

THE METROPOLIS IN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES

by

Cyrus Mechkat
Professeur
Ecole d'architecture
Université de Genève
Genève

The Thirteenth International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences
Washington, D.C. September 2-5, 1984

C 1984, The International Cultural Foundation, Inc.

THE METROPOLIS IN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES

BY

Cyrus Mechkat
Professor
School of Architecture
University of Geneva
Geneva, Switzerland

SUMMARY

The world crisis is the context. With it the whole pattern of strong economic and continuous growth has reached its deadline.

The context of the countries of the centre expands to embrace peripheral countries, which are in turn drawn into the central economic system. What effect then, does the crisis have, in the process of development initiated by the peripheral countries, on the central pattern? The metropolis is the form of urban settlement born of this central pattern. So what will become of these huge population concentrations within peripheral states?

Historical and socio-cultural backgrounds show us that the metropolis is essentially an alien urban form in an Islamic social formation. It was born of Fordism, child of both a social consensus which offered a certain quality of life, and the needs of a continuous economic growth, reflecting a concentration of productive capital, of decisionmakers, of salaried labour forces and of consumers. The metropolis itself stems from an earlier urban form, the town: the town of the Western industrialised society.

The Medina has nothing in common with these two urban forms nor with the societies which gave rise to them. The Medina has a completely different history. It was born in a time, in places, under social conditions and relations appropriate to those of an Islamic society. It corresponds to a body of former institutions and habitus totally foreign to those which characterise the towns of the Occident, and even more the metropolis.

A metropolis is impossible without a set of actors who know and act out the scenarii of the metropolitan scene, in a fordist landscape.

The existence of large population concentrations is by no means sufficient to form a metropolis.

Without massified access to a certain quality of life, without those specific things which make a metropolis, there is no metropolis. Thus, there is no metropolis in the arabo-islamic world.

The fordism of the centre, which was conceived before the 2nd World War was realised and has enjoyed 30 good years. That of the periphery, structurally coupled with the center, found itself ready, and more or less deeply involved depending on the conditions given in each country. The end of central fordism was the end of the coupling, the end of the peripheral fordism, at least in its known forms.

In its strongest form the medina prevailed throughout a dozen centuries. Its decline began in the 16th century, at which time the Western world started out on its long courtship with capitalism and the ensuing domination of the world. By the end of the 19th century, it had been thoroughly permeated by the triumphant European town.

The traditional forces which had prevailed through history vascillated, gave way and surrendered to the conquering forces.

Two forms of resistance emerged which were contradictory and antagonistic. The first was fundamentalis, conservative. The second was nationalistic and open to progress. Their real confrontation, which began towards the end of the 19th century, still continues.

The decolonisation of the 50's gave rise to a wave of optimism amongst the non-aligned nations. They awoke as from a stupor, and threw themselves into work towards social and economic progress, beginning to become aware of their capacities - and also of their limits.

The first steps towards modernity are difficult. Different agreements were made with industrialised countries engaged in expansionist fordism and metropolitan development. The financial burden was eased by the dramatic rise in the price of raw materials which gave new hope to the peripheral areas.

This was the beginning of a new world economy, firmly bound to the centre. This means the alignment with the dynamics of continuous growth marked by the center: mass production, salarisation and consumption.

But the rules of the game were interpreted and respected differently according to each country's mentality and its relations with the centre. Thus, the modes of regulation tied as they are to the central system, are rarely adhered to.

The urban way of life, the facilities, the housing, etc. are all integral elements of the consumption norms. Speculating on future developments, the local powers started building facilities suitable for Western-style consumers - housing and equipment of European style and standing, according to the Western habitus but inadequate and disconnected from the autochtone habitus as well as out of reach of the ordinary wage-earner.

The 3 case studies show this state of affairs: The Magreb, The Gulf and Teheran.

The onset of the fordist crisis of the centre caused the demise of the peripheral fordism which had been in the process of development.

What then remained?

On the one hand, the traditional cultural elements, though atrophied and a way of life in disuse. On the other hand, parts of the town being shaped and rooted in urban sprawl. The prevailing image is that of an interrupted development which had become impossible to realise.

The chances in the long or short term for the model of development from the centre seem to be unrealistic at best, because the conditions for such a realisation - a healthy and stable rate of world economic growth - no longer exist. Everything is in limbo.

More than even before, in limbo between the "never again", irremediably past, and the "not yet", to be yet conceived. What to do?

What new scenarii are to be written, for what new projects, for what new actors, for what new urban scene?

The realisation of schemes based on the standards and concepts of an advanced Western society, however attractive they may seem to be, is in reality merely cultural and economic anticipation - out of reach, and therefore only fiction.

Inversely, the same can be said of reliance on traditional appropriate local techniques. However ingenuous and admirable they may appear to be at first glance, they have not been designed to meet the mass-housing needs of a remodelled urban agglomeration. All attempts in this direction remain pale imitations.

The transplantation of intellectual Western models would lead to concepts without any place nor historical continuity.

Inversely, the reliance on any traditional concept would lead to gerontocracy of self-proclaimed wise men, massively imitated and followed... until death. Should one opt for life as a cultural project or death as an ideology and martyrdom?

Here are two definite, albeit crudely presented options for society. Both leave their mark on the urban territories and their infrastructure.

Reconstruction or de-construction ?

Because coupling between central and peripheral societies has given rise to the present situation, the solution should be sought in "dis-coupling". Only in this direction a socially acceptable issue can be attempted. This "dis-coupling" would be both economic and cultural.

The means of this policy are:

- self-centered production,
- cultural protectionism.

Such a policy should on the one hand look to its own indigenous cultures, re-considered and updated, and on the other hand reflect the achievements of industrial civilisation, which can be mastered. The patterns imposed both by the autochtone oligarchies and the international monopolies must be rejected, in favour of a co-development plan.

The future of large population concentrations in the region lies between dis-solution and alternative solution. In the case of dis-solution, the overconcentrated agglomeration will disappear through suffocation, indefinitely agonising in the forgotten "never again".

But, should the alternative solution be chosen, the same population concentrations will imagine and generate one or several new urban forms, endogenously, adapted to the complexity of the present context. Urban forms of the "not yet" because not yet born in our consciousness, in our intellect, but already at the stage of intention, of project.

INTRODUCTION

In what measure can one envisage the urban situation in countries of Islamic orientation and culture within the foreseeable future ? The context is in the crisis.

Such a crisis is profound. It did not result from the petrol crisis of the early 70's, as many people still mistakenly believe. This crisis is completely different from those which preceded it - especially that of 1929.

The issues for this crisis have, in fact, no precedent.

This is a world crisis. With it the whole pattern of strong economic and continuous growth reaches its deadline. The context of the countries of the centre expands to embrace peripheral countries, which are in turn drawn into the central economic system. What effect then, does the crisis provoke in the process of development initiated by the peripheral countries on the central pattern ? The metropolis is the form of urban settlement born of this central pattern. So what will become of those huge concentrations of population within peripheral states ?

This paper proposes some elements for the reflexion on the future of those concentrations within countries of Islamic culture.

It consists of :

1) In central-peripheral Relations :

- The town as an urban form, issue of industrial society,
- The metropolis as an urban form, issue of fordism.

2) Human settlements in an Islamic setting:

- The medina

3) From the Spice Road to the Petrol Road

- Domination from the centre and remodelling of territories.

4) Periphery, Fordism and metropolisation.

- The impossible history of a couple.

5) The Metropolis of Anticipation

Three case studies:

- The Maghreb : Waiting for Economic Growth
- The Gulf : Waiting for Homo Urbanus
- Teheran : Waiting...

6) There is no Islamic Metropolis:

- Towards new urban forms

1. IN CENTRAL-PERIPHERAL RELATIONS :

- The town as an urban form, issue of industrial society,
- The metropolis in an urban form, issue of fordism.

1.1 Throughout its history, every social formation organizes, the territory it occupies. Such organisation naturally corresponds to its own political, economic and cultural needs. It ends to a given geographical countryside, at a specific morphology. Any social formation establishes - to assure its own function and reproduction - different means, instruments, laws and norms,... customs and regularizing networks. We summon the concept of regulation mode.

This also defines portion and sharing out of the social produce destined for consumption as opposed to that which is destined for accumulation. When this concept is applied to so called asiatic or hydraulic societies, especially to pre-islamic and islamic societies, which are those with which this present study is concerned, this portion will form the tax collected by the chief, who is in charge of the reproduction of the community. In Western societies, since the end of the Middle Ages, this part of contribution has been allocated in the reproduction and transformation of the social formation. We summon the concept of accumulation systems. The concept of regulation mode evokes introverted policies and social practices including the social sphere in the individual behaviours. Habitus characterizes this whole. A social formation exists and breeds according to two interdependant vectors: the institutions and the habitus. To a given accumulation rule corresponds a given regulation mode which assures the stability and reproduction of a given social formation. Any imbalance in that order provokes a crisis.

1.2 History permits us to study the social formations caught through long periods of stability, or through moments of mutation, of transition from an obsolete system towards another in gestation.

The long periods of stability enable one to develop studies on dominant habitus and institutions, whereas the study of times of mutation emphasises the

identification of process of change and its significance as well as the necessary analysis of possible alternatives.

The present crisis falls within a period of mutation. Our investigations will concern this transformations touching the framework of the islamic social formations. Recent historical studies on economy, conducted over long periods of time, have served to bring to light how many different modes of accumulation there are and how they have evolved. Two major types predominate. There is extensive accumulation when accumulated capital is for the most part re-invested into the extension of productions, at equal productive rates. There is alternatively intensive accumulation whereby the development of the production capacity is based on productive capital increase as well as on productivity.

In spite of certain points, throughout the 19th century up until the 1920's, production only increased on average by about 2 % in the industrialized nations. In other words, within the norms of extensive accumulation.

Since the 2nd world war, a new mode of capital accumulation appeared, which has broken with the past, which has been it managed to achieve a productivity. increase of 6% er annum - an extraordinary achievement at the time. Take, for example, a worker's collective which managed to produce double the quantity 20 years previously achieved, resulting in a simultaneous and equal growth of productivity and purchasing power. The intensive accumulation mode institutionanally collectivizes in a double process a continuous economic growth of production and consumation. The productivity growth is achieved by labour fragmentation and the increased use of machines. The consumation increase is enhanced by extending the number of salaried workers to different categories of the population and the increase of purchasing power - measures regulating intervention of the state.

This form of parrallel growth of productivity and real salaries is called fordism. Its purpose is to prevent overproduction by increasing the consumers purchasing power. This requires a system of intensive accumulation together with a regulation modes to subscribe new produced goods to the entire social procedure (norms, habits). It begins by breaking former consommation norms,

limited to the needs of a reduced solvent population, and orients itself to the mass production of consumer goods. Fordism has given a solving issue to the great depression of the 30's. Bounded to the taylorisation of the production and to a keynesian policy of the state, it resulted in a long period of economic boom, from 1945-1975.

- 1.3 The crisis of the 70's can be considered as a fordist regulation mode crisis. The grounds for this can be attributed to the increasing incompatibility between productivity gain and the purchasing power of the wage-earners. The limits of taylorised production are reached, and the cost of modernisation and replacement of obsolete machinery from now on too costly. This crisis is rooted in production and labour organisation, out of tune with a new consumption restarting. This calls for radical changes. How this crisis does reach the islamic areas and its settlements ?
- 1.4 During the same post-war period many peripheral countries called newly industrialising countries launched an industrialization process. This is structurally connected, coupled with the industry of the centre countries by delocalising of a part of the production towards the periphery - as well as coupled with fordist regulation mode. We summon now the concept of peripheral Fordism. Given that the whole economic system is controlled by the centre, the economy of all peripheral countries is subject to control by the centre. We are therefore obliged to dismiss any idea of a dual economy founded on the co-existence of two economic systems - one modern and the other indigenous. Peripheral fordism reaches in the newly industrialising countries, more or less advanced degrees of success. The most notable changes can be observed in the trend from domestic reproduction of the workforce of peripheral countries to salarisation. One of the variation factors is the share of goods consumed on the local market, compared to the share destined for export. It has been noted that the higher the amount available to the local wage earner, the greater the development of the fordist regulation system. In addition, the more advanced the social consensus, the higher the likelihood of an occidental-type democracy. The indispensable condition of any contractuel salarial poli-

cy and of functioning of keynesian state is the existence of representative organisation of social partners. The primary condition of any consumer policy is a first degree of individual freedom of choice.

- 1.5 The territory, the built environment, the housing, perhaps more than in any other social formation, becomes an integrated part of Fordism. Given that every society, according to its reproduction, organizes its human settlement. This necessitates the appropriate infrastructures (roads, ports, canals), the production places, (industrial factories, fields) the military defense, the monuments the places of worship, the socio-cultural institutions..., housing, and all other buildings necessary for this reproduction. Thus the control of the territory affects institutions and habitus alike the system of accumulation and the mode of regulation every society chooses.

The built framework of industrial society was the town. Have there been historically other urban forms similar to towns of the Occident ? The history of such towns is superposed to the history of the development of capitalism and industrialisation.

It is true that other forms of human settlements have begun throughout history wherever a strong concentration of people were to be found without reproducing the same type of social relations as in the model of the western town. Therefore we cannot call them towns. This is the case with pre-colombian and pre-islamic cities. It is especially the case with the cities of islamic world, accurately called medinas and not towns.

The built framework of continuous economical growth is that which favours massed production and normed consumption. The post-war society remodeled its environment in terms of political, economic and cultural conditions linked to this project. The physical support of such a project takes the form of the modern metropolis, the focal point of powers, centre of economic decision, and vast machine for conceiving and producing, concentration place of the most important productive, salaried and consumer populations. It is required to provide citizens inhabitants the most advanced services, the infrastructures

and necessary modes of regulation and, finally, a certain quality of life. The metropolis is the foundation of the new (space and the new time of this form of production based on state mediation.

The metropolis is the urban matrix of Fordist urban development.

With the crisis, the metropolis has attained its limits. But with the crisis one discovers that fordism was also the fast-paced assembly-line work compensated by the car, the T.V., and... the electrical household appliances. As long as the system worked, productivity and salary increases and bonuses offset the disadvantages and constraints today projected by the crisis in the first instance. The same can be said of the space of fordism : the metropolis.

