

FUSION OF FACT AND VALUE IN JAMESEAN PRAGMATISM

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The search for absolute certainty in the sphere of knowledge and understanding could be looked upon as the primary reason for the appearance of the royal pair of dichotomies--fact and value--that continued to haunt philosophers for centuries. In general, the rationalist or the intellectualist tradition since Plato continued to emphasize not only the possibility of attaining certainty regarding knowledge but also gave priority to ethics even in the matter of explaining what they considered to be the truth pertaining to the factual world. Plato's ultimate Form, Good, explains the sophistication that a philosopher can achieve when following the intellectualist approach. However, such an approach often tends to undermine the importance of the empirical world. The inability to ignore the concrete factual world, the world that impresses upon the conscious human being with an irresistible feeling of clearness and vividness, provided the empiricist philosophers with a rationale for claiming certainty with regard to brute facts of sensory experience, thereby creating an almost unbridgeable chasm between fact and value. For the empirically-minded scientist, facts are the given, the real and ultimate, and, therefore, amenable to clear and

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precise formulation in terms of invariable and verifiable laws, while values, being man-made or products of human convention, cannot be subjected to such strict formulations. The objectivity of facts and the subjectivity of values continued to be justified by the materially inclined scientists and their followers, especially the philosophers of science, until a full-fledged pragmatic theory of meaning based upon a detailed analysis of the psychology of human knowledge and understanding appeared in the Western world. There is no denying that strains of pragmatic thinking were found in the reflections of the philosophers of the Anglo-European tradition starting from the pre-Socratics. However, it emerged as a major school of thought in the American continent in more recent times with the speculations of Charles Sanders Peirce. Even though Peirce was to initiate the pragmatic movement in America, the dent he made in the Anglo-European philosophical tradition turned out to be rather insignificant primarily as a result of his entering the arena of philosophy through the Kantian door. Thus, it was left to the famous psychologist, William James to break away completely from the Anglo-European philosophical tradition and enthrone pragmatism as a significant alternative to intellectualism and sensationalism, rationalism and empiricism, transcendentalism and essentialism, etc. that characterized most Anglo-European thought.

Peirce, whose contribution to the discipline of logic remains unmatched among American thinkers, was the first to abandon the pursuit of certainty in the sphere of human knowledge. "All positive reasoning,"

he maintained, "is of the nature of judging the portion of something in a whole collection by the proportion found in a sample. Accordingly, there are three things to which we can never hope to attain by reasoning, namely, absolute certainty, absolute exactitude, absolute universality."¹ This is not at all different from the standpoint adopted by David Hume. It may be assumed that when Peirce adopted the Humean skepticism he was also compelled to accept the Humean version of empiricism, according to which the first impressions of sense, the most clear and distinct, constitute the basis of the more complex forms of knowledge. However, Peirce rejects such an empiricist philosophy insisting that ". . . in truth, there is but one state of mind, from which you can 'set out,' namely, the very state of mind in which you actually find yourself at the time you do 'set out'--a state in which you are laden with an immense mass of cognitions already formed, of which you cannot divest yourself if you would; and who knows whether, if you could, you would have not made all knowledge impossible to yourself?"²

This extremely important observation on the part of Peirce, an observation indicating the rejection of the famous theory of tabula rasa of the British empiricists, regarding the nature of sensory experience should have compelled him to pay more attention to the psychology of human understanding. Unfortunately, his mentor, Immanuel Kant, had already made the most valiant attempt to banish psychology from the sphere of philosophy. Kant's famous dictum that "psychology is a scandal to philosophy"³ had a resounding effect not only on Peirce, but also on

most philosophers of the modern world. Peirce therefore opted for a more intellectualist analysis of the content of sense experience, admitting what he called the category of Firstness, representing certain qualities of feeling rather than what is actually felt in sense experience.⁴

The fact-value distinction thus lingered on in spite of Peirce's emphasis upon facts (what is) as merely "positive qualitative possibility,"⁵ instead of an ultimate reality. Thus it was left to a psychologist to examine the problem of sensory experience and indicate whether the an absolute distinction between fact and value is justified or not.

