COMMITTEE V
Problems of Third World Development:
The Case of Africa

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AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA
(The Case of Zimbabwe and Zambia)

by

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C O N T E N T S

CHAPTER I.

Introduction

Since the process of decolonisation in Africa started, most of the newly independent countries became to realize that the road to economic independency would be a long and tedious one. The inheritance from the colonial powers often consisted of a good working administration and an infrastructure, obviously designed to facilitate the export of the country's resources to the mothercountry via the port city, which after independence, almost automatically grew into the centre of administration for the entire country. Opportunity to acquire experience with the management of their country's affairs before independence was very limited and the new, inexperienced governments often looked at the industrial development of the West as an example to follow to achieve economic growth and development. The agricultural output was thus transferred into a cashflow necessary as an investment to induce growth of the industrial sector. Instead of creating facilities to stimulate farmers to become self sufficient in whatever foodcrops they needed for their staple diet as a first priority, cashcrops were emphasized by governments who's priority it was to finance industrial equipment purchased in the West. The still needed foodcrops now had to be imported at higher costs. Suddenly dependency on the former colonizing countries increased binary: firstly wheather conditions determined the yields of the cashcrops of which the proceeds are necessary to purchase machines and machineparts. Simultaneously price policies arranged by the industrialized countries could severely upset the balance of trade of a developing country. Secondly, when it comes to selling the final product of the national industrial effort to the West, protectionism in the form of import restrictions deals another blow to the already weak treasury of the society. In times of severe drought, when yields of cashcrops as well as foodcrops drop considerably, insufficient cash to keep the industry going as well as growing foodshortages not only hamper the economic growth, but inflict intolerable sorrow on the rural population to the extent where people suffer from malnutrition and starvation. Only direct aid campaigns organized by Western governments and NGO's (non-governmental organizations), cause some relief, in spite of its detrimental effect on independency and self-esteem of the population. Fortunately, not all African countries head in the direction of economic decline and dependency. Not only because their geographical position ensures sufficient rainfall, but also because their soils show a qualitative better potential. Of course such a potential does not ensure a self sufficient economy. Other factors, such as land tenure, infrastructure and distribution of income and resources influence a country's output. All these factors combined, determine whether a certain degree of economic independency is a feasible concept.

To illustrate this and as a justification of the studycase, I have made an attempt to compare the agricultural production of Zimbabwe and Zambia over a period of 16 years from 1967 to 1983. Looking at the sizes of the two countries, Zambia is almost twice the size of Zimbabwe. When comparing sizes one would expect the total output of Zambia's agricultural sector (maize, cassave, millet and tobacco) to be much higher when compared with the agricultural sector of Zimbabwe. This is not the case. A similar picture appears when we look at Zambia's external trade figures. Until 1973 the balance of trade shows a positive income with a growing trend from 1971 until 1973. From 1975 onwards the picture changes completely, when the price of copper on the world market drops considerably. Export figures decline sharply while import figures increase at an even bigger rate. The dropping copper prices and continuous domestic expenditure are responsible. To reverse the picture, a strong revival of copper prices as well asan increase of volume together with limitations in public spending are needed. During 1984, donor industrial countries were presented with an official plan to promote agriculture, to rehabilitate the existing industrial capacity and to place greater reliance on market indicators. Zambia begins to diversify its economy from industrial development to agricultural production. Because the country's supply of copper, which provides 90% of its income from export, is limited to another couple of decades. The IMF is prepared to inject US$ 300 million in Zambia's economy, but this only increases the foreign debt to the extent where interest and redemption devours some 70% of the income from exports. And this is not all. Very stringent measures to economize, such as devaluation of the kwacha, severe reductions in government expenditures, and a slow abolishment of the food-subsidies are being introduced. The result is a big increase in commodity prices followed by strong protest actions by the already heavily burdened population. Has freedom and independency, envisaged in 1964 when the British Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia was granted souvereignty and became the Republic of Zambia, been lost forever or has the Western aid programme enough quality in assisting to get Zambia's economy back on its feet?

Following Zimbabwe's history from the time when Zambia was granted independence in 1964, it is obvious that the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, the Land Husbandry Act of 1951 and the Land Tenure Act of 1969 form the basis of much of the political unrest which eventually led to the armed struggle and the abolishment of the minority white government which had governed Rhodesia for 14 years since the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965. In spite of the fact that mining and quarrying yielded only US$ 203 million against US$ 324 million for the same part of Zambia's GNP, and the international trade sanctions imposed by the rest of the world, Zimbabwe's GNP has always been and still is, a manifold of Zambia's GNP.

