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**THE HINDU ATTITUDE TO KNOWLEDGE AND NATURE**

by

**R. Balasubramanian**  
Director  
Radhakrishnan Institute for  
Advanced Study in Philosophy  
University of Madras  
Madras, INDIA

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### 1. HINDUISM : BOTH PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

Though the Indian tradition distinguishes philosophy and religion, it never separates them by placing them in water-tight compartments. Even a casual study of Hinduism will reveal this salient feature. It is, therefore, difficult to say where philosophy ends and religion begins in the case of Hinduism. If so, it is not inappropriate to speak of Hinduism as both philosophy and religion. This is equally true of Jainism and Buddhism, which are two other major schools of the Indian tradition.

#### 1.1. Hinduism as Philosophy

The conception of philosophy in the Indian tradition is broad enough to justify the unity of philosophy and religion. The word "philosophy" etymologically means love of wisdom. One who loves or cares for wisdom as worthy of attainment must pursue it through inquiry; and the inquiry must consummate in the vision or seeing of reality. In the Indian tradition, inquiry is called vicāra, and seeing is called darsāna, the two being related as means and end. If the focus is on inquiry into the nature of reality through the different methods of reasoning, it is called tattva-vicāra; and if the focus is on the vision or the seeing of reality, it is known as tattva-darsāna. So every philosophical tradition in India speaks of inquiry (vicāra) and vision (darsāna), the former paving the way for the latter. A brief elucidation will be helpful in this

connection. For example, Jainism speaks of right seeing (samyg-darsana), right knowledge (samyag-jnana), and right conduct (samyag-caritra) as the "three jewels" (triratna), of which the last through the second leads to the first. What is laid down here is that the practice of ethical and spiritual discipline leads to right knowledge,<sup>and</sup> right knowledge in its turn to right vision. In the case of Buddhism what is known as right concentration (samyag-samadhi) which is the last step in the eightfold noble path (astāṅgika-mārga) comprises inter alia reasoning (vitarka) and investigation (vicāra), which produce the joy of pure thinking. This is also true in the case of the Hindu tradition right from the Vedic times. The Taittirīya Upaniṣad, for example, says that Bhṛgu practised inquiry for knowing the supreme reality which is the source, support, and end of all beings.<sup>1</sup> Śāṅkara emphasizes the importance of inquiry through reasoning as a preliminary to the understanding of the import of the scriptural text. He observes that inquiry into Brahman leads to experience (anubhava) and that anything that is accepted without inquiry will not be conducive to the good.<sup>2</sup> Ramana Maharshi, a contemporary exemplar of the Advaita tradition, has advocated the path of inquiry (vicāra-mārga) for the realization of the ultimate. So inquiry into both knowledge and reality is absolutely necessary for seeing or realizing reality. It may be mentioned here that of the two kinds of inquiry, inquiry into knowledge and inquiry into reality, the former has precedence over the latter in the Indian tradition. Inquiry into knowledge and the means thereto is called pramāṇa-vicāra, while inquiry into reality which is the object of knowledge is called prameya-vicāra. A systematic exposition of Hinduism, as also Jainism and Buddhism, starts with epistemology before proceeding to metaphysics. Inasmuch as epistemology and metaphysics are integral to it, it is treated as philosophy.

## 1.2. Hinduism as Religion

Hinduism is more than philosophy; it is also religion. Religion, according to Paul Tillich, is the ultimate concern of man about what is experienced as ultimate. The ultimate is inclusive of everything—man, world, and God. It means that no aspect of man can be excluded, that no part of the world can be set aside, and that no dimension of God can be ignored from our conception of the ultimate. It follows that God, man, and the world will be, as in the case of philosophy, the subject matter of religion. But what distinguishes religion from philosophy is the practical side. The ultimate concern of man, which is unconditional, is a commitment; it is a way of life. Unlike philosophy, which is usually understood as merely theoretical, religion calls for a total response, cognitive, affective, and conative, of the whole man to the ultimate. Since philosophy as traditionally understood in India includes the practical side, there is justification for saying that Hinduism is also religion. According to the Indian tradition, inquiry into knowledge and reality to be fruitful calls for the right frame of mind; and the right frame of mind, what is usually called the "mental set" necessary for philosophical inquiry, requires training, both moral and spiritual. It is not, therefore, surprising that some kind of a preliminary moral and spiritual discipline has been insisted upon as the prerequisite for inquiry in the Hindu as well as Jaina and Bauddha traditions.<sup>3</sup> And this discipline in a more intensified form will continue till one attains the vision or the seeing of reality. It follows that in the Indian tradition philosophy is not only theory, but also practice, not only a view of life, but also a way of life. In other words, philosophy and religion are inseparable, though distinguishable. It is the combination of theory and practice that confers upon Hinduism the philosophico-religious character. It should be borne in mind that there is a variety of schools of Hinduism, each formulating its epistemology and metaphysics. These schools have interacted with one

another in the discussion of epistemological and metaphysical issues, sometimes agreeing on certain issues and differing on certain others. The sophisticated analysis of the issues in these two areas is comparable to that in the different schools of Western philosophy.

## 2. REALISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY

### 2.1. Subject-object Relation

There are two important metaphysical trends in Hinduism—theistic and trans-theistic. The latter is also called absolutistic or monistic. The expression "trans-theistic" is helpful as it suggests that the metaphysics which is labelled trans-theistic is not opposed to theism, but transcends theism. Irrespective of the metaphysical position which may be theistic or trans-theistic, Hinduism follows realistic epistemology. The minimum that is claimed in realistic epistemology is the admission that there is such a thing called "knowledge". With the admission of knowledge, one will be required to admit the existence of both subject and object. There is no such thing as knowledge in abstraction. Knowledge as ordinarily understood belongs to someone, and is about something. It means that knowledge is relational requiring a subject who knows and an object which is known. There is no epistemology without the subject-object distinction. The question how the subject-object or knower-known distinction arises need not be considered here. However, the question of the relation of knowledge to the object on the one hand, and its relation to the subject on the other, has to be considered at this point. Knowledge by its very nature is revelatory of the object: that is to say, it reveals the object to the subject. Knowledge, or the language through which it is expressed, is a picture of the object as the early Wittgenstein would put it. If knowledge is capable of revealing the object as it is, it is because of the fact that it is dependent on the object (vastu-tantra). "As the object,

so is our knowledge." There is no knowledge in the absence of the object. Though it is related to the subject, it is not dependent on the subject for what it is. The person concerned does not have any choice in respect of it, as it is bound to arise, given the object and the necessary conditions for the origination of knowledge. No one imagines knowledge, and what is imagined cannot be knowledge.<sup>4</sup> Though knowledge is knowledge of someone, it is not what it is because of the personal factors such as imagination, wish, desire, and so on of the person concerned. The person concerned has no part to play with regard to the origination or non-origination of knowledge; nor could he alter it from being what it is. Knowledge, therefore, is not person-dependent (puruṣa-tantra) in whatever way its relation to the knowing subject is thought of— as a specific quality of the self, or as an activity of the self, or as a manifestation of the intrinsic sentient nature of the self.