1.6 The periphery is freed from the yoke of colonialism after the 2nd World War.

Certain peripheral countries embarked upon an optimistic industrialisation policy. The monetary afflux, due in the 70's to the increase in the world price of raw materials, enabled new initiatives of industrialization. The theory of a dependant third world became outdated. Future economic autonomy became a possible objective. Is it then a valid realization in a fordist model of industrialization that the periphery can consolidate simultaneously with the industrialisation of the centre ?

Enormous urban conglomerations mushroomed and continue to grow at an alarming rate. Is this the beginning of the metropolis in the periphery ? The difficulties and obstacles to be overcome in such a Fordist peripheral development are not to be underestimated. They are more internal than external in countries that have embarked upon this process.

To come back to the question of overcoming the crisis of the centre; the world economic system vascillates and seizes up. What chances of success has fordism had in islamic periphery ?

The form of metropolis, with its services and facilities, with its specific cultural background, could this be conceivable in an islamic world ? What kind of future can there be after the failure of fordism for the massive peripheral agglomeration ?

In order to attempt to answer these questions, it is necessary to briefly review the history of the region and the evolution of its relations with the Western world.

2. HUMAN SETTLEMENTS IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD

2.1 The territory conquered by the Muslims had been inhabited by Greeks, Carthagians, Romans, Persians and Christians. These territories had been conquered by different civilizations before the advent of Islam, which remodelled them from the 7th century, from which time they were controlled quasi uninterrupted for more than a dozen centuries. Before this, the same regions, extending from the Tigris and the Euphrates to the Nile, had already experienced the first stages of urban phenomenon and had evolved writing, and had a first urban revolution. The question of the Babylonian city's influence on the Arabo-Islamic system is open.

The colonial European town appeared in the region in the 19th century. One can well ask if this existed in other regions marked by urban conceptions of so numerous civilisations.

Before going further in this paper, I would like to mention briefly a few point relative to the main characteristics of human settlements of the region with which this study is concerned. These points are useful for several purposes:

- It was the first time in history that colonial capitalist Europe found itself confronted with an "urbanized world". I beware of according to common implicit practice, to qualify these indigenous urban conglomerations of towns. In effect, they do not have much in common with the towns of the industrialized society. An understanding of this fundamental difference is imperative in order to avoid confusion at a later stage.
- The region is, in fact, one of high urbanizations. If, in the West, the same phenomenon had been accompanied by the industrialisation and salarisation of large layers of the population, this is far from true of the situation of the periphery.

2.2 About 20 States made up the region, including certain "mini-states" which were created during the last 12 years along the Gulf. Their surfaces vary between 2,300.000 km² (Algeria) to 620 km² (Bahrain). The population of Iran stands

at 40,000.000 compared with Qatar, at 200.000. The gross national product is a most unreliable indication of the actual economic situation, and the sharing of resources within each state varies greatly, and is impossible to control. Qatar and Kuwait with 16.700 and 11.250 Dollars per capita are the highest in the world. Saudi Arabia is a runner-up at 8,900, and Iran with 2,300. North Yemen, at the other end of the scale, had 400 per capita. The rate of urbanization is relatively high: Bahrain 78%; Irak 65%, Iran 47%; ... Pakistan 25%. There are a dozen very large urban concentrations in the area, and each one has considerable influence on the rest of their national urban system: Casablanca, Alger, Cairo, Alexandria, Ankara, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Tehran, Karachi. Cairo was the largest of these, with a population of around ten million, or 28% of the total national population. It is not unrealistic to assume that this figure will have doubled by the end of the century. Tehran, which had 5 million inhabitants in 1976 and 8 million in 1979 (after the fall of the Shah) now has 10 million with the influx of war refugees.

The illiteracy rate also varies considerably - some states are affected at up to 80%, in Iran it is 60% - and applies particularly to the feminine population who are particularly affected by this. These high rates result in difficulties to train and recruit suitable management trainees, not to mention qualified workers. It is therefore necessary to import qualified labour, there often being no alternative. This situation is particularly acute in numerous Gulf States, which could not function without immigrant labour from other Arab countries and particularly the Far East. This situation gives rise to perpetual undesirable repercussions in an area of denser and denser urban concentration.

It is dangerous to attempt to generalise on a region so vast and over a period of 12 centuries during which the cities had a very different destiny and were subject to several important internal changes. Nevertheless, various geographic factors and the social structure does permit certain elements in common, which permits a rough generalisation of sorts. These elements are namely of a social, religious, cultural and economic order which impart a certain unity to the region. The common denominator of the geographical

entity is essentially the existence of a huge plain which extends in the East from the east Iranian plains to the western point of North Africa, which facilitates access and communication. It is bordered by the Mediterranean, The Red Sea and the Persian Gulf on one side and by the high mountain range situated on the Northern side on the other. Apart from this mountainous region, most of the area is arid with a few fertile areas, such as the Mediterranean coast, the Nile valley, the Black Sea and the Caspian.

2.3 The repartition of the population in highly cultivated nuclei is directly linked to the availability of water. Such population centres in pre-islamic and afterwards islamic periods were where the princes resided (the imperial city of the asiatic despot). The focus of religious practice, administrative control, military base, and later, the principal trading activity centre throughout the long road from the Maghreb to distant China.

The birth of Islam as a religion took place in an "urban" and commercial environment. The practice of Islam was easier in such an environment than in a rural one. The islamic city of medina (tamadon = civilization) manifested certain characteristics in as much as it had existed prior to the Islamic conquest or had taken place in the framework of conquest of Jihad. Its situation in the Western Islamic world, with a Greek, Roman or Byzantine past, or in the Eastern Islamic world, which had a Persian cultural past, constitutes a new element of particularity. But the inhabitants of the medina, even the largest amongst them, such as Istanbul, Damascus, Cairo, Baghdad, Kasan did not live from spices or jewels, but principally from agricultural products of their outlying areas, the income from which was their real wealth and out of which all luxuries were paid for.

Islamic ideology is egalitarian: Every man is equal in the sight of God. Nevertheless, the society is ruled by a small elite, descendants of the Prophet. This group concerns itself with the maintenance of law and order (sharia); the collection of taxes (zakat); and the provision of some elementary public services. It is necessary to make the distinction between egalitarianism and democracy. But the tradition tends to continue and is

a major obstacle to real modernisation of the civilian society. Without such an evolution, progress will be held back. It is the politico-military group (often of foreign origin) that has the de facto control over the life of the medina, as well as the Ulama (the religious elite).

Numerous elements such as walls, doors, the market, baths, inns were service elements, inherited from preceding urban forms. The central power took place at the edge of the medina and easy to defend. This position is a mute witness to the frequent conflicts between the medina and the powers-that-be. The advent of a new dynasty could change the status of a city towards a decline or an essor. The quarter of the royal palace and its considerable retinue formed a separate entity from the rest of the city. The complex of institutions associated with the great mosque was a pole of attraction for the medina and its surrounding regions. It could include a centre of studies or an islamic university. The role of this complex was to put the population in conformity with the islamic way of life.

The Bazaar or Souk offered a grand variety of goods according to the importance of the medina which it served. It constituted a continuous space, linked with the network of other medinas and with their rural hinterlands. The subsistence economy was based on a system of land tenure where agricultural land was owned by the state, the direct cultivators and the rural notables having the right of enjoying the use of the porperty which was not a permanent right. Crops were cultivated for local-urban and rural-consumption. The community was generally self-sufficient. Most of the grain was destined for the medina as tax and removed from rural areas. The head of the village, the village sheykh, administered the land and collected the taxes. According to the periods the urban craft guilds aquired a more or less great importance, enjoying governmental protection, gradually becoming instruments of control of economy and the population. With the advent of the Ottmans and Persians they grew in importance and even aquired considerable religious significance. Their responsibility was to control the quality and quantity of manufactured goods sold in the medina, to decide upon the number of shops per guild, and

to check on the performance and production of each article and to note (approve every change. They formed a rigid heirachy of masters, tradesmen, journeymen, and master or ordinary apprentices. Only master craftsmen were allowed to open shops.

- 2.4 As the medina is built up through the most fondamental ties, kinship, common origin and ethnic identity, clientage, religious sectarian appartenance..., the quarters were the social areas in which this established ties appeared. The quarters forms also administrative units, headed by shaylahs, appointed by the governor to assist him in tax collection, order maintenance and ceremonial occasions. Thus the formal public institutions were reduced to their simplest form, when not abandoned completely. In the hawna (or community) and especially the derb (the street), social control was tightened to the extend that the norms of interiorized behavior and self-discipline is strong enough to solve any differences which might arise between the people and to pass by the administrative institutions.

The Islamic law recognized the family as an entity between the individual level and the level of the whole community of believers. The community provided water and sanitation to the families, who lived in introverted houses, in complete privacy within the medina. The house morphology sprang from a combination of climatic conditions, the patriarchal family system, and the islamic ideology which advocated the seclusion of women.

- 2.5 The medina, planned to correspond to the islamic way of life, present repetitive plans with a certain margin for interpretation according to specific conditions such as cultural heritage, relations with the hinterland, with physical conditions. Nevertheless, the most decisive element was the religious one. It exercised a control upon land and buildings appropriation rules, upon production, ands Guilds, upon diffused administration of each quarter, upon housing, upon different levels of education and their adequation to the communication system. The medina is the expression of a certain tacit agreements of a community way of life through the appropriation of areas and relations

of the community. It offers a perfect balance between the accumulation system by which it is ruled and the necessary mode of regulation for the functioning of this specific system.

Like this, it would not be able to satisfy any other accumulation system. It must be considered apart from the city of the Middle Ages, from the mercantile european town, from the town of industrial capital, from the metropolis. This difference lies in history namely, the rigidity of the political/economic structure, the cultural conception, the administrative functions, the property laws... the weak degree of autonomy permitted in each social category, particularly that of merchants and entrepreneurs - limited in their initiative and stifled by the power and the guilds. The difference is apparant in all institutions as well as being mirrored in the habitus futhered by the medina.

But what introverted idea of the world: will this come to affect other social orders - particularly that of the West, first known as conquerors, then as equals, then as dominated and now as independant ?

- 2.6 There is a tendency to forget that in a world organized into closed social entities, Islam has been the "centre of the World" in as much as it was the only civilization simultaneously in contact with Africa, the Far East, Northern Asia and Europe. Custodian throughtout the centuries of Greek and Roman cultural heritages, it was the essential historical link between the ancient world and the western renaissance. It was only towards the end of the Middle Ages that Europe began to discover other worlds. In a few decisive decades, Europocentrism began to supplant Islamocentrism.

There is a plethora of informative literature on these discoveries, especially on the "discovery" from Islam by the Europeans, but there is a dearth of knowledge on the discovery of Europe by Islam and the successive phases of the formation of this knowledge.

The first Europeans to venture into the Islamic world were the Crusaders of the 11th century. They stayed until the 13th century, founding numerous small fortified principalities, isolated from the rest of their region. The

"Jihad" of the Crusaders can be compared to the muslim "reconquista", peeling to the islamisation of Eastern Europe. The Crusaders were vanquished, but the European Merchants who had come with them were encouraged to remain in the Levantine ports. They lived in small communities doomed to failure, victims of the after-effects of the Crusades. Nevertheless, their written testimony, after that of the Crusaders, was a new source of information on the islamic world, which will be enriched by the descriptions of travellers.

Islam of the 13th and 14th centuries was aware of its unchallenged superiority, and therefore made no attempt to develop relations with Europe apart from trade relations established with merchants who had remained in the Levantine area. Europe did not have much to offer at the time. From the commercial standpoint, it did not produce anything that did not already exist in the orient. From the scientific side, Europe was far behind, especially in medicine and astronomy. The interest was not really aroused until the arrival on the European market of products from the new American continent. The relationship with India and China and Africa were stronger. Cultural and scientific ties were maintained with the first two, a treaty on slavery with the second and commercial relations with both.

If the Orient was uninteresting in the Occident, the reverse was not the case. The Crusades were a resounding failure religiously speaking, but they resulted in a new awareness on the part of the European merchants, who had been quick to perceive the existence of great wealth there for the taking if one only had the means. This was the European perspective of the ensuing centuries, and Venice and Genoa were particularly active in opening up this new trade possibility.

- 2.7 The vision of Islam on western world differed little from the introverted view it had of itself: the countries of Kaffers or unbelievers constituted a separate entity. There are only a few accounts of muslim travellers at that time in Europe. They were rare: a few official emissaries, among them converted Jews and prisoners. The lack of interest in Europe was such that they only went if it was really necessary. Europe was judged to be refractory, it was

said to be difficult to live there, the food was found to be inadequate from the religious standpoint, and there was a dearth of suitable places of worship.

Internal rivalries of Islam contradicted the concept of a great, universal destiny of Islam. Every new ruler made changes within the boundaries of his territory. In the 16th century the Middle East could boast of only three great established states: Turkey, Egypt and Persia. But the Sultans and the Shah of these States each considered himself to be the supreme ruler over all the followers of Islam.

During the same period, central Europe had numerous territorial entities well established under the monarchies of Portugal, Spain, England, France and Denmark. It is relevant to mention these facts, since it is well-known that state organs and institutions played an essential role in mercantile societies and in the development of industrialised capitalist societies.

- 2.8 It was between sovereign european and muslim patners, even though there was a tendancy towards bribery and corruption on both sided, that commercial exchanges are developped right up to the middle of the 19th century with a few notable exceptions (namely Algeria, which had fallen under French domination from the 1830'3). European products became increasingly interesting for oriental leaders: manufactured goods, transportation equipment, arms, civil-engineering and luxurious articles...

It is remarkable indeed to note to what degree the islamic world had isolated itself from current developments, introverted in its superiority complex. It had remained in quasi ignorance of profound changes which had shaken the West - revolutions and social changes which affeted the West and the world map. It was only towards the end of the 19th century when colonisation was widespread that the islamic world realised the profundity of the differences between the two worlds. The reaction was defensive in the extreme, and the first impression of the West, forged in the islamic imaginary, was intensified.

This prejudice has persisted to a certain extent up to the present time, fired from time to time by trends to religious fundamentalism, in spite of the fact that historical conditions are quite different.

3. FROM THE SPICE ROAD TO THE ROAD OF PETROL
CENTRAL DOMINATION AND TERRITORIES REMODELLING

- 3.1 In order to understand the development of Western influence, and the stages in establishment of such models of colonial implantation, it is necessary to delve into history once again.