Resuming one can say that in spite of all the odds being against Zimbabwe, its economic standard is in a much better condition than that of Zambia. Could we, by discovering the factors which are positively influencing Zimbabwe's economy and those with a negative influence on Zambia's economy, come to a conclusion which may be useful to design a new concept that could serve as a paradigm for improved national development plans?

It would also serve a purpose to study the many development plans and the resulting - sometimes very ambitious - projects often designed, implemented and operated by well-meaning donor countries, who are often trying to kill two birds with one stone, by simultaneously dissolving their colonial guilt complex as well as by expanding their industrial markets to developing countries.

In my capacity as an agronomist who has served in several development projects, I am of course not competent enough to unravel national development plans to the extent where a positive use can be made of its components, however, my experience with bilateral development projects enables me to discuss some factors which could lead to improvement of the quality of their output and hopefully to a sustained life of their objectives. Today it is evident that not only the small scale agricultural projects of the early days of development assistance show but a small amount of success, but even most of the current development projects do not exhibit the intended impact. The rate of success is still intolerable small. How is it possible that the flow of increasing development assistance can co-exist with perennial mass poverty, hunger and starvation? In addition conditions to IMF loans can be extremely severe, while the consequences for the population can be disastrous.

In search for the answers I will try to point out in Chapter III some weak spots that could partly be accounted for. Some suggestions for improvement of development cooperation are made for your consideration and even criticism.

CHAPTER II.

