let them down during their war of independence. The feeling that the United States is pro-colonial persists among Indonesians ..." (May 13, 1949)
- 4) The United Nations and the United States acted in order to save the Dutch from defeat. General Spoor, the Commander of the Dutch colonial forces in Indonesia, disclosed to Free Press in Surabaya on New Year's day in 1949 that the conditions were very difficult for his troops. He disclosed that the Republican troops remained intact even following all-out Dutch attacks.
- 5) See: "Sources of Social Unrest in Southeast Asia" in Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on World Peace, Japan, 1978.
- 6) p. 4
- 7) p. 6
- 8) p. 31
- 9) See: Alison Broinovski (Editor): "Understanding ASEAN", 1982. Especially the chapter entitled: "ASEAN: The Five Countries."

4. Minor Remarks

- 1) See: Mohammad Hatta, Indonesian Patriot: MEMOIRS, Gunung Agung, Singapore, 1981.
On pages 110-111, Hatta revealed that when he met the leader of the Indonesian Communist Party in The Hague in 1926, he managed to persuade him to recognize only the Perhimpunan Indonesia as the sole leader of the Indonesian nationalist movement, to which the PKI shall be subordinated.
Another book: "Bung Hatta Menjawab" disclosed that Hatta invited Tan Malakka to join the first Indonesian cabinet. p. 17.
Published by Gunung Agung, Jakarta, 1978.
- 2) In order to understand Sukarno better and how he 'operated' within the multiple cultural scene of Indonesia, see: Kuntjaraningrat, "Manusia dan Kebudayaan di Indonesia", Jakarta, 1979.
The author divided Indonesia, culturally speaking, roughly into six types of societies. Java and Bali, one of those types, is characterized by strong remnants of Hinduism (of which the wayang is an important manifestation) and relatively new contact with Islam.
Sukarno quoted freely from the Quran, as well as from Dutch, English, French and German sources.
- 3) The (Muslim) Masyumi Party openly advocated close cooperation with the United States in early 50's. Indonesia veered to the left ever since the PNI - Nahdatul Ulama cabinet towards the mid-fifties. -