The first wave of modern colonialism was aimed at the American continent, discovered on the way to India via the West. It was the achievement of the Catholic Portuguese and Spaniards, who had decided to dispense with the costly services of the Venetian and Genoese merchants in their dealings with the Orient. But they were even more determined, in the enthusiasm of the "reconquista" to pall round the sphere of Islamic control of the spice and the silk roads.

They were rapidly followed by Protestant rivals : Dutch, British, Danish and French. The British were the principal beneficiaries of this first wave of colonialism . Once the game of alliances and military protection had been worked out and commerce established, most Portuguese and Spanish precious metals landed in the royal coffers of her Britannic Majesty. Apart from gold and silver, the capital thus accumulated in England included products of colonial origin, and massive subjugation of the indigenous Americans and slaves imported from Africa, not to mention the far from negligible exploitation of the British peasantry.

But the real stroke of genius of the British, in contrast to the Spanish and other Europeans, was not to invest their ill-gotten gains in sumptuous luxuries or military, but in manufactured production and the reorganisation of their national territory (development of the urban network, the port infrastructures, navigational canals, enclosures)

The result was more than spectacular. England was the first country to launch its economic take off, -operating its industrial revolution. Colonialisation is the natural income of industrialisation - but the reverse is not true - each new stage of industrial development corresponds to a new spurt of colonisation. The loss of the United States led England towards new conquests : India, much desired by the Europeans, became the jewel of the British Empire. Several other European nations, from the very beginning of the first wave of colonisation, staked their

claims along the road to India.

- 3.2 There were the Portugese - the first to have set out for the Orient by sea from the East, looking for ways to trade. They established an outpost in the fortified port of Ormuz. The Dutch and French were swift to follow the trend.

Varied were the motives of those who set out for the great unknown: military conquest, civilization drives, religious missions, scientific curiosity, hunger for adventure, and, particularly, desire to trade were among the reasons that wowed shipbuilders and sailors, the poor and the exiled to undertake long expeditions in quest of the uncertain. With the authorization of their respective sovereigns, they set up trading posts, factories, militaries garrisons, docks, administrations and ports of embarkation.

Generally, some form of agreement was made with the local authorities on commercial partnerships. Nevertheless, rivalties erupted between the European states as well as between the chiefs of the indigenous populations used to give numerous opportunities to fight. Thus, the contacts remained tenuous and their influence limited. The Portugese influence was minimal. Dutch influence extended beyond the Arabo-Islamic world. The french influence was stronger, and remains, particularly in the Western Islamic world. Relations established with the court of Sefevide, based in Isphahan "Nesfe-djahan" (Half the world" - a significant description) were maintained. However, after the Napeleonic war, French influence diminished and vanished from the Eastern Islamic world, leaving the place to the British.

The importance of its indian colony was of such vital importance to the British Empire that it kept a permanent watch over the whole area and its accesses . This was particularly true of the Gulf areas and Persia, with their warm seas - an area always desired by their Russian rivals. In order to consolidate their control over this precious territory the British entered into many agreements, and put down any local disturbances instigated by local chiefs who had for the

most part previously been under Turkish rule. But there had not been any effective British implantation in the area before the end of the 19th century.

The same Turks had conquered the Eastern Islamic world, the South Mediterranean and the Maghreb. Since the advent of the Islam in the area, relations between the inhabitants of the two sea coasts had each in turn been characterised by the Moorish presence on the Iberian peninsula, and after the Spanish conquest in North Africa. The Mozarabe and Hispano-Moorish architectures were born out of those circumstances and spread throughout the region, to be exported in their technical and material forms.(notably adobe) to Latin America.

Finally, at the time of the French intervention in Algeria, the commercialised Mediterranean found itself abandoned, due to the presence of filibusters, controlled more or less by the Turks.

3.3 The second Wave of Colonisation

was played out in the whole world theatre.

The colonial empires of the first wave were considerably reduced. There were several reasons for this. The colonies who settled on the American continent were no longer dependant on their countries of origin. The colonial structure of the 18th century became unwieldy and expensive, it was no longer compatible with the actual situation. Relations of exchange and cooperation were established with the local powers were found to be satisfactory. But in the space of 25 years, towards the end of the 19th century, the map of the world had been changed out of all recognition. The former garrisons and trading posts were dissolved and at that point the way was left free for the colonisation of massive African and Asian territories which varied according to the region. The Arabo-Islamic world was also caught up in this movement.

After England, other European states and the United States attained a high standard of the industrialisation. The industrial productivity remains rela-

tively stable. The production growth (of about 2 % annually) is located in the extensive accumulation system, in direct relation to the extent of machines park. The mode of regulation was competition.

The pitfalls of this system became harder and harder, and very soon the limits of national capitalisms were reached. In order for the system to survive such crises, and to continue to function, it was essential to establish a balance between production and consumption of the goods produced. The domestic market proved to be insufficient for the setting off the produces. The solution to the periodical crisis was to find an export outlet for the surplus produce at an international level i.e. the world market. The international competition became stronger. It was characterised by the drying up of old trends and the establishment of new industries, lured by the possibility of new profits to be made.

Every power fights hard to increase its sphere of influence. The fight for international monopolies is underway. The increasingly difficult conditions calls for the exploitation of the masses who are caught up in the unhealthy rat-race in the faubourgs of the mining and industrial urban centres.

Workers movements are still in the formative stage, although there are moves to organise protests. The governments encourage chauvinism, xenophobia and racism in order to divert any opposition to rationalism or militarist and patriotic glorification. The old historical rancours are revived, and each major power- especially Great-Britain, France and West Germany continue to perpetrate the myth of their worldwide civilizing mission.

It is the era of triumphant imperialism.

The background will be provided for the great wars of the future. Nothing more stands in the way of future colonial empires - The colonial territories will become tomorrow's battlefields and the indigenous inhabitants will find themselves caught up in this.

I will open a parenthesis. In this paper I have made, and will continue to make reference to different concepts : here, that of imperialism, elsewhere, the international division of work. I shall also refer to various systems of production (asiatic, capitalistic). But I reserve the right to point to special events, historical examples that occur anywhere. The special study of singular events prove that these can transcend the most grandiose global laws. Nevertheless, I try to probe for the real cernit in any given purpose, even though, at the same time, one is aware of the necessity of finding new, conceptual tools, better suited to the complexities of our contemporary history.

3.4 The regions of North-Africa and the Middle-East were not sheltered by the colonial phenomena and it's consequences.

The ottoman Empire lost its Mediterranean territories. The Mahgreb fell under French domination, Libya fell under the Italian sphere of influence, Egypt was under British control as well as the coast and the Asiatic peninsula and the Indian sub-continent as far as the Persian border. The 1914-1918 war marked the end of the Ottoman Empire.

The whole area was under foreign pressure. Immense transfers of capital took place towards these countries, the poorest of which succumbed to the power struggle of the foreign capital investors. England, France, West Germany and North America were the main driving force behind such transfers of capital.

The most prosperous of the receiving countries were able to use these funds for building up expensive infrastructures: railways, civil engineering. But in less structured societies such injections of foreign capital served less to develop than to colonize and to put the power in the hands of a few local bosses. Thus led to a breakdown of local indigenous production.

England was the principal initiator of foreign capital investment in colonized regions, followed by France and West Germany.

- 3.5 The Establishment of metropolitan populations modifies the social and physical character of the colonies. The example of this phenomenon leads to new type of settlements. The most common pattern of these are the coastal factories, the hispanic american towns, the dutch town of South East Asia, the English settlement in India and the destructive French interference at Alger.

The two first patterns no longer correspond to the new colonial context. The initial phases of British settlement in India were not carried out according to any particular urban plan. Except for certain large official buildings, most colonial activities took place in existing local buildings, requisitioned for such purposes. Experience was acquired gradually but nevertheless one can attempt a definition of new colonial construction as compared to those intended for military use (fortresses, barracks, etc..) Buildings intended to house political and administration bodies (government offices, courts of law, official residences) and buildings for the organization of the economy (banks, port and dock buildings, customs and exise and commercial offices,) and buildings for religious ceremonies (churches, cemeteries); places of entretainment, and a conglomeration of equipment buildings (refuges, prisons, schools ... museums) housing of other buildings, including the famous colonial bungalows, etc. Other belated urban facilities also deserve inclusion : the avenues and the military parade grounds for instance.

The French intervention in Algeria started along the same lines, but at a much faster pace.

While colonists were installed in housing abandoned by their original inhabitants who were chased out of Alger. The first operations took place within the limits of the old city.

- 3.6 More than a century beforehand, the Dutch, fired with enthusiasm and inspired by their "urbanists" and engineers of Antwerp and Amsterdam, put up similar realizations in their colonies - new towns side by side with the indigenous cities. These model towns encroached when necessary on filled-in land,

connecting with existing port facilities. This principle, long ignored by the British and the French was "rediscovered" by them, when driven by necessity, later on. But it took a long time to get such a model launched, as the conditions had changed: the century, the place, the mentality. The Alger experience was a total failure. Opening new places, new avenues, building new street fronts in a traditional tissue was no easy task. The city had almost 30'000 inhabitants in the 1830's. Two thirds of this number were chased out by the French. The number of new inhabitants who settle down in the Casbah was estimated at around 21'000. This european population did not adapt well to traditional housing conditions - especially to the hygienic situation. Successive epidemics decimated them : 1834, 1835 and 1837. The cholera epidemic of 1835 took a total of 2'000 victims. An extension of the Casbah was begun on adjoining land which culminated in a new fortified enclosure around the Casbah. Most of the old port area was pulled down, for "sanitary reasons". A new water front was built along with the new port in neo-classic style.

Such massive destruction was met with hostility by the local people. This groping context will lead to build new European towns, outside the indigenous cities.

From the morphological standpoint, the intervention took two forms :

- the conqueror style
- the protector style.

The switch from one to the other was due to prevailing political circumstances, due to the method of occupying the territory (departments integrated with the metropolis, colonies, protectorates, zone of influence and huge capital investment), due to the kind of relationship with the indigenous population (the pattern: armed resistance, collaboration, submission), due to the exploitation of available resource (agriculture, urban work force, ... raw material and minerals).

The grand urban perspective and the neo classic architecture are the most

visible signs of a difficult relationship. It was an attempt to recreate, on the other side of the Mediterranean, an urban countryside familiar to the "average Frenchman" - who was encouraged to emigrate. The first building edified by the French administration was the health control building of the port of Alger, resembling a Greek temple. The colonial countryside does not only signify destruction also spectacularly affirm to colonized population the colonial power and the difference, affirm to the other European colonial powers the French grandeur. It was the conqueror style.

The protector style was the result of another tactic, with an identical goal : Marshall Lyautey said : "One can never see great enough. One must found for centuries". After the Romans, the Arabs and the Turks came the French. "We did not come here to conquer, but to civilize! "

In the face of increasing risk and final uselessness of the war, a substitution tactic was used - priority was given to the working out of an alliance with the traditional leaders and the agreement of the local population. The protective style was intended to replace the conqueror style. From 1865 Napoleon 3rd mentioned this change during a visit to the area.

The Orientalists denounced the destruction of the old quarters. The occupation of the holy places was tolerated to a lesser and lesser degree by the population. It was necessary to interrupt this cycle of violence and repression. Marshall Lyautey denounced the massacres of the "human flock" which could have been commandeered for colonial production.

- 3.7 Reorganization projects were set into motion throughout the territory. The traditional cities of the interior, turned towards the countryside, abandoned in favour of coastal development.

At the same time port facilities were re-inforced in view of increasing exportation of colonial products.

It was a period of great economic growth. There was no lack of projects : African, Asian and Latin American towns were all in line for development. Given the fact that the possibility for new developments were limited within the old european structure, apart from development of the suburbs, possibilities offered in the colonies tempted many young architects and urbanists. Among them Prost, one of the founders of the S.F.U. (the recently created French Society of Urbanists), was summoned to Rabat by Lyautey. He developed the plans for the new European towns of Casablanca, Meknès, Fez, Marrakesh, and especially Rabat. These plans were to become classical examples of colonial urbanist development at the beginning of the century. He created the instruments, techniques, rules and regulations necessary for the realization of his designs and made the masterplan mandatory for each town.

The importance of these projects extended beyond the colonial empire. It was indeed the first experience of intervention on such a massive scale at the time (1910). These plans served as points of reference for the establishment of plans and ideas for numerous French cities. It is interesting to note that these experiences could only have been accumulated under special circumstances - mixing the most advanced directives with ancient elements like the royal "dahir".

These plans were developed in the framework of the protector style. But independant of the quality of some of the plans it is necessary to consider them in their proper context. The goal of separating the European-town and the medina was certainly not undertaken principally to enhance the value of the patrimony. Great pains were taken with hygienic installations, and a strict segregation was foreseen. Also the famous "dahir" of 6.4.1914, relative to the plan of alignment and town extention finded part of its legitimization in the danger, not only of physical, but also of moral and political contamination. The plan was essentially an instrument of social, economic and disciplinary control.

The colonial town was, and remained a domination act - for those who had

engineered such domination as well as those forced to submit to it. Installed side by side, directly alongside the traditional city, it became a direct instrument of its disintegration.

- 3.8 Towards the end of the 19th century the economy of many areas of the whole region was progressively transformed from a self-sufficient domestic economy to a new, export-oriented economy adapted to the international economies of Europe and North-America. At the end of the 19th century, various parts of the region were more or less drawn into the international network of trade and finance.

The process of transfer of the urban poles towards the coasts was the general trend throughout the area; apart from the port towns of North-Africa were: Port-Saïd, Alexandria, Suez, Beirut, Haïfa, Jeddah, Aden, Abadan, Khorramshah. The population followed the movement of town to the coasts. Modern hygienic measures resulted in a sharp increase in the population. The capital and technology export and the increase of European business and business-men also increased. Foreign competition resulted in the ruin of local handicrafts. The relative speed at which these changes reach the region poses certain problems and can't be understood without investigating through centuries the very beginning of the phenomenon. This decline had started in the 16th century, even though certain elements fed the illusion that this was not the case. History is full of examples of apparently vigorous civilizations that were in reality on the edge of decline. The invasions had shaken the Islamic world, introverted as it was into itself, and hindered by a stagnant superiority complex. The introversion precluded an objective view of the historical changes irrevocably in progress.