Rural Observations

2.1 Zimbabwe

Travellers reports from the 19th century unanimously describe the East and Central African countryside as lush with many African entrepreneurs travelling over long distances to trade the vast variety of crops and produce. However, the early part of the 20th century began to show a picture of poverty and decay. The enormous variety of crops grown had diminished rapidly and the African trade was reduced to subsistence level. The change-over was brought about by the white immigrants from "down south", who first came to hunt for ivory, when the Great Dike attracted many prospectors to search for gold, the number of whites increased and soon land was expropriated at random all over the fertile "Highfeld", a region running approximately NE to SW through the middle of the area which later was to become Southern Rhodesia. This region lies between the latitudes of 16^{0} and 22^{0} S at an altitude of some 1250 m and has a pleasant mediterranean climate with a wet season between November and March. The average rainfall is between 800 and 1000 mm. At first, during the early days of white immigration from Transvaal to the north into Ndebele and Mashona areas, the African farmers and the Mashona farmers in particular, proved to be far more efficient than the whites. In fact they even grew surplus crops to sell to the whites who were not familiar with farming practices in general. When the country's mineral resources were explored and processed, the demand for African labour increased considerably, thus upsetting the African agricultural prosperity. Land vacated by would-be African workers fell into the hands of white settlers and speculators and was consolidated into farms of some 6000 acres, being the area which could be "paced out" at an hours ride on horseback at walking pace from the central homestead. Even at that time (1910) the settlers rather traded and transported the produce coming from the African farmers while their "own" farms remained at subsistence level. The Mashonas prosperred for a short while as foodsuppliers to the mining industry where the fierceful Ndebele, who had lost their lands and cattle to the settlers and who were forced to stop raiding the graineries of the Mashonas, had settled as labourers. Already they had used their agricultural skills to victualize the European miner/farmer who was not skilled enough and who lacked the capital to improve anywhere beyond the level of subsistence farming. Of course external factors such as droughts, pest and diseases, the lack of infrastructure, transport and markets, added to the stagnation of European agricultural development which lasted until 1908. In that year the British South African Company (BSAC) introduced a diversification programme, that was to encourage the European agricultural sector to grow import substitution crops. At the same time new immigrants were attracted with extremely low prices of land and credit facilities for Europeans only, while an agricultural extension service was put to the disposal of the farmer to boost quality and quantity of the agricultural produce. European agriculture began to prosper. In five years time the European agriculture had pushed Mashona agriculture back to subsistence level. Farm surplusses could easily provide the mining population with maize, meat and tobacco, commodities which would prove to become the mainstay of the country's agricultural production. The successes in farming created a land hunger, which could only be satisfied by pushing the Mashonas to less fertile areas, by imposing dipfees for African cattle and grazing fees for tenant cattle. These areas would later become "reserves" when the Land Apportionment Act was introduced in 1930, as a result of the whites' fear of African competition. African and European agriculture survived WW I and the recession from 1921 - 1923, but then a white government started to improve the agricultural climate by expanding the existing infrastructure, thus attracting more whites who now began a severe competition with the Africans for land and grazing. This led eventually to racial tension and conflict. But the white farmers backed by a white government were in a position to protect themselves with price control measures and restrictive measures on African agriculture during the Depression. The Maize Control Amendment Act of 1934 even managed to stop most African sales of maize by introducing different price levels for European and African maize. The situation in the reserves worsened. Firstly, overpopulation caused severe pressure on the lands and resulted in erosion. Secondly, African produce was barred from European markets, thus reducing them to subsistence level. The European legislative agricultural economic system could now claim victory to the detriment of everything the African population possessed: land, cattle, agricultural skills and even their dignity. All that remained were the reserves, situated in areas with predominantly poor soils and poor access to marketing facilities and service centres and their poverty. The sanctions imposed on the country after the government of Ian Douglas Smith chose for a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) did not effect the country's economy to the extent where industrial growth came to a standstill. In fact the external trade balance shows an uptrend until 1978, the hight of the civil war. The following years show a decline and in 1981, the year after independence, the figure becomes negative. It is obvious that the success of white farming is due to the favouritism displayed by the white government by heavily subsidizing European agriculture not only financially, but also by improving the agricultural extension services. The improvement of African farming was neglected until the late sixtees when security reasons prevailed over economical ones and extension services in the reserves were boasted. But by then it was too late to turn the tide of armed struggle and the emergence of an independent Zimbabwe. The return of the many freedomfighters to Zimbabwe caused the already overpopulated reserves to be bursting at their seams. Since the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, approximately 46% of Rhodesia's total land area was designated as African reserve land (1969 figures), 90,4 % of this area was taken up by Tribal Trust Lands (TTL) and 9,6 % by African Purchase Areas (APA). But looking at the ethnic division a picture of overpopulation emerges when we realize that the 41,6 % TTL together with the 4,4 % APA areas have to accomodate 95 % of the entire population. The other side of the coin shows a total of 277.000 Europeans, or 4 % of the total population, who occupy 37 % of the land area. The remaining 17 % is destined for unreserved land (6,1 %) and nature reserves (10,9 %). This means that in 1969 (data of origin of figures), there was only 4,8 ha available to each African person living in the TTL's and APA's, while the figure for each European was 425 ha. Considering that the agricultural carrying capacity of Zimbabwe seems to be 1 person to 13 ha, it is obvious that a re-allocation of land is necessary, but that only industrialization can absorb the growing migration flow to the urban areas, which started in the early seventees, thus easing the pressure on the rural areas. But more can be done. Well founded research data on agronomy, livestock husbandry, veld management, water management and erosion, back up the existing data on soils, vegetation, hydrology and meteorology, to show a picture of promising agricultural potential. It is up to the present government to use these data for the preparation of a national development plan, based on a sound plan to re-allocate the rural areas.

2.2 Zambia

Zambia was first administered by Rhodes' British South African Company (BSAC) after this company was given powers by the British government to administer the lands north of the Limpopo river, but they neither developed any of its mineral resources, nor its agricultural potential. Only when the colonial office took over the administration of the country in 1924, exploitation of the copper deposits started to take place. Throughout the following years, until Zambia joined the Federation with Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Britain had managed to acquire revenues through taxation of the mining industry without investing these revenues into the development of the country. Because the rural population proved to be a very useful source of labour for the coppermines, the colonial office certainly did not stimulate their agricultural ability. Besides, why should they when Southern Rhodesia already supplied enough food to the Northern Rhodesian Labour force?
In spite of the worlds economic recession between 1970 and 1980, mining still provides 95 % of the country's foreign exchange earnings and about 17 % of its GDP, while the agricultural output, through drought conditions and other mishaps, remained low. Even today commercial agriculture is in the hands of a few hundred white farmers who are responsible for about 50 % of the entire agricultural output. Fortunately there is already a small group of African farmers who are successfully engaged

