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IDEOLOGY AND SCIENCE: SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

(Can and should ideology be avoided in a scientific civilization ?)

1. Definition and Point of Departure

A discussion of the concept of ideology is both a scientific necessity and an important step in self-clarification. One's attitude to the notion of ideology is certainly not independent of personal and political values, and in its turn bears its consequences on them.

Considering the overusage of the conception of ideology, which is quoted today for any view and conviction, as a marxist, a conservative, a liberal, a religious or whatever other one, it is necessary to mark out the circumference of the notion and to define well its contents.

An ideology I would like to call a set of theses (predications), the aims and fundamental contents of which are based in human needs and intentions (and the emotions connected with them) and simultaneously claim to be able to stand against cognitive intersubjective examination and at least some sort of scientific testing.

By ideologies I understand those interpretations of nature, man, society, history, and culture originating from a ~~st~~ standpoint of value and purpose oriented aims, which at the same time claim to be competent to satisfy the criteria of scientific conclusions. Ideologies are being presented as maxims oriented towards a total and at the same time "rational" world mastery. Thereby "mastery" is not just meant to be a conceptual problem resolution but also a social domination, real or utopian.

Ideologies intend to be more than, e.g., dogmas of a religious type, which confess (or should confess) the inability to be scientifically validified. Religions define themselves as trust in (future) fulfilment, and self-realization, as aids to existence, and a hopeful type of triumph over individual and collective hardship.

As a short definition we may use: Ideologies are interpretations of world and society, which are guided by one or less defined values and purposes and strictly claim to scientific rationality. They are used to cognitively orient and emotionally steer groups and masses of people. They prepare for conflict and allow for the rationalization of aggressiveness. Ideologies legitimize interests. They channel emotions and thereby also human and material energies and resources. Ideologies are a phenomenon of both: philosophical rationalism of Western Enlightenment and the strategic use of non-rational yet fundamental human and social needs.

Ideologies have become powerful factors in the structuring of societal conflict and hierarchy with the dissemination of certain forms of learning (school systems, communication techniques) and the at least apparent acceptance of some human rights. The relationship between information and learning on the one hand and ideology on the other is curvilinear. After a certain degree and quality of information and of the capacity to learn has been reached, learning no further increases the demand for ideology but rather tends to diminish it again. In a mature society, after a certain section of the population has reached very elaborated forms of self-interpretation and scientific understanding, ideologies may lose some of their present fascination.

By the criticism of ideologies we understand an activity which aims at systematically analyzing and unmasking the claim to a "scientific rationality" which is coupled with and influenced by intentional attitudes of a certain world view and the strategies to enforce this view socially).

We call criticism of ideologies the analysis of the pride of science and the conceptual structures aiming at a global and goal-oriented interpretation of the "world".

The reproach that all criticism of ideologies bears, in itself, germs of ideology, may be enfeebled if in the ideology-critical analysis - and as a presupposition to it - in principle preconceived intellectual or political universe is denied. The idea of such a universe is itself constitutive for ideology.

The minimum assumption for my position lies in the separation of two models of cognitive operation: the scientific one being consciously kept independent of preconceived and formulated intentional views and running the risk to be fragmentary, inconclusive and easily open to rejection; the ideological one, in the contrary would start from synthetic (global) presuppositions (with the potential to agitate, orient and structure social action and movements) and end up in them again. | 4.

The criticism of ideologies leaves socio-political basic decisions open, it intends to be methodologically consistent and analytically concrete in certain historically and sociologically defined fields of application; it renounces any claim of global interpretation. The - ever necessary - revision of criticisms of ideologies, unlike the revision of ideologies itself, should not depend on socio-political opportunities and balances of power, or ways of social and political goal attainment. This necessitates the constitution of some autonomy of the "man of science" and his organizations.

30 Moreover, the concept of the criticism of ideologies is based on the conviction that among the whole spectre of human and social realms of existence - religion, sexuality, power, art, law and others - fundamentally none should be omitted in being analyzed by scientific ways and methods of knowledge (though temporary restrictions in this regard might - if justified in detail - be legitimate); criticism of ideologies does not negate that there are besides the scientific ways of cognition other forms of knowledge and judgement, other forms of apprehension which must be recognized as "legitimate" inasmuch as they serve for both the deepening and the fulfilment of human needs for self-interpretation and communication.

