

**COMMITTEE V**

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**ON THE RELATIVE FITNESS OF DEMOCRACY AND COMMUNISM  
IN THEIR RIVALRY IN THE THIRD WORLD**

by

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## On the Relative Fitness of Democracy and Communism in the Third World

In *Max Weber's Insights and Errors* I have defined 'Spencerian fitness' as the ability of a social entity to maintain its form and to replicate itself. In other words, it amounts to survival + replicability as defined below. It must be distinguished from Darwinian fitness, which refers to the organism's ability to survive and reproduce.

By replicability of a political system I mean the ability of a system or systems of a given type to promote the setting up of replicas of itself or themselves in other territories, replicas which are able to survive under the existing circumstances, thus displacing systems of another kind. Almost needless to say, the term 'replica' must be interpreted broadly, as entailing a resemblance in the essential features, because there can be no perfect resemblance in the realm of social formations. The feudal system was eminently replicable. So is capitalism. In contrast, the replicability of democracy -- in the sense of a system where the rulers must obtain power through free, honest and competitive elections based on universal franchise -- is debatable.

The main problem to which I shall address myself here is the difference between democracy and communism with respect to their replicability. By 'communism' I mean systems of the Soviet type, albeit Soviet communism diverges widely from the visions of the early writers who used this name for their utopias. However, to see our problem in a proper perspective we must look at other types of polity, which have or had some importance in the modern world, because effective (as distinguished from potential) replicability

depends not only on the internal characteristics of the given system but also on the strengths and weaknesses of the systems with which it is competing.

Replicability is related to the ability to expand but is not identical with it. Expansion may mean, firstly, the growth of one entity. Secondly, expansion may mean extension of control over other units regardless or whether they are or are not similar to the controlling unit, as in takeovers in the realm of business and imperialism in the realm of international politics. The difference between Soviet imperialism and historic western European imperialism is that the former involves the setting up of rough replicas of the imperial center whereas the latter did not try (at least on the whole) to make the colonies into replicas of the ruling countries. (This was not the case in the earliest phases when the Spaniards imposed their language, religion and many customs on the populations of their possessions in America.) At the other extreme were the British in India. They did, however, create near replicas of their country in the territories which they settled: Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Replication can also occur through imitation without a conquest or takeover. Recently, for example, replicas of north-western European democracy have been established in Spain and Portugal without outside intervention. Another example of replication without conquest is Cuba, made into a fairly typical communist state by Castro's voluntarily joining the Soviet camp.

In 1902 -- that is, after the destruction of the Boer Republic -- republican constitutions were almost confined to the Americas. Outside there were only two cases: France and Switzerland. The area under elected governments was different: it included the constitutional (in fact mostly symbolic) monarchies of Scandinavia, the Low Countries and Britain, while excluding the majority of the Latin American republics which had dictators.

Not all elected governments were democratic even in the broad sense. In the Southern states of the U.S.A. Negroes were disenfranchised by illegal intimidation. In Britain adult suffrage came only in 1918, as it did in Argentina. In other Latin American constitutional republics (as well as in the Greek constitutional monarchy) there were either legal or illegal limitations on the right to vote. The empires of the Hohenzollerns and Hapsburgs are difficult to classify because there the power was shared between the monarchs and the parliaments which were truly elected. The situation in Japan was somewhat similar albeit in that country consensus, voluntary obedience and informal but not illegal controls were the determining elements, as they still are. The rest of the world was under a straightforward authoritarian rule of a monarchic or colonial kind.

1911 saw the fall of the Chinese empire and the first addition to the number of republics in Europe: Portugal. The First World War brought an end to the constitutionally mixed empire of Germany and Austria-Hungary as well as to the absolutistic Russian and Ottoman empires. The sheer number of monarchies, however, increased because of the creation of the Arab kingdoms by the British in the former provinces of the Ottoman empire. These kingdoms, however, were weak and dependent entities whose emergence could not balance the disappearance of the great empires. So, on the whole, the trend was definitely away from effective monarchy as a form of government.