in large scale commercial farming. But the majority of the rural Africans still farm at subsistence level without contributing much to the markets. Notwithstanding the limited role of agriculture in Zambia's economic structure, President Kenneth Kaunda has begun to realize that his country's geographical position as a landlocked nation with a common boundary with 8 countries, but with only two vital railway links, one which takes care of the bulk transport to the port city of Benguela in Angola and the other which runs through Rhodesia to the port cities of Beira in Mozambique and Durban in South Africa, makes his country's connections with the rest of the world very dependent on the relations with its neighbours. This situation was emphasized during Rhodesia's struggle for independence which lasted until 1980. Already in 1973 the white minority government had closed its borders with Zambia because of Zambia's continuous involvement with the nationalist guerilla group ZAPU, who operated from Zambia's territory, thus preventing Zambia's copper transports to reach the Indian Ocean. In 1975 Angola's civil war caused Zambia's last railway link, the one to Benguela, to be cut. The almost 2000 km long dirt track from Lusaka to Dar Es Salaam was the only connection left, over which copper could be exported. Transport costs increased sharply during the wet season when many vehicles broke down. In 1973 the Chinese constructed Tazara or Tanzam railway line brought some relief although its capacity was limited due to a series of derailments caused by curves which were too tight and collapsing embankments. At the same time the Lusaka - Dar Es Salaam road link and the great east road through Malawi to the port city of Nacala in Mozambique became tarred. Isolation by the surrounding countries became less imminent. Kaunda's fears of becoming dependent on his industries only, resulted in his policy to emphasize the agricultural production of his country. But much has to be done before revenues from agriculture would come near those of mining and of manufacturing. An insufficient internal infrastructure together with an almost total absence of links with the outside world is one of the major constraints of development. Another serious constraint is the lack of skilled manpower through poor educational facilities and last but certainly not least, the scarcity of foreign exchange will remain a serious limitation to development. These conditions forced Kaunda in 1986 to accept another loan from the IMF, worth 300 million dollars to carry out his plans for economic diversification with an emphasis on agricultural production. But if the stringent measures of reform imposed by the IMF are worth it, remains to be seen. Already some public unrest to protest against the introduction of schoolfees has started. A devaluation of the kwacha, a decrease in government spending and the abolishment of foodsubsidies will come into existence soon. However, it seems as if Zambia's rural areas have enough agricultural potential with existing crops like tobacco, maize, beans, sorghum, millet and cassava, together with prospective crops such as soybeans, wheat and rice, to take up the challenge of rapid development.

2.3 Conclusions

For the purpose of this paper it is necessary to make a brief comparison between Zimbabwe and Zambia. For this reason I have tried to describe the most important relevant points in chapter 2.1 and 2.2. From these two chapters it can be concluded that in general the African agriculture in Zambia has been terribly neglected by the government. Throughout the BSAC period and British colonial rule up to its independence and even afterwards, under the leadership of president Kaunda the agricultural production has stayed behind that of neighbouring Zimbabwe. As mentioned before, emphasis on the mining industry, low edducational level of the rural population and the absence of a well functioning infrastructure and transport system both internal as well as with the outside world, are the main causes of Zambia's present deplorable economic situation. Graph 2.1 shows the yields of maize, the principal staple crop of the African population of Zambia as well as Zimbabwe. It is obvious that, apart from fluctuations due to climatical differences, there is a marked difference between yields in Zimbabwe and yields in Zambia. The average yields between 1968 and 1983 are 1.377.000 metric tons for Zimbabwe against 766.000 metric tons for Zambia. The drought year of 1973 shows minimum yields for both countries i.e. 617.000 metric tons for Zimbabwe and 418.000 metric tons for Zambia,



Graph 2.1 Maize yields '000 metric tons.

while maximum yields of 2.724.000 and 1.070.000 metric tons for Zimbabwe and Zambia respectively were obtained in 1981. A more important comparison can be made when we look at the average maize yields of European grown maize and African grown maize. Where average yields of European farmers are 25 bags per acre (918 kg per ha), the yields of African farmers in the reserves with poor soils and often marginal rainfall are from 5 bags per acre (184 kg per ha) to 20 bags per acre (734 kg per ha) for the better African farmers who farm on the better parts of the reserve areas. If we now look at the main producers of maize, it turns out that in Zimbabwe the principle maize producers are white settlers. As we have already seen, the settlers have prevented the Africans from developing their agricultural skills both in Zimbabwe as well as in Zambia. However, the agricultural system in Zambia was never taken over by the Europeans, as was the case in Zimbabwe, but left in the hands of the rural African. The following picture emerges: Zimbabwe has a small amount of settler farmers who produce high yields per ha of maize, thus forming a high percentage of Zimbabwe's total agricultural output. The African farmers with very low yields per ha, barely exeeding subsistance level hardly contribute to the national output at all. The total result is that maize forms a substantial part of Zimbabwe's GDP, but is mainly produced by European farmers.

