

**COMMITTEE V**

Problems of Third World Development:  
The Case of Africa

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**POLITICAL IMPEDIMENTS TO DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA**

by

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## POLITICAL IMPEDIMENTS TO DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

### Development and Modernization

The concept of 'development' has probably always existed in a rudimentary form, but it was only after World War II and the initiation of decolonization that social scientists were impelled towards defining, articulating and analysing the concept. Indeed, it was the interdisciplinary nature of this task that many social scientists found particularly attractive. Nevertheless, it is the economic aspect of the definition that has come to dominate the so-called 'science of development'. In common parlance 'development' has come to mean high levels of productivity, income and consumption. Conversely 'under-development' means low levels of all these three. However, closely associated with 'underdevelopment' is the value judgement that the condition is undesirable, needs to be changed and can be changed. It is here that Sociologists and Political Scientists come into their own by postulating the allied concept of 'modernization'. This refers to the process by which an 'under-developed' society transforms itself into a 'developed' one in economic terms, and in doing so undergoes a metamorphosis, not only in the means and scale of the production of goods, but in the social organization and value system of the society undergoing the process. Unfortunately, the concept has a strong ethnocentric aspect, since it assumes that the institutional differentiation and political norms (the separation of powers for instance) that characterise 'developed'

Western societies are ipso facto superior to societies that have found it quite possible in the past to function without them. Clearly this is a matter of cultural perspective, which ignores the fact that in many societies, patronisingly designated as 'developing' or even 'underdeveloped', the passionate acquisitiveness of the Western individual indicates a far lower level of development in that person than in the individual who places a much higher value on peace, serenity and harmony with nature, at the cost of material 'progress'.(1) It is with this salutary caveat in mind that this paper will nevertheless address itself to the problems of states that have for better or worse accepted the West's judgement that development is in itself desirable, and in consequence have embarked on a course hopefully designed to achieve this wished-for better condition. In this specific case the objects of study will be the states of Southern Africa.

### Determinants of Development

Before proceeding from the general to the particular it is necessary to emphasise that the constraints on development of resource bases, technological levels, existing economic and social organization and belief systems (sometimes dysfunctional with respect to the developmental/modernization process) lie outside the scope of this study, which is concerned primarily with the political determinants of the process. Politics is that process in society which in Laswell's(2) phrase is concerned with 'who gets what, when and how' -

in short the authoritative allocation of whatever resources are available. Such allocative decisions are never made by the mass of persons constituting a society, but by accepted decision makers. These elite individuals are themselves captives of their cultures, historical experience (in this instance colonial rule) and personalities. Hence, it follows that, though commitment of these elites to the goal of development must be taken as a 'given', it must at the same time be borne in mind that the above-mentioned influences will act to modify decisions and reduce their level of rationality. This in turn will affect the 'correctness' of political decisions and therefore have a direct bearing on achieving the developmental goal that is inexorably dependent on the decisions being calculatedly rational ie. 'correct'.

### Southern Africa

To be strictly logical the term 'Southern Africa' should refer to all states lying South of the Equator, but for the purposes of this study, while passing mention may be made of those states nearest to the Equator or indeed lying partly to the North of it (Gabon, Congo, Zaire, Uganda and Kenya), the major emphasis will be on the self-designated 'frontline' states of Angola and Mozambique, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana together with Namibia - whose status has yet to be finally settled - and of course the Republic of South Africa (hereafter referred to as the RSA). The reason for this seemingly arbitrary emphasis is simply that, in political terms, it is

the relations between the frontline states and the RSA that dominate the Southern African scene and constitute the major impediment to development not only in the former, but also to further development in the RSA itself.

Considerations of stylistic aesthetics have prompted the relegation of relevant factual data about these states to the notes appended(3), but it seems appropriate at this point to attempt a synoptic review of major impediments to development, shared in common by the frontline states as part of their colonial heritage - Portugese in the case of Angola and Mozambique and British in the others. Of course the styles of the Portugese and British colonial régimes were significantly different(4), but the mere fact that they were incontestably colonial - with all the connotations of that pejorative word - left their successor states with strikingly similar problems bearing directly on their developmental capabilities.