## 2.2. Intrinsic Validity of Knowledge

Knowledge as it arises is accepted to be valid. Its claim to validity is doubted or denied only when there are grounds for doubt or disbelief. When I perceive a thing, say a tree, and claim that it is a tree on the basis of my perceptual knowledge, I believe in it as soon as knowledge arises in me; and the fact that such knowledge leads to successful activity confirms that my knowledge is valid. Whatever I claim about the object—that it is tall, that it has many branches, and so on—is based on my knowledge of it; and I believe in everything that I say about the object on the basis of my knowledge, unless there are reasons to show that I am wrong in my claim. Normally we carry on our day-to-day life on the assumption, "As our knowledge, so is the object." It means that knowledge is intrinsically valid and that it is also believed to be valid, whatever be the source—perception, inference, or verbal testimony—through which it is obtained.<sup>5</sup>

### 2.3. Pragmatic View of Knowledge

Though the validity of knowledge is not dependent on its utility, Indian thinkers generally take a pragmatic view of knowledge. Knowledge is the basis of all life's activities. Whatever a person does in his daily life is based on his knowledge of things. Practical activity to which knowledge leads is a consequence of it. But it does not follow from this that every case of knowledge leads to practical activity. It may or may not, depending on the presence or absence of motive which is the link between knowledge and practical activity. Knowledge per se does not lead to practical activity unless there is a motive operating subsequently to the knowledge of anything. If a person, after cognizing something, thinks of it as useful, then he desires to attain it; if, on the contrary, he thinks of it as something harmful, then he dislikes and avoids it; consequently, his engagement in appropriate action will be in accordance with his desire or aversion. So the motivation to attain what one likes and to avoid what one dislikes on the basis of pragmatic considerations of good and bad respectively should arise subsequent to knowledge. In the absence of such motivation mere knowledge does not lead to practical activity.

### 2.4. The Distinctive Nature of Human Being

Human life is purposive. The Hindu mind never thought of knowledge as an end in itself. Pursuit of knowledge for the sake of knowledge has never been the Hindu ideal. A celebrated Vaisṇava teacher, Vedāntadesika, observes that knowledge which man possesses is to help him secure the goals of life and for adopting the appropriate means to secure these goals.<sup>6</sup> The goals of life which man aims at must be fully reflective of his nature. Otherwise there will not be any difference between man and animals. The life-activity of man should not be confined to the cultivation of the senses, which

has already been achieved at the animal level. Man cannot be considered to be "human" unless his senses have become "human" or refined. His senses should not be subservient to the basic needs alone such as hunger, sleep, and sex. The Hitopadesā says: "Hunger, sleep, fear, and sex are common to man and beasts. It is jñāna (i.e. reflective awareness) that specially characterizes man." Sankara maintains that man<sup>is</sup> preeminent among all creatures on the ground that he alone is eligible for the pursuit of knowledge and the practice of religious duties (karma-jñāna-adhikārah).<sup>7</sup> He justifies this speciality of man which lifts him above the animal level on three grounds. First of all, man has the ability for acquiring knowledge not only of the things of the world, but also of the supreme reality, which is the source and support of all beings, since he is equipped with mind which, being inspired by the self, is capable of comprehending everything including the highest reality. Unlike other creatures, man has the ability to understand scripture and follow it; and scripture is the authority for the performance of religious duty as well as for our knowledge of the highest reality. Secondly, he has the distinctive quality of desiring certain ends as a result of discrimination, deliberation, and choice. He cognizes something, desires it, and is engaged in activity with a view to fulfil his desire. The sequence of cognition, desire, and action, i.e. cognition followed by desire, and desire leading to action, is characteristic of man's goal-seeking activity. Thirdly, when man exercises his choice on the basis of the knowledge of the object presented to him, he is not indifferent to the object of his choice. On the contrary, he is earnest about it. He is in search of the right means to realize the end chosen by him. So the life-activity of man which is fully reflective of his knowledge, desire, deliberation, and choice is directed towards the pursuit of worldly prosperity, happiness and freedom. So the question, "What is knowledge for?" which underscores the pragmatic attitude of the Hindu mind has to be answered with reference to the distinctive feature of the human being.



## 2.5. Knowledge and the Value System

Man leads his life at two levels—organic and hyper-organic. The value system of the Hindus, which takes note of man's life at organic and hyper-organic levels, provides the answer to the question about the utility of knowledge. The Hindu mind has reduced the entire range of values to four—wealth (artha), pleasure (kāma), duty (dharma), and liberation (mokṣa)—in a hierarchy. While the first two values belong to the organic level, the last two belong to the hyper-organic level. Bodily and economic values which contribute to material well-being and happiness have been emphasized right from the Vedic times. Prayers and sacrifices which we come across in the Vedas are for a happy, healthy, and full life of a hundred years. The spiritual side of man which is not satisfied merely with material prosperity and happiness is interested in other values as well. Intellectual, moral, aesthetic, and religious values which are higher values in comparison to bodily and economic values are pursued by man as a hyper-organic being in fulfilment of the mental and supra-mental dimensions in him. It may be noted that dharma is not only a value, but also a regulative principle which allows the pursuit of both wealth and pleasure without jeopardizing individual well-being and social welfare. So, if knowledge is cared for, it is because of its usefulness in the pursuit of the various values desired by man.

## 2.6. The Pleasant and the Good

According to Hinduism, the purposive character of knowledge has to be finally explained with reference to the existential problem of suffering which is bondage. When superficially viewed, it may appear that man has not only body, but also spirit as if both of them constitute the nature of man. The truth, however, is that man is

essentially spirit having association during empirical existence with a psycho-physical body which is external and accidental to it. If the source of suffering is to be identified, then it is necessary to distinguish the self or spirit from the psycho-physical organism which serves as its outfit. The self which is "soundless, touchless, colourless, undiminishing, tasteless, eternal, odourless, without beginning and without end,"<sup>8</sup> as the Upaniṣad would describe it, is by its very nature free, and no experience of any kind—cognitive, or affective, or conative—can be associated with it. If the self per se is totally free, i.e. free from everything including suffering, then the source of suffering in embodied existence must be the psycho-physical body. But the body separated from the self can have no suffering, because when separated from the self it is in no way different from a piece of wood or stone. It is only the sentient body that has the experience of suffering; and the body becomes sentient only when the self is associated with it. Neither the disembodied spirit nor the disspirited matter can have the experience of suffering. On the contrary, it is only the embodied spirit that is subject to suffering. So there is the existential problem of suffering for man as the embodied self.