From the 16th century, the world politico-economic tendency within the Islamic city networks had begun to disintegrate with the advent of European maritime expansion and the first bastions of capitalism.

The development imposed upon ancient cities of these regions had nothing to do with the indigenous development, and was in fact similar to that taking place in European towns caught up in the industrial revolution. From the very beginning of this process, the ancient urban structure gave way. The former traditional system of control by the shayks was replaced by a municipal administration. Such changes in production relations spelt the progressive diminution of the power of the professional guilds. They became of secondary importance, and had to content themselves with a sterile, defensive policy in an attempt to retain the last vestiges of their obsolete authority. Structurally, culturally and professionally, they were no longer capable of engendering an autonomous developmental initiative.

3.9 The Iranian example illustrates this

The dominant orders of the social formation are the landowners (members of the ancient aristocracy, merchants motivated by the social prestige which came from possession of land, and tribal leaders). The Ulamas, custodians of the wagsfs (lands granted to religious institutions, the revenue from which was to be used for investments in schools and charitable organizations), the peasants, themselves sub-divided in various corps. Members of the other social groups of the population played a subordinate role. They were, for the most part, merchants in the bazaar, engaged in the commercialization of traditional products; the artisans as well as the other groups submitted for them. All these populations layers are historically too much to the dominant orders in order to transform themselves into a real category of entrepreneurs to initiate the development of capitalistic relation of production, exploit the urban areas with the goal of rent formation and capital accumulation, to remodel the traditional city as a modern town.

European domination created two kinds of resistance :

- one, an introversion towards the structures of the past, towards conservation or revival of ideological and cultural fundamentals. The Taglid, repetitive reference to ancestral models, re-inforced by the vagaries of the system, became the normal way of thinking towards the Kafir, the infidel.
- the other, taken by groups of intellectuals sensitive to certain Western values (democracy, laïcité) and advocated modernization projects and an autonomous development of society.

By the end of the 19th century, political and ideological movements had had adopted one or the other of these forms of resistance- two forms which were thoroughly incompatible. Everything that took place from that point onwards reflected more or less this conflict of interest.

The perpetuation of the influence of the traditional dominant orders slowed down the construction of towns throughout the region.

What then, of the process of change from town to metropolis ?

4. THE PERIPHERY, FORDISM AND METROPOLISM AN ILL-FATED UNION

4.1 After the 2nd World War relations between the centre and the periphery were radically affected by the change in taste of the couple production-consumption in the centre, and the development of nationalisms and liberation movements within the periphery. The development of capitalism based on the exportation of manufactured goods for the centre and the raw materials and the work force for the periphery reached its limits.

The impossibility of the realization of marchandises, in high overproduction was one of the main reasons for the crisis. It had been the institutionalization, in the centre, of the parallel growth process at both productivity and purchasing power of the wage earners that had led the way out of the economic crisis of the post-war period and culminated in a period of economical boom. This period is known as fordism which adapts the whole social procedure (norms, laws, habits) to the new produced goods.

The framework of life, particulatly housing, enters in mass consumption norms.
From 1945-1975 the turnover of household-related products increased at a furious pace, and everyone was eager to aquire consumer goods such as electrical applicances, furniture and cars.

The metropolis as an urban form born of fordism re-organised the territory. It changed the environment to better accomodate the new political, economical and cultural situation. It offered production the advantages of its state management tools, its land, energetical and technic infrastructures, its public and private decision centers and all equipments and services necessary for the growth of the productivity. It offered the population a new habitat, consumption centers, recreational facilities and a wide range of social and cultural amenities.

It also offered elements of mediation negotiation between those with capital and producers, between supplier and consumer.

In Europe, the type of dwelling for continuous economic growth is this born in the peripheries of urban centers, which means the high rise building situated in territories, planned in segregated and specialized zones, with cars as means of connection between them. Each of these dwelling unit is organized into functionally differentiated elements (rooms for day and night use...) and designed to accommodate specific furniture and household appliances, which had in the meantime become "standard" and taken for granted.

In the USA the type of dwelling is different - but it served the same purpose - a receptacle for consumer goods.

4.2 If we try to analyse the crisis of the 70's as a crisis of the fordist model, we are also obliged to consider at the same time the crisis of the urban metropolitan form, born of fordism. To the raising constraints and servitudes of fordism correspond the raising servitudes of metropolitan life. On an alienated rhythm of production corresponds a fragmented urban infrastructure and space with a pendler movement by car or subway between work and home. The parallelism of growth of productivity and wages do no more function. Accepted and interiorized servitudes of the time of the economic boom became more and more heavy constraints. Unemployment, penury,... weakening of the states's role of negotiator, monetarism, lack of social consensus and worsening of the social climate were the results.

4.3 What of the peripheral countries in the midst of industrial development ? What are the particularities of this area of the region of our study ? What is the future outlook for the vast urban concentrations in the course of formation, considering both the past of affected countries and the context of the actual crisis ?

Between the two world wars, certain peripheral countries, especially Latin America, profited from the crisis which had affected the countries of the centre to re-orient a part of their own production system, and produced certain goods for mass consumption. This substitution strategy of imports

gained momentum from the 50's with the emergence of the "non-aligned" movement, avoiding the necessity of having to offset the productivity increase of their raw materials by correspondingly increasing the ratio of products manufactured in the centre.

However, this autonomous production strategy was unable to find adequate ground for development for several reasons: especially the dearth of qualified manpower and the lack of an industrial culture and workers tradition. The production rate remained spectacularly inferior to that of industrialized countries. The limitation of the domestic market and the limited purchasing power of the potential consumers forced them to export part of their production. But in spite of the relatively low cost of labour, the equally low production rate rendered these products not competitive on the international market. Nevertheless, the experience of industrial foundation is used by several countries of the centre to shift part of their production towards the periphery a solution made possible by the taylorisation of the industrial production. Also the emergence of newly industrialized countries the result of a combination of autonomous projects and the tendency of international companies to look for cheap labour in countries where the unions are not so powerful. Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, ... Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco are affected to a greater or lesser degree by this process. All countries of the region are feeling the direct consequences.

- 4.4 This kind of industrialisation remains fragile indeed. The domestic markets remain low. Salary increases are not in proportion with the productivity rythm, and large sections of the population, lured to the cities are unable to enjoy the fruits of socio-economic change, these being out of their reach financially. Therefore the level of consumption necessary for the smooth functioning of the system does not take place. Simultaneously social tensions develop, encouraging firms to sub-contract and move out to the poorer regions. The export situation is just as precarious. This type of industrialization is only profitable if part of the goods that could not be absorbed on the domestic market are exported. At the same time, manipulation from the outside

also increases: it is generally only the subsidiaries of industrial enterprises that de-localise. The main entities stay in the central countries. Such industrial de-location therefore still requires imported technology, engineers and equipment. This is impossible without coupling with countries of the centre. Therefore the fordism of the periphery is blocked in a contradiction between two imperatives, one internal: the growth of the indigenous market, the other external: the exportation. Exportation increase leads to the overexploitation of the workers, which can only be maintained by a repressive regime.

The growth of the domestic market depends on an increase of local purchasing power and on the relative democratisation of social formations which means the rise of an urban middle class, the apparition of free trade unions with high power to negotiate, etc. This fragility of this kind of industrialization is situated somewhere between democratic pressure and military and totalitarian tentation.

Iran in the 70's is an example of this fragility. A strong regime had succeeded in finding and implementing an industrialization process. Only a democratic system, such as those of Greece and Spain, could assure its continued development and function. Instead of this, the regime of the Shah had tightened the reins to breaking point.

- 4.5 The Keynesian model induces a way of life that cast off the traditions of the periphery. It stemmed from links with the countries of the centre: an economic coupling, but also a cultural coupling link, which broke with the former established habitus.

In terms of the production of the built environment the coupling entailed reorganization of the housing system, which passes from a system produced in the domestical reproduction of labour force, largely dependant from selfconsumption, to another system similar to that conceived and realized in central fordism. Thus it came about that the peripheral countries produce housing according to the consumption norms of salaried workers of the central countries, even before the corresponding economic situation had been achieved - in other

words, in anticipation on supposed productivity earning, in anticipation on supposed wage earning, on the coming mass consumption, on the future economic growth.

In order to do this, several such countries, notably the more advanced of the region which were in the process of industrialization have bet on this supposed future economic growth and invested either their owned or borrowed capital in public works and particularly in mass housing. State involvement in public housing in such countries remains considerable.

Even though housing in the center had become an essential element of a consumer society, the construction industry had not, up until this time, enjoyed the same economic growth as other consumer industries due to real estate constraints. As a result this led to an increase of employment in the construction industry and there for to an increase in building costs. With time this increase became more and more difficult to bear, and such housing became too expensive for the ordinary worker. This increase, accompanied by the real estate cost, affects and reduces the nominal wages through the housing costs.

The investment in housing had come to be too expensive, and the production of construction becomes one of the main factors in causing of the crisis of the mode of intensive accumulation and the failure of central fordism. The slowing down of economic growth in the center led to greater export effort in order to artificially prolong the effects of the now extinct economic boom as long as possible. The construction sector in the center, beeing caught up in this export process, has increased the production capability in the periphery.

Given the coupling and the complicated interaction between central fordism and peripheral fordism, the failure of the first led inevitably to the downfall of the second. The one could not survive without the other. Therefore the whole development model disintegrated. The bet of growth anticipated by the newly industrialized nations did not materialize to the extent that had been foreseen. The production and consumption power did not live up to expectations. Therefore the investment in housing, according to european standards, had to be interrupted, as it was no longer profitable.

4.6 By its very architectural composition, the housing in the center requires a given scenario and appeals an appropriate actor-consumer figure, without which the housing will not be what it is supposed to be. This actor is identified by his habitus as well as his solvency. If this solvency is insufficient, the Keynesian state will assist him by paying the difference. In the periphery, this massified actor has never existed, does not and will never exist.

The same can be said of the metropolis, which bears such type of housing. A metropolis is impossible without a set of actors who know and act out the scenarios of the metropolitan scene, in a Fordist landscape.

The existence of large population concentrations is by no means sufficient for the formation of a metropolis.

Without massified access to a certain quality of living, without those specific things which make metropolis, there is no metropolis.

The industrialized town in the periphery, without any of the Fordist advantages and compensations becomes Dickensian, "bloody", because based on over exploitation of the labour and tenements, as described by Dickens.

And what of the "bloody" metropolisation ?

The Fordism of the centre, which was conceived before the 2nd World War was realized, and had enjoyed 30 good years. That of the periphery, structurally coupled with the center, found itself ready, and more or less deeply involved depending on the conditions which had been given here or there. The end of central Fordism was the end of the couple, was the end of the peripheral Fordism, at least in its known forms.

The metropolis, conceived as segment of a world wide network of metropolis, came into being and lived up, as a known urban form, with Fordism. The logic of expansion of this system foresaw an ever-expanding network: with Fordism, it got as far as the periphery. The metropolis process was almost still-born, its survival impossible without a mother-network to sustain it.

The curtain fell on the scenario of the metropolis. Apart from a few brief curtain-calls, it marks the end of the career of the play metropolis.

5. WAITING FOR GROWTH

THREE CASE STUDIES:

- THE MAGHREB: WAITING ... FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH
- THE GULF: WAITING ... FOR HOMO URBANUS,
- TEHERAN: WAITING ...

5.1. In the following paragraphs we will attempt to present three specific cases : a brief section on the Maghreb, and the Gulf and Teheran in somewhat more detail.

The cultural and historical common denominators in all three cases have already been discussed at the beginning of this paper. The following lines merely serve to better appreciate certain peculiarities of each case. We will present necessary arguments on behalf of each case in order to better conclude our hypothesis on the future prospects of the metropolis in the arabo-islamic region to which this study is confined.

- THE MAGHREB: WAITING... FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH

The three countries of the Maghreb, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia can each offer an individualised reply to our general enquiry.

Algeria is engaged at the present time in a vast socio-economic urbanisation and industrialisation plan. Urban housing projects are part of this development plan, and the construction of 100,000 units is foreseen for the 80's. This housing project is financed for the most part by the state. The logic of the "industrializing industry" has given the construction of housing secondary priority over other sectors of production, such as metallurgy, electricity. As there is an acute shortage of housing, attempts are being made to counteract this shortage. The State has subsidised this work in order to compensate for the relatively high cost of construction in order to enable such housing to be put within the reach of middle class workers and employees from the service sector and the civil service.

The production of housing in Tunisia and Morocco is nearer to peripheral fordims pattern with the state subsidy of 65% in Tunisia, which is much higher than that in Morocco (16%) and Algeria (50%).

Apart from implementing many housing realizations the Tunisian State intends to intensify the control of construction costs as well as the depletion of private savings of popular nature. The intervention of the State appartus is much more restrained in Morocco. Apart from several real estate operations implemented in the outskirts of major cities, essentially two types of construction need to be considered.

On which is registered in the market comprises an important percentage of housing built by individuals for their personal needs, and the other built outside the formal sector, that mean the "self-construction" type. According to estimates, this type makes up from 50-65% of the total in Morocco, less than 20% in Algeria and around 33% in Tunisia. For those concerned with real estate, the Algerian operations are implemented on State land and in Morocco first the real estate reserves dating back to the "protectorate", and then on agricultural land purchased by the State and then declassified as such, are the types mainly used for the major housing developments.

The percentage of State intervention with respect to housing is not however a globally relevant indicator.

In certain cases state aid can concentrate on the creation of equipments related to production which enjoys priority over housing. This choice means a production policy essentially oriented towards exportation to the detriment of the promotion of deomestic consumption.

The conditions of urban existance reflect the effects of this orientation, and they can be measured by the quality of housing and social amenities.

- 5.2. Urban housing in the Maghreb can be put into the rough categories as below :
- Traditional housing situated in the Medinas,

- Colonial period housing 19th and 1st half of the 20th century constructions, situated in the new european cities,
- Post-war modern housing planned on the fordist model, situated in the city suburbs,
- More or less precarious housing, incorrectly called "spontaneous" built without any licence by people of limited means.

These types of housing are more or less universal throughout the majority of the urban sectors of the region, to which shanty towns and slum areas can also be added, these being the most precarious form of housing.

The respective importance of each of these urban sectors and the proportion of each type of housing mentioned above per sector give a rough overall picture of each country being examined.