#### Inherited Handicaps from the Colonial Era

All colonial régimes seem to suffer from a peculiar form of political myopia - an inability to recognize when they have reached a terminal condition. In consequence, they never make provision for the proper continuation of the day-to-day tasks of governing the societies they are about to leave in the lurch. In practice this amounts to a failure to recruit and train adequate numbers of civil servants.(5) Partly, this arose from cultural arrogance clearly identifiable in an

unquestioning belief among the governors in the incapacity (assumed to be genetic) of those under their tutelage to perform any but the most humdrum and routine clerical chores. Educational systems therefore remained limited to the imparting of elementary literacy - and that too in a foreign language - and, in the case of mission schools, an alien belief system. Since the very basis of 'modernization' (in the political sense of having clearly differentiated institutions to carry out allocative responsibilities) is the development of rational-legal skills and secular values in decision makers, it is clear that colonial education was woefully inadequate. As a result many of the successor régimes were staffed by individuals, who had only rudimentary and often contradictory ideas of how to approach often complex tasks of government. It can hardly be regarded as heinous then, that in many cases such ill-equipped individuals were forced to fall back on illconsidered and over-simplified authoritarian solutions doomed to failure from the start. Notwithstanding lip-service ritually paid to Democracy this made it almost certain that this liberal Western political form was the first casualty in the new régimes. The blame for this must rest therefore in substantial part with now departed colonial administrations.

In mild mitigation it must be said that the British in their last years, and even in the immediate post-colonial period, did attempt to make hasty amends by providing scholarships for promising students to pursue higher studies in Britain. A cynic may dismiss this as paltry

conscience payment for a major default, but the intention seems to have been genuinely well-meant. Unfortunately, like many well meaning actions, the scholarship scheme proved to have some serious dysfunctions. The most apparent one was the failure of the more highly educated indiginé to return to his native land, there to employ his newly acquired talents in the tasks of development.

Since colonialism is undeniably an extractive enterprise, it should hardly be a matter of surprise that industries were seldom allowed to develop beyond an elementary level, and in consequence most of the successor states were left with no resources other than primary produce (usually monocultural) to peddle on unpredictably fluctuating world markets. Hence, to administrative inexperience was added the technological handicap of having little capacity to diversify economic activity to generate the funds on which so many other non-profitmaking developmental tasks depend.

Another phenomenon shared in common by the frontline states is uncertainty about which of several competing models of development to follow. This is basically an economic problem, but with strong political undertones. The colonial régimes originate from metropolitan societies wedded to doctrines of capitalistic forms of economic organization ie. virtually free-market policies, modified here and there by elements of Welfare State interventionism. The accompanying political form of course was Representative Democracy

based on a wide franchise, periodic elections, secret ballots and competing political parties. Needless to say, none of these institutions was ever transferred to their colonial societies. Nevertheless the elites (or elites-to-be) in those societies were well aware of the existence of these forms of economic and political organization, and may well have adopted them (albeit in modified form) as necessary pre-requisites of development. However, the existence of alternative models in Soviet Russia and the Peoples Republic of China - both committed to a measure of ideological missionary effort, whether for its assumed intrinsic truth or for the furtherance of national interests - proved attractive to some of those elites. An added temptation to experiment with alternative models was that it satisfied the amour propre of some of the leaders, who had been the victims of gratuitous insults from colonial administrators and therefore harboured rancour against the systems they represented. Here was an attractive symbolic way of thumbing their noses at their former masters and in some measure venting their spleen. Unfortunately neither model has proved successful in the event and the economic ills - quite dysfunctional to development - of Tanzania and Mozambique at least, can be laid at the door of these ill-conceived theories of development and their associated political forms. Consequently, the lack of a sufficiently large catchment pool of leaders, and the dogmatic rejection of competitive party systems has propelled all these states towards near-dictatorial one party political forms. Zimbabwe is but the latest recruit to the genre



having dismantled, in record time, the democratic constitution adopted at independence.