Many areas of human action, the coherence of which cannot be sufficiently designed by scientific rationality, e.g. wide areas of legal rights or moral norms, must not be, therefore, denoted as simply irrational or ideological. The internal connections in legal theses, (even their

derivability from each other) can often only be explained by the aid of other than mere scientific criteria. Though such connections in legal theses are not irrational, they can be linked into one system only by the aid of certain conditions and hypotheses of a 'value-rational' type (Max Weber).

It is, however, extremely difficult to draw the boundaries between 'value-rationality' and ideology. Hence, the criticism of ideologies is a permanent intellectual and scientific task.

2. The Development of the Concept of Ideology: Some Historical Aspects

Before further discussing the concept of ideology, we must define a few historical steps leading to it.

The dependence of fundamental religious and metaphysical judgements on the experience and the weight of social facts was already recognized by Greek antiquity. Xenophanes of Kolophon is reported to have said: "Ethiopians have gods with black and curly hair, Thracians have gods with red hair." This is the word of a philosopher who considered a deity who may be depicted as belonging to a lower form of religious belief. Xenophanes designed a theology centering on an abstract notion of God, whom he conceived to be beyond all perception, in order to correspond to the highest possible imagination man might arrive at.

Francis Bacon, the versatile English scientist and philosopher of the 16th century, criticized idols, though not so much motivated by a quest for a religious and metaphysical reform, but strongly determined by the wish to open the course for a development of science. An obstruction of the functioning of the intellect - (of which Bacon conceives to be able to follow its own laws) - is seen by him, for example in the public presentation of ideas. For the sake of success, ideas are distorted, watered down, or pressed into plausible patterns: thus the idols of the "market place" and other disturbing elements of thinking were created.

The position of Francis Bacon presupposes that there are influences on the intellect which direct it from outside. The 'vulnerability' of the intellect is Bacon's topic. The faculty he ;ntellect may be irritated or confused, and this 'deviance'

may become the object of the criticism and control of science. The endangeredness and weakness inherent in the intellect - according to Bacon - are to be acknowledged. If thinking was just to follow and accomplish whatever 'nature' or 'substantiality' had outlined, then the danger of a deviation would not be so central. If thinking means the production of explanatory constructs, then intellectual control of social forces which cause deviance from logical reasoning becomes an important task of the theory of knowledge.

Criticism of ideologies could of course only come about when, in addition to this basic idea of critical theory and knowledge, there emerged an awareness of fundamental common historical conditions and common social factors. When nations and states discovered their independence and their national identity in the 18th century, conceptions of history distinguishing great stades and epochs became predominant. History no longer was viewed as a narration of 'incidents' or of single actions, or as the sequence of single actions and incidents on the battlefields of dynastic decision making.

The field of historiography of old changed and was deeply influenced by the successful physical sciences. It became more and more important to define 'laws' and regularities in historical processes just as one had discovered, or was just discovering laws in the natural sciences. Jean Bodin in France was one of the most influential theorists in historical laws and phases.

Johann Gottfried Herder was the one in German cultural history and philosophy who endeavoured to work out the meaning of the unity and the coherence of historical epochs and phases. This theory of history, which was immanent in Hegelian thought as a theory of development and movement, conceived the unity of meaning as a dimension inherent in all acts of thinking of one phase or epoch. What happened in a historical phase must be understood and described under the presupposition of this unity. Any event in itself would have to be interpreted as the manifestation of the spirit of the people or of the age. In this theory of history old mythological concepts of the origin and end of time were fused with the modern desire to find 'laws' explaining historical process,

This way of thinking by means of a 'philosophy of the whole' ^{paradigmatically} furnished some common basis for ideology as well as for the

ception of the criticism of ideologies. The 'whole' had to be understood in a double way: on the one hand, any actions and decisions in Hegelian philosophy could be understood only as derived from the framework of superior structure; on the other hand, the notion of wholeness implied the unity of the event with its cognition. 'Experience' through pain, labour, and patient receptiveness, (negative) repercussion of the event in the human 'receptor' became a prerequisite for the construction of meaning and models. 'Understanding' was seen as the conceptual counterpart of an event or of sequences of events. Hegel's conception of the unity of a historical epoch aimed at summing up the expression of life and thinking in a formula which should characterize an epoch. The epochs or historical entities were, in a dialectical succession, considered as the path of the world spirit through history, or, more correctly: the path of the world spirit as history.