It is not enough if man attains bodily freedom as it will not solve the problem of suffering. Bodily freedom is freedom for the body from economic, social, political, and other kinds of restraints. Though it is desirable, its attainment does not necessarily terminate suffering. Freedom from the manifold demands of the body becomes equally necessary in the course of one's spiritual development. Nothing short of spiritual freedom, i.e. freedom of the spirit, will satisfy one who is discerning and reflective. According to Hinduism, liberation of the spirit, which is called mokṣa, is the highest value. On the basis of the dichotomy between the good and the pleasant, the highest value is called the good (s'reyas), whereas all other values

are brought under the category of the pleasant (preyas). Referring to this distinction the Upanisad says: "Both the good and the pleasant approach a man. The wise man, pondering over them, discriminates. The wise chooses the good in preference to the pleasant. The simple-minded, for the sake of worldly well-being, prefers the pleasant."<sup>9</sup> In the course of his commentary Śāṅkara points out that the two goals, viz. liberation and worldly prosperity, are radically different in their nature calling for different means for their attainment and that, though both the options are open to man, it is impossible for him to pursue both of them at the same time.<sup>10</sup> The choice of one means the rejection of the other, though there is no compulsion as to which one he should choose. However, the human being cannot escape from this predicament of value preference as he has to choose one of them exercising his discrimination.

### 3. HIGHER WISDOM AND LOWER KNOWLEDGE

#### 3.1. Axiological Approach

Hinduism divides knowledge into two kinds on the basis of axiological consideration. The distinction between the good and the pleasant involves a broad classification of knowledge into higher wisdom and lower knowledge. That which is conducive to the attainment of the good, i.e. liberation, is called higher wisdom (parā-vidyā), whereas the knowledge of the objects of the world, which is the means to the attainment of material prosperity and happiness, is called lower knowledge (aparā-vidyā). One who pursues values of various kinds belonging to the sphere of the pleasant is ignorant of the highest reality. Such a person, notwithstanding his knowledge of things empirical, is therefore said to be in the state of ignorance; and lower knowledge itself for this reason is called "ignorance" by Śāṅkara.<sup>11</sup> The terms "lower knowledge" and "ignorance" are not used in a derogatory sense. From the perspective of higher wisdom, it is called lower knowledge. Since the scope of lower knowledge does not extend to the

highest reality, it is given the label "ignorance" with a view to emphasize what is and what is not comprehended by it. The Bhaḡavad-gītā conveys this distinction by using the imagery of "day" and "night".<sup>12</sup> It speaks of the difference between the sage who is awakened to truth and others who are ignorant of it by saying that what is "night" to others is "day" to the sage who sees and that what is "day" to the sage is "night" to them. There is an explicit reference to two kinds of knowledge in the Muṇḡaka Upaniṣad. When Śāunaka requested Aṅgiras to teach him "that which having been known all this becomes known," the latter told him: "There are two kinds of knowledge to be acquired—the higher and the lower,<sup>1</sup>— this is what, as tradition goes, the knowers of Brahman say."<sup>13</sup> After making such a distinction between higher and lower knowledge, the Upaniṣad proceeds to give an account of what is included in the lower knowledge vis-à-vis the content of the higher wisdom. It says: "Of these, the lower comprises the R̥g-veda, Yajur-veda, Sāma-veda, Atharva-veda, the science of pronunciation, etc., the code of rituals, grammar, etymology, metre, and astrology. Then there is the higher knowledge by which is realized the Immutable."<sup>14</sup> The seventh chapter of the Chāṇḡgya Upaniṣad presents the classic case of Nārada who was in sorrow notwithstanding his proficiency in all the disciplines dealing with things empirical: he was "the knower of words and not the knower of the Self."<sup>15</sup> Hence he sought instruction from Sanatkuṁāra for overcoming sorrow.

### 3.2. Ontological Approach

The twofold classification<sup>of</sup>/knowledge arises not only from axiological, but also from ontological consideration. Just as there is the distinction between the good and pleasant, there is also the distinction between the Self and the not-self. While the former distinction is axiological, the latter is ontological. While the supreme Self, the highest reality, is trans-empirical, everything

other than the Self is empirical. That which is the highest value axiologically is also the highest reality ontologically. The Hindu tradition, therefore, identifies the good with the real. As in the case of the value system, so also in the ontological scheme there is a hierarchy comprising the empirical and the trans-empirical. Following a particular pattern, the senses, the sense-objects, the mind, the intellect, and so on, which are material and which constitute the empirical realm, are arranged in a hierarchy; and the Self, also called the Puruṣa, is said to be higher than the highest in the empirical. Consider the following passage from the Kātha Upaniṣad: "The sense-objects are higher than the senses, and the mind is higher than the sense-objects; but the intellect is higher than the mind, and Mahat is higher than the intellect; Avyakta is higher than Mahat. Puruṣa is higher than Avyakta. There is nothing higher than Puruṣa, which is the end, the final goal."<sup>16</sup> The terms such as "Mahat", "Avyakta" and "Puruṣa" have been employed in the Sāṅkhya school. Avyakta is Prakṛti, the primordial material stuff of the physical universe; and Puruṣa or the Self which is totally different from the material Prakṛti, is said to be higher than it. So in the ontological hierarchy there is in the final analysis the dichotomy between the Self and the not-self, between Puruṣa and Prakṛti, between the trans-empirical and the empirical. Corresponding to this dichotomy, there is the twofold division of knowledge into higher and lower—the higher knowledge comprehending the Self or Puruṣa, and the lower knowledge comprehending Prakṛti and its products which are material and empirical.