The outcome of the Second World War put an end to the four authoritarian monarchies in Eastern Europe (or five if you count Hungary) as well as to the more symbolic monarchy in Italy. More recently monarchy has vanished in Iraq, Egypt, Greece, Ethiopia, Cambodia and Iran. The only effective (as distinguished from symbolic) monarchies which exist at present

are in Arabia, Morocco, Brunei and Thailand. There has been no case during the present century of a successful monarchic restoration. Monarchy was restored in Spain after Franco's death but it immediately acquired a symbolic character when the King promoted a democratic constitution and transferred his power to an elected government.

The vanishing of monarchies was not a consequence of the advance of democracy (or any other kind of representative government), because in this century (in contrast to the 17th or the 19th centuries) in no case has an effective monarchy been permanently replaced by an elected government. Invariably a monarchy has been succeeded either by a military dictatorship or a one-party system, albeit in Iran the clergy constitute the ruling party. The influence of democratic ideals seems to have been more of a destructive than of a constructive kind: they merely helped to erode the legitimacy of the monarchs' right to command.

Another factor is the decreasing role of kinship and descent in regulating human relations. Perhaps even more important is the increasing difficulty of the task of governing, which makes it very unlikely that the vagaries of genetic transmission could assure an adequate supply of abilities. This applies not only to the throne but all the way down the administrative hierarchy: the principle of inheritance of positions precludes the minimum of efficiency needed for surviving in the modern world. The monarchies of Arabia exist only because they are massively supported by foreigners. A more direct military intervention might be needed before long to prevent their demise.

The maladaptation of the monarchic principle of authority to the modern world has made it unprofitable to rely on monarchies in the game of power politics. It was not profitable in the long run to the American and

British governments and oil interests to restore the Shah's power after the Mossadeq episode. The American reliance on Haile Selassie did not pay off either. The British hopes of controlling Iraq, Egypt and Libya through friendly monarchs were also dashed. Nor were the friendly emirs of Northern Nigeria or the Kabaka of Uganda of much help in preserving the British influence. The most misplaced hopes of this kind were those the British political élite placed on the enlarged Commonwealth which (in contrast to the old Commonwealth) was not bonded by common culture and descent. Unable to face the loss of the empire -- always based on force, though relatively humane in its closing years -- British politicians embarked upon the absurd attempt to transform it into an entity based on mutual love between the former masters and servants and their love for the monarch.

In fact the Commonwealth (the more appropriate name for which would be 'Commonpoverty') functions as a dining club for dignitaries from the poorest parts of the world, maintained by the British taxpayers for the purpose of enabling the members of the royal family and the politicians to feel more important than they really are. The determination to dwell in the dreamland of vanished power is perhaps the main cause of Britain's decline. The relevance of this situation to the problem under discussion is that in the 20th century dynastic loyalty is generally useless as a cement of a political system. The replicability of monarchies appears to be nil.

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The next type of political system to be considered is non-ideological personalistic dictatorship. Such dictatorships have always been mostly of the military kind. Until decolonization after the Second World War military dictatorships were common in Europe and Latin America. Since then they

have become rare in Europe (where only Spain and Greece have experienced them, apart from the brief revolutionary interlude in Portugal in the seventies), but they became the most common form of government in the new states of Asia and Africa. The replicability of this type is great, but it occurs through spontaneous generation rather than transplantations; I know of no case in this century of a military dictator setting up in another country a dictatorship similar to his own. Franco (who in any case was not a typical military dictator) received help in the struggle for power from Hitler and Mussolini, whose dictatorships were of a very different kind.

Transiency is a salient characteristic of military dictatorships. Most of them were or are purely personal and often ended with the death of the dictator. Some were followed by a resuscitation of a democracy or oligarchy, others by a period of turmoil from which another dictator emerged. The Brazilian post-Goulart military regime was almost unique in having an agreed rule of succession which permitted changes at the top without violence. Normally, the question of succession is settled by another coup.

Military dictatorships tend towards venality. True, kleptocracy can seldom be imputed to the influence of the soldiers. Commonly, a military dictatorship springs up where politicians have been thoroughly discredited and there is no respect for the office or the law. In such a situation power tends to go to those who have the guns. Nevertheless, albeit the soldiers can seldom be blamed for having brought it into existence, in no case have they been able to stamp out venality. The reason is that an administration can be honest only if it is imbued with respect for law, which is impossible under a government which seized power in breach of the law and is backed by no ideology which could provide another basis for a sense of duty. The same is true of dictatorships which may not be classified as military because they are

headed by a civilian, but which also have no ideology to justify them, and whose sole support is the armed force, a part of which may consist of gunmen without uniforms.