3. Ideology and science in the work of Karl Marx

Marx' concept of ideology shows, as perhaps no other conception of Karl Marx does, his origin both in Hegel and in the French late Enlightenment.

Marx criticised the interpretation of history as a sequence of epochs determined by the world spirit and by ideas. Marx main attack is aimed against the followers of Hegel, the Young-Hegelians. He reproaches them that "according to their fancy", they consider "the condition of mankind, all its doings and drivings, its shackles and limits" as products of consciousness.¹⁾ He also reproaches them that they centrally lack self criticism. "It has occurred to none of these philosophers to enquire about the connection between German philosophy and German reality, the connection between their criticism and their own material surroundings".²⁾

"Ideology" according to Marx results from the false expectation to reach a change in circumstances through a change in consciousness, and from the incapacity (of the philosophers who followed Hegel's idea) to grasp themselves in the material net of entanglement. According to Marx, ideologists are philosophers who only reflect their own existence insufficiently and inadequately and are therefore not capable of developing a concept of social change, a concept which alone would be realistic with regard to the real driving historical powers.

If one recognizes that Marx sees the very core of science in "the history of man", as (political) selfinterpretation will not be possible in a similarly "plastic" way anywhere else, then one comes to realize also the core of Marx' theory of science. According to Marx "almost the whole of ideology" rests upon a "distorted interpretation of history" or on a "complete abstraction from it".³⁾ Speaking against the "distorted interpretation" and the "complete abstraction" Marx takes his position on the correct method of interpreting history.

He is explicit on prerequisites. They should not be arbitrary or dogmatic, but "real" prerequisites. This means that one must start from the "action" of the "real individuals" and their "materially essential conditions of life", both the existing ones and those "produced by their own action". Such suppositions

shall take up this important point on "prerequisites" and lyse it step by step:

One ought to analyse individuals "not in any fantastic seclusion and fixation", but must analyse them in their "real, empirically evident development under certain conditions." By the representation of history as an "active living process" it ceases to be - so Marx says - "a collection of dead facts, as with the abstract empiricists, or an imaginary action by imaginary subjects, as with the idealists". Therefore Marx' argument is here directed against a double front, against "abstract empiricists" on one side, and against "idealists" on the other.

The philosophy of consciousness of the old - or new - Hegelian type becomes superfluous through some sort of "socio-scientific" method to insert a current notion to characterize Marx' attitude. He is quite prophetic:

"The phrases about consciousness cease, real knowledge must enter in their place." Here we can already see ^{Marx'} position which is oriented towards the "positive science" as opposed the "ideology". The end of the "phrases about consciousness" means also the end of "independent philosophy" which loses its "medium of existence" when and if "reality" is mediated by "positive science".⁵⁾

Indeed "certain abstractions" and certain concepts of classification are necessary, to offer a framework for "real representation".⁶⁾ Marx speaks of "abstractions" which he uses versus ideology.⁷⁾ Evidently, the concept of the course of history developed in his book "German Ideology" as a step by step development of human needs, including the unfolding of the division of labour (to respond to the needs). Marx' abstraction were class struggle and alienation: these notions formed the framework of generalization which were to step into the place of the previous "ideological" view of history. The question to be raised here is, where do the criteria lie, according to which the one framework (of class struggle and alienation) facilitates the "classification of historical material", while the other (or any other) has to be denounced as "separated from actual history" and therefore as ideological.

d) According to Marx, empirical observation should replace speculations on consciousness as an interpretation of history. Thus in every single case the "connection between social and political organisation and production" should be shown "empirically and without any mystification and speculation."⁸⁾ The central reality is (here Marx follows Saint-Simon) production as a means to survive, as the origin of material conditions upon which individuals are dependent - "That which they (^{the} individuals) are, is coincidental with their production, both with what they produce, as well as with how they produce it".⁹⁾ Social organisation and the state result from this "living process", which is a process of production. Yet not only the factual arrangements, but also the "ideas" which occur to man, and which individuals need for their social and political structure, arise from the production process. They originate either

1. from the relation of men to nature or
2. from their relationship to each other or
3. from the relation by which men manage to reflect on their own situation.