Other factors such as ownership policy, the status of occupation, state of maintenance etc. also need to be taken into account.

However, in this paper we are primarily concerned with modern, post-war housing. Generally speaking, a large part of the G.N.P. of the Maghreb countries is allocated to housing. The cost of such housing is generally too high, compared the solvency level of the populations for which it is destined. However, the housing subsidies generally benefit the higher social classes who are already relatively well-off, as it remains out of reach of the majority of ordinary salaried workers.

The housing under construction generally conforms to the european model, with performances, surfaces, materials, equipment and the general plans in all phases of construction are of a type alien to the social norms of the Maghreb.

The plan of dwellings composed by specialized cells does not correspond to the lifestyle of the people who will live in such housing. Also the rent is so high that often two families must share an apartment in order to make ends meet.

For those concerned with implementing the construction of such housing, it might be beneficial to consider points mentioned earlier : the great loss of productivity estimated to be between 30 and 50% of the productive capacity of imported machinery and pre-fabrication systems; the difficult mutation of qualifications; the shortage of managerial staff during the construction process which can be from 4 to 5 years depending on the size of the project; the burden of fixed charges and the immobilization of the invested capital.

Although the construction loans from the State carry a low interest rate, in Algeria, for example, they considerably influence the final cost of the buildings, sometimes running them up to 20 and even 30%.

If the capital is national or more easily foreign, the costs rise accordingly. The complete absence of banks as providers of capital for the construction of housing leaves the two expensive options of public or foreign capital. The first is made available through a budget and the foreign capital carries heavy interest rates.

The enormous investment in housing greatly swells the national external debt.

5.3. THE GULF à WAITING ... FOR HOMO URBANUS

In the Middle East and particularly within the past 10 years in the arabopersian Gulf region, the construction activity (comprising civil engineering and building) has been the most intense never known.

This exceptional economic boom is due to the massive increase in the prices of petroleum products in 1973 and 1979 and the massive huge capital investments made in the area.

The quadrupling of petrol prices is one of the major events of the latter half of this century. The industrialized nations saw their economies take a downward spiral, and relations between the industrialized countries of

the centre and those of the periphery changed. Certain countries formally engaged principally in the production of raw materials began to industrialize.

There is another aspect to be taken into consideration : the politico-economic apparatus is highly sensitive towards "world events". The region is very fragile and a reversal of the situation a distinct possibility.

Successive developments of the Palestinian drama and their repercussions, the fall of the Pahlavi regime and the rise of islamic fundamentalism, the Irano-Iraqi war, the repercussions of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan constitute the main points of explosion to which various lesser conflicts can be added.

Today, when discussing the region, three elements stand out :

- The fratricide war between Iraq and Iran
- The magnitude of operations currently undertaken,
- The gigantism of the markets for the industrialized countries

The new markets are vast indeed. Investments are directed towards production of equipment as well as consumer goods, industrial goods and production of the means of production, as some of the countries are already engaged in the process of industrialization.

More architects, engineers, consultants and other contractors are more sensitive to tenders or bids, as the slowing down of the growth rate and the restructuration of the Western markets pushes them into the search for new trade outlets.

The magnitude of realizations, the specific conditions of their conception, building. utilization on one hand, and the new place occupied by the region in contemporary history, the nature of the established powers and the types of relationships maintained with the industrialised societies on the other

hand are the elements which associate here more than any othe situation, economical and cultural factors.

- 5.4. The rapid expansion of the region began in 1909 under the control of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Abadan became the first mining town of the region.

Based on the design of the english garden city, it was considered for a long time to be the epitome of modernity. It is also under the sign of the petrodollar that other Gulf States have, in more recent times, emerged on the world scenario.

Projects currently being undertaken are enormous complexes connected with the extraction and refinement of petroleum oil; transportation networks (ports, airports); and an infrastructure of roads, energy, industrial installations and back-up systems such as hotels and the equipment for them; housing complexes in the form of apartment blocks and bungalows, socio-cultural equipment, commercial facilities, etc, etc... as well as temporary cities or colonies especially built to accomodate the foreign work force.

Does not the enormity of these projects announce the beginning of the phenomena of a metropolisation underway ?

It concerns in fact two things :

- The huge urban agglomerations, i.e. Teheran and Baghdad
- The large population concentrations of the Gulf and the creation of new towns.

We will return later on to the case of Teheran.

The new towns that have mushroomed throughout the Gulf States are essentially errected on the blueprint of the industrialized nations although with carefully segregated zones of activity. Bu which definitive actors are destined to play in them ?

Each concentration of people has an effect of polarisation on the neighbouring groups. For the time being it is essentially a population of temporary migrant workers. This phenomena of the Gulf states has an unknown element, due to its numerical aspect... by the different populations involved, in the current situation. This can be aptly illustrated by two examples :

- More than half the active labour force of one major exporter of manpower - North Yemen - is outside the country
- Nearly 90% of the active labour force in another country - Oman - consists of immigrant labour.

In a recent survey published by "Le Monde" it was reported that :
"Almost half of the population of the Gulf States (Excluding Iran and Iraq) in the global analysis, is made up of immigrant workers. In three of them, the citizens are by far in the minority : in Kuwait 35-40%, in Qatar 25-30%, and in the United Arab Emirates 15-20%".

Never, in such a short period of time, in such limited territories, have so many men been concentrated by reason of their labour, from so many different countries.

No blueprint for analysis of this phenomena has yet been put to paper, and any attempt to put forward analogues with other migratory movements would be unconvincing, due to the particular situation of these regions.

Behind the global figures there are socio-cultural elements to be taken into consideration : the reasons for the migrations, the character of them, the ethnic origin of the migrants, the kind of work performed by these people and the conditions under which this work is carried out, the types of worker and the qualifications sought.

One of the first kinds of migration was the installation of the migrant worker, with his family, in the host country. These were, for the most part, from other Arab countries : Egyptians, Syrians, Palestinians,

coming from urban societies, and relatively to very well qualified who arrived from the 60's. This kind of immigration and subsequent naturalization was halted at the end of the 1960's.

A second wave of migration, involving far greater numbers began from the early 70's. They were minimally qualified workers of rural or newly-urbanized origin. This work force, apart from a few nurses and domestic servants, was exclusively male, and they came from increasingly distant places - Pakistan, Bengal, Thailand, Sri-Lanka, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, Somalia and Eritrea. Each national group has a speciality to offer. There are three million temporary migrant workers in the Gulf States - not including Iran and Iraq. They will have increased to 3 ½ million by 1985, according to estimations of the World Bank.

These numbers are enormous in themselves, but it is only in comparison with local and regional demographic data on one hand and the confrontation between the number and quality of jobs occupied by the active local population and the immigrant population on the other hand, that really exposes the extent of the phenomena.

The decisive element is to be found in the comparison of the volume of immigration to data relative to the active local population. The activity rate of the immigrant workforce is much higher than that of the indigenous population. Qatar and the United Arab Emirates estimated that 90% of their workforce was composed of foreigners. Generally speaking the proportion of foreign workers amongst the active workforce is between 70 and 90% depending on the country, but at the same time other states in the region, although faced with the labour problem see their own actual and potential labour force under-employed. This situation, contradictory as it may seem, has several causes, among them :

- one constant factor throughout the region : the exclusion of women from the workforce.
- The weak male rate of participation in the labour market.

The local, population reserve certain activities for themselves (commerce, etc.) without the qualifications for technical professions. They refuse manual work. Also, the duration of an average worker's professional lifetime - for a Kuwaiti for example, this is about 15 years, whereas it is almost 40 years for a migrant worker.

Finally, the exclusion of certain classes of the local population from the labour market (urbanized Bedouins, certain categories of foreign emigrants), an aspect of which is scarcely known and which raises the question : does this mean the prevention of the birth of a national worker population ? As the walls cannot hide the slum areas, this problem cannot be ignored for long.

The ratio between the native and foreign workforce highlights the burden undertaken by the latter in production in the Gulf States.

Certain sectors, as in construction rely solely on foreign labour without taking their qualifications into consideration.

This remark leads to another indicator, concerning the quality of employment assumed by the two categories of the work force. Certainly, emigrants can be found in more or less all types of labour, except those categories reserved for the natives. However, it plays a major role at the two extremes of the qualification ladder. Jobs requiring high qualifications call for personnel who are appropriately trained and educated at universities, and with experience in the industrialized countries. Jobs requiring lower levels of qualifications call for numerous persons who generally come from the large, poor states. The construction industry functions by the conjuncture of these two extremes of the labour force : planned and managed by architects and engineers from America, Europe and Japan and carried out by an army of labourers from South and SouthEast Asia.

How does the urban framework function when the urban actor, the homo urbanus is still missing ?

- 5.5. In general, a large part of the new capital drained by the increase of petrol prices boosts the international "hot money" supply. The rest returns to the countries offering the possibility of internal financing of private or public nature.

Contemporary history has shown that the increase of mining output in the under-developed countries does not contribute to the creation of lasting industries, as the new material exporting regions cannot benefit from the economic upsurges created without their initiatives.

Therefore the enormous disponibility of the petroleum income cannot be channeled to an indigenous capital productive project. This capital has been invested in sectors generally unproductive, public sectors (military sector in constant growth, urban equipment etc,,), private sector (international commerce and speculation, luxurious goods, investments and speculations for real estate, etc...).

The case of Iran during the evolutionary years 1973-78 sets a good example. This state was considered to be the model offering the best conditions for importing products and valuables from the Western industrial societies.

As a result of the income due to the explosion of petroleum prices, Iran announced and embarked upon an industrialization policy which was the most advanced in the region, aimed at integrating the production industries means of production and the consumer goods industries production. The construction industry was not at a standstill either : accellerated urbanism, means of equipment, housing. Had not the Shah announced his ambition of making his country a second Japan ?

The aggressive graft of modernization with little concern for the violation of existing social norms was not favourably accepted. It was subjected to a violent phenomena of rejection, as those in power could not implement the necessary adaptations for the development of fordist industrial society.

After Iran it was the turn of Iraq, second state of the region to have

embarked upon a plan of industrialization. It decided to take over as "The gendarme of the Gulf" left vacant by the fall of the Shah. This spelt war between the two strongest countries of the region.

In fact an important part of the revenues of the second petrol crisis of 1979-80 served to feed a more limited, but also more destructive and murderous war : Abadan, Bassorah ... with hundreds of thousands of victims. Traditional weapons - sabres and swords - were not more employed, but rather much more sophisticated and deadly weapons. If the conjugation between oriental despotism and asiatic mode of production with the industrialized civilization could not be realized in production terms, it functions quite effectively in terms of destruction. In the meantime, all states of the region built up their arms.

Here, schematically exposed, are the conditions under which a new generation of mining towns is to be created :

They consist of Abadan, the garden city and brainchild of British Petroleum, now partly destroyed by the Iraqi army, and all the towns that were built in the region : Shushtar (also destroyed), Jubail, Yanbu, Kuwait City, Sulyia, Doha ... Ruwais.

5.6. TEHERAN : WAITING ...

"In addition to the delegation of more responsibility and authority to local administrative officials, the public itself will have to participate more fully in productive investments and social activities while the efforts of the central government will be directed more to maintaining public order, establishing an infrastructure for economic activity, facilitating private initiative, protecting the rights of the individual, planning, determining overall policies, establishing standards and regulations, coordinating and directing individual endeavours in the national interest".

This quotation from the introduction of the Fourth Plan, covering the period 1968-73, illustrates the orientation given by the Iranian powers to the organization of its capital, Teheran. This orientation was founded on the search for new opportunities for growth. The planning project is a mixture of private interest, public welfare, and autocratic rule. It combines entrepreneurial, corporate and private planning, industrial and real-development, public entrepreneur activity at the behest of private interests.

The national effort, like the urban efforts, gives priority to the creation of the infrastructure necessary for the development of private enterprise, from the profit of which the state apparatus functions. In which pre-existing urban set-up can this plan be called upon to insert itself ? What is the future of the existing urban system ? The case of Teheran shows us a more relevant kind of case.

Due to numerous historical and contemporary factors closely linked to conditions of the expansion of the agglomeration as well as to politico-ideological events affecting Iran. There remained, due to various facilities offered and the degree of advancement attained by the procedure, a demonstration of the impossibility of importing methods and solutions borrowed from the industrialized West, without parallel procedure linked to the desired evolution of the existing habitus, and in effect, returning them to the foundation of imported methods and solutions.

Within the space of 20 years (1955-75) Teheran's population increased from 1,5 to 5 million inhabitants. Today there are nearly 10 million. In quantitative terms this is, with Cairo, the highest population concentration in the arabo-islamic region. Measured in terms of population, Teheran can be compared to the world's huge Metropoli.

Let us note briefly the geographic and recent historical context of Teheran.

5.7. The capital is situated on a high plateau descending gently from 3 to 1 degree, between 1600 and 1050 metres of altitude. This plain is bordered on the North and on the East by the chain of Elbourz (the summit of the Damavond attaining 5600 metres). On the South there is a high desert plain.

The fresh mountain breezes blow over the capital, a privileged zone compared to the arid South which is exposed to hot winds. It is in this area that the poorest categories of the population live.

The history of the urban region of Teheran is turbulent indeed. It was born a dozen kilometres or so from the actual centre of Teheran with the little city of Rey, the potteries of which prove that it dates back to the fourth century before Jesus Christ. The first written documents go back to the 8th century before Jesus Christ, and the Old Testament mentions Rey as a Jewish colony installed by Cyrus.

The climate and vegetation of Teheran played a decisive role in the development of the city, placed on the road to the Far East, which considerably influenced the urban and architectural installations, here, as throughout the rest of Iran. Destroyed several times by invaders, and subsequently rebuilt, we find in the 14th century a cave-dweller township on the actual site of Teheran.

The town received an initial fortification in the 16th century and a second in the 18th century, and became the residence of the Kadjar dynasty and capital of Persia.

Teheran grew in importance, both politically and economically. It expanded on the North side and in the 2nd half of the 19th century incorporated a Vauban-style fortification system, erected on the orders of Nasser-ed-Din-Shah.

In the beginning of the 20th century its development was held up by the British/Russian occupation. In 1925, with the advent of Reza Shah, the town changed its character completely. As the state is structured, Teheran, by centralising the recently-created administrations, and by building the first industrial installations, became, for the whole country, the representative of centralised power, the epitome of modernization, the centre of attraction. Remnants of the past (city gateways, ramparts) were pulled down and new, european-style areas created. The grand avenues were open.