Last, but by no means least in importance, is the fact that many of the inherited state boundaries were drawn by the colonial powers to suit their agreed political convenience, and seem to be the result of an irrational passion for cartographical simplicity at any price! As a result, these purely arbitrary boundaries frequently divide societies, traditionally homogeneous both ethnically and culturally, and produce, either potentially or in practice, all the traumas associated with irredentist movements.

### The Republic of South Africa

Turning now to the maverick of mavericks on the African or even the world political scene, it is necessary to keep clearly in mind that the masses of condemnatory rhetoric that have been expended on the topic of apartheid have effectively obscured some essential facts, bearing directly on the theme of development in Southern Africa.

In the first place, though in a global context South Africa is not a major power, on a regional scale it is in military terms overwhelmingly strong(6) and has a well-developed supporting industrial base, which in turn rests on a vast supply of minerals, making it autarchic for practical purposes. Secondly, notwithstanding recent setbacks consequential on a drought, that has affected most of

its neighbours as well, South African agricultural production is of an order that makes it the foodstore of Africa south of the Sahara at very least.(7) Thirdly, both these strengths are reinforced by a highly rationalised organisational structure underpinning long-term forward planning, particularly in terms of economic development. A recent commentator has identified the present Prime Minister (now State President following recent constitutional changes) - P.W. Botha - as an experienced "organisation man", whose experience as Defence Minister prompted him to apply management practices developed in that capacity to the public service and the Cabinet committee structure.(8) By contrast, neighbouring African countries, though similarly richly endowed, have suffered a marked decline in productivity and therefore in standards of living since their emergence as independent states. The key element in this state of affairs appears to be managerial ineptitude, and a serious overall shortage of technical/managerial personnel in all fields following on the departure of the European colonist population after independence - 200,000 in the case of Mozambique alone. The political consequence of this disparity is that, the "front-line" label notwithstanding, these states, dedicated to the overthrow of white supremacy in South Africa, are singly and collectively incapable of making a significant dent in its formidable military carapace, and embarrassingly dependent on it for supplies of food to ensure the continued existence of large proportions of their populations. As Julius Nyrere succinctly put it

"If South Africa was the only source of shoes, I'd do without them, but if she was the sole source of supply of maize I'd go and get it"

Hence the RSA seems in material and military terms to be in a highly advantageous position vis-a-vis its neighbours. Nevertheless it need hardly be stressed that the continuing conflict between the present régime and its black majority has completely overshadowed almost all other aspects of the situation. Not only is the régime abhorred by its nearest neighbours, but is subject to a barrage of condemnation in the international community and a variety of unremitting pressures directed to its overthrow, or at very least the unconditional dismantling of apartheid. Since it cannot be denied that human injustices exist in many other societies, but frequently seem to be ignored (or at best only sporadically condemned) by world opinion, it is not surprising that white South Africans feel that they are victims of selective persecution. This colours their entire outlook and behaviour, which in turn determines their policies and therefore has a deleterious effect on the prospects for stability and development in the region as a whole.

Indeed, their self-image is best summed up in the words of the only South African in recent times to be accorded unquestioned international recognition - Jan Christian Smuts - who stated in 1947,

"The world does not know or understand us, and we feel this deeply, even when we are conscious that we are much to blame in it all"(9)

It is in this context then of a confessedly culpable, but perhaps wilfully misunderstood, international pariah, that South Africa approaches its relations with its neighbours far and near. A sense of being unjustly selected by the international community as the target for special odium pervades the thinking of the ruling 'White Tribe', and is nowhere more evident than in the pronouncements of its leaders, particularly when any attempts to make a start on dismantling the monstrous heritage of apartheid, devised by their predecessors, are condemned out of hand as mere cosmetic tinkering. Given this frame of mind then, it is not surprising that the decision-making oligarchy frames its foreign policy in the context of a belief that it is catering for the needs of a garrison state permanently at risk. This sense of siege has been enhanced by the appearance of the Soviet Union and its surrogates on the African scene and in the Indian Ocean! Therefore, to reduce the multiplicity of externally generated crises in order to deal with continuing and escalating internal disorder and violence, the government of the RSA has adopted policies towards its neighbours aimed at defusing (at least in part) an increasingly desperate situation. These policies, designed as responses to external threats, have significant effects on the region as a whole and will now be examined.