Marx says - "It is obvious that in all these cases these ideas are the - real or illusory - conscious expression of their real relationships and activities, their production, their business, and of their social and political behaviour".¹⁰⁾

e) All this means that by "consciousness" one may not imagine anything, cannot conceive of anything other than "the conscious being". This is the counter-formula "ideology" as defined by Marx. "If the people and their relationships seem to stand on their heads as in a camera obscura of the whole ideology, then this phenomenon results from its historical living process just as much as the reversing of objects on the retina results from its immediate physical living process".¹¹⁾ In his concluding remarks to the second edition of the "Capital" (1878) Marx sticks to this formula: "For me, on the other hand, idealism is nothing other than materialism transformed and translated in the human head".¹²⁾

Here is the point where the ideology-critical Marx

dominate and to swallow "positive science". Historical materialism becomes the matrix of the global explanation of the world and history.

Let us point out a discrepancy in Marx' thought: the schematic theory of the necessary reflection contradicts "positive", "empirical" analysis. Furthermore, the reflection theory contains yet another problem: on one side ideology develops by way of reflection. It is seen as the outcome of a compulsory process. On the other side it is said to be an expression of the reversal of reality. Where is the criterion which can accept the one reflection and legitimate it as the correct doctrine, and which can criticise the other^{as} "reversal" and illusion and self deception ?

We find an important indication to this criterion in the Communist Manifesto: "The theories of Communism are in no way based upon ideas, principles, which have been invented or discovered by this or that perfectionist. They are just general expressions of actual relations in an existing class struggle, a historical movement which is taking place before our very eyes".¹³⁾

The criterion which - according to Marx - determines whether an ideology is to be accepted or rejected is to be found in its "correct" identification with the historical moment, in the revolutionary selfcertainty.

According to Marx, history is conceived as a material world grasped scientifically and "practically" by the communists, and only correctly grasped by the world-movement of Communism. Thereby science is clearly subordinated to the concept of action, when the latter reaches its revolutionary climax - in the constellation of history when the oppressed reach out for power and seize it. Here again Marx, the critic of ideology, proves himself to be an ideologist.

4. Criticism of Marx's Theory of Ideology

Marx' concept of ideology changed in the course of the development of his thought, and one can pursue the concept of ideology from the "German Ideology" onward to a much stronger generalisation. In "German Ideology" it had the meaning of a mystification reversing historical causality. Marx criticized the "error" to explain society from consciousness.¹⁴⁾

Marx described ideology as processes of objectivation. Ethics, metaphysics and "other ideologies" are for him an almost dead sum of norms and symbols without development. A theory of resubjectivation, of the actualisation of cultural structures in actions, did not concern him. Yet just this topic today is centrally important for the formation of social science theories in the fields of information, communication, socialization and propaganda. We must study e.g. the "Sleeper-effects", the norms and symbols which remain on hand and those coming into effect with delay, both in the course of the life of the individual, and in the process of development of groups and institutions.

Concerning Marx' theory of consciousness one must necessarily take into account that the power of information and communication of the mass media could not be foreseen in the middle of the past century. Today, however, we are concerned with the considerable power of "fascination through communication". The immensely grown importance of learning for men's professionalism and selfclarification, and the social broadening of learning have again demonstrated "consciousness" as a factor in its own right. The strategic position of science in production and information systems do not allow to do away with "consciousness" as the philosophers' "ideology", as Marx had believed in his controversy against the followers of Hegel. It is a paradox that Marx himself did not foresee the great ideological effect and symbolic power of his own thinking and the (ideological) consciousness which he has created and creates.