The 2nd World War caused postponement of plans for further development of the town, but from 1945 the concentration process and the power of attraction of Teheran continued to develop rapidly, flagging somewhat during the crisis which followed the nationalization of petroleum by the Doctor Mossadegh.

If we take the last quantitative analysis into account, the population of Teheran increased from 200.000 inhabitants in 1900 to 500.00 in 1940, 1.000.000 in 1950 and passed 2.500.000 figure in 1965, reaching 5.000.000 in 1978. This corresponds to a third of the urbanized population and a sixth of the total population. This disproportion shows the extreme concentration of activities and decision centres of the country situated in the capital detrimental to other regions of the country. One must remind oneself that M. Reza Pahlavi had decided to reverse the ancient proportion of 2/3 rural to 1/3 urban, namely a rate of 66% urbanization. The statistical provisions have shown that Teheran would have 12.000.000 inhabitants by the year 1992.

However, events have totally changed the statistical provisions. During the final two years of the Pahlavi regime there had been a strong afflux of the population towards Teheran and this phenomena was amplified by the installation of the new regime, aninly due to promises made by certain irresponsible leaders of attribution of housing to people without shelter.

In 1980 the population of Teheran was 7.5. to 8.000.000 despite efforts made to slow down the afflux of the newcomers, this phenomena increased. There are two reasons for this : the extreme centralization inherited from the previous regime still exists, and the malfunctioning of the system has obliged quite a number of people to come to Teheran to settle their affairs. But the principal reason for this increase in population is the war with Iraq. Victims of combat zones without shelter were transferred to Teheran. A large number of people have also sought refuge in the capital following an ancient custom whereby the peasants in time of war sought shelter behind the walls of islamic cites. We have to add to that the presence a half a million Afghan refugees. The whole population is now estimated to be 10 million. This situation has very exceptional causes and we have every reason to believe that there would be some easing up once the conflict is resolved.

5.8. The morphology of ancient Teheran is of the traditional islamic city.

The plan of ancient Teheran as represented in the documents of the mid-nineteenth century corresponds to the model of the contemporary islamic cities. This model comprises a concentric arrangement whereby a network of principal arteries admist a very dense web of construction connects the centre of the city where the Grand Mosque, the Bazaar, are situated, to the different gates in the city walls.

An enclosure within the main walls of the city and partially supported by the latter form the citadel (called Ark) where the palace of the ruler is situated in shelter against any likely riots.

In Teheran this inner enclosure is situated at the North of the city which is separated from the rest by a large ditch. Very little remains of the relics of these fortifications.

A very large part of central Teheran still displays elements of the ancien islamic city model, with its narrow winding streets (with small bazaars,

shops, a mosque, baths etc..) and spreading alleyways in turn giving way to cul-de-sacs where the entrance to the courtyard of the houses are situated.

This model is found in the majority of Iranian cities. To show his authority and to stamp the presence of the central power, Reza Shah had pierced through two straight avenues intersecting at rightangles to each other, creating a central square with his statue in military uniform.

The Iran of the 70' is the place where the old spacial conception was definitely destroyed without having found an original way of forming a new social and morphological space.

Parrallel to its rapid growth, Teheran has been the centre of fundamental change of social structure which has initiated a profound modification of the social division of space. In the 19th century the mode of occupation of different quarters of the city corresponded to the traditional model as described above.

The ancient structure of society and State transposes in a spacial model, distributing in each quarter, around the residences of the rich, other residences, reserved for their entourage - (clients, suppliers, servants etc...) according to organization by clans. From the begining of the 20th century, particularly from 1925, the date of the creation of the new centralized and bureaucratic state, a new society organized in classes was born, slowly at first, but increasing rapidly.

In Teheran this transformation took place principally after the war, essentially within one generation. In the provincial cities this took longer.

The beautiful old residences of the central quarters of Teheran have been progressively abandoned by the rich proprietors who instead of restoring their urban properties have preferred to build new ones in the North of the capital. conforming to the model borrowed from the higher classes of the Western developed societies. The ancient abandoned sites are left to

decay, and they are now occupied by the poorer classes (one room per family), who do not have the means to construct new houses, but who bring in considerable income to the proprietors in the form of rent. We find the same process of decay and degradation in the heart of ancient Islamic cities unless they are completely destroyed.

The bazaar, situated in the heart of the city unites small and medium merchants with whom people with limited incomes deal, and artisans are also found in the same areas. The impossibility for expansion of the bazaars, and the difficulty of these merchants obtaining supplies due to the competition from foreign made goods and because of the support given to nationalistic policies of Dr. Mossadegh, and the opposition to the Pahlavi regime blocked any kind of development.

We have tried, in a paper elaborated a couple of years ago, to identify constructive factors of homogenous sectors defined for the urban area of Teheran. Let us summarize the principal points of this work :

Transversal axis East-West is the major demarcation between the Northern and Southern agglomerations. Secondary demarcation lines, also East-West define, on the Teheran plateau a succession of social grades. -Superior from North to inferior to South respectively occupied by different social classes-.

On a North-South principal axis, the central sector of Teheran developed where tertiary activities take place which are also marked by a tendency to shift movement towards the North. Whereas the part situated in the South of the principal axis East-West (the centre, built between the 30's and 60's) is saturated, its Northern part still extending up to the new administrative city of "Shahestan".

The housing directly adjacent to the central zone, was following the general movement towards the North, already with some of the residential housing of the well-to-do classes. The result was a geographical gap at the socio-economic level between the higher classes of employment and the neighbouring quarters.

A zone of special housing is formed by that which was built in the 40's and 50's - the open type constructed on 3 to 4 levels, on both sides of the principal East-West axis. This type of housing - the first apartments - was readily accepted by the Armenian residents, who set up their homes there.

A vast semi-circle develops from the principal East-West axis towards the South of the town. It comprises three relatively large homogenous zones at the East, West and South. Each of these zones is composed of internal zones definable by their quality, ranging from average, inferior housing to slums. The observed features enable us to define the internal zones by the homogeneity of the physical and social landscapes which compose them.

The size and the type of plots, the construction (materials, equipment, etc.) are important indicators in these landscapes.

The Eastern zone is made up of one-family housing of 2 to 3 flats and constitutes one of the first large-scale speculative operations destined to accomodate the future middle class. (1960)

The development towards the West was achieved by speculative and classical extension of the urban web. It was destined for the upper middle class. It is composed of large urban housing complexes and several satellite housing estates (such as the Ekbatan planned to accomodate 100.000 inhabitants).

The development towards the North exploded rapidly, overflowing on to every possible and accesible terrain, regardless of the configuration. It also comprises a very important urbanization operation, which was meant for higher executives of the administration, the army and the police. Finally, a new administrative centre had been planned which would establish Teheran as the "Heart of a regional Metropolis". A network of urban motorways connects the more prosperous areas (or those of high standing) to the administrative and commercial centre of Teheran. The construction of a Metro network began in 1978.

The evolution of each of these sectors continued according to plan. The Northern sector became richer, and the gap between the North and the poor South widened.

- 5.9. Analysis of different installations appropriate to each of these sectors is significant of the increasing gap between the sectors and their respective inhabitants. The presence of various types of housing characteristic of these sectors confirms the observations already made.

Depending a great deal on the class of revenue, housing varies enormously, from shacks, (makeshift housing, slums) to worker's housing (one-family housing, administrative housing or enterprises located within buildings), bourgeois housing (villas and flats) destined for the upper middle classes, prominent personalities or for the ruling class of the old regime, executives or foreign advisors.

The old heart of Teheran, scene of traditional habitat ("closed" housing) constructed according to a land density $D = 1$ to 1.5 is composed of a very large number of housing units, worker housing, reduced frequently to one room per family, each family comprising 4 to 4.5 persons.

These characteristics are also valid for the ring segment of recent urban expansion which, from the East to the West, passing by the South, includes the ancient core of the city.

The density of population can be as high as 1000 inhabitants per hectare in these two zones, which is more remarkable is that the construction in these zones is of single story or two storey tapes.

The upper part of Teheran comprises housing of "semi-closed" or "semi-open" type shelters - a moderne and well-off habitat of which the density at times reaches $D = 2$. At the North of this part, the habitat of the ruling class is situated, amidst green surroundings with a very low density of population, whereas on the developmental axis of Teheran from the East to the West satellite housing estates have been constructed.

Teheran is composed of four types of habitat :

- The closed house :

This is an introvert habitat of traditional patriarchal family. Situated within the web of alleyways and cul-de-sacs, it is accessible by a low gate, generally the only access to the outside. All other openings look out into the interior courtyard into which from two, three or four sides different rooms are arranged, the main room being reserved for the head of the family. This kind of house can have a second courtyard, enabling better seclusion of the female members of the family.

- The semi-closed house :

These are houses constructed on rectangular plots oriented towards North-South to benefit from the cool winds, the construction occupies the North face of the minor side of the rectangle, the courtyard being in the South, as generally speaking the entrance was cut through a wall, hiding the courtyard from the outside. The original form of these houses comprised a floor with windows looking on to the street and could be seen from the street. The lay-out of these streets form a network of roads perpendicular North-South and East-West. This type of house appeared after the war.

- The semi-open house :

This house is found less often. It is the classical extrovert habitat of villa or "pavillon" situated in the middle of a garden or an urban plot more or less square. All doors and windows look out to the outside. This was the modern habitat introduced into Iran in the 30's, within the framework of the modernization imposed by those in power. Nevertheless, it certainly had as cultural impact.

- The open house :

This type represents the first construction of blocks, namely three or four stories high, erected in Teheran just before or after the second world war. These are situated at the South of the East-West roads or along certain North-South streets. These buildings have shops on the ground floor, offices

and cabinets of the liberal professions on the first floor, and even flats on the higher floors.

These are the forerunners of the high-rise buildings which appeared on the housing market from 1965 onwards, going on to housing estates consisting of several dozen repetitive and identical apartment blocks (like the city of Ekbatan mentioned above).

After having considered all these models, we see that the semi-closed house is the type which is the most common, and which seems to be most suitable to the lifestyle and the financial means of the middle classes. This type lends itself well to an adaption of imported economic elements inherent in the system, and the preservation of traditional values.

This type of housing resembles a modern, rational habitat model (rooms differentiated by function, lighting, equipment), in the meantime retaining traditional elements (courtyard, position of the kitchen, etc.). But the combination of elements stemming from the two different habitat conceptions which reveal justly the contradictory nature of the solution, placed between two cultures, but as inadaptable to the one as to the other. The courtyard becomes an illusionary garden and is inhabited. The use of the rooms have nothing to do with the rationality of the plan. It would be useful to mention here the presentation of the system of occupation of the housing, forms of ownership, the role of the real estate capital in Teheran. Briefly, in an oversimplified manner we can say that there are three types of property development.

For one part the financing comes from the State and the public collectivities who generally construct for their employees, housing which is average to inferior. The social character is situated towards the periphery.

A second part comes from private capital which is used for the construction of "free" housing, which is bartered like goods on the capital market, housing being rented out or sold at high prices.

The third variation comes from individual, inherited family capital. A large proportion of the inhabitants of the capital occupy their own housing, part of which they may sublet in order to earn some supplementary income.

5.10. Disenclavement of Abadan

The integration of the petroleum industry into the national economy and the industrializing effects of the petro-chemical complexes required the intervention of the State for the urban organization.

A discrepancy in the fordist consumption norms was a distinct possibility. The State left the initiative for the production of consumer goods as well as the housing to the private sector. It is a fact that part of the oligarchy controlled the urban land and the construction markets. Speculating on future growth, the price of housing was fixed at a very high level, which prevented access by the majority of the population.

The consequent housing shortage played an important part in the overthrowing of the regime.

Whereas Iran of 1975 was engaged in a wild race to construct an industrial infrastructure, goods, equipment and housing, the Iran of the 80's announced the closing down of more than a thousand of the largest industrial production units (according to certain estimations, this figure could be doubled). Whereas in the surviving industries the output has fallen by 10 to 20 % of the previous production. The construction industry has experienced a considerable slump, and we know that this loss has been estimated for the international financial circles by the Financial Times as follows :

"It has been estimated that the likely loss of business for foreign concerns on major civilian projects alone in Iran will be nearly 38 billion dollars. Defense contractors and smaller civilian projects would probably double that figure".

But the biggest construction markets, the largest building sites of the world, did not lead up to a product of quality. Only the corruption and the speculation were equal to the projects and the swallowed-up millions.

The model of the new image of the official Iranian architecture should be given as the Shahestan Pahlavi project, produced by the group Llwyn-Davies of London, winner of a restricted competition, and the design of the national Pahlavi library produced by a German group within the framework of an international competition organized by the U.I.A. whereby 3000 architects took part. It was about the construction of a politico-administrative city on an old plot of land for military exercises, situated on the North-South axis of Teheran. For this city the work of levelling and the infrastructure had already begun, and it was destined to receive in 10 or 20 years (according to different estimates) a daily population of 250.000 to 330.000 persons (about 40.000 to 50.000 residents, 175.000 to 200.000 jobs, 35.000 to 80.000 visitors).

It was spread out on 554 hectares of land, a former exercise ground for the army, which was to be divided into plots to be given to the retired graded military personnel. However, the plan of Teheran established by Victor Gruen in 1968-1969 mentioned the exceptional situation of this land for a new urban centre (rich in a modern neighbourhood, excellent climate, location North of the central axis of Teheran, easily accessible thanks to the metro and the motorway (work on the metro had already begun).

In 1975 a restricted competition gathered half a dozen consulting agencies for the design of the new centre of Teheran. The definite choice was Llwyn Davies International, Planning and Urban Design Consultants, London, which was charged to establish the definitive project to make Teheran an "International Capital" as explained by J. T. Robertson, director of the project. The Anglo-American team declared having conceived their work as a synthesis between the ancient Iranian architecture and the modern western architecture, comparing the importance of this project to the development of the centre of Isphahan by Shah Abbas. He had superposed the grid of automobile circulation like the grid of a large American city with little pedestrian islands of European and Iranian inspiration, with a place "larger than anything in Europe or America".

The plan of the city of Shahestan is constructed on a spine, laid out in stairs on a North-South axis. On this axis the principal elements of the new centre had to be developed and articulated.