The picture of Zambia is somewhat different. Apart from a few European producers, the bulk of the maize production comes from the African rural areas, where the numerous subsistence farmers cannot produce enough maize. This necessitates the government to import maize from Zimbabwe where overproduction allows for maize exports. Although Zambia seems to have an enormous agricultural potential of which the possibilities at present are being explored, and leading to some areas being able to market substantial quantities of maize, tobacco, cotton and groundnuts, this only seems to be a start of Zambia's future agricultural development. The present still looks very grimm indeed. It would be wrong to look at one single commodity when making a comparison of such importance. A much better impression of the situation can be obtained when looking at the following table which shows the share of agricultural exports in total exports during the period between 1962 and 1964 for Zambia and Zimbabwe. The table speaks for itself.

Exports in million US$

	Total exports	Agricultural exports	Percentage of agricultural exports from total exports
Zimbabwe	384,9	169,9	44,1 %
Zambia	469,7	12,6	2,7 %

Table 2.2 Export figures

It is clear that both countries have potential resources to play a role as a self supporting, viable nation in the universal economic system. The mineral wealth of Zimbabwe conprises nickel, coal, tin, iron ore, chromium, asbestos, copper, cobalt, gold and silver. The main export mineral produced by Zambia is copper and in small quantities coal, zinc, lead, cobalt and gold. But Zambia's one-sided emphasis on the production of copper without a strong support from the agricultural sector, has caused a balance of trade deficit during the economic recession of the 1970's and 1980's, when the price of copper fell drastically. The majority of the African labourforce was now forced to return to the rural areas, thus increasing the burden on the already impoverished subsistance farmers and being of no use as upgraders of the agricultural systems. Zimbabwe on the other hand also suffered a major set back when universal sanctions were applied after its Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965. But a strong agricultural sector with large European maize and cashcrop producers managed on the one hand to maintain a large labourforce and on the other hand to produce enough revenue to be re-invested in the mining and industrial sectors which, because of their vigour employed another large labourforce. In fact, since Rhodesia was economically isolated by the outside world since UDI, the exports as well as the imports began to grow in spite of the sanctions.

Year	Import	Export	Balance of trade
1967	187,0	188,6	+ 1,6
1968	207,0	183,5	- 23,5
1969	199,4	226,9	+ 27,5
1970	234,9	253,6	+ 18,7
1971	282,4	277,2	- 5,2
1972	274,2	328,5	+ 54,3
1973	323,3	386,6	+ 63,3
1974	--	--	--
1975	--	--	--
1976	382,7	557,4	+ 174,7
1977	388,1	550,8	+ 162,7
1978	403,7	609,3	+ 205,6
1979	549,3	715,7	+ 166,4
1980	809,4	909,2	+ 99,8
1981	1017,7	888,1	- 129,6
1982	1081,8	807,1	- 274,7

Figures are in million Rhodesian Dollars.

Table 2.3 Trade figures

Table 2.3 shows a growing surplus on Zimbabwe's national balance of payment until 1979, the year before independence, when guerilla warfare paralysed mainly the agricultural activities, but also slowed down the industrial expansion. Immediately European settlers and immigrants began to pack their bags. The situation worsens when white dominated Rhodesia becomes black independent Zimbabwe. Although both countries can be viable from an economic point of view, both show a negative balance of payment. This situation can be attributed mainly to internal historical, cultural, sociological and political factors, although influences from the outside world, such as protectionism, price fluctuations on the world market and economical interests from the industrial countries, should not be disregarded. Resuming we can say that at present the farming skills of the Zimbabwean European settler farmers are superior to the skills of the African farmers, but that a reverse situation existed in the past. However, the skills of the African farmers have deliberately been neglected to favour the European sector which, at present, is capable of providing enough produce not only for internal food supplies, but also to export food to Zambia. The African population of Zimbabwe partly works as a wage labourer in the European managed mines and heavy industires (16,6%), and partly as farm labourer in the European farming areas (19,2%).