L. Kolakowski exhibited the mythmaking of Marxism through the propagation of "innocent reason".¹⁵⁾ Indeed the "ideological myth" in Marxism is almost constantly forced to its rescue, to carry an incompatible "cargo of science on its back".¹⁶⁾ The formation of myth out of Marx' thinking, which is described by Kolakowski, is facilitated by conviction. - this is particularly evident in the Theses Against Feuerbach - that practice is zero and nullification of existent informative and normative structures. This is analogously^{to} the theory of Fichte and Moses Hess¹⁷⁾ that actions are the basis for knowledge - which Goethe symbolically expressed through the word: "In the beginning was the deed

Let us try a synopsis:

- 1) Marx's concept of ideology, depends on Hegel's philosophy of history and is founded on the "reversal" of Hegel's theory of consciousness and world-spirit. Marx advocates a new aspect of the meaning and methods of history which would replace the central position of Consciousness. Revolutionary action and positive science should replace philosophy.
- 2) Furthermore, ideology results - according to Marx - from an antagonistic class society will the decay of the latter make the former unnecessary ?
- 3) Marx denounces ideology to be a mechanical reflex; elaborating this he goes further and denotes ideologies as reactionary and instrumental uses of already objectivated concepts in religion, morals etc. which had been put up for (hidden) purposes of maintaining power. True science, however, emerges according to Marx, not from a priori developed superstructures but from positive research as well as from a new revolutionary action. The latter changes society and does away with the social basis of ideology, namely a ruling class. Marx' concept of ideology is built upon^{the} conceptual structure of Hegel's idealism. It sticks to dialectics as a method¹⁸⁾ to develop the theory of class struggle. According to Marx ideology is the stronghold which is already outdated by the course of history. of a class clinging to power

5. The Position of the Sociology of Knowledge

Following Francis Bacon the Hungarian philosopher Karl Mannheim points out the continual interference of factors outside of logics upon the processes of the acquisition of knowledge and upon their limitation. The 'social existence', he maintains, determines whether or not certain steps of abstraction in the scientific process may be attained, it determines approaches and starting points and even the formulation of problems.¹⁹⁾

What Mannheim, however, did not point out clearly enough is, that, though this interference will occur in the process of cognition, which is a many-dimensional one, it is not to touch the logic itself, so that the interference will concern real thought processes but cannot affect logical structures as such.

Psychoanalysis and cognitive-developmental psychology have, since there is a sociology of knowledge, pointed out the ways of extralogical interference in the functioning of the intellect. The sociology of knowledge points out certain screening mechanisms geared to avoid aspects of scientific or intellectual penetration,²⁰⁾ shows reasons for the automatics of forgetting or 'repression'; it also stresses the one sided emphasizing of aspects, which are frequently rooted in loyalties, consideration for and ties to persons, groups, institutions, and symbols.

The negative conclusion, namely, that it is impossible to be completely free from ideology must, however, remain unsatisfactory, if it is not supplemented positively, namely by the self-restriction of science as to its proper scope and by recognizing its ability to revise and clarify itself.

Starting from the theories of Th. and H. Gomperz and H. Kelsen, Ernst Topitsch has developed a typology of 'patterns of thinking', issuing from the explanatory analogies of metaphysics. Like A.M. Knoll, he stressed the legitimizing function of general metaphysical concepts. Consequently he introduces the concept of 'Leerformel'²⁰⁾ (empty formulae), by which he further elaborates his critique of ideologies.

The basic idea of this notion of 'Leerformel' is, that general statements which melt factual predications with value statements, or where the latter are presented as being of the

first kind, are so broadly and ambiguously formulated that they attain a certain immunity against specific criticism.

In historical, pre-industrial cultures 'Leerformeln' which bore relevance for action mostly emerged from specific ideas on human order and social necessities and/or the purpose to hold on to power. These formulae were then projected to the background of the concepts of nature, cosmos, celestial order, the seasons, etc. Thus they obtained an overwhelming sacredness and apparent superiority over man and society. This way many norms regulating life and customs which were experienced as heteronomous and superior were finally 'read' out of 'nature' and, so to speak, imposed downwards from a realm, where they had been previously transferred to.

For Topitsch's 'Leerformel'-theory this many-step transportation is very important. It seems that through just such a rotation further immunization effects for the formulae are arising.