- The central square of the Shah and the Nation for ceremonies and official parades,
- The Western boulevard of Shahbanou,
- The different superior administrations,
- Various commercial centres,
- The cultural centre comprising the national museum, an art palace and the National Pahlavi Library (which was subjected to the greatest architectural competition of the world, the first prize being won by a German agency).
- The monument of the Shah as well as other edifices for the glory of the Pahlavi dynasty,
- Finally a hotel, installations and housing for the higher class of the population.

5.11. In summary, the power, after having dismantled the ancient means of production and thanks to the agrarian reform, having put on the urban market capital and "reserve of manpower" constituted by the deprived peasants, after also having disenclaved Abadan and integrated petroleum exploitation to the national economy, after having united by the dictatorial nature of its regime the necessary elements for industrial development, did not know how to manage this development. It did not know how to make a competent and enterprising bourgeoisie and compensated this absence by the accentuation of the dictatorship and repression which culminated in the ultimate loss...

Between the need for dictatorship and the need for democracy it is the former which got the upper hand.

What remains after five years from the Teheran metropolitan beeing stoped ?
Formation of Teheran ? A "bloody" metropolis ?
The population has continued to increase.

In the first place (stage) from 1978 to 1981 Teheran has experienced a real estate boom of considerable importance, and the organ of the Central Bank of Iran announces officially construction of more than 110.000 buildings essentially one family. To this number we have to add a very large number of undeclared housing constructed without authorization by the population on every plot of land they could occupy. All of these new constructions have been exclusively financed by individual private savings without the support of the banks. The new urban authorities have been overflowed by the extent of this phenomena about which they tried to check, subsequently legalizing the faits-accomplis. Very important steps have been taken to fight off the speculative measures inspired by the Islamic Law (sharia) which by circumstances to be praticed (reduction of plots from 2.000 to 1.000 m²), ban on resale of plots of land, ban of constructing more than one floor.

These measures raise a new urban project and presents an anachronic character.

The question asked still remains. One cannot modify history after the event. One cannot go back 50 years with a decree. One cannot rubber 500 years european history. And history leaved spours in iranien culture and landscape. Thus, the near totality of houses built since the advent of Islamic republic ignore the invented house type even though this is a firmly established aspect of Islamic tradition. They are inspired by the semi-closed, even open models. It is also reflected in the planning of the new quarters, even though erected clandestinely. This example exposes a fundamental aspect of the framework of life, showing to what extent Iran is caught between "never again" and "not yet". The "never again" of a traditional context - irrevocably past and not recusitable, and the "not yet" of a new situation which has not yet resolved

in the consciousness. This situation of "in between" is well described by the Iranian philosopher Dr. Shayegan, whom we quote below, speaking of Iranian Art of the 70's. :

"This art...is like other manifestations of the spirit in an in-between stage : it cannot be motivated by the divine folly of Van Gogh, neither by the magic serenity of our ancient miniaturists : it imitates past forms without seeking the spirit that inspired them, nor the avant-garde forms of an art to the spirit of which it remains closed.

Consider the architecture. That which we have seen appearing in our country (Iran) is neither Oriental nor Occidental. It is a profanation of the functional space of modern art and the organic space of the traditional spirit".

We are :

"Somewhere between a "place" in the process of disintegration (not yet having reached its term) and another which has not yet reached conscious form : in other words, in a "non-place", u-topian caricature, the "non-place" of the imaginal. Our poets are not Hâfez, Rilke or R.S. Eliot, our pinters are not Behzâd, Matisse, Picasso, our philosophers are not Sohravardi, Mollâ Sadrâ, Nietzsche or Heidegger, but poets, philosophers and artistis between the two".

- 5.12. By introducing this paragraph on Teheran, we are in fact, citing an extract from the introduction to the Fourth Development Plan. At the end of the same paragraphe we refer to the extract quoted in the beginning relevant to this same Plan and we can say that due to the uncontrolled superposition of private interests and the state appratus, which we have already mentioned, this Plan is full of contradictions which will have a fatal outcome.

The whole planification system proposed solutions to an as-yet non-existant problem in Iran, and especially Teheran. These imagined problems stem from the experience of new industrial models of the industrialized Western type transplanted to an Iranian setting, which are expected to develop according to Western norms. The anticipation of the realization of such programmes of industrialization and the setting up a supportive infrastructure to cater

to this imaginary growth will lead inevitably to the same problems the Occident has experienced in that respect. The proposed plans will become inoperable.


The analysis of the actual situation in Iran, which rests on criteria drawn from Western socio-cultural norms are inappropriate to the Iranian situation, its past and its potentialities. In fact the success of such a plan required the pre-condition of a society assimilated into the Western socio-cultural and political reality, which is an urban industrial model, based on the conjugal conception of partnership within the family, a democratic political system with different levels of consensus, and a rational administrative state apparatus, etc.

This was not the case in Iran. The Plan, based on a foundation of expansion, was only an imaginary reflection of a socio-cultural structure and an industrial background of illusion.

This was the misunderstanding of the resistance power of past structures, of the persistence in clinging to ancient social orders no longer relevant in the present context, the historical immaturity of the ruling classes to engage in an appropriate modernisation strategy, the absence of a workforce with the industrial and technical know-how, the permanence of the patriarchal family structures...and the *taglid* as cultural reference. That is to say imitation.



For some the *taglid* remains a link with the past. For others, the *taglid* opens up an imported way of life.

How then, given all these variables, can the idea of the birth of a Metropolis be even entertained ?




CROISSANCE URBAINE

- 1 1869 VILLES DE PLUS DE 10'000 HAB.
- 2 1931 " " " DE 20'000 "
- 3 1956 " " " DE 30'000 "
- 4 1966 " " " DE 40'000 "
- 5 SITUATION EN 1978



IRAN COUPE NO-SE




6 TAUX DE REPARTITION POPULATION URBAINE ET POPULATION RURALE

POPULATION URBAINE
POPULATION RURALE




IRAN - INFORMATIONS GENERALES - PHYSIQUES ET DEMOGRAPHIQUES.


TEHERAN - ETAPES DE CROISSANCE - DEMOGRAPHIE




1850
7.2 km²




1890
24.7 km²




1945
33.6 km²




1955
59.9 km²



1965
120.3 km²




1977
250 km²
5'000'000 HABITANTS




1992 ESTIMATION PLAN DIRECTEUR
650.0 km²
6'5 A 12'000.000 HABITANTS

CROISSANCE
POPULATION
TEHERAN
1900 - 1978

ESTIMATIONS
1978
1992




ELEMENTS DE MORPHOLOGIE URBAINE



- 1 TEHRAN MILIEU 19e SIECLE : VILLE A PLAN ISLAMIQUE
- 2 VUE S-O TEHRAN DE LA CITADELLE (ARK) S/BAZAR + MOSQUEE DU KHAN
- 3 VUE ALONGEANTE S/BAZAR (N. ARDALAN, JENICE OF UNITY CHICAGO 73)
- 4 MOSQUEE JEHANSALAR
- 5 PORTE ELMASSIAH

TYPES DE LOGEMENTS · MATERIAUX · DISPOSITIONS CLIMATIQUES




TPOLOGIE DES LOGEMENTS
 TYPE FERME TYPE OUVERT
 SEMI-FERME ENSEMBLE APPART.
 AVEC DEVELOPPEMENT
 A L'OUEST AU NORD
 A L'EST ET AU SUB-EST
 DE L'AGGLOMERATION

SOURCE : IERS
 DESSINS : C.M.

Nature des matériaux employés	Dans l'ensemble du pays	Dans les zones urbaines
Béton armé	10 723	8 215
Pierre et fer	21 764	19 228
Pierre et bois	389 839	29 829
Briques et fer	421 359	41 641
Bois et brique	345 283	304 426
Bois	55 350	5 230
Brique brute et bois	1 390 421	271 782
Brique et plâtré	1 124 540	237 803
Nettes en jonc tressé	92 021	4 490
Autres	244 422	18 185
Total	3 898 719	1 300 828

PROBLEMES DU LOGEMENT, DE L'URBANISME ET DE LA CIRCULATION FONCIERE EN IRAN.
 CLASSIFICATION DES UNITES DE LOGEMENT SELON MATERIAU
 A. H. BAKHSAD
 IN ESPACES ET SOCIETES 22-23 / 79



TYPES DE LOGEMENTS




1. MAISON FERMEE

2. MAISON FERMEE A COUR INTERIEURE ET COUR EXTERIEURE

3. MAISON SEMI-FERMEE

4. MAISON SEMI-OUVERTE

5. APPARTEMENT TYPE OUVERT





6. DE LA MISE EN VALEUR DES OMBRES ET DE LA FRAICHEUR
 7. DE L'IMPORTANCE DE L'ORIENTATION EN FONCTION DU SOLEIL ET DE LA VENTILATION NATURELLE
 8. DE LA MISE EN VALEUR DE L'Eau ET DE L'HUMIDITE


SOURCE : MINISTERE LOGEMENT + AMENAGEMENT URBAIN - TEHERAN

SURFACE D'EXTENSION SPECULATIVE




-  SURFACE D'EXTENSION SPECULATIVE (EVAL. 1966)
-  ETENDUE AGGLOMERATION
- ESTIMATION PLAN DIRECTEUR SELON PROJET ETABLI EN 1969 POUR 1992

SOURCES : SURF. EXTENSION : P. VIELLE
 in MARCHÉ DES TERRAINS ET SOCIÉTÉ URBAINE
 RECHERCHE SUR LA VILLE DE TEHERAN
 ANTHROPOS PARIS 1970
 PLAN DIRECTEUR : H. KARIMAN
 in TEHERAN - PASSÉ ET ACTUEL - TEXTE IRANIEN
 UNIVERSITÉ NATIONALE TEHERAN 1976



REPARTITION SOCIO-PROFESSIONNELLE DE LA POPULATION ORDRE DE GRANDEUR

SOURCE : I.E.R.S. INSTITUT D'ETUDE ET DE RECHERCHES SCIENTIFIQUES
TEHERAN - 1966




COUCHES DIRIGEANTES
CLASSES MOYENNES SUPERIEURES ET INTERMED.

-5% 11 à 20%
6 à 10% +20%

COMMERÇANTS ET ARTISANS
MOYENNE TEHERAN ~17%

-15% 21 à 25%
16 à 20% +25%




EMPLOYES ETAT ET SECTEUR PRIVE
MOYENNE TEHERAN ~17%

-15% 16 à 20%
+30%



OUVRIERS MANUELS
MOYENNE DE TEHERAN ~30%

-10% 31 à 40%
20 à 30% +40%


MODES D'OCCUPATION DU SOL - DES LOGEMENTS - DENSITES
ORDRE DE GRANDEUR SOURCES DIVERSES 1966-68





NOMBRE MOYEN D'HABITANTS/HECTARE DE ZONE BATIE - HABITABILITE - DENSITE




NOMBRE MOYEN DE PIECES POUR 100 MEUVAGES
(SOURCE IERS + BANQUE CENTRALE 1960)




DENSITE D'OCCUPATION AU SOL - SUR 100m²



LOGEMENTS OCCUPES PAR LEURS PROPRIETAIRES
(SOURCE IERS + BANQUE CENTRALE 1960)






**REPARTITION SOCIO-PROFESSION
DE LA POPULATION**

ORDRE DE GRANDEUR - IERS-TEHERAN-1966

- ① COUCHES DIRIGEANTES
- ② COMMERÇANTS - ARTISANS
- ③ EMPLOYÉS - ETAT + SECT. ARME
- ④ OUVRIERS MANUELS




**MOES D'OCCUPATION SOL + LOSEMENTS
DENSITES**


ORDRE DE GRANDEUR IERS+ DIVERS 1966-68

- ① NOMBRE MOYEN HAB/HA - DENSITE
- ② NOMBRE MOYEN PIECES/100 MENAGES
- ③ DENSITE D'OCCUPATION AU SOL - SUR 1.00 m²
- ④ LOSEMENTS OCCUPES PAR PROPRIETAIRES

TEHERAN
ESSAI DE DEFINITION DES SECTEURS HOMOGENES




SECTEUR DU CENTRE
CROISSANCE SUR AXE NORD-SUD EN DIRECTION DU NORD
DEMI-ANNEAU NORD
+ DEMI-ANNEAU SUD
DEPLOIEMENT DE PART ET D'AUTRE DE L'AXE EST-OUEST (AV. DE LA
LIBERTE - ANCIENNEMENT CHAH-REZA)
ENSEMBLE D'ENTITES URBAINES
INSCRIPTIONS DANS LES DEUX DEMI-ANNEAUX NORD ET SUD
ENTITES PERI-URBAINES
EN PROLONGATION DES AXES DE CROISSANCE DE L'AGGLOMERATION
AU NORD ET AU SUD (AUTOUR DES NOYAUX EXISTANTS)
A L'EST ET A L'OUEST (CITES SATELLITES)





1



2



3



4



5



6




7



8



9



10



11

- 1 LYCEE STYLE PAHLAVI
- 2 VILLA + HOTEL - NORD TEHERAN
- 3 CHANGEMENT TISSU ANNEES '50
- 4 VUE SUR UNE AVENUE DU CENTRE
- 5 CITE EKBATAN - OUEST TEHERAN
- 6 COUR. A L'INTERIEUR BAZAR
- 7 RUElle QUARTIER QUPLAJAN
- 8 MASSE AN. CAUVIEAU - SUD OUEST
- 9 QUARTIER SUD. EN CONSTRUCTION
- 10 CITE AU SUD. EST TEHERAN
- 11 GORBIVILLE SUD AGGLOMERATION

VUES DIVERS QUARTIERS DE TEHERAN

PHOTOS C.M


ABASSABAD - PROJET A LA QUOIRE DU REGIME PAHLAVI
CITE "CHAHESTAN PAHLAVI" - NON REALISEE



PLAN DE LA CITE
(554 HA)



COMPARAISON
DE L'AXE
DORSALE DU
PROJET AVEC
L'AXE
CHAMPS ELYSEES
DU LOUVRE
A L'ETOILE



VUE SUR L'AXE PRINCIPAL - PHOTO MAQUETTE

SOURCE : CHAHESTAN PAHLAVI LLEWELYN - DAVIES INTERNATIONAL
PLANNING AND URBAN DESIGN CONSULTANTS

6. THERE WILL BE NO ISLAMIC METROPOLIS.

TOWARDS NEW URBAN FORMS

6.1 Our conclusion will be brief. It gives rise itself to the arguments developed below. There is no metropolis in the arabo-islamic world. There are only certain parts of industrial towns. There are large concentrations of populations, most of whom are young. This concentration of populations and their youth do oblige the vital forces and the intellectuals of the region either to worry about their futur... or to slowly decay.