### 3.3. Relation between Higher Wisdom and Lower Knowledge

It is necessary at this stage to consider the question of the connection between the two kinds of knowledge and of the order and mode of transition from the one to the other. This question cannot be considered to the exclusion of the objects of knowledge as any discussion of knowledge carries a reference to its content. It should

be noted first of all that according to the Upaniṣad both the kinds of knowledge have to be acquired (dve vidye veditavye).<sup>17</sup> It does not say that only higher knowledge has to be acquired and not the lower one. In fact, the distinction between higher and lower knowledge can be spoken about only by one who has attained the higher knowledge, just as one who has climbed the peak can, on the basis of one's authentic experience, meaningfully talk about what is lower than the highest point reached by him. That is why the Upaniṣad says that the knowers of Brahman (brahmavidah), i.e. those who have realized the truth or the highest reality, make such a distinction.<sup>18</sup> The implication is that others cannot make such a distinction.

Secondly, nowhere does the Hindu tradition say that lower knowledge or things comprehended by lower knowledge are useless. There are mantras enjoining prayer and sacrifice for attaining intelligence and prosperity, which are necessary for a happy life in this world. Śāṅkara observes that, if intelligence and prosperity are enjoined in scripture, it is because of the fact that they are also indirectly helpful to the attainment of higher knowledge.<sup>19</sup> In another context, Śāṅkara points out that learning and teaching, socially good conduct, getting married and raising children, entertaining guests, and so on, which are enjoined in the Vedas, should not be neglected, because they are contributory to the attainment of human goals.<sup>20</sup> The different kinds of activities, secular and scriptural, connected with the empirical realm are characterized in the Upaniṣad as satyam,<sup>21</sup> i.e. true or real, as they are unfailing in ensuring human goals. Studies relating to polity and society, mathematics, astronomy and medicine, erotics and dance, art and sculpture, and so on would not have found a place in the Hindu tradition if lower knowledge was considered useless. The list of subjects in which Nārada claims to be proficient is impressive as it covers the entire range of the empirical.<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, he is unhappy because he has not realized the Self through higher knowledge. It should be borne in mind that even philosophy must be consigned to the category of lower knowledge

if it fails to produce higher knowledge of the ultimate reality, because higher knowledge, the Upaniṣad says, is that by which "the wise realize everywhere that which cannot be perceived and grasped; which is without source and features, eyes and ears; which has neither hands nor feet; which is eternal, multiformed, all-pervasive, extremely subtle, and undiminishing; and which is the source of all." <sup>23</sup>

Thirdly, the transition is from lower knowledge to higher knowledge and not the other way. The nature and scope of lower knowledge should be known, for detachment from objects of lower knowledge arises, so the tradition holds, only as a consequence of knowing its nature. That is why the Upaniṣad itself says that "only after examining the worlds acquired through works" that one should resort to renunciation for the pursuit of higher knowledge.<sup>24</sup> Śāṅkara in his commentary remarks that "one who is detached from the whole world of means and ends is competent for higher knowledge." There are also other reasons to show why the transition is from lower to higher knowledge. That we proceed from the known to the unknown for the purpose of instruction is well-known. Normally it will not be possible for one to understand the highest reality which is said to be acosmic (niṣprapañca), devoid of qualities and specifications (nirguṇa and nirviśeṣa), one only without a second (ekameva advitīyam) independently of the pluralistic universe which falls within the scope of lower knowledge. So the normal procedure is from lower to higher knowledge, which is similar to the technique of pointing to a branch of a tree for the purpose of showing the moon. Also, it is easy to teach gross things first before teaching, step by step, subtle and subtler things.<sup>25</sup> In the ontological hierarchy of things mentioned earlier in which the senses are placed at the bottom and Puruṣa at the top, what is subtle is rated higher than what is gross. The supreme Self or Puruṣa, declares Śāṅkara, is the highest, because it is the subtlest, the greatest, and the most inward of all things.<sup>26</sup>

If it is admitted that there is axiological choice or category preference, it follows that no one could be compelled to pursue the

good instead of the pleasant, or the trans-empirical instead of the empirical. It may be that there is someone who is not inclined to have any axiological/ontological preference of values/categories thinking, to use the well-known aphorism of Bentham, that "push-pin is as good as poetry." But if someone with a discerning mind exercises his choice, it is because of the fact that a lower value does not satisfy his desire or that a lower category does not fully answer his metaphysical urge, and so he prefers the higher in the scale. It is this value/category preference on the basis of the intrinsic worth of things that was suggested by J.S. Mill when he said that it was better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied. It is by following the criterion of intrinsic worth, of value preference, that the Upanisad says that one should see the Self—through hearing, reasoning, and contemplation. The transition from the lower knowledge to the higher takes place for one who, equipped with discrimination, detachment, and dispassion, has a deep urge or longing for the latter. It may be noted that the transition is neither easy nor automatic. The higher is accessible only to one who has fulfilled the requirements therefor.

The distinction between higher wisdom and lower knowledge is not absent in the West, though it may be doubted whether it receives the same attention in the writings of the academic philosophers in the present century. After classifying knowledge into three kinds—theoretical, practical, and productive—according as it is pursued for its own sake, as a means to conduct, or as a means to making something useful or beautiful, Aristotle refers to "sensory knowledge," "memory," "experience," "art," and "wisdom," arranging them in a hierarchy in which the sensory knowledge is placed at the bottom and wisdom at the top. "Wisdom," according to Aristotle, is the highest knowledge, because it is not limited to just practical and productive ends. He maintains that the knowledge of the first and final cause of all things must be called "wisdom" because (1) it is the most comprehensive; (2) it is the knowledge of the most difficult to know;



(3) it is the most precise knowledge; (4) it is the most instructive; and (5) it is the most self-contained.<sup>27</sup> The knowledge of the first and final cause of all things mentioned by Aristotle is parā vidyā of the Upaniṣads. It is worthy of attainment, because it is the saving knowledge. The point to be emphasized here is that this knowledge of the One, the first and final cause of all things, should not be mediate, but im-mediate. It is this im-mediate knowledge (aparokṣa-jñāna) that liberates one from suffering (sā vidyā yā vimuktaye).