The fragility of non-ideological dictatorships reduces their reliability as pawns in global power politics.

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Whereas personalistic and/or military dictatorships spring up like mushrooms but are unable to acquire legitimacy, democratic ideals are irresistibly attractive in our times, but they are often difficult or even impossible to approach in practice. The reason is that democracy is like a tender flower which can live only under very specific conditions whereas despotism is like a hardy weed which can thrive almost anywhere. No matter whether the country is rich or poor, highly industrialized or purely agricultural or even nomadic, without illiterates or full of them, homogeneous or divided by religion, race and national sentiment, egalitarian or deeply stratified, a gang with sufficient force may hold everybody in thralldom. The only condition which is necessary for an emergence of despotism is the existence of a population of a certain density within an accessible territory. If these conditions are present, then sooner or later one gang will overcome the others and establish its supremacy. In *The Uses of Comparative Sociology* I have proposed 'the principle of naturalness of despotism' as the label for this unwelcome truth.

The conditions which are necessary for the existence of an effective (as distinguished from nominal) democracy are:



1. Absence of widespread misery;
2. Existence of a fairly prosperous middle class (instead of an abyss between the very rich and very poor);
3. A fairly high level of respect for the law (which prevents bribery and electoral fraud);
4. Consensus on the rules of the political game;
5. A spirit of tolerance combined with a firm adherence to principles;
6. A fair degree of cultural homogeneity (without which Conditions 3, 4 and 5 cannot be met); and
7. Overlapping rather than congruence of class, ethnic and religious cleavages, which in any case must not be extreme.

These conditions are necessary though not sufficient for the existence of political institutions characterized by a certain degree of separation between the opinion-making (especially religious) power and the economic and political; and within the latter a subordination of the military to civilian authority and a sufficient degree of independence of the judiciary.

Given the rarity of co-presence of all these conditions, it is not surprising that the history of democracy is very short. In most systems of government by election the right to vote was restricted to a minority, often very small. Apart from Switzerland (which came into existence as an alliance of peasant communities) the two countries which first developed parliamentary government were Britain and Poland-Lithuania. The British parliament did not become democratic until after the Third Reform and fully so only in 1918. The Polish parliament became supreme as early as the 17th century when the monarchy became elective. The adoption of the principle of unanimity led to an administrative paralysis and the destruction of the

kingdom at the end of the 18th century. The rise of the parliament to supremacy was accompanied by a strict monopolization of the right to vote by the nobility.

Today the only country where the right to vote is restricted by law is South Africa. In most of the world, however, the right to choose the rulers exists only on paper, while the elections are either purely ceremonial (as in the communist and other one-party states) or fraudulent (as in Mexico) or determined by extralegal pressure, as in India. In Latin America elected government existed even in the 19th century, but either suffrage was restricted by law or controlled by informal networks of patron-client relationship and the lack of a secret ballot. To make the results of election independent of the voters' wishes it is not necessary to inspect every vote: it is enough if the voters suspect that the officials or the 'patron,' on whom they depend for their daily bread, might find out that they have voted against his wishes.

Of course, there can be no perfect democracy -- government by the people -- in a society larger than a small tribe. The parties are oligarchies whose leaders are usually selected by co-optation or other maneuvers which bear little resemblance to proper elections. A financial backing is often decisive and has become more so since the advent of television. So, realistically we can define democracy as a political system characterized by legal arrangements which prevent the rulers from continuing to hold office (beyond the specified period of a few years) when a substantial majority of the population wants to replace them. The extralegal or illegal mechanisms of control referred to above rule out democracy as thus defined but permit a combination of authoritarianism in fact with democracy on paper.

Such a system cannot acquire legitimacy, unlike frank authoritarianism where the rulers do not conceal the reality. In the monarchies of old few people doubted the king's right to command and their duty to obey. For a time Hitler succeeded in converting most Germans to 'the Leadership Principle' and the view that democracy was bad because it led to disunion and national weakness. The combination of democracy on paper with illegal authoritarianism in practice has the very serious consequence of erasing respect for the law not only among the common people but also the élite. This fosters dishonesty -- especially venality of officials and politicians -- and a general lack of the sense of duty which causes all public institutions to function badly and has an adverse effect on private business as well.