The majority of the Africans (62,8%) live in reserves at subsistance level. They hardly contribute to Zimbabwe's economy at all. With the present land distribution of roughly 50% of the land belonging to the European farmers (34.000 in number) and 50% of the land belonging to the African farmers (3.905.000 in number) and the poor educational facilities in the reserves, the European settlers and immigrants will be able to maintain their superior position. But not for long! Overpopulation in the reserves causing the already poor soils to deteriorate even more rapidly, malnutrition, poverty and last but not least the want of freedom and the restoration of their dignity will cause the African population to react to the present situation. But is there anything in their power they can do to improve their economic conditions in a situation where the export/import ratio is already decreasing rapidly?

In spite of the fact that both countries have enough natural and human resources to overcome their worsening economic position, it is not only the historical, cultural and colonial background which is responsible for a worsening situation after independence. But let us look first at the situation in general: To provide the necessary funds for the public services sector, the improvement of the infrastructure and to stimulate the industrial sector, the already weak agricultural sector is heavily taxed. In the sixtees some economic growth could be noticed, but ten years later it was obvious that the agricultural development began to

slow down. This had an immediate effect on the export figures which began to drop, causing governments to lose revenue.
To cover up for their trade deficits the effected countries called for help from the industrialized countries, thus losing some of their newly gained independence. Apart from donations, they received medium and long term loans on easy terms. The debts began to increase, which was to be expected as many investments would only show profits over a long period of time. But at the end of the seventees it was obvious that many debtors would find themselves in trouble. The ability of a country to repay the interest and redemption on loans depends largely on its ability to increase its exports and reduce its imports at the same time. But at the beginning of the eightees the situation became worse. Population growth, droughts, the recession of the world economy and last but not least internal mismanagement at many levels were the major responsible factors. Diversification from food-crops to cashcrops was thought to be the problem solving saviour but this only increased the dependency on the industrialized countries who determined the low world market prices for agricultural produces on the one hand, while on the other hand the imported foodstuffs were increased in price. Developing countries were now forced to borrow more money, thus increasing the inflation. But now private banks began to worry about the credit-ability of their customers, forcing them to approach the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF immediately imposes the

usual but very austere short term measures such as devaluation of the local currency, abolishment of price control measures and subsidies, price increases for agricultural products, raised interests and reduced government spending. A further price to pay for IMF control is social and political instability. But do all these measures help? Apparently not. The demand for agricultural products from the developing countries is not to increase drastically in the near future. Their industrial development lacks both technical know how as well as capital. The former is caused by the well known brain-drain to the industrialized countries, while the latter suffers from investing IMF money directly in western countries as a safe and profitable return. In other words, both Zimbabwe as well as Zambia are caught in a process of increasing economic dependency on the developed countries. Unless they develop western management skills, adopt western techniques and start thinking like westerners, their present state of under-development cannot be diminished to the extent of equal partnership with the industrialized world. But few Africans are prepared to give up their identity and mimick westerners. Therefore a different approach to development must be sought. Certainly it is going to be a long and tedious road of monitoring the present development techniques, but also the organisational structures and even the individuals behind these structures, in order to improve the development cooperation in the future.

3.1 The Developers

In spite of the prospects to narrow the gap between the North and the South being very small, efforts to decrease the Southern dependency from the North must continue. When retrospecting, it is obvious that the policy of the donating countries over the last two decades has failed and needs to be reviewed drastically. At the same time it is necessary that the developing countries begin to realize that, like in the past, the agricultural sector cannot any longer be used to continue financing a weak industrial sector which is often government owned. The cashcrops like cotton, sisal, coffee, tobacco and cocoa, which the heavily taxed farmers are encouraged to grow to provide the financieal means for the necessary infrastructure and industrial sector, must be abolished in the first place to make room for foodcrops which, until that time are imported at higher costs when produced locally. This means that diversification to foodcrops shall result in increased self-sufficiency while saving valuable foreign exchange currency at the same time. It is obvious that a start must be made to try and solve some of the most important problems in the agricultural sector of the developing countries. But has that not been tried before with limited or no success? Of course, but renewed efforts must be made based on the lessons which were learned from mistakes made in the past. Therefore it is necessary to make a brief visit to the early days of development cooperation.

