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THE STUDY OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1980s

by

Frederick C. Turner
Professor of Political Science
University of Connecticut
Storrs, Connecticut, USA

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Over the past quarter century, a small ocean of ink has been consumed in writing about "development," yet how much better do we understand the concept and the reality than did our counterparts in 1960? Much of the most explicitly comparative work was done in the 1960s and the early 1970s, and eminent scholars have become so disillusioned with the overall results as to see the field of development economics in serious decline¹ and to call for an abandonment or a complete reorientation of developmental paradigms.² Yet, when we do not expect the developmental literature of the past to be conclusive and exhaustive, as no literature in the social sciences ever is, we can appreciate its contributions: to make the connection between theory and fact gathering far more explicit, to shift the focus of comparative studies away from Europe and North America to include the rest of the world, and to allow scholars to bring a large, new, and thoughtful literature to bear upon the more specific and limited issues that they face in analyzing one country or process at a particular time.³

The orientation of development studies has also shifted significantly between the 1950s and the 1980s. Instead of accepting the abstract categories of Talcott Parsons or Gabriel Almond, social scientists in the Third World are actively defining questions and paradigms that may better fit the indigenous needs of their own societies. Some have actively rejected the "modernization theory" of the 1960s as being merely a "counter ideology" of scholars and policy-makers in the United States, designed to undercut the appeals of Marxism, and scholars in all parts of the world now reject the hypothesis of linearity, the early concept that economic development would become self-sustaining and irreversible, with the corollary that it could best be achieved in and would ultimately lead to political democracies. In the 1980s, the emphasis, often stimulated by grants from national governments and international agencies, is on solving the immediate needs of economic plans rather than on understanding more fundamental and abstract

processes in the social sciences. Yet, in this context there remains a pressing need to interpret more realistically the various roles of government in economic development, the implications that the political experiences of each nation have in illustrating alternative patterns of social and economic change. We need, as Kenneth Prewitt has recently suggested in a thoughtful review essay, to build an appreciation of development patterns that responds to fundamental concerns in the social science disciplines as well as to the needs of governmental agencies for specific advice, an appreciation that can only be gained through more active collaboration between social scientists and institutions in the northern and southern hemispheres.⁴

One avenue for development studies in the 1980s is to investigate in detail the similarities and contrasts between specific regions of the world. Asia and Latin America provide especially fertile bases for comparison, since they contain nations with some comparability--extremely high rates of economic growth, heavy dependence upon exports, ties to North American and European markets, and long periods of military direction in politics. While the underlying cultural orientations in the two regions differ widely, this contrast allows national studies to probe what effect cultural variables actually have upon economic and political change. It is difficult for individual scholars to understand the various languages in the regions so well as to grasp the nuances that are vital to a genuine appreciation of culture, but social scientists who specialize in the nations of the two regions can make far more systematic comparisons than they have done in the past. If they are to do so, it becomes useful to review the central questions--and some of the conclusions--development studies up to now.

Before taking up this review and suggesting new lines of inquiry from it, the issue of definition must be squarely confronted. It has been a particular problem in the literature on development, since scholars have each provided their

own definitions, which have frequently been idiosyncratic, mutually exclusive, or teleological. For our purposes, we can adopt the recent and comparatively simple conception that development refers to "a comprehensive process of socioeconomic change that includes emphatic attitudinal and institutional alterations requisite to the creation of a modern productive system."⁵

In terms of the discussion that follows, this view can be amplified in a number of components, both economic and political. In their economic dimensions, the issues include: (1) How rapidly is the gross national product (GNP) of a nation increasing, and what elements advance and impede its growth? (2) What groups in the society receive which degrees of its wealth, in terms of both the distribution of current income and the ownership of the means of production? (3) How appropriate are the levels of technology in different sectors of the economy, and what are their impacts upon the distribution of income and power? (4) How great is the internal and the external indebtedness of the nation, and how well have the monies raised from public borrowing been used to finance economic growth? (5) What are the ties in the public and the private sectors to foreign governments and to multinational corporations? (6) How adaptable is the culture of the nation in question to borrowing economic strategies from abroad and in devising indigenous practices that further productivity and national wealth?

From the realm of politics, six further issues stand out for detailed analysis: (7) How much stability has a given polity been able to achieve, in terms of avoiding internal violence, minimizing crises of political successions, and gaining a fairly wide consensus on national goals and strategies? (8) What political and economic demands do segments of the populace make? (9) How dispersed or how centralized is the pattern of participation in making political decisions? (10) What attitudes and values does the population as a whole hold in regard to such issues as the national community, trust in others, and support for the system of government?

(11) How creative have leaders been in articulating goals for the society, winning popular support for them, and establishing institutions to further them? (12) What have been the roles of military officers in observing or directing the development process, coming in or out of executive offices at critical junctures in the nation's history, and taking advice from civilian experts?

Nothing in this approach assumes that "development" is an inevitable or self-reinforcing process, that the human condition will be improved by it, or that nations in the Third World today should learn from the experience of Europe or North America in the past. Instead, the historical and cultural inheritance of each nation is assumed to create both limitations and possibilities. In the People's Republic of China, the Cultural Revolution could undercut technical training and economic advance for a generation, but it could not eradicate the Confucian ethic of an educated elite to direct the society or the strength of family loyalties within it. In Latin America, instead of the analogy of a nation approaching development to an airplane taxiing for takeoff--the "onwards and upwards forever" approach once preached both by Unitarians and by Marxists--Charles Anderson rightly points to what he calls the "living museum", the fact that Latin American societies continue to contain most of the varieties of politics and politicians that have competed there in the past.⁶ As Gerald Heeger writes, "Social change, far from being inevitable and ultimately modernizing, is sporadic, erratic, and (eventually) unpredictable in its consequences."⁷

If we conceptualize political and economic change in these nonlinear terms, then it becomes clear that the citizens of one nation may learn from the experience of another, and that, in fact, the English, or the Soviets, or the North Americans may have as much to learn from nations in the Third World as their citizens do from studying the experience of Europe or North America. The comparisons become more helpful when they are systematic and empirical, when they

can be quantified at least to a degree, and when they can be related to extant hypotheses or theories. In this sense, a framework of analysis can be useful.

(1) Economic Growth

To begin such a framework, one needs to measure performance first. As Robert Holt and John Turner emphasized long ago, we can not easily measure the capacities of political systems and their leaders to implement new strategies of development. Therefore, as they say, "given this context, one does not measure capacity; one seeks to measure performance, and then to compare performance with capacity."⁸ The more detailed and theoretically rich are our measures of performance, then the more appropriate our analyses of their causes are likely to be. There is a two-way interaction between measurement and conceptualization in development studies. That is, not only do new methodological capabilities allow us to determine quantitative interrelationships with far more ease, economy, and sophistication than was true in the past, but, as Blalock has recently emphasized, innovations in methodology in turn depend upon the enrichment of our schemes of conceptualization.⁹

The data summarized in Table 1 provide a number of advantages. They measure wealth in per capita rather than aggregate terms, and, while total GNP is most useful for estimating the power of nations in the international community, the per capita figures are more relevant to the living standards and the political perceptions of citizens. By looking down the first column, we can get a feel for the gross inequalities of income levels among countries in 1980, even though, in comparison to several African nations that experienced declines in per capita GNP between 1960 and 1980, the states in Table 1 demonstrated quite positive results, with income growth and comparatively high levels of literacy. Moreover, in the

second column, the data allow us to be fairly precise about the relative gains in wealth among various nations within a specific period. Looking at different nations, and at other time periods, would raise other queries about why growth was particularly high or not so high in those contexts.¹⁰ It is within such frameworks of comparison that social scientists need to investigate the variables that account for such varied economic performance.