### Regional Policies of the RSA

The régime in Pretoria sees the major threat to internal stability arising from the revolutionary activities of the African National Congress (ANC) and its leadership, at least half of which espouses communist doctrines.(10) These activities are conducted from more or less safe bases inside the frontline states. Hence the RSA frequently conducts military strikes against these bases, to the outrage of the governments of those states and of the wider world. While Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Botswana have been affected by these 'surgical strikes', it is on the Namibian border with Angola that the military commitment of the RSA has been most intense and frequent.

### Namibia

The failure to find an agreed solution to the vexed question of Namibian independence continues to founder on two obstacles. The first is the claim by the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) that it alone is the representative of all the peoples of Namibia. This claim is palpably unsustainable as the composition of the Namibian population demonstrates(11), since the Owambo base of SWAPO does not amount to an absolute majority, but is persistently supported by the United Nations General Assembly, which has accorded SWAPO 'special status'. The second is the refusal of the RSA to withdraw its troops from the Angolan border or to co-operate in a UN supervised election in Namibia, until the 26,000 strong Cuban contingent is withdrawn from Angola. The strategic imperative for

this RSA demand is quite clear. A SWAPO victory in any conceivable Namibian election, (and such a victory is quite possible, even without SWAPO's overt use of violence), while the Cubans remained, would bring the prospect of externally generated communist onslaught just so much nearer the Western frontier of an already beleaguered RSA. On the other hand, if the Cubans did leave, and SWAPO did establish a government in an independent Namibia, this would probably be accepted grudgingly by Pretoria as a less than satisfactory but bearable outcome. Further, it would strengthen Pretoria's position with respect to Angola, since the UNITA forces of its protégé, Joseph Savimbi, would then be able either to defeat or to come to an accommodation with the then unsupported forces of the Angolan MPLA government. This would produce a régime distinctly more to the liking of the RSA than the present one, if only because it would be less threatening.

The cost of the Namibian venture to the RSA has been considerable in money and material, and significant in lives (mainly of white South African troops), so it is anxious to disengage as soon as possible, though not at the cost of increased risk to the régime in Pretoria from yet another effectively hostile 'frontline' state. Hence, while awaiting a chance to disengage on terms acceptable to itself, the RSA has followed a policy towards its Eastern neighbour Mozambique designed to minimise any threat emanating from it. The form that the defusing process has taken merits examination.

### Mozambique

In brief, when Samora Machel returned from exile to take up on 15 June 1975 the positions of both President and Prime Minister of a newly decolonized Mozambique, he made no secret of his Marxist-Leninist convictions, or his strong leanings towards the Soviet Union. He could barely wait to enter into Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation with the U.S.S.R. and the German Democratic Republic, and to institute collectivised agriculture. However, to his disappointment these attachments to the Eastern bloc failed to bear any tangible fruit in the way of aid other than Soviet arms. Further it was not long before a Mozambique Resistance Movement (MNR) emerged to harass FRELIMO strongholds and assets. Even though the basis of MNR is tribal rather than ideological hostility, it has proved an irritant that Machel has been unable to ignore. Further, as the chickens of his collectivised agriculture came home to roost they proved scrawny indeed.(12) Again, swift and severe South African retaliation on ANC bases in Maputo itself for bomb attacks in South Africa were both damaging and humiliating. The exodus of Portugese technicians had virtually brought rail and port activities to a halt, until (hostilities notwithstanding) South Africa provided the personnel to restore these activities, in sufficient measure at least to guarantee the continued use of Maputo as an export outlet for South African produce such as citrus fruit. Thus, even in terms strictly of self-interest and despite Machel's Marxist rhetoric, there remained a basis for cooperation and negotiation. This was further enhanced by

the necessity for both parties to come to some agreement about the electricity generated, upon its completion, by the Cahora Bassa dam, which lies in Mozambique but for which South Africa is a major customer, providing much needed revenue for Machel's government.