After World War II the western world made a rapid economic recovery. At the same time many African countries began to gain their independence from colonial rule. They realized that their degree of independence was directly related to their degree of economic development, their ability to exploit their resources and a positive balance of trade. But to achieve these goals technical and financial aid was necessary. Western countries, eager to expand their markets were prepared to come to their assistance. At first the task of giving development assistance was thought to be an easy one. The western concept of economic development via industrial expansion was followed. It was soon discovered that progress was not achieved as fast as was expected. Consultants from the industrialized countries began to compete for capital intensive projects with a high probability of success, like infrastructural works and big scale irrigation schemes. However, salinification, soil erosion, deforestation, desertification continued to take place at an ever increasing rate, while a widening gap between rich and poor showed clearly that a different approach was needed. Slowly the paternalistic approach of the developers was changed in the more successful participating approach where the target sector was stimulated to help themselves. The word socio was introduced as a prefix to existing disciplines and the Third World started to respond. Today's developers realize that development is a slow process of continuous participation and transfer of knowledge to the target group, but changes are still not significant. Despite renewed efforts, the majority of development projects are failures. Again donor countries knew exactly where to find the weak spots. Political instability, mismanagement, corruption in all strata of the administration and economic system, shortage of operating and maintenance cadre were a typical characterisation of the receiving countries. But it took a long time before the donating countries became critical of their own policies and their implementations. And even today after almost 30 years of development co-operation, the rate of success is extremely small. Unfortunately it is impossible to tell how small the successes are. To do this we need to define success. Next a scale is needed which indicates different degrees of success and at what part of this scale success turns into failure. The project evaluations of the World Bank, IMF and IDA show that 80% of their projects are successful. This unbelievably high rate of success can be explained when looking at their evaluation criteria: A project is successful when project funds return more than 10% in investment. This definition excludes the projects aim, the target group which is to benefit, the time limit, the methodology, its effect on the environment, viability and sustainability.

But what happens when existing social structures and values are destroyed by a "successful" project? It is understandable that answering these questions requires an enormous effort from the developing experts who have not even learned from their past mistakes. I would like to give a few examples from my own experience. The mistakes from which I have learned my lesson are still being made at micro and macro level.
My first job after graduating from a college for tropical agriculture took me to the rural areas of Zimbabwe, where I was posted as an extension officer. On my first rounds through the area I tried to "sell" my theoretical agricultural knowledge whenever and wherever I could. After some time I evaluated my work and I came to the conclusion that I had not achieved much. An experienced collegue put me on the right track. "Try to relax" he said, "but keep your eyes open and investigate". After a while some African farmers came into my office. At first they talked about nothing in particular, but after a while the subject slowly changed and some minor agricultural problems were raised. I explained that I possibly knew a few tricks about agriculture, that could be of some benefit to them, but that I was only going to show these tricks to those who were prepared to help themselves. Apparently this method proved to be successful, because slowly the indifference changed and I was asked for more advice. Not always on agricultural matters as I had hoped, but mainly on domestic

matters which I had thought to be unimportant at that time. I was disappointed that I could not show off my wisdom but patience proved to be my best teacher. I had not been aware of what the farmers realy wanted from me, until they showed me. Only then I realized that I had discovered for myself what felt needs were. Needless to say that lesson number one was understood and that my extension work improved with time. But how well equiped is the administrative machinery of our western development cooperations to study the target group well enough to discover the real felt needs? In other words: does the North know what the South needs and wants? Or does the North prefer to think that the concept of development since the industrial revolution can be applied for the South as well? Why don't the industrialized countries find out? The cases of Zambia and Zimbabwe are clear. Both countries have comparable potential resources: soil, climate, mineral resources and human resources. Zambia followed the path of development by emphasizing the industrial sector. In spite of becoming independent in 1964, Zambia's dependency on the industrialized world increased. At present it belongs to the poorest countries of Africa and is now being supported by the IMF. Zimbabwe on the other hand had the chance to develop its agricultural potential. In addition to being self sustained, it is capable of exporting many agricultural commodities as well as minerals, while its national balance of trade shows a positive income up to 1980. In many developing countries it is realized that agriculture is often the backbone of further development and that the felt needs give clear indications where to start the development process.