A word of caution is necessary before proceeding, however. Since the early writing on development, far more sophisticated measures of wealth have been adopted, and future comparisons between the developing nations and those of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) can be made on these bases. The comparisons of Table 1 reflect incomes in the various countries as measured in dollars at the official rates of exchange; the comparisons do not reflect the actual costs of living in the countries. In contrast, OECD economists have devised purchasing power parities (PPPs) to measure the "real" comparison in the buying power of incomes among countries. At great cost in terms of data-gathering, collecting information on some 1,300 items in a basket of goods for the fifteen OECD nations, the economists concluded that for 1980 the GDP per capita in the United States (as measured in PPPs) was substantially greater than that for the other nations,¹¹ including Germany and France, which, from Table 1, would appear to have achieved higher incomes. The implications of the PPP comparisons are also especially rich for Japan, whose rapid growth has spawned a significant literature in the development field and caused consternation in business and labor circles in the United States. The PPP data reveal that the absolute dollar gap between the United States and Japan actually widened between 1970 and 1980, and that, when their percentage shares of the total GDP for all OECD nations are compared, the position of Japan increased only marginally vis-a-vis the United States.¹² Clearly, it remains vital to devise that most precise economic measures

of performance that are possible, since both our intellectual understanding and our political initiatives depend so fundamentally upon these measures.

With this caution in mind, and in terms of the recent development experience of the nations listed in Table 1, the most fundamental question is why some nations grew so much more rapidly than others. The contrasts are truly striking between, on the one hand, rapid economic growth in Japan and Korea and, on the other hand, much more sluggish growth in Chile and Argentina. Of course, given a total per capita income that is so much larger, Germany increases its per capita income in real terms much more than does South Korea, even if Germany's rate of growth is less than half the Korean, but the variation in rates is dramatic indeed. Considering growth over a period as long as twenty years sometimes masks exceptionally varied rates of increase within the period; in these cases, it obscures the negative growth of the Chilean economy in the early 1970s and its rapid growth later in the decade, the major falloff in South Korean growth in 1980 and 1981, and the fact that United States GNP rose by 4.2 percent between 1960 and 1973 but only by 1.8 percent between 1973 and 1982. These comparisons over a long period of time downplay the impact of particular leaders and policies in any given year, focusing attention instead on some of the underlying structural contrasts among the nations.

The data in Table 1 also question generalizations that are frequently made about economic growth. In the 1970s, South Korea and Taiwan were headed by military figures and spent heavily on national defense, yet their economies prospered: Paraguay, headed by a general who has survived in office longer than any other chief executive now serving, had a much more mediocre record, despite rapid growth at the end of the decade. Just as military leadership does not prevent or assure swift economic expansion, so neither does the level of population increase. Economically, Brazil grew more than twice as fast as Argentina even in

per capita terms during the 1960 to 1980 period, while the Brazilian population was also growing more than twice as fast as the Argentine population. In other respects, militarism significantly curtails personal freedom, and unrestrained population increase makes it far more difficult to raise living standards for most citizens, but, in evaluating processes of development, we need to go far beyond the stereotypes that condemn the generals or the population explosion as the culprits behind underdevelopment. The specific data on comparative levels of economic growth confirm this beyond question, and they also point to specific case studies and institutional contrasts that we need to investigate in detail.

(2) Distribution of Income

Fernando Henrique Cardoso was quite right recently when he wrote that "It is now time to reorient efforts to measure success in development by indicators centered on the quality of life and on equality in the distribution of goods and services."¹³ In terms of human welfare, the distribution of income is fully as important as the level of per capita income and the rate at which it is rising or falling, and, moreover, the growth of per capita income levels in most developing countries in recent decades means that--hypothetically, if not politically--more egalitarian distribution can occur without disrupting the lives of the most affluent. As Table 2 demonstrates, no countries approach the ideal of fully egalitarian distribution, but some countries are much more egalitarian than others. Among the various nations in Table 2, South Korea and Israel reveal the most equal distribution, and indeed the distribution of income in Korea has been more equal than that of Norway, Sweden, or Denmark, the Scandinavian nations usually associated with the policies of the "welfare state." Such data establish the parameters within which we need to consider issues related to distribution, but the

experience of various nations reveals far more about its impact in development.

What are the underlying determinants of income distribution? Weede and Tiefenbach conclude that South Korea and Taiwan have far more egalitarian distribution than do the Latin American countries because of the need to mobilize mass support against threats from North Korea and mainland China.¹⁴ The interpretation also fits the situation of Israel, which, surrounded by hostile neighbors, has one of the lowest Gini coefficients of inequality in Table 2.¹⁵ To the extent that this view is correct, it has interesting implications for Latin America, suggesting that the perceptions of dangers from the United States and other states are significantly less than the threats that neighbors seem to pose for the South Koreans, the Taiwanese, and the Israelis.

Another result that appears from the comparative study of income distribution is that, if the people and the leaders of a nation opt to distribute and consume the wealth of the nation to the exclusion of concern for producing new wealth, they and their children will enjoy a far lower standard of living than they might have had. Thus Uruguay, the "Switzerland of Latin America" in the 1930s with its advanced social legislation and its pride in widely enjoyed wealth, by the 1970s underwent a military coup and found economic growth just matching the population increase year by year; productivity in the export agricultural sector had stood still, and the country could not afford the cost of welfare and old-age pensions, no matter how much people enjoyed them. Similarly, Argentina, which had ranked about sixth in the world in per capita income in 1928, by 1982 fell to about thirty-sixth,¹⁶ after decades of income redistribution under Peronist governments and reversals of those policies under the military governments that ousted the Peronists. In a third case in point, during the 1970s the Costa Ricans enjoyed lavish government spending, but with a foreign debt of over \$3 billion and a falloff of world prices for coffee, sugar, and bananas, the government of Luis Alberto

Monge in 1982 and 1983 had to emphasize hard work once again, cutting public expenditures drastically, escalating taxes, and encouraging new export industries, while curbing imports and sharply lowering the standard of living from what citizens had come to expect.¹⁷

If government priorities need to stress productivity and the generation of wealth in the long run, then what role is there for more egalitarian distribution of income at the present time? Brazil has the most unequal distribution in Table 2, and has become even more unequal since 1960, even though not as much so as is sometimes claimed.¹⁸ The governments of Brazil and the Soviet Union, so different in other respects, have each pursued reinvestment of wealth at the expense of consumer spending, with the result that their national economies have grown rapidly, despite the disincentives of over centralization in the Soviet case and the heavy blows of increased energy costs since 1973 for Brazil. But at what time will the real standard of living for most citizens be raised, through government decisions to produce more consumer goods in the Soviet case or through a Brazilian decision to give a higher proportion of national income to those who are least advantaged?

One possible answer to this sort of question appears in the case of South Korea, which has combined an exceptionally high rate of economic growth with one of the most egalitarian distributions of income between the industrial and agricultural sectors anywhere in the world. The high compensation for the rural sector is attractive on ethical grounds, recompensing those upon whose labor in a sense the industrial advance has been built, but it has other advantages as well. Compensation for farmers encourages agricultural self-sufficiency, and it reduces the pressures from the countryside for rapid urbanization.¹⁹ After economic advance has brought the per capita income level up to, say, that of most Western European countries at the present time, redistribution becomes less painful for the affluent, but the Korean case demonstrates that more egalitarian distribution can occur at

far lower levels of per capita income.

The Korean case calls particular attention to the dimension of distribution between the agricultural and the urban communities, the degree to which the farming sector is sizeable, productive, and autonomous. As Table 3 indicates, some societies, such as Switzerland, Israel, or England, have comparatively small agricultural sectors where a given percentage of the population produces an equivalent proportion of the national income, whereas others, such as Indonesia or the People's Republic of China, continue to have two-thirds or more of their population in agriculture, contributing a much smaller percentage of the GNP. Besides the question of how, and in relation to what incentives, the size and productivity of farming communities are changing, it is helpful to see how agriculturalists relate to other dimensions of development. Do they provide for most national food needs or earn significant foreign exchange through exports? How vulnerable are they to natural disasters and fluctuations in market prices? Can private initiative or governmental assistance encourage highly efficient family farms that help to raise nutritional standards for others and also provide solid incomes and opportunities for greater autonomy and political awareness among farm families as well? Will the Swiss be a model for the future, and, as the data in Table 3 might imply, are nations like South Korea in some sense half way in the transition from a situation like that of Indonesia to one like that of Switzerland?