William James, as is well known, was responsible for resurrecting Peirce's first formulation of the pragmatic principle that went almost unnoticed by the philosophical circles. Even though James was inspired by Peirce's formulation, he was not simply elaborating or commenting upon that principle. His was a bold attempt to carry the principle of pragmatism into an arena where Peirce was reluctant to enter, namely, psychology. Indeed, it is a total misconception that Peirce re-formulated his pragmatism in what he called "pragmaticism" in order to prevent his theory being kidnapped from psychologists like James. On the contrary, Peirce had great respect for James and his expansion of the pragmatic principle in relation to the radical empiricism which James was to formulate. When Peirce spoke of kidnappers, he was only referring to the popular versions that began appearing in journals, and not to the work of James.

The difference between Peirce and James is this. When Peirce simply observed that "the state of mind in which you actually find yourself when you do 'set out'" to deal with the sense impressions "is already laden with a mass of cognitions already formed," and left it as a mere argument to refute the Humean sensationalism, James decided to examine the nature of that mass of cognitions, how it comes to be generated and co-ordinated in order to produce human knowledge. For this reason, before proceeding to examine problems such as sensation, perception, inference, etc. James embarked on an analysis of the human person involved in having such experiences. The result is his conception of the "stream of thought"⁶ or the "stream of consciousness"⁷ which still remains his unique contribution to psychology as well as philosophy.

The "stream of thought" is James' answer to Kant's "transcendental unity of apperception,"⁸ a theory which James considered to be the result of a "psychologist's fallacy par excellence."⁹ Abandoning the conception of a metaphysical subject, James perceived consciousness as a perpetual flux or a stream with five main characteristics. They are as follows:

- (1) Every thought tends to be part of a personal consciousness.
- (2) Within each personal consciousness thought is always changing.
- (3) Within each personal consciousness thought is sensibly continuous.

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(4) It always appears to deal with objects independent of itself.

(5) It is interested in some parts of these objects to the exclusion of others, and welcomes or rejects--chooses from among them, in a word--all the while.¹⁰

James' first assertion seems to have far reaching philosophical consequences. He maintains that the thoughts are related to other thoughts. My thought belongs with my other thoughts and your thoughts with your other thoughts. At first sight, this relationship between one thought and another may appear to be similar to the relationship that Peirce recognized between signs. However, there are some major difference, one of which is that Peirce identified thoughts with verbal and bodily signs in order to render them open to public scrutiny. On the contrary, James was to consider signs as convenient substitutes for thoughts. For the psychologist James, the elementary psychic fact is not simply a thought, either this thought or that thought, but rather my thought, every thought being owned. This ownership simply represents the way in which each thought appears in relation to a constantly changing cluster of thoughts unique to the individual. This is not a way of justifying any form of ego-centricism. It is in fact intended to replace the notion of ego with a theory of relations. The uniqueness of the individual streams of thought can get partly lost as a result of achieving some form of uniformity through culture and learning. Such uniformity can be achieved only when concepts or signs are substituted

for thoughts. According to James, the intellectual life of man consists almost wholly in his substituting a conceptual order for the perceptual order in which his experience originally comes.¹¹ James was insistent that this conceptual order should not be given a privileged status as it some times happened in the philosophical tradition before him. The conceptual order admits of modification, correction and re-alignment in the light of experiences, past, present or future, of oneself or of others. Furthermore he had little respect for abstractions dissociated from the concrete. Percepts are blind without concepts, concepts are empty without percepts. This would, in a way, discourage the wild-goose chase after ultimate conceptual or linguistic structures.

This leads him to the second characteristic of thought, namely, constant change. As if criticizing the Humean view, James maintains that by constant change he does not mean necessarily that no one state of mind has any duration. Change he has in mind takes place in sensible intervals of time. Following Heraclitus, he discounted the possibility of the recurrence of identical sensations, for that would require an unmodified brain at each moment of sensation. A tabula rasa is only a theoretical figment. An alternative view that our higher or more complex thoughts are all built out of unchanging simpler ideas, a view that appeared in a tremendously influential work a few decades later was rejected by James. To quote his own words: "What wonder then, that the thought is most easily conceived under the law of the thing whose name it bears! If the thing is composed of parts then the thought of the thing must be composed

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of parts."¹² Yet we continue to justify similar views. For instance, sometimes we use the modern technological apparatus called "word-processor" to exemplify such a view. Most of us know that the words typed on the computer terminal are recorded in the Central Processing Unit in the form of signals, and that they could be subsequently retrieved as they were originally recorded. James' explanation of the brain process and sensory experience does not allow room for such exact reproduction in the process of retrieval. In the stream of thought, thoughts do not flow all the time without being processed. The processing takes place not only in terms of the incoming sense data but also by the changes or modifications produced in the brain as a result of previous thoughts, so that what is retrieved is often different from what was originally put in. This may be one reason why we are frightened to look at our own past when arguing about the present or the future..