The second lesson took much longer before it dawned on me that a different approach was necessary to achieve some results. It all started when I met mr. Vurunga on one of my inspection visits through part of my area. Mr. Vurunga belonged to the Mashona tribe. His kraal, an extended family unit headed by a kraalhead, was situated in the drier parts of the country. His lands encompassed 2 ha and consisted of soils with low fertility. A meagre prospect even for a subsistance farmer. But Vurunga was lucky in one aspect: a small spring started to flow on the highest part of his slightly sloping land. When I first saw it, it was surrounded by a few banana trees which used some of the water from the spring. Vurunga was an intelligent farmer and he realized that the spring offered him the means to improve his economical situation. After one year of very hard manual labour Vurunga had constructed a small fishpond. A government loan enabled him to buy fencing materials to keep predators out, enough fish fingerlings to stock his pond, rice seed to be grown in the pond thus being fertilized not only by the fish, but also by a few ducks which he could buy out of the same loan. Apart from his investments his daily inputs proved to be small: household wastes to feed the ducks and some agricultural lime to feed the fish. The harvested products like fish, poultry meat and rice, raised his income considerably. The following year Vurunga constructed another pond and a fish smoking oven to conserve the fish, enabling him to sell his fish at distant markets. Vurunga began to prosper. But during the third year the trouble began. Vurunga belonged, like all the members of his kraal, to a religious sect, of which there are so many in that part of Africa. He was told by his religious leader that it was against the religious laws to touch fish or duck. Finally he was forced to abandon his prosperous scheme and revert back to his old method of farming. At first I was stunned, but then I realized that Vurunga's position in the social structure of his kraal had suddenly changed from a poor subsistence farmer to that of a wealthy man. It is understandable that the established elite of the kraal began to resist this threat, by using their influence on the religious leaders. Unfortunately for Vurunga they succeeded and the equilibrium reestablished, leaving Vurunga without his fishponds, ducks and rice. I have seen similar cases in different countries where the community who's responsibility it is to care for the poor and often landless members, does not allow the change of positions within the social structure.

Mr. Vurunga had become a victim by defying the rules of the community. To approach individuals with the idea to improve their economical position and to use them as an example for the entire community could therefore prove to be very unsuccessful and even unacceptable. A more reliable method is to try to raise the economical level of an entire community by upgrading all sectors within the community, such as administration, infrastructure, health, education, watersupply, housing, etc.
Of course this integrated approach will take quite a long time before any results can be noticed, but the overall effectiveness can be much higher. However, when we look at todays development cooperation it is possible to discern projects which benefit minorities within a community. Such projects are sometimes tolerated as long as the donors are prepared to finance them, but soon after the foreign funds are depleted, the project is dissiminated in the community without trace.
In spite of their complexity from a planning point of view, integrated development projects score better results in the long run.
What is the record of the relationship between development assistance and the economic situation facing developing countries? The record shows that the economic conditions which obtain in the developing world continue to worsen vis-a-vis the economic conditions of the developed countries.
Two international investigation commissions were

established in the past two decades to examine thoroughly the ineffectiveness of development assistance, with the view to remedying such ineffectiveness: the Pearson Commission and the Brandt Commission. Both commissions observed that the failure to create meaningful employment is the most tragic failure of development. But the Brandt Commission differs from the Pearson Commission when it concludes that development assistance without social reforms is not helpful to the developing countries. But the question remains: why has not development assistance brought the desired reforms thus far? It goes too far to deal with the complexity of the multi-faceted process that is called "development" in the scope of this paper, and to examine the obstacles in the way of achieving desired goals. To reduce the mistakes that have been made in the past and to improve the quality of development assitance, or as it is called nowadays development cooperation, it is of great importance that policymakers from both the North and the South will continue in seeking a constructive dialogue to discuss common positions and better understand those of the other side. It is a fact that the North, by and large, is satisfied with the status quo and feels no need to restructure the international system, where most developing countries (the South) feel precisely the opposite. They maintain that the present economic order systematically discriminates against them and denies them equal opportunities. They argue that all the

mechanisms and decisionmaking institutions have been created to serve the needs of the industrialised, rich countries at the same time neglecting the interests and needs of the poor countries. Of course there are differences of opinion on this issue among the Northern and Southern countries themselves. But there are but few donor countries who try to accomodate to the proposals of the receiving countries.
However, negotiations will continue and are even unavoidable, because the developing countries are of economic and political importance for the North, because they are much more numerous and today they dominate international forums. But the South has to make it clear that it is not asking for charity but for a reform of the international economic system, in order to make it more open and equitable for both sides, and that agreements must be sought on the basis of mutual gains.

Africa has a very strong negotiating power: its rich mineral and human resources. Common sense and political will demands to redirect the outward-looking orientation towards the building of internally directed economies. Only when the agricultural sector is strong enough to support and promote labour-intensive industrial development, a sound basis for a growing economy and self-sufficiency in food production can be formed.

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