#### 3.4. Consciousness: The Presupposition of All Knowledge

Advaita makes the distinction between consciousness and what is presented to consciousness as its object; and it is on the basis of this dichotomy that it explains knowledge of external objects as well as knowledge of subjective states. The senses and the mind are material. The senses by themselves cannot give us knowledge of external objects without the functioning of the mind and the Self. The mind or the intellect cannot give us knowledge of anything without the functioning of the Self. According to Advaita, the Self is consciousness, and in the absence of consciousness, no knowledge is possible. Śāṅkara speaks of two kinds of seeing: the seeing of consciousness (the seeing of the pure Self) and the seeing of the ego-consciousness. (i.e. the empirical self). In the words of Śāṅkara: "Seeing is of two kinds. Ordinary seeing is a function of the mind as connected with the visual sense; it is an act, and as such it has a beginning and an end. But the seeing that belongs to the Self is like the heat and light of fire; being the very essence of the witness (Self), it has neither beginning nor end... The ordinary seeing, however, is related to objects seen through the eye, and of course has a beginning... The eternal seeing of the Self is metaphorically spoken of as the witness, and although eternally seeing, is spoken of as sometimes seeing, and sometimes not seeing."<sup>28</sup>

Like Husserl, Advaita holds that consciousness is the "principle of principles" and that the evidence of consciousness is the only one

that is certain and apodictic for any claim that we make—claim that we know something as well as the claim that we do not know something. Every source of knowledge is dependent on consciousness—be it perception, or inference, or scripture. Consciousness which is the presupposition of every kind of knowledge and of every source of knowledge cannot be validated by any other principle. Since both sensory perception and rational understanding depend on consciousness, the controversy of rationalism v. empiricism dominant in the Western epistemology since the days of Descartes and Locke is absent in the Hindu tradition. Nor is there any justification for the Humean legacy that human knowledge is restricted to two spheres, ideas of relations (mathematical knowledge) and matters of fact (empirical knowledge).

The ultimate reality which is trans-empirical cannot be known through the senses and reason. Even though reason may help us to know that there is the ultimate reality which is the ground or the cause of the world, it can give us only mediate knowledge of this reality. The Hindu tradition holds that the trans-empirical reality can be known and realized only through scripture. It establishes the validity of scripture as a source of knowledge on the ground that what it teaches (1) cannot be contradicted by other sources of knowledge, and (2) is not a restatement of what is conveyed by other sources of knowledge.<sup>29</sup> There is demarcation between scripture and other sources of knowledge. While the authority of the former is restricted to the trans-empirical reality, that of the latter is restricted to things empirical. Hence, there is no scope for conflict between them, or duplication of work by them.

#### 4. THE PHYSICAL WORLD/NATURE

##### 4.1. The Concept of Ksetra

The human being is a complex entity consisting of spirit and matter. What is distinctive of the human being is the possession of "reason" and "will"—reason being the capacity for conceiving the

perfection (i.e. liberation), and will being the capacity to action for the realization of the perfection. Śāṅkara speaks of this distinctive feature as the eligibility for knowledge and action. The functioning of both reason and will presupposes a physical medium which the human being possesses in the form of mind-sense-body aggregate. The mind-sense-body complex which is material helps the human being to have cognitive, affective, and conative experience during empirical existence. It is not necessary here to consider the work of each of these three factors separately. All these three, individually and collectively, help the human being to be engaged in the various kinds of life-activity. There is also the external world of material objects for our enjoyment. Hinduism holds that the mind-sense-body aggregate as well as the physical world is necessary for the attainment of the pleasant and the good. It uses a common term "kṣetra" which denotes both the mind-sense-body aggregate and the physical world. Since everything other than the self or spirit, which comes under the category of nature, is an object of knowledge to the self, the latter is called the knower of nature.<sup>30</sup> The Sanskrit word "kṣetra" is very significant. The entire mind-sense-body complex is called kṣetra, because it protects the self from the evil by being conducive to the origination of the saving knowledge (jñānotpādanadvārā kṣatāt trāyate iti kṣetram), or because it is destructible or changeable (kṣīyate iti, kṣarati iti vā kṣetram), or because it is like a "field" for the reaping of the fruits of action (karmaphalānām asmin niṣpatteḥ kṣetram).<sup>31</sup> Since the reasons for calling the mind-sense-body complex kṣetra are applicable to the external world, the latter is also called kṣetra. So, everything other than the self or spirit, according to Hinduism, is material.

#### 4.2. Source of the World: Eternal Atoms

Every object which is composite and limited, e.g. a pot or a table, is an effect originating from a material cause. If so, what is the cause of the material universe which is a conglomeration of

objects which are composite and limited. Hinduism answers this question in two ways. Let us first consider the Vaiséśika answer to this question. Not everything in the universe is created according to the Vaiséśika. Making a distinction between eternal substances, viz. four kinds of atoms, ākāśa, space, time, mind, and self and composite objects, the Vaiséśika holds the view that all composite objects of the universe are the products of the eternal atoms which are simple, indivisible, and infinitesimal. There are, according to this school, four kinds of material atoms, viz. atoms of air, fire, water, and earth; and all composite and therefore non-eternal objects are the aggregation of these atoms. The atomic theory of the Vaiséśika, it should be borne in mind, is not applicable to space, time, ākāśa (ether), mind, and self, since each one of these substances, being eternal, can neither be created nor destroyed. Since not all objects in the universe are products of material atoms, it is wrong to think of the Vaiséśika philosophy as materialistic. The Vaiséśika accounts for the combination and separation of atoms, which are called respectively creation and destruction of the universe, through the will of God who controls the atoms and makes the world a moral order, dispensing justice on the basis of the stock of merit and demerit (adr̥ṣṭā) of the individual souls. So the universe as conceived by the Vaiséśika consists of living beings and physical things, and of these some are eternal and some non-eternal. The processes of creation and dissolution are applicable only to the non-eternal composite objects.

#### 4.3. Source of the World: Primordial Matter

According to the second answer given by theistic schools like Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism as well as by the trans-theistic school of Advaita, the entire manifested physical universe other than the self must be traced to a primordial material stuff called by different names such as prakṛti, māyā, avyakta, and so on. Creation and dissolution of the world alternate like day and night. When the world manifests in a particular order from the primeval material

stuff, it is called creation; and when it gets back to its source and remains in the unmanifest condition, it is called dissolution. Since the self called Puruṣa or Ātman is eternal, it is not subject to the processes of creation and dissolution, though the psycho-physical organism which it is equipped with during its empirical journey is subject to these processes. Like the Vaiśeṣika, these schools also admit the existence of God who is responsible for the change from the unmanifest to the manifest condition, and from the manifest back to the unmanifest condition, of the physical universe as the primordial material stuff by itself cannot undergo these periodical changes. There is, however, an important point of difference between the theistic and the trans-theistic schools. While the former schools hold the view that the primordial material stuff, which is the source of the world, is eternal and coeval with God, according to the latter it is not eternal; and nothing is eternal excepting the non-dual Brahman which is the sole reality. Whether eternal or not, māyā/prakṛti/avyakta which is the primeval source cannot exist and function independently of God.