James then proceeds to explain what he means by continuity. He is reluctant to speak of the unconscious, the deep abyss infested by criminals such as robbers, perverts, and murderers, often utilized to account for time gaps in thought or consciousness. Instead, he prefers to speak of consciousness that feels as if belonged to consciousness before it. He even utilizes an example from physics, namely, the current of an electrode buried in the ground unerringly finding its way to its own buried mate across how much intervening earth there is. How it happens is not explained to us in physics, but we are willing to accept it. Yet,

when Peter wakes up in the morning, and immediately connects himself with his thoughts of the previous night, and even by accident does not connect himself with the thoughts of Paul, we need a substantialist explanation to account for such continuity.

Having explained the nature of continuity in the stream of thought, James goes on to deal at length with what he refers to as sensible continuity, and this pertains to the experience of relations in the sensible world. According to him, the Intellectualists as well as the Sensationalists have presented unacceptable theories. As a radical empiricist he pays great attention to the felt relations. His explanation is significant. "If we speak objectively," he says, "it is the real relations that appear revealed. If we speak subjectively, it is the stream of consciousness that matches each of them by an inward coloring of its own."¹³ This appears to be James' explanation of the Peircean dilemma which I referred to earlier. When Peirce suggested that the laws of nature are inveterate habits, he seems to be struggling to explain the function of human consciousness in the formulation of the so-called physical laws without admitting that he was engaged in any psychological enterprise. On the contrary, James who was not ashamed of being a psychologist, highlights the difference between those statements that presuppose objectivity and those that imply subjective involvement without denying objectivity. James concludes this analysis with the words: "This is all I have to say about sensible continuity and unity of our thought as contrasted with the apparent discreteness of words, images

and other means by which it seems to be carried on. Between all their substantive elements there is 'transitive' consciousness, and the words and images are 'fringed,' and not as discrete as to a careless view they seem."¹⁴

James is now compelled to explain the problems of time and space which necessitated the Kantian eternal categories, as well as the problem of the perception of the same object by different individuals. These problems are explained by the fourth characteristic of the "stream of thought," namely, that human thought appears to deal with objects independent of itself. In other words, stream of thought is cognitive or possesses the function of knowing. James is here once again taking the same bold stand that he adopted in explaining the Peircean dictum that laws of nature are inveterate habits.

The reason why we believe that the objects of our thoughts have a duplicate existence outside, is that there are many human thoughts, each with the same objects, as we cannot help supposing. The judgment that my thought has the same object as his thought is what makes the psychologist call my thought cognitive of an outer reality. The judgment that my own past thought and my own present thought are of the same object is what makes me take the object out of either and project it by a sort of translocation to an independent position, from which it may appear to both. The sameness in a multiplicity of objective

appearances is thus the basis of our belief in realities outside of thought.¹⁵

It is easy to understand how this could provide the inspiration to a phenomenologist to present his theory of phenomena, of lived time and of lived space. Yet James was not building up another theory. He was merely explaining how we come up with the so-called inveterate habits of thinking. He provides us with an excellent example. "Take, for example," he says, "an altogether unprecedented experience, such as a new taste in the throat. Is it a subjective quality of feeling or an objective quality felt? You do not even ask the question at this point. It is simply that taste. But if a doctor hears you describe it and says: 'Ha! Now you know what heartburn is,' then it becomes a quality already existent extra mentam tuam; which you in turn have come upon and learned. The first spaces, times, things, qualities, experienced by the child appear like the first heartburn, in this absolute way, as simple beings, neither in nor out of thought."¹⁶

His conclusion is that a mind which has become conscious of its own cognitive function plays role of the psychologist upon itself. It not only knows the things that appear before it, but knows it that it knows them. It is at this point that James takes up for criticism the philosopher's assumption that the reflective consciousness of the self is essential to the cognitive function of thought, that is, the Kantian postulate.