Thus, having an existing infrastructure of economic associations of convenience, the impetus provided on the one hand by the necessity for South Africa to reduce the number of tensions it had to handle, and on the other Machel's disappointment with the supportive performance of the Eastern bloc and the failure of his agricultural policies, was sufficient for talks to be initiated during 1983, which eventually produced an agreement known as the Nkomati Accord, signed by P.W. Botha and Machel on 16 March 1984. A major feature of this Accord was the undertaking given by each party not to aid any guerilla activities against the government of the other. Thus the ANC lost at a stroke a long standing haven (albeit of doubtful security) and the MNR its powerful backer. In a way this may have placed South Africa in the embarrassing situation of having proved itself a faithless ally, and this could rebound to its disadvantage in its relations with anti-SWAPO and anti-MPLA groups in the West, in particular Joseph Savimbi's UNITA. However, apart from the fact that the two situations are similar only in respect of their violent activities, but not their political basis, a further defusing exercise occurred on 3 October 1984 when South African, FRELIMO and MNR delegates signed a further accord known now as the Pretoria Declaration, which not only provides



(at least tentatively) for a cease-fire, but makes the quite astonishing provision that it will be monitored by South African troops. In addition South Africa has pledged that members of its contingent will supervise and/or participate in the reconstruction of roads, railway lines, communications facilities and the reticulation of electricity all of which have been damaged during the guerilla struggle against the Maputo government or have gone to rack and ruin through neglect. In short, while this latest advance in cooperation may or may not have compensated for South Africa's flawed image as a loyal supporter of guerilla movements trusting in it, it certainly has tightened the links between two improbable bedfellows and eased tensions to the indubitable benefit of both.

### Zimbabwe

Having supported the rebel régime of Ian Smith over the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), the RSA undoubtedly earned the implacable hostility of the successor régime of Robert Mugabe. Nevertheless, the cold hard fact of Zimbabwe's economic position is that it is substantial measure dependent on basic food supplies from the RSA and is locked into the railway system with respect to its own exports, the Zambian-Tanzanian railway being inadequate. It is therefore vulnerable to threats by the RSA in these two sensitive areas. Notwithstanding Mugabe's support of sanctions against the RSA, even if it severely hurts the people of Zimbabwe, it remains to be seen how far this heady rhetoric can actually be

implemented in a state still deeply divided by tribal and factional conflicts - of which the RSA will take any advantage offering.

### Grand Strategy of the RSA

So far this study has concentrated on regional conflicts affecting development. However, there is abundant evidence that over and above the self-image of a garrison state, South Africa, under its latest leadership, has a wider view of its place and role in an international community, divided into hostile camps locked in confrontational postures.

While it may be previous and hasty to characterise the style of the present leadership with the outward-looking view of Smuts (a renegade Boer in the view of the verkrampste section of South African Society), there is much to suggest that the unquestionably verligte stance of the present administration first displayed signs of a less-than-parochial view under Vorster, and has burgeoned under P.W. Botha into a fully-fledged and articulated vision, described by its author as "total national strategy". Far from being confined to a laager of its own making, this philosophy promulgates initially the concept of "a constellation of states", economically and politically interdependent to ensure prosperity and stability to Southern Africa, and give to it an economic viability currently possessed by South Africa alone. It then proceeds to a concept of a Southern Hemispheric belt of states associated by common interest - Argentina, Brazil,

South Africa, Australia and even India. The final phase of this concert of convenience is the underwriting of the Hemisphere's security by the U.S. This is grand design indeed, and may well be misunderstood to the point of being dismissed as chimerical, but a closer look at the reorganised foreign-policy decision-making structure shows that it is by no means the pipe-dream of a single idealist but underwritten by important sections of society. There is plenty of evidence that policy-formulation and decision-making now involves inputs not merely from members of a cabinet, but from government departments, the defence community (on whose strength and resolution so much else depends), the business and financial sectors of society and the academic world.(13) Opposing forces to the fulfilment of the new vision are the intransigent verkrampte Afrikaaner minority still sufficiently influential not to be ignored, and the reluctance of neighbouring states to participate, as demonstrated by their attempts to found a 'counter-constellation'.(14) Last, but by no means least, is the reluctance so far of the U.S., even under the Reagan administration, to lower significantly the barriers of diplomatic reserve that cut it off from greater political interaction with the South African régime, and this is another factor inhibiting the swifter implementation of the new style South African polity.