Lately Topitsch has emphasized the aggressive side effects of the functioning of the 'Leerformel': it is inherent in 'sham'-reasoning to 'refute counter arguments as the expression of a false consciousness'.²¹⁾

Recent criticism was carried forth against science directly. Through its very activities, science creates its own false legitimation, according to these critics.

Herbert Marcuse²²⁾ has pointed out the 'intrinsically instrumental character' of (modern) science, which as such produces serfdom and leads to a 'more and more effective control of men over (other) men'. He propagates the vision of a 'New Science'.

Jürgen Habermas in a paper 'Technology and Science as 'Ideology' '²³⁾ also states this pretense for power, the control aspect of modern science. Unlike earlier philosophical and scientific systems, modern experimental science (since the days of Galileo) has developed a methodological frame of reference which reflects more than method the transcendental viewpoint of technical utilization. Modern science, according to Habermas, produces a knowledge, the form of which (not its subjective

intention) is technically useable, concentrates and articulates power. Different from Marcuse's vision of a 'New Science', Habermas tries, with the help of a new system of categories, to restructure²⁴⁾ cognition as a cooperative and reform-oriented enterprise.

Earlier in this century Max Scheler had suggested a self-limitation of science by acknowledging self-interpretation with the help of symbols, rites, the arts and a special form of mysticism.

Here I should like to present a viewpoint that diverges from E. Topitsch's position. The esthetic and contemplative function of symbols and formulae is not just limited to the mystification of factual value-irrationality of human experience. Religions, esthetic expression are the outcome of attempts of self interpretation with their own individual and social justification - yet certainly not independent from scientific criticism. The lives and teachings of moralists and of the founders of the world's great religions as Buddhism and Christianity, gave orientation for and interpretation of life, they furnished parables and formulae. There lie concentrated the experiences of men in extreme situations.

We hold that it is empirically unfeasible to center an action-guiding world orientation around Science alone. The present-day tendency towards the dominating role of science in mastering life must not lead to a total claim or to a 'scientific world view'. To do this seems to be just as one sided as to try to 'protect' any area of human and social knowledge or any experience from science.

Science may give a certain but limited help for the understanding of the self and of others in the choice of partners and friends, for the formation of enduring (self-chosen) relationships with their resulting bonds. In a situation of fear, in the situation of the death of someone close, in one's own fear of death, and even under less extreme stress: in question of self-esteem, or the evaluation of the weight of a certain prestige etc., no one will think scientific criteria alone to be sufficient for making decisions in view of serious

situations and problems. Perhaps it is necessary to render much more conscious the underlying motivations for such decisions.

To characterize extra-scientific elements in the search of meaning generally as 'Leerformel' which but conceal the reality of the former, will diminish, for the whole culture, the constitutive significance of symbolic interventions or rediscoveries to interpret and unveil central problems of life. Mastering the present presupposes in a not yet sufficiently recognized scope an identification with history and a self-criticism. This means the elaboration of new concepts of 'therapy'.

The important question arises of where plans and goals of social innovation, improvement, evolutionary or revolutionary processes for reform and planning can and should be won. A critical attitude towards the analysis of ideologies will not suffice.

Basically the point is to burden the scientist not only with general social responsibility, but to also create a space of possibilities for social innovation beyond conformity to the system and dogmatic utopianism, to realize 'imaginative participation' (H. Schelsky).

The scientist has the responsibility to scrutinize his values through his scientific activities as well as to reflect on the assumptions and consequences of his work, to evaluate them selectively, and to face them respectively. He should develop mental and moral attitudes to widen the scope and organizational network of self-induced research.

6. Suggestions for an Interdisciplinary Cooperation in the Criticism of Ideologies

Criticism of ideologies is not just the task of sociology. Psychology, psychiatry, and politicalology are also connected with the concept of ideology.

The process described by psychoanalysis as 'repression' is central for the criticism of ideology. The unconscious working of the self-defense mechanisms by forgetting and rationalization, ²⁵ i.e. ^{replacing} unknown or unconsciously known motivations for behaviour and attitudes by other more rationally substantiated ones, without criticizing the original construct, must necessarily be incorporated into the area of research on the concept of ideology.