A final question from a distributionist perspective is: Has a given government helped the poor to help themselves? This is a useful issue for voters to consider for administrations like that of Ronald Reagan in the United States, and it is proportionally even more important in the Third World, where those virtually without savings make up a far greater part of the population. In Latin America, for example, the writing of John F. C. Turner and others has suggested that the poor--such as the migrant poor in the shantytowns--must take charge of their own

lives to work their way out of poverty. Government can not do it for them. In relation to the high proportion of citizens in Asian nations who live in rural areas, John Friedmann has recently articulated the same sentiment.²⁰ In evaluating both rural and urban poverty, therefore, we should ask how much has the central government facilitated citizens' efforts to aid themselves, how successful have the efforts been, and have they led to a sense that the poor can participate in broader political decisions as well.

(3)Technology

Technological innovation has major significance for the processes of development. As Alexander King has recently written, technology is in fact "a force in its own right,"²¹ one whose implications are only now coming to be better appreciated, one where all countries require capabilities in order to meet national needs. Scientific research and its technological applications may be directed toward very different ends. The Brazilians, for example, have increased their exports and their national power rather dramatically through their domestic military technology, through the QT system of independent suspension for military vehicles and the production of jet fighters that are especially effective in counter-insurgency operations. In contrast to innovations that increase exports and military power stand those that more directly affect the quality of life for citizens at home: improving food production or health, reducing unemployment through labor-intensive practices that are nevertheless efficient, cutting balance of payments problems by substituting for costly foreign imports. Important--although as yet little studied--measures of the priorities of any government are the levels, the directions, and the results of its investment in indigenous technology.

The technological investments that governmental leaders make also have

rather profound implications for the evolution of political institutions. Despite the admiration of leading social scientists for George Orwell's warnings in Nineteen Eighty-Four,²² his views of technology at the service of totalitarianism have not come true, at least by the date of the novel. Two-way television screens do not monitor our comings and goings; citizens in many democracies, and especially minority group members, enjoy arguably more freedom, autonomy, and privacy than did their counterparts in 1948. This is not to say that the evolving technology assures somewhat wider liberty any more than it assures tighter authoritarianism, but it does suggest that politics can take precedence over technology, that we can collectively decide to protect civil liberties despite greater governmental capacity to overturn them. In various countries, there is a need to investigate the connections between technology, civil liberties, and the implementation of government power. Such studies might look at the ways in which expensive television propaganda like that of the Brazilian government affects citizens' attitudes, or how new techniques of production gradually alter basic values and orientations as appears in Korea or Japan, or how government data banks and computers work to break up networks of opponents and subversives as they did in the "dirty war" in Argentina during the 1970s.

(4) Public Indebtedness

An issue that has taken on far more salience since the early writing on development is public indebtedness, especially the level of foreign debt. By the middle 1970s, debt service payments had come to vary widely in the developing nations, from a high of nearly half the annual value of exports in Uruguay to less than 1 percent of export value in Gambia.²³ With recession characterizing so many nations in the early 1980s, their low demand for imports has curtailed the ability of

many Third World nations to pay back large external debts through export sales. It is therefore useful to compare nations in terms of their borrowing to finance development, especially to ask: (a) How large is the external debt, in absolute, per capita, and value-of-exports terms; (b) How effectively has the borrowed money been used to finance projects that can help in time to repay it; and (c) What policies in the future should be adopted by borrower and creditor nations, by the International Monetary Fund, and by financial institutions in the private ?

By 1983, levels of foreign debt have reached unprecedented levels: \$85 billion dollars in Brazil, \$83 billion in Mexico, \$39 billion in Argentina, \$32 billion in Venezuela, \$26 billion in Poland, and \$18 billion in Chile. Both in absolute terms and in relation to the size of export earnings, Asian nations face debt repayment that is far less arduous than is that in Latin America, and this alone assures more capital in Asia for the financing of development projects. Israel, which has the highest per capita external debt in the world, also has a large number of supporters overseas who can help to pay it off, but remittances going back to the major debtor nations of Latin America are small indeed.

The seriousness of this foreign debt situation in Latin America has caught distinguished economists as well as bankers off guard. It was only several years ago that Albert Fishlow praised what he called "debt-led, rather than export-led growth" in Brazil, saying that he wished "to stress the special character and importance of Brazilian integration into world capital markets as a condition of success of the model."²⁴ Now, with an \$85 billion debt, that degree of integration threatens the capital markets as well as Brazil. The "debt-led" paradigm needs to be rethought.

(5) Foreign Ties, Dependency, and the World System

Until quite recently, most economists have assumed that the ties between the wealthier and the poorer nations could benefit the latter substantially. As late as 1980, Lloyd Reynolds wrote that "the growth of Third World economies has been closely related to growth in the OECD countries, and to international flows of goods, finance, and technology. Growth in the world economy provides, as it were, an escalator onto which Third World countries can climb."²⁵ Yet is this still true later in the 1980s, after serious recession in the West, the growth of protectionism there, and the dangers that recession and protectionism pose for Third World nations that have based their development strategies upon increasing exports, incidentally contracting their huge foreign loans under the assumption that increased exports in the years ahead would pay them off?

Do the reversals of recent years in the international economic system demonstrate that Third World nations have become overly dependent upon capital or markets abroad, perhaps even affirming the strictures of the "dependency theory" that grew up in the 1970s? The answers to these two questions may well be "yes" to the first and "no" to the second. It may be time for many nations in the Third World to concentrate upon more internally oriented models of growth, distributing income more widely, expanding internal markets, and reorienting some production and employment to better fill domestic needs rather than concentrating as strongly upon the export sector. Yet a pragmatic reorientation of some resources to the domestic market does not validate the "dependency" literature for a number of reasons: because careful historical analysis shows the perspective to be wrong in many cases,²⁶ because dependency theorists actually vary greatly in their analysis,²⁷ because concerns of national security rather than economic policy predominate in the relations of such nations as South Korea and the United States,

and because, despite current problem, economies such as Korea or Brazil have done far, far better over the past two decades than dependency theory would suggest. Scholars have rejected dependency theory as the explanation of underdevelopment in Asia²⁸ and Latin America, yet wide room still exists to investigate particular cases and degrees to which economic production and income in the nations of these regions are tied to foreign markets and foreign firms.

Counterbalancing the earlier literature are recent emphases on interdependence. Dependency is a two-way process, because, as Heraldo Munoz argues convincingly, the wealthier countries of the center are tied significantly to the developing countries of the periphery through their need for strategic raw materials, labor that is cheap even in terms of productivity, and markets in the Third World.²⁹ Direct foreign investment is by no means limited to that from the United States, Europe, and Japan, as recent case studies have demonstrated that public and private overseas investment also rose dramatically in the 1970s from such nations as Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Brazil, and Argentina.³⁰ Keohane and Nye have articulated this growing interdependence of nations, particularly in economic terms.³¹ Many central events of the past fifteen years buttress the interdependence perspective, such as the fourfold increase in oil prices that OPEC countries imposed on the "center" and the "periphery" alike in the early 1970s, or the heavy indebtedness of Brazil or Mexico in the early 1980s that simultaneously threatens institutions and prosperity in both lending and borrowing nations.

Another recent approach deserving further consideration is the "world-systems analysis" suggested by Immanuel Wallerstein and his associates.³² Drawing upon classic elements of Marxist theory, it focuses attention not on development within individual nation-states but rather among nations worldwide. In this context, it becomes especially important to ask how, for any developing nation, its level of income and choice of products (industrial, agricultural, extractive) relate to its

patterns of trade, what proportion of the profits generated within the nation are reinvested there, and how economic structures affect the relations among social classes. Potentially useful in directing attention to the transnational dimensions of development, the approach nevertheless concentrates, as did early dependency theory, upon the notions of "core" and "periphery" that came from the Economic Commission for Latin America in the late 1940s. Like the original theorizing of Parsons, Easton, and Almond, it still remains at a highly abstract level. Later, when the developing countries have been more systematically studied in terms of transnational ties to multinational corporations, foreign governments, trade union movements, religious institutions, and the emerging cooperation among socialist and conservative parties, the countries may turn out to vary widely in the degrees of their international connections.