#### 4.4. Some Implications of the Hindu View of the World

It is necessary at this stage to highlight some of the implications of the Hindu view of the physical world. One of the ways by which we try to understand the nature of a thing is by finding out its material cause. A pot made of clay is essentially clay; a table made of wood is essentially wood. If the physical world is a product of māyā/prakṛti/avyakta, it is essentially material, because its cause is material. When an object which is subject to modification undergoes change of state, it is called cause in one state, and effect in another state: that is to say, the difference between cause and effect is the difference in states of one and the same entity. Hinduism does not think of cause and effect as two discrete, unconnected entities. If that were the case, there would be the difficulty of accounting for their connection which confronted Hume. If cause and

effect are distinct "configurations of matter" separated by space, there will be no way of overcoming the bifurcation between them, and Hume will remain unanswered. Hinduism emphasizes the inner tie between cause and effect by saying that the effect is non-different from its material cause (kārya-kāraṇayoḥ ananyatvam). There is the inner tie not only between the manifested world and its primordial source, but also between God and the primordial source. There is more than one explanation for the inner connection between God and prakṛti/māyā/avyakta in the Hindu tradition. While some view māyā as the power of the Lord, some others say that God is both the material and the efficient cause rolled into one to show that the material cause of the world is not separate from God.

Since everything other than the self or spirit is material, there is no mind-body dualism in Hinduism. Mind and matter are not radically different substances as in the case of the Cartesian theory; and so Hinduism is free from the problem of reductionism—reducing matter to mind, or mind to matter. However, there is another kind of dualism in Hinduism—the dualism of spirit and matter, Puruṣa and Prakṛti. This dualism does not amount to a physical separation of the two entities, though there is the need to discriminate the one from the other. The relation between these two entities is sought to be explained in terms of the ground and the grounded, or in terms of the organic relation between soul and body. The concept of the antar-yāmin (the inner controller) which has been elaborated in one of the Upaniṣads is relevant in this context.<sup>32</sup> The Upaniṣad speaks of the self as the indwelling ruler of everything. It first of all says: "He who dwells in the earth, yet is within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who controls the earth from within, he is your self, the inner controller, the immortal."<sup>33</sup> Then it speaks of other elements and the various parts of the body, and says that the self is the inner ruler of everything. Finally, it concludes by saying: "He is never seen, but is the seer; he is never heard, but is the hearer; he is never perceived, but is the perceiver;

he is never thought, but is the thinker. There is no other seer but he; there is <sup>no</sup> other hearer but he..."<sup>34</sup> The antaryāmin section of the Upaniṣad admits of more than one interpretation. Whatever may be the interpretation, the highest reality, according to Hinduism, is not only ontologically immanent in everything, man and the world, but is also the inner ruler of everything. Admitting the distinction between spirit and matter both at the microcosmic and macrocosmic levels, Hinduism assigns different values as well as different ontological statuses to them. The body exists in order to subserve the purpose of the self.

## 5. SPIRITUALITY AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

### 5.1. Spiritual Disposition

Spirituality is a disposition, a disciplined way of life through which one can attain spiritual awakening. Usually, it is contrasted with the materialistic way of life. The Bhagavad-gītā, the most popular scriptural text of the Hindus, draws a sharp distinction between spiritual disposition and materialistic disposition. It speaks of them as daivī-sampat, i.e. divine nature, and āsuri-sampat, i.e. demoniac nature, respectively. It enumerates the following virtues as constituting spiritual or divine disposition: "fearlessness, purity, steadfastness in knowledge and concentration, charity, self-restraint, worship, study of one's scriptures, austerity, uprightness, non-violence, truth, absence of anger, renunciation, serenity, absence of calumny, compassion, uncovetousness, gentleness, modesty, absence of fickleness, energy, forgiveness, fortitude, absence of hatred and absence of pride."<sup>35</sup> It also gives a list of qualities such as "ostentation, arrogance, self-conceit, anger, insolence, and ignorance of what is right and wrong" as constituting materialistic or demoniac disposition.<sup>36</sup> It declares that a person of materialistic disposition

does not know what should be done and what should not be done and cannot, therefore, do anything conducive to one's prosperity and social well-being.<sup>37</sup> A few comments are relevant in this connection. First of all, it is not the intention of the Bhagavad-gītā to list all the qualities of each of these two ways of life. The list in both the cases is only suggestive. However, the contrast between these two dispositions has been highlighted in unmistakable terms. Secondly, everyone in this world, irrespective of religion, region, gender and caste, can be classified under one of these two categories, spiritualistic or materialistic. It is, therefore, wrong to speak in exclusive terms of the spirituality of the East and of the materialism of the West as if the East has the monopoly of spirituality and the West, the monopoly of materialism. Spirituality is universal; materialism too is universal. As a contemporary Hindu philosopher puts it, countries which produced men like St. Francis of Assisi, St. John of the Cross, Eckhart, Boehme, Pascal, John Bunyan and hundreds of others cannot be less spiritual than the homeland of Hinduism.<sup>38</sup> Thirdly, there is no suggestion, explicit or implicit, in the text of the Gītā that only some persons, e.g. a philosopher or a theologian, are capable of spiritual disposition, and not others. Anyone who cares for and cultivates the virtues which constitute spiritual nature—such a one may be a philosopher or a scientist, a ruler or a social worker—may lead a way of life which may be called spiritual. Though it is admitted that spiritual disposition can be developed by everyone, it does not, however, follow from this that there will not be any variation at the level of spiritual development. It may be that spirituality is more intense in one, and less intense in another; and this kind of difference in degree in spirituality is bound to arise among the seekers of truth, whoever they may be, as there is difference in kind between one who is spiritually oriented and one who is not. That is why we are able to speak of some as more spiritual, or very highly evolved, and so on. Fourthly, spiritual disposition itself is not spiritual awakening; it is only a means to the latter. How soon or



how late it will lead to the attainment of the saving knowledge depends on its strength or intensity and other factors. So it should not be thought that a person who is of spiritual nature is a liberated one.