### External Political Determinants of Development in Southern Africa

Having considered the complex web of interdependence that exists between the RSA and the frontline states, it is now necessary to take some cognizance of the influence exerted by political actors external to the political scene in Southern Africa, and largely beyond the control of any of its component states.

First, and most important, is the enormous economic involvement of Western industrialised states in the region, but particularly in the RSA. The magnitude of this investment is of an order that makes its orderly dismantlement nearly impossible. This correspondingly diminishes the effectiveness of the threat not to invest any further, for in fact little new investment has been made by the Western powers over the last four or five years. What there is, already in place, still constitutes a very strong bond indeed of shared interests.

Second, the assumed dependence of Western industries (particularly those of military significance) is of an order that makes rapid disengagement and substitution from alternative sources very difficult if not impossible.(15)

Third, the appearance of a rival political influential - the USSR - on the regional scene constitutes not merely a further threat to regional stability, but a serious potential economic hazard for Western interests, which therefore are increasingly anxious to see a

settlement of the tensions prevailing between the RSA and its neighbours. By a strange irony the USSR itself is the only serious alternative source of the strategic minerals just mentioned. Therefore, the supplanting of the white régime in the RSA by one more amenable to Soviet influence would put the USSR in a commanding position with respect to monopolising the supply of those minerals and denying them to the West if it suited Soviet purposes(16) - which it almost certainly does, since the doctrine of strategic denial, even in its most elementary form is clearly applicable to the confrontational situation that currently exists between the West and the Soviet bloc.

Hence, while a well orchestrated litany of condemnation, accompanied by cries for disinvestment, total sanctions on all trade, and even for collective armed intervention is now an all too familiar background noise, those most closely affected - the black workers in RSA industries and their white counterparts in Western industries dependent on South African minerals - are in very real danger of unemployment without hope of recovery. This would be the single most important destabilizing factor, and therefore an acute inhibitor of development potential in the region.

Not only would widespread unemployment result in Southern Africa, but even on a smaller scale, (in say Britain), this would weaken the West's ability to resist further Soviet pressures (exerted through front organizations bearing various 'peace' tags) to concede in some

measure unilateral disarmament, which the Soviets regard as their summum bonum. Indeed, it is quite clear that the only party to profit from destabilization in Southern Africa would be the USSR.

In short, the chorus of condemnation emanating from sources most likely to suffer from the implementation of the measures they advocate, seems to reflect an almost suicidal tendency to ensure their own inclusion in a cataclysmic debacle of which they are the co-authors. They will have proved the victims of their own default from pragmatic realpolitik policies in favour of sanctimonious and minatory generalizations, that have lost sight of both Biblical and Hobbesian view of mankind and its manifest moral infirmities.

### Conclusion

Of course it can and will be argued that there is no real hope of progress without the immediate and unconditional dismantling of apartheid, but the recent enfranchisement of Coloured and Indian minorities (however reluctantly accepted by them as a second best solution to their participation in the political process) can be viewed as a step in the direction of proposed enfranchisement of the black majority, on terms at present unspecified, but hopefully likely in the long run to meet the demands of all but the most intransigent elements, both in South Africa and in the neighbouring States, towards which the new policies of collaboration are being extended as part of the master plan to bring greater stability to the region. And it is

on stability and stability alone that the developmental future of the whole of Southern Africa depends. To achieve it demands concerted effort by all component states along national lines rather than rhetorical stances. Should these efforts fail, then there seems no future for the whole region but to be lost in the fulfilment of the doomsday scenarios, painted with relish by critics removed by distance from any risk of involvement and oblivious to the fact that such scenarios are unlikely to be tailored to suit the convenience of their authors. Perhaps some of these critics, particularly if they are members of the 'Old Commonwealth' or even Empire, with their own aboriginal populations would do well to take a second look at their own records and echo with the leader writer of The Times