Finally, James is interested in eliminating what I call the royal pair of dichotomies that has plagued the philosophers for a considerable length of time. The stream of thought that was to account for our experience of things, relations, time, space, etc. is now being utilized to account for aesthetics and ethics. In other words, the marriage between fact and value is solemnized without having to admit extra-empirical postulates. This represents the fifth and final characteristic of the stream of thought, namely, its interest in one part of the object than in another, its welcoming or rejecting, or choosing all the while it is thinking. Perception, reason, aesthetics and ethics are all co-ordinated leaving no room for absolute distinctions between fact and value. Perception is a "big blooming buzzing confusion" inviting some form of order. The stream of thought with its selectivity and preferences, its propensity to choose from the "sensible muchness" carves out its object. Similarly, reasoning depends on the ability of the mind to break up the totality of phenomena reasoned about, into parts, and pick out from among them the particular one which, in our given emergency, may lead to the proper conclusion. In other words, reasoning is another form of the selective activity of the mind. Similarly, the artist notoriously selects his items, rejecting all tones, colors, shapes, which do not harmonize with each other and with the main purpose of the work. In the plane of ethics choice reigns notoriously supreme. An act has no ethical quality whatever unless it be chosen out of several equally possible ones. In short, the human race as a whole largely agrees as to what it shall notice and name, and what not. Among noticed parts we

select in much the same way for accentuation and preference or subordination and dislike. Conventionalism (vyavahara) becomes inevitable. In this situation truth is being-made, never ready-made.

The "stream of thought" thus represents the empirical psychologist's answer to the problems for the solution of which most philosophers were positing substances or transcendental categories. The context in which James expounds his theory of the "stream of thought" is indeed significant. He does so immediately before he proceeds to explain the psychology of perception, feeling, attention, etc; these latter being the primary source of human knowledge and understanding. In other words, human experience cannot be explained except in the context of a "stream of thought."

In the face of difficulties relating to the recognition of "omniscience" as part of human knowledge, this last characteristic enables James to explain the working of the pragmatic principle even at the time when the "big blooming buzzing confusion"¹⁷ of sensory input assails a person with its irresistible force. For James, the "big blooming buzzing confusion" consists not only of events but also their relations. Thus, events and their relations, even if these were to be recognized a priori, that is, as the given, need to match the consciousness that becomes alive to them. To quote James in full:

The first thing I have to say is that all schools (however they otherwise differ) must allow the elementary qualities of cold, heat, pleasure, pain, red, blue, noun, silence, etc. are

original, innate or a priori properties of our subjective nature, even though they should require the touch of experience to waken them into actual consciousness, and should slumber to all eternity, without it.

This is so on either of two hypotheses we may make concerning the relation of the feelings to the realities at whose touch they become alive. For in the first place, if a feeling does not mirror the reality which wakens it and to which we say it corresponds, if it mirror no reality whatever outside of the mind, it of course is a purely mental product. By its very definition it can be nothing else. But in the second place, even if it do mirror the reality exactly, still it is not the reality itself, it is a duplication of it, the result of mental reaction. And that the mind should have the power of reacting in just that duplicate way can only be stated as a harmony between its nature and the nature of the truth outside of it, a harmony whereby it follows that the qualities of both parties match.

The originality of these elements is not, then, a question of dispute. The warfare of philosophers is exclusively relative to their FORMS OF COMBINATION. The empiricist maintains that these forms can only follow the order of combination in which the elements were originally awakened by the impressions of the external world; the apriorists insist, on the contrary, that

some modes of combination, at any rate, follow from the natures of the elements themselves, and that no amount of experience can modify this result.¹⁸

The above analysis takes into consideration three modes of perception in our analyses of experience:

- (1) Facts, that is, events and their relations, are to be considered ultimately real in the sense that they are impressed upon consciousness, no matter what that consciousness is.
- (2) Facts, that is, events and relations, are real only in so far as they are able to harmonize with the reacting mind. If they could not so harmonize, they could not gain the respectability as objective facts.
- (3) If no such harmony is available, that is, if the reacting mind does not mirror such events and relations, they are purely mental products.

It seems that philosophers who made a sharp distinction between fact and value perceived facts in terms of the first mode and values in terms of the third. There seems to be no middle ground for them. However, James the psychologist recognizes the second mode, and this provides him with a furnace for melting solidified conceptual thinking. Here there is no

denial that values represent conventions that are adopted by human beings as they are pragmatically relevant for peace and harmony in the world. What is highlighted is that even the so-called facts are facts because they too are pragmatically relevant and hence eliciting responses from a reacting mind. James' conception of the "stream of consciousness" enables him to locate both facts and values in the world of experience.