## 5.2. Religious Experience

Spirituality should not be equated with religious experience. Though in some cases spirituality as a way of life may be part of religious experience, it does not in every case constitute religious experience. A brief explanation of the nature of religious experience will be helpful to see the distinction between them. There are psychologists and philosophers who hold the view that there is no such thing as religious experience and that what goes in the name of religious experience is an illusion. Some others hold the view that religious experience cannot be separated from general experience. According to some others who are extremely conservative, religious experience should be identified with some historical form of religion. If spirituality and religious experience are identified, it will not be possible to accept the former as something universal on the basis of any of these three views which deny the genuineness, or separate identity, or universality, of religious experience. There is, however, a fourth view according to which religious experience is not only genuine, but also can be identified by means of definite criteria. 39

According to this view, religious experience, first of all, is a response to the ultimate reality. Response is response to something. Being of the nature of a response, religious experience is not merely subjective. The reality to which we respond, in the language of Whitehead, is "beyond, behind, and within, the passing flux of immediate things; something which is real, and yet waiting to be realized; something which is a remote possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts..."<sup>40</sup> This reality to which we respond is characterized

in the Upaniṣad as "without an earlier and without a later, without an inside and without an outside."<sup>41</sup> The second criterion of religious experience is that it is a total response of the total being to the ultimate reality. Religious experience is the total response involving reason, feeling, and will; and it is the response of the whole man with the whole of human life. The third criterion of religious experience is intensity, suggesting that it is the most powerful experience that the human being is capable of. The intensity of religious experience as revealed by the lives of the charismatic spiritual leaders of all religions is well-known. Religious experience, according to the fourth criterion, finds expression in action for the upliftment of others, for the regeneration of all beings. This kind of action which is free from the sense of "I" and "mine" is associated, for example, with the jīvanmukta (the liberated-in-life) of Hinduism and the bodhisattva of Mahāyāna Buddhism. All these four criteria are necessary for identifying religious experience.

It should be borne in mind that religious experience which transcends the frontiers of established religions, which is not bound by the limits of space and time, gender, caste, and race, is universal. However, the universality of religious experience should not be interpreted to mean that there will be no difference in religious experience. Since it presupposes a capacity on the part of the human being to respond, there is bound to be variation in its manifestation in thought as well as in action, though the core of it must be the same. Ramana Maharshi, a contemporary mystic-saint of Hinduism, points out that, while there can be degrees or levels of experience, there cannot be degrees or levels of reality.<sup>42</sup> Spirituality as a disposition may or may not involve a belief system. Many a person may follow some of the virtues which constitute spiritual or divine disposition without following or accepting a set of religious beliefs about man, cosmos, and the ultimate reality. But religious experience is based on a

belief system in the form of anthropology, cosmology, and theology. Spirituality as a way of life does involve moral and spiritual discipline. But this discipline itself is only a means and not the goal which is variously described as spiritual awakening, enlightenment, liberation, mystic or religious experience, higher wisdom, and so on. Without this religious experience or vision, human life, declares Whitehead, "is a flash of occasional enjoyments lighting up a mass of pain and misery, a bagatelle of transcendent experience."<sup>43</sup>

## 6. INDIAN CULTURE AND MODERN SCIENCE

### 6.1. Hindu Tradition: Continuity and Change

The question whether the great tradition of Hinduism, which has admitted the distinction between higher wisdom and lower knowledge and has raised the problem of value preference and of ontological priority between them, can accommodate modern science which is Western and survive retaining its identity, is worth considering here. The Hindu tradition which has come down to us from the Vedic times is very ancient, more than four thousand years old. It has faced many encounters and challenges. The philosophy of Hinduism was challenged by Jainism and Buddhism, which provided a totally different picture of man and the world. Especially, the no-self theory (anātma-vāda) of Buddhism was a formidable alternative to the Hindu doctrine of the self. The fact is that Hinduism survived the combined challenge of Jainism and Buddhism. Subsequently, it encountered severe opposition from two alien religions, first from Islam and later from Christianity, and survived preserving the "essentials" of the great tradition, notwithstanding the support and patronage received by its rivals from the rulers at that time. This, however, does not mean that the great tradition has remained the same all over and that it has not been influenced by Jainism and Buddhism, Islam and Christianity, Western education, civilization, and culture. It should also be noted that the

work of the Hindu reformers of the Brahmo Samaj and the Arya Samaj and of the spiritual leaders of the renaissance such as Ramakrishna Paramahansa, Swami Vivekananda and others in the modern period of Hinduism did produce a perceptible impact on the tradition. No tradition worth the name can continue without changes. It will be petrified, dead, and gone without changes in it. At the same time, change cannot be total; total change is destruction. Change will be meaningful only in the context of identity. What goes in the name of Indian culture today of which the great tradition is the main stream is a product of the interaction and fusion of several facets contributed by Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity. Hinduism, nevertheless, has retained its identity. If the Hindu tradition is a reality, it is because of, in the words of Whitehead, the spirit of change and the spirit of conservation inherent in it. Whitehead remarks; "There can be nothing real without both. Mere change without conservation is a passage from nothing to nothing. Its final integration yields mere transcendent non-entity. Mere conservation without change cannot conserve. For after all, there is a flux of circumstance, and the freshness of being evaporates under mere repetition."<sup>44</sup> There cannot be a better and more authentic statement about the continuity and change in the Hindu tradition than the one given by Radhakrishnan: "Hindu thought whether or not we agree with its transcendental claims has survived the storms of the world for over three thousand years. It has seen empires come and go, has watched economic and political systems flourish and fade. It has seen these happen more than once. Recent events have ruffled but not diverted the march of India's history. The culture of India has changed a great deal and yet has remained the same for over three millenia. Fresh springs bubble up, fresh streams cut their own channels through the landscape, but sooner or later each rivulet, each stream merges into one of the great rivers which has been nourishing the Indian soil for centuries."<sup>45</sup>

## 6.2. Hinduism Compatible with Modern Science

Many factors such as renaissance, reformation, enlightenment, secularization, have contributed to the emergence of the modern world in the West of which modern science is a characteristic expression. Though modern science originated in the West, it has become a pan-world phenomenon transcending the geographical frontiers. Just as religion, irrespective of its origin, is universal, even so modern science is universal. What is puzzling to quite a few is how the great tradition in India is able to accommodate or withstand the modern scientific revolution. The problem appears to be a clash of values—values of tradition v. values of modern science and technology, as Earl MacCormac would put it.<sup>46</sup> If one thinks of a conflict between Hinduism and modern science, it must be in respect of subject matter or method. On the basis of the distinction between the Self and the not-Self, Puruṣa and Prakṛti, the trans-empirical and the empirical, Hinduism both as philosophy and religion is mainly concerned with the knowledge of the Self or Puruṣa which is trans-empirical. The entire realm of the empirical, known as the vyāvahārika, is left over to the sciences. The empirical, it is necessary to reiterate, is neither unimportant nor useless; and the this-worldliness of Hinduism can never be neglected. So there is, according to Hinduism, a clear demarcation in respect of the subject matter.