Underlying the approaches of dependency theory or world systems analysis is the assumption that the wealth of the more affluent countries has come from their exploitation of the developing countries. This is a fundamental reason why Marxian analysis has been so popular in the Third World, and, if accepted, it justifies far greater assistance from the affluent to the developing nations in terms of higher prices paid for Third World exports, foreign assistance, and the restructuring of international institutions. Thus the Brandt Commission typically called for "a large-scale transfer of resources to developing countries" between 1980 and 1985,³³ yet no such transfer has taken place, essentially because the arguments and the current distribution of political and economic power among nations have not been sufficient to convince the affluent to share a greater proportion of their wealth. Appeals to good will or to past exploitation are not sufficient to change behavior. It is only when the leaders and the voters in the richer nations become convinced that their future prosperity does depend on that in other nations that their behavior will change.

(6) Cultural Adaptation

Another international dimension of development is cultural assimilation and adaptation. Foreign merchants have stimulated commerce and entrepreneurship in many contexts, as have the Chinese in Southeast Asia or the Levantines in Latin America.³⁴ How they have done so and how indigenous groups have reacted to their doing so form chapters in the developmental experience of many nations. All too often, there are jealous and chauvinistic reactions against them and their success, encouraging political leaders to restrict or expel them, as Idi Amin Dada drove out the Asian merchants from Uganda, whose economy Amin virtually destroyed. Even where the case is not as extreme as in Uganda, studying the role of entrepreneurs from minority groups can be useful, suggesting both ways that their civil rights may better be protected and ways that their economic contributions may be encouraged.

Another link between foreigners and the indigenous population encompasses cultural adaptability, the degree to which citizens in various countries can adapt to foreign techniques of production and the attitudes that partially go along with the new techniques. Nations vary strikingly in this regard. In 1983, for example, the People's Republic of China was producing automobiles patterned after those of the Soviet Union thirty years before and signing an agreement with American Motors to begin building jeeps in Beijing, whereas, with a legendary ability to accept foreign technology and improve on it, the Japanese automobile industry had so outdistanced its North American competitors as to capture 24 percent of the American market. The adaptation to foreign processes of production varies according to fundamental characteristics of the culture in the recipient country as well as according to how welcoming the host government is to foreign firms, and understanding the elements

in each culture that affect adaptation would facilitate the roles of both entrepreneurs and government officials.

(7) Political Stability

As Simon Kuznets said in his speech accepting the Nobel Prize for his work on national income and its growth, "such growth demands a stable, but flexible, political and social framework, capable of accommodating rapid structural change and resolving the conflicts that it generates, while encouraging the growth-promoting groups in society."³⁵

Political stability, change in governments, and alterations in types of governments remain a central concern of developmental studies, one that can be investigated somewhat better than it could be a quarter century ago. The most seminal work in this area remains Samuel Huntington's 1968 study, Political Order in Changing Societies, a work that was widely read and accepted in Third World Nations as well as in the United States and Europe.³⁶ Perhaps because its coverage is so broad and its conclusions so forcefully argued, or because Huntington and his students soon turned their attention to other issues, the major propositions of the volume have yet to be reconsidered in other contexts.

Another avenue for political stability studies involves the wider utilization of survey data. As Juan Linz has suggested recently, regime change finally comes down to "a conflict about legitimacy formulas,"³⁷ and legitimacy can be studied best through survey research. Data banks and the archives of survey research firms are littered with studies of the political attitudes of national populations and subgroups before, during, and after shifts in government, shifts that occurred with elections, with military coups, or with the death or resignation of chief executives.

In recent decades, surveys have proliferated in countries throughout the

Third World, and the quality of the work done has generally improved.

Furthermore, careful evaluation of survey data in the authoritarian countries of the Southern Cone in South America suggests that the data are surprisingly accurate when compared to other measures of public attitudes,³⁸ although no such validation has yet been done for Southeast Asia. To understand political stability in greater depth, we require a series of case studies using these data, looking in detail at the interests and the perspectives of the groups most responsible for undermining a regime or for keeping it in power. This study of stability is not only essential in countries like South Korea or Chile, where dramatic changes in regime have taken place, but it is just as necessary in countries like Taiwan or Paraguay, where the hallmark has been regime continuity over a long period of time.

(8) The Level of Demands

Demands from the populace can curtail or enhance the capacity of leaders to further their developmental policies. We should thus ask, in terms of both economic rewards and participation in making political decisions, how much do the occupational and interest groups of a given society demand. Given the need to husband and reinvest economic resources, and the need as perceived by many national leaders to centralize allocative decisions rather than letting others have veto power over them, a high level of demands may seriously limit the ability of the central government to implement its objectives. Whether or not the demands of the populace impinge very significantly upon the calculations of governmental leaders depends in turn upon the political structure, upon how much influence the groups actually assert, and, when they seem to exert too much, whether there is an impetus for more centralization of authority, for the political system to become more authoritarian.³⁹

A major issue for the 1980s is how can wage demands be kept at competitive levels, that is how can management salaries and blue-collar wages not exceed the levels needed for finished products to compete in the domestic and the international markets. Such salary and wage restraint, evident again in 1982, has been a significant dimension of growth and prosperity in Sweden, with the close working relationship between organized labor and the Social Democratic Party. From even more striking success in this regard, Japan has become a fascinating case study, with North Americans increasingly interested in studying the patterns of production and worker-management relations that seem so successful there. In one of the most thoughtful commentaries on this theme, Harry Oshima concludes that "the main lesson to be learned from Japan's postwar experience is not so much that other countries should import the various institutions which were successful (although some of them may be imported in modified form) but that managers and workers can be motivated (and owners can be induced) to play for lower stakes and that all this is crucial to the growth of GNP and its distribution."⁴⁰ If there are indeed systematic ways to lessen demands in the short run, to "play for lower stakes," then the inducements need to be studied in detail.

The issue of wage demands demonstrates once again how interdependent are the forces that shape development, as they interact, for example, with cultural values and political leadership. Fundamentally, the cultural norms of a nation establish the framework within which patterns of wage demands emerge. Japan instills in its young men a sense of fierce competition, yet, in contrast to the individualism of North Americans, the Japanese are able to express their striving in a more cooperative working context. How can assembly-line workers in the United States be expected to take pay cuts to compete with the Japanese, when management executives make so very much more in salary and fringe benefits than do their Japanese counterparts? In a more specific contrast to the Japanese case,

Juan Peron rapidly increased wages and benefits for workers and the disadvantages in Argentina in the late 1940s. The legacies of the Peron years have included low economic growth, a fratricidal competition over distribution rather than a concentration on production and mutual benefits for workers and managers, and a pattern of elections and military coups that put in office governments with very different positions on the distribution issues.⁴¹ Leadership makes a lasting difference.