"We have our racial problems too... we are not holier than Mr Botha: we are merely luckier".(17)

Ultimately each of the actors in this grim drama would be well advised to heed the sage aphorism propounded by Hans Morgenthau in his justly celebrated work Politics Among Nations pinpointing the cardinal determinant of successful policy making in interstate relations -

'Diplomacy, one might say, is the brains of national power, as national morale is its soul. If its vision is blurred, its judgement defective, and its determination feeble, all the advantages of

geographical location, of self-sufficiency in food, raw materials, and industrial production, of military preparedness, of size and quality of population will in the long run avail a nation little'.

W.T. ROY



NOTES

- (1) The acme of this is Gandhi's vision of self-sufficient villages peopled by individuals with an improbably saintly penchant for plain living and high thinking. However, a more practical and realistic example is the outback Australian aborigine, reputedly blessed with an almost mystical rapport with his seemingly harsh and forbidding environment.
- (2) H.D. Lasswell Politics: Who gets what, when, how. McGraw Hill  
New York 1936
- (3) See Table 1.
- (4) The comparatively easygoing (even lackadaisical) attitude of Portuguese colonial officials and a tolerant attitude to mixed marriages, contrasted sharply with their aloof and patronising but hardworking and frequently dedicated British counterparts, who saw themselves in the role of Platonic Guardians. It never seems to have occurred to the former that their seemingly never ending trusteeship warranted training indigenous successors, whereas the latter clearly believed that their colonial charges were incapable of succession, and therefore it was not worth the effort of training them for the role.

- (5) During the last twenty-five years of the century and a half of British rule in India, the top echelons of the Indian Civil Service were 'Indianized' only in part, leaving a decimated force to carry on the tasks of administration after 1947. In Africa the average British colony had existed for approximately only seventy-five years, so the degree of indigenization was correspondingly miniscule.
- (6) The total armed forces number 106,400 including 64,000 conscripts, but the total mobilizable strength is 423,400. (Source: The Military Balance 1985-86.) Further, the arms embargo enforced by the U.N. has made South Africa attempt (and in large measure achieve) autarchy in conventional weapons, with the exception of long-distance reconnaissance/maritime surveillance planes and blue-water surface vessels.
- (7) South Africa's population has grown at the rate of 2.1% per year over the last twenty years, but agricultural production has consistently stayed ahead with an average annual increase of 3.4%. This makes South Africa virtually self-sufficient in food and also enables it to sell 20% of its output abroad, mainly to neighbouring African states.

- (8) D. Geldenhuys The Diplomacy of Isolation, Macmillan, Johannesburg, 1986, pp. 90-91 records that, as a consequence of rationalization, 39 government departments were reduced to 22, and 20 ad hoc Cabinet Committees replaced by 4 of which the State Security Council is the most important. These committees meet regularly and have a regular input from relevant government departments, which also constitute Planning Branches linked with each Cabinet Committee thus

Planning Branch linked with Cabinet Committee

Security	State Security Council
Economic	Economic Affairs
Social	Social Affairs
Constitutional	Internal Affairs

- (9) Ibid. p. 205.
- (10) Tom Lodge 'The Second Consultative Conference of the ANC' South Africa International Quarterly, Vol. XVI, No 2, Oct. 1985, Johannesburg, pp. 90-96.
- (11) See Table 2.

- (12) Since 68% of Mozambique's 12 million people are engaged in agriculture, the decline of agricultural food production by nearly 75%, to say nothing of a 50% fall in cash crops such as sisal and cotton, is nothing short of catastrophic. Again, hardnosed Soviet trade practices result in the U.S.S.R. taking only 3.8% of Mozambique's exports whereas the U.S., E.E.C. and South Africa take a substantial 50.1%.
- (13) J. Roherty 'Beyond Limpopo and Zambesi: South Africa's Strategic Horizons', South Africa International, Vol.14, No.1, July 1983, p. 323.
- (14) Soon after P.W. Botha had put forward the idea of a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), five states in the region- Botswana, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania - considered the alternative proposal in May 1979 at Gabarone, Botswana. This was followed by a meeting in July 1979 at Arusha, Tanzania, which set up a Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference-SADCC (pronounced SADEC), which formalised its objectives in the Lusaka Declaration of April 1980. The initial group has now been joined by Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Hence CONSAS presently consists of the Republic of South Africa and its constituent homelands of which Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei are deemed by it to be independent states, though they are not recognised by the

international community. SADEC on the other hand has set out to achieve an autarchic 'counter-constellation' of Southern African States with the specific over-riding objective of freeing themselves of the shackles of economic dependence on South Africa.