Though Hinduism admits several sources or methods of knowledge such as perception, inference, and scripture, it holds that the Self or Puruṣa can be known only through scripture. Things empirical do not fall within the scope of scripture. They have to be known only through perception and inference. We do not require the help of scripture to tell us that fire is hot and that ice is cold, because this can be known through perception. Nor can scripture tell us anything contrary to this. As Śāṅkara puts it, "Even a hundred scriptural texts, declaring fire to be cold or non-luminous will not be authoritative."<sup>47</sup> In the same way, perception and inference which can give us knowledge

of objects such as the tree and the table, the mountain, the ocean, and the planets, which can be known, cannot give us the knowledge of the self or consciousness. It is scripture that helps us to know the Self, even though the latter is not an object of knowledge like stocks and stones. It is not necessary to go into the details as to how scripture "shows" the Self which can neither be described by words nor comprehended by the mind. The method of science consists in setting up principles or hypotheses, making logical conclusions from these principles or hypotheses in order to derive observable facts about them, and experimental checking or verification of these observable facts. The method followed by science does not come into conflict with the method followed by Hinduism for the purpose of knowing the Self. The distinction between these two methods has been very well brought out by Thomas Aquinas. There are two ways in which we can explain our belief in a statement. One reason for believing a statement is that it can be checked by observation. This is what science does. Or, we can believe a statement because it can be deduced from an intelligent, self-evident principle.<sup>48</sup> The Self or consciousness is the ultimate, self-evident principle in terms of which other principles and statements can be understood. Hinduism is in search of the ultimate, "the principle of principles," on the basis of axiological preference and ontological priority. So there is no conflict between Hinduism and modern science in respect of method either.

It is true that modern science and technology is a challenge to the great tradition of Hinduism. A creative response is necessary to meet this new challenge. There is bound to be cultural change as a result of the institutional changes in society brought about by science and technology. But this cultural change in order to be creative should be within the framework of the great tradition. "If Christianity, European medieval culture, theology, and philosophy could put up with science and technology and achieve a new culture, cannot India do the same?"<sup>49</sup> asks a contemporary Hindu philosopher.

NOTES

1. See 3.1.1. The text reads: "He practised tapas." The word "tapas" in the context means inquiry according to Sureśvara. See Sureśvara's Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika (Madras: University of Madras, 1974, Revised edition, 1984), III, verses 14-19.
2. See Śāṅkara's commentary on Brahma-sūtra, 2-1.4: "anubhava-ava-sanam ca brahmavijñanam." Also, his commentary on Brahma-sūtra 1.1.1: "tatra avicārya yat kincit pratipadyamāno niḥśreyasāt pratihanyeta anarthahcēyāt."
3. For example, while Advaita speaks of the fourfold discipline (sādhana-catustaya), Viśiṣṭādvaita mentions the sevenfold discipline (sādhana-sapataka) as the prerequisite for inquiry into reality. Śāṅkara enumerates the following in the preliminary discipline: 1. discrimination between the ephemeral and the eternal, 2. renunciation of the fruits of action, here and hereafter, 3. possession of "six treasures" such as control of the mind, control of the senses, etc., 4. an intense longing for liberation. According to the Vakyakara of the Viśiṣṭādvaita tradition, the following constitute the preliminary discipline for the practice of bhakti: (1) purification of the body, (2) purification of the mind, (3) continuous practice of the presence of the indwelling self, (4) performance of the fivefold duty, (5) practice of virtue, (6) freedom from despair, and (7) freedom from exaltation.
4. Just as a scientist, as Newton declared, does not imagine a hypothesis (hypothesis non fingo), even so we do not "imagine knowledge."
5. This idea is conveyed as follows: "prāmānyam svataḥ utpadyate; pramānyam svataḥ jñayate ca."
6. See his Śrīmad Rahasyatrayasāra, Translated into English with Introduction and Notes by M.R. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Published by Agnihotram Ramanuja Thathachariyar, Kumbakonam, 1956, p.53.
7. See his commentary on the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, 2.1.1.

8. See Kaṭha Upaniṣad, 1.3.15.
9. Ibid., 1.2.2.
10. Ibid., see Śāṅkara's commentary on 1.2.1.
11. See Śāṅkara's commentary on Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, 1.1.4.
12. 2.69.
13. Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, 1.1.4.
14. Ibid., 1.1.5.
15. "mantravideva asmi na ātmavit."
16. Kaṭha Upaniṣad, 1.3.10-11.
17. Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, 1.1.4.
18. Ibid.
19. See his commentary on Taittirīya Upaniṣad, 1.5.1-2:  
"medhakāmasya srikāmasya ca mantra anukrāntāḥ te ca pārampariyena vidyopayogārthā eva."
20. See his commentary on Taittirīya Upaniṣad, 1.9.
21. See Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, 1.2.1.
22. See Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 7.1.2.
23. See Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, 1.1.6.
24. Ibid., 1.2.12.
25. See Śāṅkara's commentary on Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 7.1.1.



26. See his commentary on Katha Upaniṣad, 1.3-10.
27. See W.D. Ross, Aristotle (Meridian Books, 1961), p.152.
28. Śāṅkara's commentary on Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 3.4.2.
29. See R. Balasubramanian, The Naiskarmyasiddhi of Suresvara, (Madras: University of Madras, 1988), III, 35, p.258.
30. See Bhagavad-gītā, 13.1.
31. Ibid., see Śāṅkara's commentary.
32. See Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 3.7.
33. Ibid., 3.7.3.
34. Ibid., 3.7.23.
35. Bhagavad-gītā, 16.1-3.
36. Ibid., 16.4.
37. Ibid., 16-7.
38. See K. Satchidananda Murty, The Indian Spirit (Waltair: Andhra University Press, 1965), p.6.
39. See Joachim Wach, The Comparative Study of Religions (New York & London: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp.30-37.
40. A.N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), p.238.

41. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 2.5.19.
42. Arthur Osborne (Ed.), The Teachings of Bhagavan Sri Ramana Maharshi (London: Rider & Company, 1971), p.177.
43. Science and the Modern World, p.238.
44. Ibid., p.250.
45. S. Radhakrishnan, The Brahma Sutra (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1960), preface, p.7.
46. Earl R. MacCormac, Myths of Science and Technology (Madras: Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, 1986), p.83.
47. See Śāṅkara's commentary on the Bhagavad-gītā, 18.66.
48. See Philipp Frank, Philosophy of Science (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1958), p.16.
49. K. Satchidananda Murty, The Indian Spirit, p.27.