(9) Political Participation

In the study of participation among nations, survey data can establish fundamental comparisons of attitude, and then these data can, as in the classic seven-nation study by Verba, Nie, and Kim, be compared with levels and varieties of participation and with socioeconomic and institutional data from each nation.⁴² How much do citizens really want to participate in political decisions? Who wants to participate, on what sort of issue, at the local, regional, national, and international levels? How effective is the participation of various groups, given the institutional structure and the political issues of specific nations? How do increasing technological complexity and reliance upon experts limit the opportunities for participation?⁴³

Recent work points to self-imposed limitations on participation, to different utilization of institutions among countries, and to the values obtained during study abroad. Notwithstanding United States concern with "democracy" and Soviet concern with "building socialism" in the Third World, many citizens there are far more concerned with improving their material standard of living than with gaining new opportunities for political participation.⁴⁴ Other analysis shows that Koreans tend to use political organizations far more than do Kenyans or Turks in

order to bring their views to the attention of the national government.⁴⁵ It remains intriguing to investigate the participation and impact of scientists and technocrats who were trained overseas, to assess how their training affected their view of what they should be doing in their societies as well as their technical capacity to do it.⁴⁶

Another dimension of participation involves patterns of perception among political elites and the degree to which the elites of a given society fear or actively encourage wider degrees of participation by the rank and file. Following the work by Lowell Field and his students on elites and particularly elite consensus in the process of development,⁴⁷ studies in the 1980s can approach these issues with new data, especially survey data. Such work in Brazil demonstrates that elites there, while deeply divided among themselves, nevertheless "dread mass politics," as Peter McDonough puts it,⁴⁸ suggesting that the much discussed return to democracy there may be more arduous than many expect.

And what of participation at the local level? If Gabriel Almond has proven correct in predicting that "the political systems of the new and modernizing nations will have to have strong centralizing and authoritarian tendencies," then have they been able as well to implement what he called "a democratizing strategy"--the maintenance of a vigorous tradition of political autonomy at the local level?⁴⁹ To the extent that nations have maintained this absence of centralized control, is it genuinely leading to greater stability or to wider political participation at the national level in the long run?

(10) Attitudes and Values

The traditional literature on political culture⁵⁰ alerts us to look for what values and attitudes citizens possess: What is their sense of national community,

trust in each other, and support for the current government and for the rules of the political game? How do these perceptions affect their effectiveness in working together, shaping political stability and economic growth? Instead of trying to estimate the levels of "trust" or "legitimacy" for national populations as whole, some political development studies in the 1980s may, on the other hand, more comprehensively compare values in different nations while, on the other hand, other studies investigate attitudes within specific segments of national populations, tracing how attitudes change over time and in relation to what specific events the change is most likely to occur.

Thus Gallup International is engaged in a survey project costing several million dollars, comparing human and religious values in the populations of sixteen nations in Europe, North America, and Latin America. A summary book on all the nations is planned, and then separate books for each country will more deeply probe the patterns of values in each national context. The early studies in development focused upon nations in the Third World and borrowed conceptual schemes from Europe or North America to apply or test there, and it remains worthwhile to test such constructs in other parts of the world.⁵¹ But, with a different approach, Gallup seeks to ask the same questions in all parts of the world, even including Eastern Europe and parts of the Soviet Union.⁵² As these data on values are collected at the same period for more nations and in a more coordinated fashion than has ever been done before, so too researchers in the 1980s have an unprecedented amount and quality of survey data available to them for secondary analysis in the various national and international survey archives around the world. Here too, data from the Soviet Union is beginning to appear.⁵³

In another project that seeks to study the Soviet Union and the United States in the same context as some of the "developing" nations, a study group of the International Political Science Association is focusing upon the levels and

effects of nationalistic commitment in different countries, using extant survey data and also coordinating a small body of questions to be asked in new surveys.⁵⁴ Significant issues include the willingness indifferent segments of the population to sacrifice personal (e.g. economic) self-interest to promote such national goals as rapid growth, the ways in which patriotic campaigns can influence political behavior, and the extent to which perceived threats from abroad can bring mutually antagonistic groups closer together. For instance, how much effect did the strongly nationalistic slant of the Pinochet government have upon the plebiscite of 1980, and how has it been able to use patriotism--especially among some of the least affluent members of the society--to bolster support for its strategy of economic growth, which demands the most stringent sacrifices from those with the lowest incomes? Alternatively, do Vietnamese incursions on the Thai border really significantly increase backing for the government? More broadly, has the situation of citizens in South Korea regarding North Korea or citizens in Taiwan regarding the government of mainland China been similar to that of citizens in Mexico vis-a-vis the United States, one where sacrifice, cooperation, and therefore economic growth have been easier because of the constant menace of a powerful and threatening foreign neighbor?⁵⁵

(11) Leadership

Leadership remains a central variable in politics and in economic development. As Anderson, von der Mehden, and Young emphasized long ago, leaders in developing nations are not "instruments" in a process of modernization, but rather people involved in highly complex problem-solving.⁵⁶ Some are better at it than others, because of their own capabilities, the resources at their command, or the tractability of the problems. Each of these dimensions deserves

detailed scrutiny in various national contexts, especially because, from a clearer understanding of effective leadership may come more thoughtful and effective leaders in the future.

One of the problems of the early literature on development was that it provided little practical advice to such executives and administrators in the day-by-day decisions that they faced. As Ilchman and Uphoff criticized it, "contemporary political and social science can provide little guidance in the conduct of politics.... Macro-analytical approaches, which view society and the polity in global terms, cannot handle choices made by the statesman and other political activists."⁵⁷ Focusing more directly upon political leadership--a central concern of the classical philosophers--can help to provide better guidance for policy makers. Looking at the goals of leaders, the policy alternatives that they faced, their choices, and the results suggests possible patterns for political actors. It would be useful to have far more case studies like Wayne Cornelius' detailed analysis of institutional reforms under Lazaro Cardenas,⁵⁸ who fundamentally and lastingly reshaped the Mexican political system.

In studying leadership in comparative politics, it is important to recognize that innovation may come from any part of the world. That is, some of the traditional theorizing on development, which was done at a time when political scientists in the United States were trying to break from the old orientation that concentrated exclusively on Europe and North America, assumed that North American or European models would ultimately fit the patterns of the Third World, just as many nations in that world had originally patterned their constitutions on those of Britain, France, or the United States. But this approach has proven untenable, and it needs to be replaced by one where would-be innovators keep an open mind as to the sources of innovation. Thus, for example, early in this century Mexico enacted a labor code far more advanced than those of Britain or the United

States, and the legislation on the status of women was more progressive (more "modern") in Uruguay than in North America or Europe. More recently, South Korea minimized the cost of the oil price rises of the 1970s by sending construction crews to Saudi Arabia to earn vast amounts of foreign exchange,⁵⁹ a wise move that made the impact of the high energy costs far less damaging in Korea than in other Third World nations. Looking ahead, some observers even predict that more and more North Americans may deal with disorientation in their environment by adopting the norms of Asian religion.⁶⁰)

(12) The Military

Finally, given the predominance of the military in many nations of Southeast Asia and Latin America, patterns of apparent similarity should be investigated. Are patterns of civil-military relations analyzed in Asia at a particular time⁶¹ similar to those in Latin America? Does the new literature on "redemocratization" in Latin America⁶² have any logical counterpart among the Asian states? Why are some military governments far more successful at economic growth, or redistribution, or political tolerance than others, and how can success in such areas be encouraged?

Useful--and counterintuitive--information comes from careful comparisons of various national patterns of government spending on the military. As Table 4 makes clear, it is not whether a nation is run by military leaders but rather the security threats that it faces that primarily determine what part of the national wealth goes to the military. Israel, a vibrant democracy, spends nearly a third of its GNP on defense, whereas Brazil, a military-led state for many years, spends under 1 percent. States threatened by the Soviet Union, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and the People's Republic of China, all support heavy defense

expenditures, and in passing, it is interesting to note that the per capita weight of defense spending has been exactly the same for Argentina and Chile, two nations in military confrontation across the Beagle Channel. Another important conclusion to come out of expenditure comparisons is how rare is the Mexican case, where the leaders of a nation feel secure enough to spend more than six times as much on education as on defense, and where civilian leaders also have enough political power to impose this decision on the military establishment. In terms of training for economic development, it is advantageous to spend at least something more on education than defense, as Table 4 reveals to be the case for Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and the Philippines. Of course, the initial data require further elaboration; in Paraguay, for example, the major benefit to military officers and the major costs to the system come not through government salaries but through control of contraband. But the data of Table 4 do evidence the central role of security concerns in military spending, and therefore the need to reduce threats of warfare and violence, not only to protect human life but also to allow vastly more funds for the development process.