6.2 The historical and socio-cultural arguments developped above have shown us that the metropolis is essentially an alien urban form in an islamic social formation. It was born of fordism, child of both a social consensus, which offered a certain quality of life, and the needs of continuous economic growth, reflecting a concentration of productive capital, of decision markers, of salaried labour forces and of consumers. The metropolis itself stems from an earlier urban form, the town: the town of Western industrialised society.

The medina has nothing in common with these two urban forms nor with the societies which gave rise to them. The medina had a completely separate history. It was born in a time, in places, under social conditions and relations appropriate to those of an Islamic society. It corresponds to a body of former institutions and habitus totally foreign to those which characterizes the towns of the Occident, and even more the metropolis.

In its strongest form it prevailed throughout a dozen centuries. Its decline began in the 16th century, at which time the Western world started out on its long courtship with capitalism and the ensuing domination of the world. By the end of the 19th century, it had been thoroughly permeated by the triumphant european town.

The traditional forces which had prevailed throughout history vascillated, gave way and surrendered to the conquoring forces, clinging to the remaining areas of power they had succeeded in salvaging, but short-circuited even those, and every possibility of indigenous development, which may result in the erosion

of their last privileges.

Two forms of resistance emerged: which were contradictory and antagonistic. The first was fundamentalist, conservative. The second was nationalistic and open to progress. Their real confrontation, which began towards the end of the 19th century, still continues.

The decolonisation of the 50's gave rise to a wave of optimism amongst the non-aligned nations. They awoke as from a stupor, and threw themselves into work towards social and economic progress. Vast industrial projects were undertaken. This time they made their own experiences, and encountered pitfalls of their own making. Thus they began to be aware of their capacities - and also of their limits.

The first steps towards modernity are difficult. Different agreements were made with industrialised countries engaged in expansionist fordism and metropolitan development. The financial burden was eased by the massive rise in the price of raw materials which gave new hope to the peripheral areas.

Industrial development had to adjust to these changes.

This was the beginning of a new world economy, firmly bound to the centre.

That means the alignment with the dynamic of continuous growth marked by the center: mass-production, salarisation and consumption.

But the rules of the game were interpreted and respected differently according to each country's mentality and its relations with the centre. Thus, the modes of regulation tied as they are to the central system, are rarely kept to.

The urban way of life, the facilities, the housing etc. are all integral elements of the consumption norms. Speculating on future developments, the local powers started building facilities suitable for Western-style consumers - housing and equipment of european style and standing, according to the western habitus but inadequate and in disconnection to the autochtone habitus as well as being out of reach for the ordinary wage-earner.

The onset of the fordist crisis of the centre caused the demise of the peripheral fordism which had been in the process of development.

6.3 What still remained ?

On one side, the traditional cultural elements, though atrophied and disused way of life. On the other side, parts of town being shaped and rooted in urban sprawl. The prevailing image is of an interrupted development which had become impossible to realise.

The chances in the long or short term of the model of development from the centre seem to be unrealistic at best, because the conditions for such a realisation - a healthy and stable rate of world economic growth - no longer exists. Everything remains suspended.

More than even before, suspended between the "never again", irremediably past, and the "not yet", to be yet conceived. What to do ?

What new scenarii are to be written up, for what new projects, for what new actors, for what new urban scene ?

The realisation of schemes based on the standards and concepts of a advanced Western society, however attractive they may seem to be, is in reality merely cultural and economic anticipation - out of reach, and is therefore only fiction.

Inversely, the same can be said of reliance on traditional appropriate local techniques. However ingenious and admirable they might appear to be at first glance, they have not been designed to meet the mass-housing needs of a remodelled urban agglomeration. All attempt at this direction remains pale imitations.

The salaried mode of reproduction of the labour forces available to men and women, even if it constitutes a definite improvement on the system of craftsmen guilds and of exclusion of women from the labour force, cannot be considered as generalised according to the norms we have discussed when one takes into consideration the enormous potential workforce concentrated in the urban areas. Inversely the domestic reproduction of the labour force simultaneously revives obsolete forms of the selfsustaining economy, the idleness of the youth, the perpetuation of the ancestral patriarchal authority, subjects the women - the eternal victims of all domestic economic forms - to repeated pregnancies and to a more and more restricted daily life.

The transplantation of intellectual Western models would lead to concepts without any place nor historical continuity.

Inversely, the reliance on any traditional concept would lead to gerontocracy of selfproclaimed sages, massively imitated and followed... until death. Should one opt for life as a cultural project or death as an ideology and marthyrology !

Here are two definite, albeit crudely presented options for society. Both leave their mark on the urban territories and their infrastructure.

Reconstruction or de-construction ?

Because coupling between central and peripheral societies has given rise to the present situation, the solution should be sought in "dis-coupling". Only in this direction a socially acceptable issue can be attempted. This "dis-coupling" would be both economically and culturally.

The means of this politic are :

- selfcentered production,
- cultural protectionism.

The periphera countries will only succeed in breaking out of the present deadlock when they manage to introduce social and technical relations and production techniques better adapted to their culture and conditions. The choice of such autonomous and self centered development means the choice by each state of its own dominant mode of production and social relation. Cultural protectionism marks the beginning of a countrys effort to take in hand its own way of life, not as a final goal, but as a point of departure.

Such projects can only be realised if the states concerned find the strength and imagination necessary to carry out reforms which first of all have to be identified and set into motion. Such reforms should from one hand look to their own indigenous cultures, reconsidered and uptodated, from the other hand reflect the achievements of industrial civilisation, which can be mastered. They must reject patterns imposed both by the autochtone oligarchies and by the international monopole.

A plan of co-development could be established with those in the center who have decided to seek out new ways of production and who are willing to share their technical experience and to collaborate for the purpose of working out a feasible plan better adopted to the actual situation of the peripheries.

The future of large concentration of population in the region is situated between dis-solution and alternative solution. If dis-solution, the overconcentrated agglomeration will disappear by suffocation, for definitively being agonised in the forgotten "never again". And the atrophied culture will be lost, the parts of town will be reduced to tatters. The inachieved skills will remain so far ever.

If alternative solution, the same concentration of population will imagine and generate one or several new urban forms, endogenously, adapted to the complexity of the present context. Urban forms of the "not yet" because not yet born in our consciousness, in our intellect, but already in state of intention, of project.

And the atrophied culture will be re-juvenated, enriched by autochtone and foreign choosen elements. The inachieved skills will regenerate and develop, inventing new ways and tools of production. The parts of cities will be starting points for the new coming urban forms.

INDICATIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. - La crise
Denis Clerc, Alain Lipietz, J. Sartre-Buisson
Syros, 1983, Paris
- Babel-Metropole
Giairo Daghini
in Change International - Metropolis no 1, Laffont, 1983, Paris
- Divers documents photocopiés "Production du cadre bâti"
D. Marco, M. Schwartz
Ecole d'Architecture, Université de Genève - 1982-1983
- L'Architecte, la Brouette et la Maison
avec C. Socratidis
in Archithèse no 1, 1980, Zurich
- Qu'est-ce qu'une Révolution Religieuse ?
D. Shayegan, p. 126 à 178
- The Muslim Discovery of Europe
Bernard Lewis
W.W. Norton & Co, 1982, New York
- Middle Eastern Subcultures
William E. Hazen, Mohammed Mughisuddin
Lexington Books, 1975, Massachusetts
- L'Islam Medieval
Dominique Jourdel
PUF, 1979, Paris
- La civilisation de l'Islam classique
Dominique et Janine Jourdel
Arthaud 1976, Paris
- Al Mugaddina - Discours sur l'histoire universelle
Ibn Khaldun
Sinbad, 1978, Paris
- Architecture d'Exportation - Etat de la Question, du Sable dans la Structure
avec C. Socratidis
in Werk Archithèse no 29-30, Zurich, 1979
- Architecture d'Exportation - Typologie
avec C. Socratidis
in Werk Archithèse, no cité
- Architecture d'Exportation - Enseignement
avec C. Socratidis
in Werk Archithèse, no cité

- Schweizer Bauen in Ausland
Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale, Zurich, 1978
- Les villes du tiers monde
Milton Santos
M. Th. Génin, 1971, Paris
- The Economic Development on the Third World Since 1900, p. 57 et sq
P. Baïroch
Methuen & Co Ltd, Londres, 1975
- Villes coloniales
in Urbi VI
p. Mardaga, 1982, Paris
- Colonial urban development
Anthony O.King
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976, London, Henley, Boston
- Henri Prost
in Urbanisme no 88, Paris, 1965
- Modern Turkish Architecture
Renato Holod and Ahmet Evin
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984, Philadelphia
- De l'Euphrate à l'Atlas
Jacques Bergue
Sindbad, 1978, Paris
- Occident et Orient au Xe siècle
Actes du Colloque de la Société des historiens médiévistes, Dijon, 1978
Société des Belles-Lettres, 1979, Paris
- Covering Islam
Edward Saïd
Random House, 1980, New York
- L'Orient musulman au Moyen Age 622-1260
Nikib Elisséeff
Armand Colin, 1977, Paris
- 2. - Middle Eastern Cities
Ira M. Lapidus
University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Londres, 1969
- Recent Arab City Growth
Saba G. Shiber
Kuwait Government Press, 1967, Kuwait City
- Urbanization in the Middle East
V.F. Costello
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977

- An Urban Profile of Middle East
H. Roberts
Croom Helm Ltd, Londres, 1979
- From Madina to Metropolis
L. Carl Brown, Ira P. Lapidus, Janet Abu-Lughod, ... Hassan Fathy
Darwin Press, 1973, Princeton, New Jersey
- Architettura nei paesi islamici
Seconda mostra internazionale di architettura
La Biennale di Venezia
Electra, 1982, Venise
- Arabisances
François Béguin
Dunod, 1983, Paris
- Présent et avenir des medinas
Equipe de recherches associées CNRS no 706
Urbanisation au Maghreb
Tours, 1982
- Le citte islamische
in Storia della citta no 7
Electa, 1978, Milano
- Monde arabe (urbanisation)
in Maghreb - Machrek no 81
Documentation française, 1978, Paris
- Islamic Environmental Systems Engineering
S. Wagan Ahmad Husaini
Mac Millan International College Editions, 1980, London
- L'hygiène publique et l'espace urbain
Michèle Jole
Séminaire de Hammamet sur les métropoles maghrébines, février 1980, Tunis
- Fronte sahariono e fronte mediterraneo
Mounira Chapoutot-Remasi
in Hinterland 15-16, 1980, Milan
Fiere itinerari mercati nella formazione della citta moderna
- Urbanization and Social Change in the Arab World
Special issue
in Existics, vol.50, no 300, 1983, Athènes
- Islamic human settlements
Special issue
in Existics, vol.47, no 280, 1980, Athènes
- 3. - De la ville islamique à la métropole iranienne:
quelques aspects du développement contemporain de Téhéran
X de Planhol
in CNRS, Tome IX, 1964, Paris

- Les problèmes sociaux de la ville de Téhéran
(Actes du séminaire d'avril 1962) texte persan
Institut d'études et de recherches sociales
- Les villes de l'Iran
Frédéric Bemont
Vol. I et II, Chez l'auteur, Paris, 1969
- Die Entwicklung der Stadt Teheran
Peter Georg Ahrens-Technische Universität Berlin
Berlin, 1965
- Marché des terrains et société urbaine
Paul Vieille
Anthropos, Paris, 1970
- Téhéran: évolution récente d'une métropole
Bernard Hourcade
in Méditerranée no 1, 1979, Paris
- L' "Habitat révolutionnaire" à Téhéran 1977-1981
Bernard Hourcade, Farhad Khusrokhavar
in Hérodote no 31, Maspero, 1983, Paris
- Téhéran: An Urban Analysis
H. Bahrambeygui
Sahab Books Institute, 1977, Téhéran
- National Committee for human settlements habitat bill of rights
Ministry of housing and urban development
Téhéran, 1974
Voir extraits in: Existics 252, nov.1976, Athènes
Existics 258, mai 1977, Athènes
- Vieux Téhéran
Pakravan Emineh
Bank Melli Iran, 1967
- Teheran. Eine stadtgeographische Studie
Martin Seger
1982
- Gourbiville à Téhéran
Cyrus Mechkat. Ghar Darvazeh
Polycopié, Ecole d'Architecture de l'Université de Genève, 1967
- "Mahaleh Godnechinha"
Cyrus Mechkat
in Les formes de croissance urbaine sous-intégrée
Secrétariat des Missions d'urbanisme et d'habitat. SMUH, Paris, 1971
- "Téhéran: un modèle de développement?"
Cyrus Mechkat
in Aktuelle urbanisationsprobleme no 3a, 1977-78
Département d'architecture, Ecole Polytechnique - Zurich

- "Téhéran: un scénario - un enseignement"
Cyrus Mechkat
in Werk-Archithese - "Architecture d'exportation" No 29-30, Zurich, 1979
- Téhéran: un modèle de développement?
Cyrus Mechkat
in Aktuelle Urbanisationsprobleme no 3a, 1977-78
Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale, Département d'architecture, Zurich
- Téhéran, de la Ville islamique à la Métropole contemporaine
Cyrus Mechkat
in La Ville arabe dans l'Islam
1982, CERES, Tunis - CNRS, Paris
- Réserve de main-d'oeuvre et rente pétrolière
Ph. Fargue
Centre d'études et de recherches sur le Moyen Orient contemporain CERMOC
Beyrouth, 1980
- International Migration and Development in the Arab Region
J.S. Birks et C.A. Sinclair
Bureau International du Travail BIT - ILO, 1980, Genève

See also :

- Mimar - Architecture in Development - périodique - Singapour
- Al Faisal Architecture and Planning Journal - périodique - Dammam
- Al Banaa - périodique - Riyadh
- Journal of the Organisation of Islamic Capitals - périodique - La Mecque
- Middle East Construction - MEC - périodique - Londres
- Construction Industry International - CII - périodique - Londres