Not many political systems satisfy the minimal definition of effective democracy proposed above. Those which do and give the impression of stability are confined to the shores of the North Atlantic with the addition of Australia and New Zealand. In southern members of the European Economic Community a collapse of democracy is by no means impossible. Indeed, in Greece it is even likely. In Argentina and Uruguay democracy is very precarious, while elsewhere in Latin America it exists mostly or at least partly on paper only, if at all.

As in many other respects the case of Japan is unique. It is a one-party state in fact but there is no evidence of intimidation, electoral fraud or any other illegal method to prevent the voters from voting as they like. It is a one-party state by consent, which might also be described as a non-consummated democracy. Given that elections take place as prescribed by the constitution, the voters could throw the Liberal Democratic Party out of office. But the Japanese people have an extraordinary sense of hierarchy which prompts them to vote for the rulers because they are the rulers. As the present élite

have led them to unrivalled economic success, the people feel no desire to consummate their democratic right to change leaders. Despite its economic power, Japan exerts little influence on the global political arena because it is militarily dependent on the U.S.A., its foreign policy is subordinated to strictly commercial goals, and few foreigners feel tempted to imitate the Japanese ways. So, in what follows I shall speak of the West, meaning thereby western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand.

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One of the fundamental weaknesses of the West is that its political systems cannot be replicated in most areas under its influence. Outside the sphere of the West (as defined above) the economic and cultural prerequisites of democracy exist only in Japan and up to a point in Argentina and Uruguay. Yet, most Westerners are genuinely devoted to democratic ideals and many sincerely try to encourage their implementation everywhere in the world. Moreover, the inhabitants of the so-called Third World (especially the élites) are fascinated with the West and strongly inclined to imitate everything they see there. Consequently, they are under the influence of democratic ideals which they could not put into practice even if they tried very hard. This influence is strong enough to undermine the legitimacy of the surviving effective monarchies and to prevent an emergence of indigenous ideologies which might prompt a development of political systems endowed with some legitimacy.

The result is that governments in the southern (though not the southernmost) part of the world are either very shaky monarchies or on-paper-only democracies or unprincipled dictatorships. Westerners would prefer to have allies in the South who practice democracy. But, as they cannot

find such, they make alliance with dictators and crypto-authoritarian pseudo-democrats. In consequence, many Westerners suffer from an uneasy conscience and are half-hearted in supporting their authoritarian partners. Sometimes Western politicians prefer crypto-authoritarians to open dictators, albeit an honest dictatorship (like Franco's was on the whole) might leave better foundations for a democracy than a government by fraud. At the same time many Western politicians connive with their unscrupulous businessmen who add fuel to the corruption rampant in most poor countries. All this makes the political structures of most undeveloped countries very fragile and an easy prey to another product of Europe known as communism.

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The system which came into existence in Russia after 1917 has spread widely. In most of the non-Russian provinces of the Tsar's empire, in Eastern Europe (with the exception of Yugoslavia) and in Tibet it was imposed from outside by force. In Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Yemen, Angola and Mozambique the job was done locally. Afghanistan is a mixed case. Up till now the advances of communism have been irreversible: once in the camp no recruit has slipped out, with the partial exception of Grenada which was not yet properly integrated. True, communist rule might have collapsed in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in Poland in 1980 and in Afghanistan more recently without a Soviet intervention, albeit veiled in the case of Poland. Nonetheless the fact remains that the U.S.S.R. was able to bring recalcitrant vassals into line whereas the U.S.A. has achieved this only in the minuscule case of Grenada.

The greater Spencerian fitness of the communist system (as compared with the democratic) stems from the fact that it can be imposed by force and

maintained by force -- which can be done under almost any conditions -- whereas a democratic system cannot, but requires 'hothouse' conditions. Communism's advantage over other authoritarian structures, on the other hand, is due to the possession of a doctrine which makes use of certain aspects of the democratic ideal to justify authoritarianism of its brand. True, this is contrary to the dreams of Marx and Engels (not to speak of their more gentle forerunners), but the doctrine has been adapted to this purpose by Lenin and Trotsky. Anyway, since the demise of fascism, Leninism (apart perhaps from Khomenism) seems the best recipe for setting up in an undeveloped country a system which is not fragile. A dictator will die, a dynasty may die out or leave a moron on the throne, but a ruling party is immune to these dangers. It is also less likely to consist of lazy or very dim individuals than a dynasty or an aristocracy, because recruitment and promotion are by and large competitive.