An emerging focus for joint research that can not be studied through quantitative comparisons turns to the ways that military leaders deal with their civilian assistants and advisers. Guillermo O'Donnel has recently demonstrated in detail how military governments in Argentina, Chile, and Brazil in the late 1960s and the 1970s depended upon the developmental strategies of civilian "technicians" far more than has been recognized in the past.⁶³ In the South Korean case, it appears that a significant element in the impressive economic growth over the past two decades has come from a modern application of the Confucian ethic of leadership, from the fact that national leaders have given major responsibility for implementing development goals to administrators chosen for their talent and training, a meritocratic elite that has undertaken its tasks with great competence.

It would be helpful to see just how unique this approach really is.

CONCLUSIONS

Approaches to development in the 1980s look quite different than they did a quarter century ago. Some of the old issues, like economic growth and political participation, remain central to the field, but other issues, such as the roles of technology and external debt, have gained prominence as well. We now have far more data on some topics, such as income distribution, and far more material for comparative case studies, such as those of modernizing military regimes. Our ability to collect and analyze some sorts of information, such as survey research data, has increased dramatically, and a rich store of survey data awaits secondary analysis by a new generation of social scientists. Perhaps the greatest change from the 1950s, the area where the old orientations now appear most dated and quaint, is our appreciation that useful paradigms of development can appear in nations throughout the world, that they are not some exclusive prerogative of the West to be shared like foreign aid with other countries.

A special concern of development in the 1980s is that of self-reliance, moving away as far as is possible from dependence upon other nations and eliminating as far as is feasible vulnerability to worldwide economic conditions such as recession and volatile demand. In one sort of situation, the dramatically increased prosperity of the Ivory Coast over the past two decades demonstrates that great progress may occur with considerable foreign ties, like those of the Ivory Coast to France. Yet dependence upon foreign markets and loans as in the case of Brazil, or markets and military defense in South Korea, significantly limits the options open to national decision-makers. The resulting push for greater self-

reliance among Third World nations does not, as Johan Galtung argues,⁶⁴ require heightened struggle and conflict with the wealthier nations. When China or Tanzania pursued more autarkic strategies, neither the West nor the Soviets prevented it, although the losses in education and technology that China experienced in the Cultural Revolution stand as a stark warning against one form of inward looking development. Instead of rejecting technological innovation, developing nations need to adapt technologies to their own indigenous needs, working to produce more efficiently the food, clothing, and shelter that their people require. A strategy of filling domestic needs from domestic production, rather than relying too heavily upon export earnings, can also help to reduce the inequalities in living standards within Third World nations as well.

When seen in terms of self-reliance and of the twelve issues outlined above, the study of development in the 1980s becomes more a framework of questions than a set of answers. At first, this may seem superficial, a betrayal at the very least of the aspirations of developmental theorists twenty-five years ago. Yet it is also far more realistic. Development studies are not and should not be a separate discipline; it is fruitful precisely because it brings together economists, political scientists, sociologists, and others, because it works to integrate insights from different disciplines as well as different parts of the world. As Harold Lasswell wrote in 1941, "Although they are neither scientific laws nor dogmatic forecasts, developmental constructs aid in the timing of scientific work, stimulating both planned observation of the future and renewed interest in whatever past events are of greatest pertinence to the emerging future."⁶⁵

The conclusions of developmental studies are and will long remain short-range or middle-range at best, yet here they can bring far more balanced insights to researchers and policy choices to public officials. These investigations do not tantalize researchers with Nobel prizes or the chance to uncover the double helix,

but they do offer opportunities to understand both specific nations and social processes far better through explicit theorizing and a vast extant literature. To the extent that the findings of this literature are appreciated by those who govern, the studies can inform more appropriate public policies as well. Surely this is compensation enough in a world so much in need of better theory and better policy.

NOTES

1. Hirschman, Albert O., "Ascensao e declinio da economia do desenvolvimento," Dados, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1982). The indictment is particularly telling, since Professor Hirschman has been one of the most thoughtful and articulate contributors to the literature. See especially his two most recent books, Essays in Trespassing: Economics to Politics and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), and A Bias for Hope: Essays on Development and Latin America (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971).
2. Eckstein, Harry, "The Idea of Political Development: From Dignity to Efficiency," World Politics, Vol. 34, No. 4 (July, 1982).
3. An Excellent review of the conclusions of the traditional literature on political development may be found in Samuel P. Huntington and Jorge I. Domínguez, "Political Development," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Macropolitical Theory, Vol. 3 in Handbook of Political Science (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1975).
4. Prewitt, Kenneth, "The Impact of the Developing World on U.S. Social-Science Theory and Methodology," in Laurence D. Stifel, Ralph K. Davidson, and James S. Coleman, eds., Social Sciences and Public Policy in the Developing World (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1982).
5. Gregor, A. James, Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 303.
6. One of the most original interpretations of development in Latin America remains Charles W. Anderson, Politics and Economic change in Latin America (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1967).
7. Heeger, Gerald A., The Politics of Underdevelopment (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974), p. 5. Square brackets mine.
8. Holt, Robert T. and Turner, John E., "Crises and Sequences in Collective Theory Development," American Political Science Review, Vol. 69, No. 3 (September, 1975), p. 992.
9. Blalock, Hubert M. Jr., Conceptualization and Measurement in the Social Sciences (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage, 1982).
10. For worldwide comparisons of economic and social data in earlier periods, see especially Bruce M. Russett, and others, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964), and Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 2d ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972).

11. "Comparing Real Standards of Living," OECD Observer, No. 115 (March, 1982), pp. 31-32. For more detailed information, see "Estimates of Real GDP Based on PPPs," OECD National Accounts, Volume 1, Main Aggregates, 1951-1980, part 4, pp. 91-97.
12. For these important comparisons, I am indebted to Everett Ladd, who read and commented upon an earlier version of this paper.
13. Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, "Towards Another Development," in Heraldo Munoz, ed., From Dependency to Development: Strategies to Overcome Underdevelopment and Inequality (Boulder, Col.: West-view Press, 1982), p. 310.
14. Weede, Erich and Tiefenbach, Horst, "Correlates of the Size Distribution of Income in Cross-National Analyses," Journal of Politics, Vol. 43, No. 4 (November, 1981), p. 1041.
15. Without income distribution in mind, Christopher Lucas makes the general comparison, calling Taiwan "a sort of Far Eastern Israel" and going on to describe it as "a small beleaguered nation threatened by hostile powers, a country whose industrious people are prepared to defend themselves against subjugation from without and who have worked hard to achieve the material prosperity that is the goal of so many developing countries," a state whose people reject "the drab socialism of a proletarian" neighbor and where "ability and talent are rewarded and capitalist incentives flourish." Christopher J. Lucas, "The Politics of National Development and Education in Taiwan," Comparative Politics, Vol. 14, No. 2 (January, 1982), p. 223.
16. Turner, Frederick C., "The Aftermath of Defeat in Argentina," Current History, Vol. 82, No. 481 (February, 1983), p. 58. On the policies of the Peronist years, see also Frederick C. Turner and Jose Enrique Miguens, eds., Juan Peron and the Reshaping of Argentina (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983).
17. A useful summary of problems facing the Costa Ricans is "Costa Ricans Work to Rebuild Economy and Maintain Stability," The Wall Street Journal, May 3, 1983.
18. In a detailed analysis of the Brazilian data, Samuel Morley shows that the poor have lost ground relatively to the rich, but not by as much as is commonly believed, because social and economic mobility have occurred among the poor in given base periods, and those citizens have been replaced at the bottom of the wage scale by new entrants into the labor force. Samuel A. Morley, "The Effect of Changes in the Population on Several Measures of Income Distribution," American Economic Review, Vol. 71, No. 3 (June, 1981).