Motives for inflicting ideology are - according to Social Psychiatry²⁶) - the search for safety as well as defense against doubt.

The 'revolutionary' definition of ideology in the concept of Marx is characterized by antagonistic polarisation. Marx called the ideas against which **he** fought: ideology. From this point, Karl Mannheim started his study 'Ideology and Utopia', as one of the most important contributions to the theory of ideology in the 20th century. Different from Marx, Mannheim suggested to cast suspicion also on oneself and one's own position.²⁷⁾

This is a meeting point of sociology and psychoanalysis. Experimental social psychology also plays a role in creating a criticism of ideology. From Heider's research we know that a decrease in contacts between members of a group and persons outside of it, if it is coupled with an increase in animosity to the outsiders, leads to an intensification of contacts within the group and a growing sympathy among its members. It would be interesting to know whether this self-complacency or self-defense increases tendencies towards ideology-formation.

Can one assume that such a social recapitulation of the members of a group furthers for them the acceptance or an activation of ideologies? Mannheim's theory is too general and unfocussed, and perhaps the connection between social and ideology-theory is only relevant to the radicalization of

ideologies, not for their creation. Also, maybe the group level is only of limited importance in the study of ideologies. This will have to be further explored.

From the studies of **Muzaffer** Sherif we know that in the polarization of small groups who convene for **competitive** performances there is also an increased desire to display visible symbols (names, insignias, flags, etc.). Does the willingness to take up ideologies increase as well?

Which level of education is a condition to the conviction that justice is always on the side of the group to which one eternally belongs, as Peter R. Hofstätter thinks indicated by the results of his research? ²⁹⁾

Can we at all speak of ideology in the context of small or middle-sized social units? Can there be such a thing as an ideology relevant to larger groups of society, when it arises out of the social relationships of groups or organizations?

A study of clandestine political groups by Eugen Lenhoff shows that small groups with definite characteristics can be outstanding entities in which revolutionary or reactionary concepts are prepared and worked out. ³⁰⁾

The motivation, however, for the formation of an ideology is a philosophy of life and a guiding line for political action does not seem to lie in the fact of separation or isolation of group or in its polarization against others; such a situation may lead to re-inforcement of ideologies, to radicalization, not, however, to their genesis.

Next to small group processes, a sociological investigation of ideologically motivated attitudes and their internal change could also have to be examined along organizational aspects. Through the study of institutionalization also one arrives very quickly at the notion of ideology which, in many cases, can serve as a backbone of institutions and their pretence to have answers to all problems arising in their domain.

A large field for research lies before us.

Summary

Ideology in the late 18th century was formed as an attempt to interpret nature, history and society on the basis of selected cognitive principles which were declared to be scientific but - contrary to this declaration ^{were} severely restricted by values and norms not subjected to further scientific analysis.

Even nowadays ideologies are politically purposeful pre- or extrascientific global interpretations of nature, history, society and culture with the pretention to be scientific and analytically explanatory. } sounds like Huskell's 6

The increase of some fields of learning and science and the growing scope of their diffusion through the school systems and the mass media created new categories of popularized science for broader strata of the population. Also, the decrease of the wide social acceptance of general religious, esthetic and traditional symbols and norms in entire cultures and the rise of philosophical, moral and political, pluralism has created a demand for quasi-scientific justification and legitimation of one's own moral decisions and political programs. This demand - though understandable - should be criticized as it leads to a deterioration and abuse of scientific criteria as well as to an avoidance of the fuller explanation of one's own value positions. Criticism of ideologies includes self criticism as well as interdisciplinary cooperation in the analysis of ideologies.

Different from ideological reasoning scientific thinking should go beyond defensive and aggressive explanatory mechanisms. Although no area of personal or public, social or cultural life should on principle be excluded from scientific study, other forms of perception and knowledge than scientific ones should be accepted and valued and not denounced by scientists and by a civilization strongly built on scientific development. Convictions of individuals and groups should seek their expression and place in the political sphere without the permanent internal constraint to prove themselves as "scientific".

The scientific civilisation will not be able to completely avoid ideology; it should, however, be the role of science to criticize the structure and to reduce the cognitive and political power of ideology.