The reason for the communists' successes in the poor countries is not that they have a cure for poverty. Their only medicine which works quickly is mass slaughter, which can alleviate misery by reducing numbers, as has happened most notably in Cambodia. Putting the entire economy under direct management by the state has had bad consequences everywhere, but especially so in countries with utterly inefficient administrations, like Angola and Mozambique. The inefficacy of the cure, however, does not diminish its attractiveness to people who have not tried it. In a situation of widespread misery and frustration a program of confiscating the wealth of the rich can easily find enough supporters to outvote the opponents. For this reason a combination of a market economy with effective democracy is not viable in an environment of widespread misery, albeit the market is much more likely to create a way out than an overgrown and inefficient bureaucracy.

Unless intimidated somehow, starvelings are unlikely to resist the temptation to vote for themselves benefits which cannot materialize and to opt for a confiscation of the wealth not only of the idle rich but also of businessmen who must make a profit in order to produce goods and services. In a country full of desperate people a party which has no scruples about making unfulfillable promises will defeat one which is more honest if the vote is free. And if promises are made to lure people into a totalitarian cage, then the victory of the deceitful demagogues will be more or less final.

Such an outcome may materialize in conditions much less terrible than those of most of the Third World today. In consequence of the great Depression of the thirties the democracy of the Weimar Republic was brought to an end by Hitler's success at the polls. The post-Second World War democracy in Italy came to the brink of suicide more than once when the Communist Party failed to win the elections by a very small margin. The economic difficulties after the First World War constituted the main cause of the replacement of Italian democracy by fascism. Among the democratic systems which came into existence in Central and Eastern Europe after 1918, those which had not collapsed earlier succumbed to dictatorships during the economic crisis of the thirties, the only exception being Czechoslovakia. The story of democratic constitutions in the post-colonial states is similar: they were all replaced either by open dictatorships or *de facto* one-party systems based on extralegal control of voting.

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On their record up to the present communist systems appear to be much sturdier than democratic systems, as they can be set up and maintained in a much wider array of environments, ranging from prosperous and democratic

Czechoslovakia (with an industrious, literate and law-abiding population) to hitherto corruption-ridden Ethiopia, full of desperate starvelings and illiterates. Even more important is the irreversibility of a transition to communism . . . at least up till now. A kind of ratchet mechanism seems to operate here: once in, never out. So far the only exception to this rule has been the overthrow of Bela Kuhn's government by Horthy in 1919 with the help of the Rumanian troops, but this occurred before Kuhn had the time to crush all his opponents, while the Soviet army was very weak and had no access to Hungary. The existence of this ratchet mechanism in no way proves that the communists live up to their promises and make people contented.

Fitness must not be confused with desirability, ethical worth or conduciveness to general happiness. The main reason for the communist system's replicability is that it can be imposed by force and maintained by force. This, however, is true of many other kinds of authoritarianism. The question therefore arises whether communism has an advantage over them; and if so, to what it might be due? The answer to the first question appears to be yes, because there have been many instances of such authoritarian systems succumbing to communism but not the other way round. Indeed, with the exception of Czechoslovakia and Estonia, which was a case of pure conquest from outside, communism has expanded at the expense of other authoritarian systems. The communists' successes were due to their strengths as well as to their opponents' weaknesses.

I have already mentioned earlier some of the weaknesses of effective monarchies and military dictatorships. A one-party system is less fragile. A personalistic dictatorship may come to an end with the death of the dictator. A dynasty may die out or leave a madman or imbecile on the throne. A ruling party is likely to be more permanent. It is also less likely to consist of lazy or



dim individuals than a hereditary aristocracy of dynasty, and therefore is likely to be more capable of maintaining itself in power. In contrast to military dictators, communists have a doctrine which justifies their power.