19. On the problems of urbanization in Latin America more generally and the responses of different governments to them, see Frederick C. Turner, "The Rush to the Cities in Latin America: Government Actions Have More Effect Than Is Generally Recognized," Science, Vol. 192, No. 4243 (June 4, 1976). On migration more generally, see Third World Migration and Urbanization: A Symposium, a special issue of Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 30, No. 3 (April, 1982).
20. He writes, "It is not a matter of reaching 50,000 or 100,000 peasant farmers with an impressively financed program of irrigation, where the construction work is supervised by Dutch, Taiwanese, or Israeli engineers. This approach never leads to anything other than a showpiece. If the rural masses are to see a substantial improvement in their lives, it is they themselves who will have to do the work, who will have to organize themselves, and, rising from below, transform the social and physical conditions of their existence. In such a development. . . central government must act to inspire, to empower, to guide, to facilitate, to promote, to assist, and to support. It must not plan, command, administer, or implement projects of its own unless in support of the entire effort and therefore beyond local capacity." John Friedmann, "The Active Community: Toward a Political-Territorial Framework for Rural Development in Asia," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 29, No. 2 (January, 1981), p. 261.
21. King, Alexander, "Interdependence and Self-Reliance: Science and Technology in an Alternative Approach to World Order" (paper presented in Tunis, April, 1983), p. 17. See also Alexander King and Aklilu Lemma, "Scientific Research and Technological Development," in Jan Tinbergen, coordinator, Reshaping the International Order: A Report to the Club of Rome (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1976), and Richard S. Eckaus, Appropriate Technologies for Developing Countries (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Science, 1977).
22. In a marvelously detailed biography, Bernard Crick sums up the views of many admirers of Orwell, writing that he "simply extended certain discernible tendencies of 1948 forward into 1984" and that "Nineteen Eighty-Four is to the twentieth century what Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan was to the seventeenth." Bernard Crick, George Orwell: A Life (New York: Penguin Books, 1982), pp. 563, 570.
23. Dhonte, Pierre, Clockwork Debt: Trade and the External Debt of Developing Countries (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1979), p. 63.
24. Fishlow, Albert, "Brazilian Development in Long-Term Perspective," American Economic Review, Vol. 70, No. 2 (May, 1980), p. 106.
25. Reynolds, Lloyd G., "Economic Development in Historical Perspective," American Economic Review, Vol. 70, No. 2 (May, 1980), p. 95.
26. Among the most interesting and best documented case studies of the inapplicability of dependency theory are Paul B. Goodwin, Jr., "The Politics of Rate-making: The British-owned Railways and the Union Civica Radical, 1921-1928," Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 6, Part 2

(November, 1974), and Paul B. Goodwin, Jr., "Anglo-Argentine Commercial Relations: A Private Sector View, 1922-43," Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 61, No. 1 (February, 1981). For a more general critique of the dependency perspectives, see Tony Smith, "The Case of Dependency Theory," in W. Scott Thompson, ed., The Third World: Premises for U.S. Policy (San Francisco, Cal.: ICS Press, 1983).

27. One of the most reasonable and widely accepted views of dependency is Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Associated-Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications," in Alfred Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973). Cardoso says that, in Brazil, dependent development has allowed rapid economic growth and social mobility, but that at the same time, in Brazil and elsewhere, "part of the industrial system of the hegemonic countries is now being transferred, under the control of international corporations, to countries that have already been able to reach a relatively advanced level of industrial development" (pp. 156-157). More radical and more controversial views of dependency may be found in Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), and in the various articles in Latin American Perspectives.
28. DasGupta has recently written that "the charm of class analysis in South Asia derives in part from the pleasure of speculating on who is to blame for the national predicament," and he goes on to criticize dependency theories that treat foreign aid in Nepal "as direct evidence of active underdevelopment promoted by imperialism" when "most of this aid comes from India--- according to dependency theory, itself a stagnating economy as a result of imperialism." Jyotirinda DasGupta, "Development and Poverty Reduction In South Asia--A Review Article," Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 42, No. 1 (November, 1982), pp. 109-110.
29. Munoz, Heraldo, "The Strategic Dependency of the Centers and the Economic Importance of the Latin American Periphery," in Munoz, ed., From Dependency to Development.
30. See Krishna Kumar and Maxwell G. McLeod, eds., Multinationals from Developing Countries (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1981).
31. Keohane, Robert O., and Nye, Joseph S., Power and Interdependency: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), especially pp. ix, 8-19.
32. The best summary of the approach is Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: Theory and Methodology (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1982).
33. North-South: A Program for Survival. The Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues under the Chairmanship of Willy Brandt (Cambridge, Mas.: M.I.T. Press, 1980), pp. 276.
34. For comparative comments on the roles of these two groups, see Yuan-Li Wu, "Chinese Entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia" and William Glade, "The

- Levantines in Latin America," American Economic Review, Vol. 73, No. 2 (May, 1983).
35. Kuznets, Simon, "Modern Economic Growth: Findings and Reflections," in Cyril E. Black, ed., Comparative Modernization: A Reader (New York: Free Press, 1976), p. 195.
 36. Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968).
 37. Linz writes, "It is important to keep in mind that the rebellion against democratic regimes is ultimately a conflict about legitimacy formulas." Juan J. Linz, Part I, "Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibrium," in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 92.
 38. Smith, Brian H., and Turner, Frederick C., "The Quality of Survey Research in Authoritarian Regimes: Brazil and the Southern Cone of Latin America in the 1970s" (paper presented at the XIIth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Rio de Janeiro, August, 1982).
 39. This is, for example, the explanation that S. N. Eisenstadt gives for the rise of militarism in Japan in the 1920s and 1930s. As he writes, "During that period various new elites the more modern and independent middle classes, professional, and intellectual groups, as well as some workers' organizations attempted to enlarge the scope of their political participation. Failing to absorb these new elements, the modern system broke down and this gave rise to the militarist regimes of the thirties. This development was mostly due to the rulers' attempt to stifle new demands, and to control these new groups and their demands through bureaucratic and military factions under the aegis of Imperial symbols." S. N. Eisenstadt, "Transformation of Social, Political and Cultural Orders in Modernization," in Ronald Cohen and John Middleton, eds., Comparative Political Systems: Studies in the Politics of Pre-Industrial Societies (Garden City, N.Y.: The Natural History Press, 1967), p. 451. That military rule encouraged imperialism and foreign wars in the Japanese case can not be generalized to other cases. Some military governments seek instead to lessen demands at home and to get on with the process of modernization.
 40. Oshima, Harry T., "Reinterpreting Japan's Postwar Growth," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 31, No. 1 (October, 1982), p. 42. On a more narrow theme, Oshima writes that "the historic significance of Japan's postwar economic growth is the demonstration that the labor force under capitalism can be motivated to produce efficiently without relying entirely on material rewards, but through making the workplace a 'joyful place to work.'" With cool detachment and a note of prophecy, he concludes that "Japan will certainly surpass the United States if there is complacency concerning the superiority of present American ways of working, producing, selling and innovating." Ibid., pp. 41, 43. On the historical background of Japanese growth, see Cyril E. Black, and others, The Modernization of Japan and Russia: A Comparative Study (New York: Free Press, 1975).