Unfortunately this most significant function of the "stream of consciousness" has been completely ignored by many who have attempted to deal with the age-old issues in philosophy. A look at the subsequent response to this conception seems appropriate. The deliberate and unprofessional attempt on the part of Edward Boring, an adherent of Wundt's brand of psychology, to keep James completely out of the field of psychology when he wrote the history of psychology that was to become the standard text for the next four decades, may have contributed a great deal to the suspicion with which most psychologists and philosophers of a later generation looked at James.¹⁹ Very few seem to have even cared to read James' writings even when they are commenting on his ideas. Most recently we find the Nobel Laureate and neurosurgeon, John C. Eccles, in his book on the Self and Its Brain (co-authored by Karl R. Popper), making the following remark about James' conception of the "stream of consciousness."

Quite obviously, it results from a passivist way of looking at the mind. In dreams we are less active than in a state of full

awareness and wakefulness, perhaps there is something more or less like a "stream of consciousness" going on in dreams; though I doubt it. I think that the description "stream of consciousness," which I believe is due to James, is a description of a very artificial situation: a description of the artificial situation created when we just watch ourselves, and try to do nothing.²⁰

This evaluation certainly indicates that Eccles did not even look at a copy of James' Principles of Psychology. So much for the psychologists who either disowned or did not care to read James.

The philosophers seem to have faithfully followed Kant's advice that they should stay away from any form of psychological speculation whether it be metaphysical or empirical. This is evident even from the writing of one of the most critical among the philosophers of the twentieth century, namely, Wittgenstein. Proposition 5.641 in the Tractatus reads:

Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way.

What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that 'the world is my world.'

The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world,--not a part of it.

It is this search for the limit of the world that gives us the objective world of scientism and the subjective world represented by the metaphysical self recognized in some philosophical and religious traditions. It is to the credit of James that he rejected both the metaphysical object and the metaphysical subject as being necessary conditions for the explanation of objectivity and subjectivity. His conception of the "stream of consciousness" is intended as a way of restricting such a pursuit and highlighting the importance of human experience as the primary source of all human knowledge and understanding. In his most recent work, A View From Nowhere (Oxford, 1986), Thomas Nagel has made a praiseworthy attempt to indicate to what extent the search for ultimate objectivity has infested most philosophical thinking.

The limit of objectivity with which I shall be concerned is one that follows directly from the process of gradual detachment by which objectivity is achieved. An objective standpoint is created by leaving a more subjective, individual, or just human perspective behind; but these are things about the world and life and ourselves that cannot be adequately understood from a

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maximally objective standpoint, however much it may extend our understanding beyond the point from which we started. A great deal is essentially connected to a particular point of view, and the attempt to give a complete account of the world in objective terms detached from these perspectives inevitably leads to false reductions or to outright denial that certain patently real phenomena exist.²¹

Nagel perceives the world described by physics as an exemplary case where we have achieved our greatest detachment from specifically human perspective on the world. In order to achieve this physics is compelled to leave undescribed the irreducible subjective character of conscious mental processes, whatever may be their intimate relation to the physical operation of the brain. The same problem is echoed in John Eccles' view that science can never explain the origin, and therefore of the functioning, of consciousness in a human being.²² Eccles finds "superhuman creation" as a solution to this problem. Whatever that may be, our exemplary science, namely, physics, is prevented from recognizing that the subjectivity of consciousness is an irreducible feature of reality, for without such consciousness we cannot even engage in the scientific enterprises.

As a medical man James confronted the same issues regarding the relationship between the brain and consciousness. However, he starts with the given--the brain and consciousness--without attempting any

reductionism of any sort. As a philosopher, he is more concerned with the "view" of the world expressed in propositions. In the formulation of such "views" James recognizes the function of the brain as well as consciousness thereby leaving no room for the complete renunciation of the human perspective. For him, a "view from nowhere" is no view at all. Abandoning the pursuit of excessive objectivity, and along with it the notions of metaphysical objects and subjects, James considered "views" to be invariably related to human perspectives. He saw that in adopting views, rational human beings have to rely upon two things: past experience and utility. James' "stream of consciousness," which explains the role of human perspective in the formulation of "views," thus represents a more detailed explanation of what his fellow pragmatist, Peirce, referred to as the "rational instinct" involved in all forms of hypothetical reasoning (=logic of discovery) without which all inductive reasoning would be circular and all deductive reasoning tautological. According to James, so long as these views function fruitfully they are to be counted as true. Failure to produce such consequences would call for the modification of these views in the light of new contexts and new experiences. This is how James deals with the perennial problems of realism and nominalism, realism and idealism, etc. In short, abandoning the search for the limit of objectivity, James presents a rather flexible conception of the "factual world" which accommodates human perspectives while allowing its modification in the light of future or possible worlds.