The faith of the masses fades after the revolution, when the promises are seen as empty, but the doctrine gives the rulers confidence in their right to rule... which is very important and mostly lacking among non-communist dictators today. Such a situation is, of course, completely contrary to the dreams of Marx and Engels (not to speak of their predecessors), but the doctrine has been adapted to élitist rule by Lenin, who enunciated the transubstantiation of 'the proletariat' into 'the party,' and taught that loyalty to the party must take precedence over all other considerations. In contrast, other authoritarian rulers of today either feel a bit ashamed or obliged to be apologetic. Since the demise of fascism, non-communist dictators have been unable to invent a persuasive justification of their regimes. Some attempts in this direction have been made (for example Peron's *'justicialismo'*), but they never managed to repeat the fascists' success between the two World Wars. What is the explanation?

Perhaps the main factor stems from the tendency of the poor to imitate the rich. In the non-communist world the rich and powerful nations are democratic, which makes democracy fashionable. In addition to spontaneous imitation, proselytizing as well as pressure from affluent democratic countries helps to thwart the development of an ideology which could be put into practice in poor countries. The resulting discrepancy between democratic ideals and authoritarian practice fosters the yearning for a revolution. And as no other ideology which would justify a revolution has sufficiently wide currency, discontented people turn to Marxism.

The power of Marxism stems from its ability to convert the attraction of the democratic ideals into a justification for building an authoritarian system. Consequently, in an environment where democratic ideals cannot be put into practice, the appeal of Marxism will be stronger the more devoutly these ideals are espoused. It follows that by attempting to promote democracy where it cannot strike roots, Westerners are facilitating the spread of Marxism.

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A survey of history supports the more inferential arguments against the soothing preconception that democracy provides a cure for poverty. Britain became the workshop of the world when its government was narrowly oligarchic and oppressed the common people. In France the crucial steps were taken during the Second Empire. Only in the U.S.A. did the 'take-off' occur under a democracy but (apart from the South) there was never much poverty there because of the abundance of land. If we look at the recent success stories, the conclusion emerges that it is the combination of market economy with a fairly honest and enlightened authoritarianism which offers the most effective remedy for long-standing poverty. The examples are South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong (as well as Japan before the Second World War). The qualification 'honest and enlightened' is crucial because it would be absurd to suppose that authoritarianism *per se* provides a cure for misery, which would have disappeared long ago if this were so.

Most modern dictators were (or are) at least as bad as the despots of old: just as ready to sacrifice their subjects' welfare to their own vanity, greed or malice. Many were (or are) narrow fanatics or simply too stupid for the task

which they arrogated to themselves. Some of the worst kleptocrats have sprung up in countries which could least afford their exactions.

Provided it is not as disorganized as those in Angola or Mozambique, a communist dictatorship may be better able to cope with backwardness than a corrupt and disorderly pseudo-democracy such as, for example, existed in the Philippines before Marcos declared himself to be an open dictator. A comparison of China with India points to the same conclusion. However, no communist country has even remotely approached the economic achievements of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore or Hong Kong. Seekers for a remedy for backwardness can do no better than try to learn from the last four, who started later than Japan, and without the advantages of the earlier starters in Europe, not to speak of the U.S.A.

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In their attitude to the so-called Third World, Westerners resemble an unwise gardener who pours seeds on unsuitable soil, where they merely provide fertilizer for weeds, instead of preparing the soil first. Trying to foist democracy on desperately poor countries is exactly analogous. A wiser course would be to attend to the elimination of mass misery first, leaving the promotion of democracy until the first task is achieved. It follows that the goal of spreading democracy is better served by supporting a dictator who is helping to create an economic foundation, than a government which professes democratic principles but does nothing to prevent a slide into ever greater misery and disorder.

To do any good an authoritarian government must be honest and enlightened. Little needs to be said about honesty because it is obvious that a kleptocracy will insure poverty and disorder. What constitutes enlighten-

ment is more debatable. Which policy is wise depends on the circumstances; and a discussion of this question would have to proceed case by case. Two points, however, are clear and apply everywhere. The first is that no improvement can be durable if it is achieved by destroying the ecological base. Secondly, no improvement is possible without putting an end to the population explosion.

It is a striking proof of mankind's irrationality that the problem of overpopulation is assiduously avoided in public discussions, although a few simple calculations suffice to demonstrate that the present rates of growth must overwhelm any conceivable increases of production, even leaving aside the effects of the destruction of the environment. Unless the fertility of the exploding population is reduced there will be an increase in mass slaughters and a multiplication of tyrannies of increasing ferocity, unless a disease or a nuclear holocaust brings down the numbers.