41. Wynia, Gary W., "Workers and Wages: Argentine Labor and the Incomes Policy Problem," Chapter 3 in Turner and Miguens, eds., Juan Peron and the Reshaping of Argentina.
42. Verba, Sidney, Nie, Norman H., and Kim, Jae-on, Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978). See also Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-on Kim, The Modes of Democratic Participation: A Cross-national Comparison (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage, 1971), and Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).
43. For some useful comments on ways to maintain broad participation while relying for information on those with technical information, see Stephen Wexler, "Expert and Lay Participation in Decision Making," in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., Participation in Politics (New York: Lieber-Atherton, 1975).
44. Commenting on the failures to institutionalize wider participation in Yugoslavia, which once seemed a promising model to many Third World leaders, Thomas Oleszczuk proposes that most Yugoslavs have tried to gain "prosperity in return for obedience." Oleszczuk, "The Liberalization of Dictatorship: The Titoist Lesson in the Third World," Journal of Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (August, 1981), p. 822. Considerable confirmation of this conclusion comes from survey work done in Yugoslavia. See Jan F. Triska and Ana Barbic, "Evaluating Citizen Performance on the Community Level: Does Party Affiliation in Yugoslavia Make a Difference?" in Donald E. Schulz and Jan S. Adams, eds., Political Participation in Communist Systems (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981).
45. Kalaycioglu, Ersin and Turan, Ilter, "Measuring Political Participation: A Cross-Cultural Application," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1 (April, 1981), p. 132.
46. One of the most suggestive of these analyses remains A. H. Halsey, "The Education of Leaders and Political Development in New Nations," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966). More recently, important studies are being done by the Study Group on International Communication of the International Political Science Association.
47. Field, G. Lowell, Comparative Political Development: The Precedent of the West (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967); G. Lowell Field and John Higley, Elites in Developed Societies: Theoretical Reflections on an Initial Stage in Norway (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage, 1972); G. Lowell Field and John Higley, Elitism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980); and John Higley and Gwen Moore, "Elite Integration in the United States and Australia," American Political Science Review, Vol. 75, No. 3 (September, 1981).
48. McDonough, Peter, "Repression and Representation in Brazil," Comparative Politics, Vol. 15, No. 1 (October, 1982), p. 90.

49. Almond, Gabriel A., Political Development: Essays in Heuristic Theory (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 230. Almond argues that the "Whig tradition" of local autonomy encouraged British democracy and made Britain more stable than centralized France.
50. Pye, Lucian W., and Verba, Sidney, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965).
51. See, for example, Scott C. Flanagan, "Changing Values in Advanced Industrial Societies: Inglehart's Silent Revolution from the Perspective of Japanese Findings," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 14, No. 4 (January, 1982).
52. For more details on the human values project, write to its director, Gordon I. Heald, Social Surveys Limited, 202 Finchley Road, London NW3 6BL, England.
53. On the cooperation between data archives in the Soviet Union and the United States, write to William Gammell, the Roper Center, the University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut 06268, United States of America.
54. On the nationalism project, write to Edgardo Catterberg, Study Group on Comparative Public Opinion, Pacheco de Melo 2668, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
55. Turner, Frederick C., The Dynamic of Mexican Nationalism (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1968), especially chapters 2 and 6.
56. Anderson, Charles W., von der Mehden, Fred R., and Young Crawford, Issues of Political Development (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 8.
57. Ilchman, Warren F., and Uphoff, Norman Thomas, The Political Economy of Change (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 8, 11.
58. Cornelius, Wayne, "Nation Building, Participation, and Distribution: The Politics of Social Reform under Cardenas," in Gabriel A. Almond, Scott C. Flanagan, and Robert J. Mundt, eds., Crisis, Choice, and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973).
59. This point is especially well made by Anthony Sampson in The Money Lenders: The People and Politics of the World Banking Crisis (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), pp. 221-225.
60. See K. Klostermaier, "Will India's Past Be America's Future: Reflections on the Caitanya Movement and Its Potentials," Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol. 15, Nos. 1-2 (January and April, 1980).
61. Hoadley, J. Stephen, Soldiers and Politics in Southeast Asia: Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1975).

62. Handelman, Howard and Sanders, Thomas G., eds., Military Government and the Movement toward Democracy in South America (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1981). One of the best recent interpretations of military roles in Latin American politics, which seriously challenges earlier perspectives, is Irving Louis Horowitz, Beyond Empire & Revolution: Militarization and Consolidation in the Third World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).
63. O'Donnell, Guillermo, "As forcas armadas e o estado autoritario no Cone Sul da America Latina, Dados, Vol. 24. No. 3 (1981).
64. Relying upon the old notion of world centers that exploit the periphery, Galtung writes that, "The politics of self-reliance has been and will continue to be resisted both from within and from without. It will be a politics of struggle because of the vested interest in the present world order for those at the top.... We are not heading for a nice linear, or even exponential, growth in the phenomenon of self-reliance around the world; the resistance will also gain increasing momentum." Galtung, "The Politics of Self-Reliance," chapter 9 in Munoz, ed., From Dependency to Development, pp. 175-176.
65. Marvick, Dwaine, ed., Harold Lasswell on Political Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 176.

Table 1: Economic Indicators:

Income, Growth, Inflation, and Literacy

	GNP per capita, 1980 (in dollars)	Average Annual Growth (%) in GNP per capita 1960-80	Average Annual Rate of Inflation (%)	Adult Literacy (%), 1977
Argentina	2,390	2.2	130.8	93
Brazil	2,050	5.1	36.7	76
Chile	2,150	1.6	185.6	--
China, P.R.	290	--	--	66
France	11,730	3.9	9.7	99
Germany, F.R.	13,590	3.3	5.1	99
Indonesia	430	4.0	20.5	62
Israel	4,500	3.8	39.7	--
Japan	9,890	7.1	7.5	99
Korea, R.	1,520	7.0	19.8	93
Paraguay	1,300	3.2	12.4	84
Philippines	690	2.8	13.2	75
Switzerland	16,440	1.9	5.0	99
U.K.	7,920	2.2	14.4	99
U.S.A.	11,360	2.3	7.1	99
U.S.R.R.	4,550	4.0	--	100

Source: World Development Report, 1982 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

Table2: Income Distribution

	% Income Received By Top 5%	% Income Received By Top 10%	% Income Received By Bottom 10%	Gini Coefficient
Argentina 1961) ^a	32.0	40.7	1.8	.4895
Brazil (1960) ^a	39.9	49.1	1.2	.5896
Chile (1968) ^b	31.0	41.3	1.9	.5065
France (1962) ^b	24.7	37.2	0.5	.5176
Germany, F.R. (1960) ^a	35.4	43.0	1.9	.5053
Hong Kong (1971) ^b	23.3	33.7	2.1	.4301
Indonesia (1971) ¹	33.7	40.7	2.7	.4625
Israel (1957) ^c	13.1	22.7	2.5	.3143
Japan (1962) ^b	18.8	28.8	1.7	.3868
Korea, R. (1966) ^b	12.1	21.0	3.9	.2650
Philippines (1961) ^b	28.8	40.3	1.6	.5128
Taiwan (1964) ^b	16.7	26.1	3.0	.3290
U.K. (1960) ^b	15.6	25.8	2.3	.3546
U.S.A. (1960) ^b	16.3	26.7	0.8	.3865

Source: Shail Jain, Size Distribution of Income: A Compilation of Data (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1975). The dates after each country are those for which the distributions of income are given.

(a) By income recipients.

(b) By households.

(c) By wage earners.

Table 3: The Agricultural Sector, 1982

	% Labor Force in Agriculture	% GNP Produced by Agriculture Forestry & Fishing
Argentina	16.0	12.2
Brazil	35.6	8.6
Chile	19.5	7.2
China, People's Republic	67.0	38.0
France	10.7	4.2
Germany, Federal Republic	5.8	2.8
Indonesia	64.1	25.7
Israel	6.5	5.4
Japan	10.6	4.5
Korea, Republic of	35.6	20.4
Paraguay	44.9	29.5
Philippines	52.6	25.4
Taiwan	21.0	10.5
Switzerland	8.0	7.0
U.K.	2.6	1.9

Source: Deadline Data on World Affairs (Greenwich, Conn.: DMS, Inc., 1982).

Table 4: Military Expenditures

	Defense Expenditure as % of GNP, 1979	Central Government Expenditure, Per Capita, 1979 (in 1975 dollars)	
		Defense	Education
Argentina	2.5	37	22
Brazil	0.8	11	15
Chile	4.2 ^a	37	40
China, P.R.	5.7	12	7
Germany, F.R.	2.8	222	21
Israel	29.8	1,083	246
Korea, R.	5.5	44	24
Mexico	0.5	8	50
Paraguay	1.2	9	10
Philippines	2.2	15	16
Singapore	5.1	164	100
Switzerland	2.1	187	65
U.K.	5.4	249	45
U.S.A.	4.6	376	51

Source: World Development Report, 1982 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

(a) Data are for 1978.