(15) See Table 3.

(16) See Table 4.

(17) Cited by E.W. Anderson and G.H. Blake op. cit. 'Alone, alone, all, all alone', The Times, 9 March 1982.

TABLE IBASIC DATA ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES

STATE	POPULATION	ESTIMATED GDP (YEAR)	ESTIMATED DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (YEAR)	TOTAL ARMED FORCES
Angola	8,000,000	\$4.186bn (1982)	\$780.731m (1982)	49,500 +20,000 Cuban Troops 6,000 Instructors 800 E. Germans 700 USSR 7,000 SWAPO
Botswana	980,000	\$1.051bn (1983/4)	\$26.663m (1982)	3000
Malawi	6,833,000	\$1.199bn (1984)	\$19.740m (1984)	5250
Mozambique	12,324,000	\$3.008bn (1983)	\$203.279m (1982)	15,800

R.S.A	29,000,000	\$64.495bn	\$2.147bn	106,400
	Black 15,250,000	(1984/5)		(Reserves)
	White 4,600,000			(317,000)
	Coloured 2,800,000			
	Asian 805,000			
	Homelands 5,500,000			
Tanzania	21,300,000	\$5,534bn	\$307.31m	40,350
		(1981/82)	1982/3)	
Zambia	6,800,000	\$2.638bn	\$325.887	16,200
		(1984)	(1981/2)	
Zimbabwe	8,500,000	\$5.775bn	\$238.953m	42,000
		(1982/3	(1984/85)	

**NOTE:** All expenditures are shown in U.S.\$ at the average conversion rate for the national financial year.

**SOURCE:** THE MILITARY BALANCE 1985/86, IISS, LONDON, 1986.

Table 2Composition of Namibian Population 1980

<u>Group</u>	<u>%</u>
Owambo	46.3
Whites	11.9
Damara	8.7
Herero	6.6
Kavango	6.5
Nama	4.3
Coloured	3.7
Eastern Caprivi	3.3
Bushmen	3.0
Tswana and others	2.6
Rehoboth Basters	2.2
Kaokolanders	0.9

Source: South Africa Yearbook: 1983, Johannesburg.



TABLE 3  
SOUTH AFRICAN MINERAL EXPORTS

Importing Country	% of RSA Mineral Production
W. Europe	20.4
Japan	19.6
W. Germany	18.2
U.K.	16.6
U.S.	10.6
Canada	4.1
TOTAL	89.5
These minerals represent the following percentages of Western consumption.	
Platinum	99
Chrome	84
Manganese	84
Flourspar	50
Titanium	40

Source: W.T. Roy. 'South Africa and the Indian Ocean',  
South African International, Vol. X, No. 4, April  
1980, Johannesburg.

TABLE 4


## HYPOTHETICAL SOVIET CONTROL OVER MINERAL PRODUCTION

## AND RESERVES SHOWN AT % OF WORLD FIGURES


<u>Mineral</u>	<u>Production %</u>	<u>Reserves %</u>
Platinum	94	99
Chrome	67	84
Manganese	62	93
Gold	72	68
Vanadium	70	97
Flourspar	26	50
Iron Ore	35	46
Asbestos	47	35
Uranium	43	17

Source: W.T. Roy 'South Africa and the Indian Ocean' in South Africa International, Vol. X, No. 4, April 1980, Johannesburg.

Map 1



# Southern Africa (minerals)



Source: Andrew Boyd 'An Atlas of World Affairs' (7th Edition) N.Y. 1983