R e f e r e n c e s

- 1) Karl Marx, Die deutsche Ideologie (1845/46), in: Die Frühschriften, ed. by S. Landshut, Stuttgart 1964 Kröners Taschenausgabe 209), p. 345.
- 2) op. cit., p. 346.
- 3) ibid.
- 4) op. cit., pp. 346 f.
- 5) op. cit., p. 350. One must certainly consider that this early actionist 'positivism' of Marx', built into a history philosophy of the class struggle, later undergoes corrections in the 'Kapital' in the direction of a fixed schema of explanation of a strongly dogmatic type.
- 6) op. cit., p. 350.
- 7) ibid.
- 8) op. cit., p. 348
- 9) op. cit., p. 347.
- 10) op. cit., p. 448.
- 11) op. cit., p. 349.
- 12) Karl Marx, Das Kapital, Ökonomische Schriften, Vol. 1, Stuttgart: Cotta, 1962, p. XXXI.
- 13) Karl Marx, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, in: Die Frühschriften, ed. by S. Landshut, op. cit., p. 539.
- 14) Georges Gurvitch, La sociologie de Karl Marx (Scriptum), 'Les cours de Sorbonne', Centre de Documentation Universitaire, Paris 1959, p. 66.
- 15) Ernst Topitsch and Kurt Salamun put forward similar arguments in their study 'Ideologie, Herrschaft des Vor-Urteils', München-Wien 1972, pp. 77 ff.
- 16) 'The strange contradiction in the life of the Marxist idea called and calls up further numerous illusions in the judgement of the present value of marxism: on one hand the illusion of an innocent reason, which has achieved the myth of a scientific ideology and the stereotyped Marxism, which was justified by indubitable scientific advances; on the other hand, the illusion of total depreciation of Marxism, which grew out of his ideological activity. However in reality we always deal with an internally contradictory process, whereby science becomes a myth, through which the ideological myth is permanently forced to carry an incompatible cargo of science on its back.'
L. Kolakowski, Ideologie und Theorie, in: Ideologie, Ideologiekritik und Wissenssoziologie, ed. by K. Lenk, Neuwied-Berlin, 3rd Edition, 1967, p. 374.
- 17) Moses Hess, Philosophie der That, in: Philosophische und sozialistische Schriften 1837-1850, ed. by A. Cornu and W. Mönke, Berlin 1961, pp. 210 ff.
- 18) Karl Marx, Das Kapital, op. cit. p. XXXI.
- 19) Cf. K. Mannheim, Ideologie und Utopie, Frankfurt/Main 1952, p. 238.

- 20) E. Topitsch, Über Leerformeln, in: Probleme der Wissenschaftstheorie, Festschrift für V. Kraft, ed. by E. Topitsch, Wien 1960. E. Topitsch, Begriff und Funktion der Ideologie, ~~xx~~ in: E. Topitsch, Sozialphilosophie zwischen Ideologie und Wissenschaft, Soziologische Texte 10, Neuwied-Berlin 1961, pp. 15-52. (New edition 1971.)
- 21) Ernst Topitsch, Die Freiheit der Wissenschaft und der politische Auftrag der Universität, Neuwied-Berlin 1968, p. 51. In this essay Topitsch, from the point of view of the criticism of ideology, presents an interesting position on problems of actual relevancy.
- 22) H. Marcuse, Der eindimensionale Mensch, Neuwied-Berlin 1967, pp. 172 ff.
- 23) Published in his book with the same title: J. Habermas, Technik und Wissenschaft als 'Ideologie', Frankfurt/Main 1968, pp. 48-103.
- 24) op. cit., p. 64.
- 25) Alexander und Margarete Mitscherlich, Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern. Grundlagen kollektiven Verhaltens, München 1967, pp. 13 ff.
- 26) According to personal communication, by Hans Strotzka.
- 27) Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, 6th Edition, London 1952 (1st Edition 1936), pp. 248 f. ('overemphasis on concreteness').
- 28) G.K. Homans, The Human Group, New York 1950.
- 29) Peter R. Hofstätter, Einführung in die Sozialpsychologie, Wien-Stuttgart 1954, p. 371.
- 30) Wien 1930.