Nagel also refers to the pursuit of excess objectivity in ethics. "Objectivity is the driving force of ethics as it is of science: it enables us to develop new motives when we occupy a standpoint detached from that of our sorely personal desires and interests, . . ."23 However, he observes that "The pursuit of objectivity with respect to value runs the risk of leaving value behind altogether. We may reach a standpoint so removed from the perspective of human life that all we can do is to observe: nothing seems to have the value of the kind it appears to have from inside, and all we can see is human desires, human striving--human valuing as an activity or condition."24

Following upon his analysis of the "factual world," James renounced the attempt to reach ultimate objectivity in ethics. While recognizing the contribution of the intuitionist or intuitional moralist in dealing with the psychological facts relating to morality, James found them to be spoilers. In James' own words:

They do much to spoil this merit on the whole, however, by mixing it with that dogmatic temper which, by absolute distinctions and unconditional "thou shalt nots," change a growing, elastic, and continuous life into a superstitious system of relics and dead bones. In point of fact, there are no absolute evils, and there are no non-moral goods; and the highest ethical life--however few may be called upon to bear its burdens--consists at all times in the breaking of rules which have grown too narrow for the actual case.²⁵

However, for this reason he was not prepared to leave moral discourse as meaningless gibberish without any cognitive or experiential content. Good and evil are not mere "matters of emotion." The emotivist explanation of moral phenomena was not acceptable to James. For the pragmatist James, the ethical question is most tragically practical. "The actually possible in this world is vastly narrower than all that is demanded; and there is always a pinch between the ideal and the actual which can only be got through by leaving part of the ideal behind."²⁶

Pragmatism thus turns out to be a middle standpoint between many other extremist and contending -isms. Human perspectives and their utility, especially in the matter of bringing about human satisfaction and happiness, turn out to be the criteria for determining what counts as fact or value. These constitute the foundation for a lasting marriage between facts and values.

NOTES

- 1 Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1974, 1.141 (second number refers to the paragraph, not page).
- 2 Ibid., 5.418.
- 3 Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith, London: Macmillan, 1963, p.34, note a.
- 4 Collected Papers 1.304.
- 5 Ibid., 1.25.
- 6 The Principles of Psychology, ed. Frederick Burkhardt and Fredson Bowers, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981, 1983, p.195.
- 7 Psychology: Briefer Course, ed. Frederick Burkhardt and Fredson Bowers, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1984, pp. 139 ff.
- 8 Critique of Pure Reason p.136.
- 9 The Principles pp.195 and 264.
- 10 Ibid., p.220.
- 11 Some Problems of Philosophy, edited by Frederick Burkhardt and Fredson Bowers, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Harvard University Press, 1979, p.33.
- 12 Principles p.230.

- 13 *ibid.*, p.238.
- 14 *ibid.*, p.262.
- 15 *ibid.*
- 16 *ibid.*, pp.262-263.
- 17 Some Problems of Philosophy, p.33.
- 18 The Principles, pp.1216-1217.
- 19 See article by Daniel Goldman, "William James: Stature Raised in New Appraisal," The New York Times (Science Times), October 1, 1985, C.1 f.
- 20 The Self and Its Brain, Karl R. Popper and Joch C. Eccles, New York: Springer International, revised, 1985, p.517.
- 21 Thomas Nagel, A View From Nowhere, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 8.
- 22 John Eccles, "The Human Brain and the Human Person," in The Re-evaluation of Existing Values and the Search for Absolute Values, New York: The International Cultural Foundation Press, 1979, p.1140.
- 23 Nagel, A View From Nowhere, p.8.
- 24 *ibid.*, p.209.
- 25 William James, "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life," in Essays in Pragmatism, ed. A. Castell, New York: Hafner, 1948, p.83.
- 26 *ibid.*, p.78.