Committee VII
In Search of Understanding
Among the Monotheistic
Religions

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Absolute Values and the Unity of the Sciences

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Absolute Values and the Unity of Religions

In convening the Committee VII, "In Search for Understanding Among the Monotheistic Religions" of the Sixteen International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences, Professor Raphael Patai has noted the contradictory legacy of the three great monotheistic religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. On the one hand, their teachings concerning such basic themes as "the nature of the deity, the relationship between God and man, the duties of man toward God and toward his fellow men, and the destiny of man" constitute the fundamental, unifying behavioral norms for at least half of the human race and are among the greatest and the most ancient of humanity's spiritual values. <1>

At the same time, Professor Patai reminds us of the dark side of the great religions. In their exclusivism they have been involved in, if not directly responsible for, many of the most catastrophic conflicts between communities.

Moreover, some of the worst religiously engendered strife has been within as well as between communities. The original conflict between Jews and Christians was, for example, intra- rather than inter-communal. According to Professor Patai, without genuine understanding between the different

religions, humanity will be unable "to achieve unity, harmony and global cooperation."

Given the conflicting truth claims of the monotheistic religions, Patai argues that "clergymen" committed to the values of their own religion are ill-equipped to create the intellectual and scholarly foundation for fruitful dialogue and understanding. If the task can be accomplished, it will be by historians of religion and other scholars who study religion "from the point of view of dispassionate scholarly analysis" and "without a priori commitment to a single historically developed formulation of faith." Patai has proposed that a committee of such scholars be assembled to explore the differences and similarities among the monotheistic religions in order to identify "the common denominator among them" and in the hope of "developing a basis for common religious values and a unity of religious knowledge."

It is clear from a study of the papers presented in Committee VII that the participants, who come from the Buddhist and Confucian as well as the Jewish, Christian and Islamic traditions, have made an informed, earnest and sincere attempt to advance the cause of religious understanding and dialogue. It is less clear, at least to this observer, that even if it were possible to achieve a consensus among historians of religion committed to

dispassionate study that genuine interreligious understanding would be achieved without the more difficult, and perhaps impossible task, of achieving a consensus among committed religious leaders. Historians of religion can influence those with moral and spiritual authority within their respective traditions; they themselves do not possess the requisite authority.

Let us consider briefly the limitations of dispassionate historical analysis. This problem has been explored many times, one of the most authoritative being that undertaken in the early years of this century by the late German Protestant sociologist, Ernst Troeltsch. Although Troeltsch addressed himself primarily to the question of the compatibility of modern historical scholarship with traditional Christian faith, his conclusions are equally applicable to Judaism and, perhaps, to Islam. For the sake of clarity and simplicity, I will confine the discussion of Troeltsch to Judaism and Christianity. Although they affirm obviously contradictory views concerning the way God is said to have related to humanity, both religions claim to be exclusively and objectively true. Their claims rest ultimately on belief in the supernatural inspiration of Scripture or, at least, the truth of Scripture's assertion that certain events were a direct expression of God's unconditional involvement in human history. In the case of Judaism such events include

the covenant at Sinai; in the case of Christianity they include the Incarnation, Death and Resurrection of Jesus Christ. In both cases, the traditional believer could not be faithful to his or her tradition and exclude decisive divine involvement. Yet, as Troeltsch has observed, that is precisely what the critical historian must exclude. Such historians start with the methodological assumption that the Bible and decisively important religious events can only be understood in terms of their historical context. The methods by which one studies such phenomena can be no different from those used to investigate any other ancient document or event. To the extent that historians of religion meet Professor Patai's requirement of "dispassionate scholarly analysis," they must treat the documents and events of their respective traditions as they would any profane document or event. According to Troeltsch, from the historian's perspective, every expression of truth and value is historically conditioned. The critical historian must therefore reject supernatural intervention as a principle of explanation. <2>

But, to reject supernatural intervention is to reject revelation and prophecy which are the ultimate foundation of all three monotheistic traditions. Far from being qualified to discern a common basis for religious values, historians of religion, by virtue of the *critical distance* they must assume exclude themselves from positions of authority within

their own community, at least in their scientific roles. It is very likely that any joint conclusions about a common core underlying the monotheistic traditions they might reach would be rejected by those with genuine religious authority within each of the traditions. Moreover, as one reads the papers of Professors Donald W. Dayton and Amira El Azhary Sonbol, it becomes apparent that too great a stress on shared elements would be likely to engender a conservative reaction emphasizing supernaturally-legitimated distinctive elements of believe and ritual. <3>

If there is to be credible movement toward greater unity of the great religions, it will come from religious leaders of unquestioned authority rather than historians whose vocation demands a posture of critical distance. One of the most important functions of religion has been to define and provide supernatural legitimation for a universe of moral obligation. Those within the defined universe are bound by certain expectations of trust, mutual support and altruistic behavior. Outsiders can have no such expectations. Elsewhere, I have attempted to demonstrate that the traditional Christian moral universe was so defined that Jews were regarded not only as outsiders but as unremitting and unconditional enemies. <4> This is clear in the following passage from the Fourth Gospel in which Jesus is depicted as responding to those Jews who challenge his authority:

If God were your Father, you would love me, for I proceeded and came forth from God; I came not of my own accord, but he sent me. Why do you not understand what I say? It is because you cannot bear to hear my word. You are of your father the devil, and your will is to do your father's desires....He who is of God hears the words of God; the reason why you do not hear them is that you are not of God. (John 8:42-44, 47, italics added)

When we add to this divinely-legitimated depiction of the Jews as the Devil's spawn, the accusation that they were and have remained responsible for the Crucifixion of Christ and, as such, are murderers of God, the social consequence was the casting out of the Jews from any conceivable shared universe of moral obligation with Christians. An important reason why Jews of all ages and condition without exception were so easily targeted for utter extermination by the Nazis, with almost no opposition from either European churches or society, was that they were regarded as not only strangers but as wholly outside of any conceivable Christian universe of moral obligation. No act of violence, no matter how obscene, was regarded as inappropriate in dealing with a people who had been depicted as murderers of God. There is no other

defamation of one religion by the sacred writings of another which remotely approaches the deicide accusation in its potential for genocide. In fairness, however, it must be stated that since World War II both the Roman Catholic Church and the mainline Protestant churches have sought to limit, if not to eliminate, the destructive potentialities nherent in the traditional Christian depiction of Jews and Judaism.

Nevertheless, just as monotheistic religion has been an agency of exclusion, it has been one of the most effective agencies for inclusion, especially when it became necessary to form new communities when older ties of kinship, common descent and ethnicity broke down. As we shall see, it is very likely that all three monotheistic religions originally took hold largely because they met such a need.

In his paper, Professor Benjamin Uffenheimer observes that "the basic religious experience which forged Jewish thought and mentality for all generations is the Divine revelation at Mount Sinai." <5> Professor Uffenheimer also notes that the biblical sources (Exodus, chapters 19-20, 24 and Deuteronomy 33:5) which describe the Sinai revelation reflect a "primeval historical event," namely, " the coronation ceremony of God as the King of Israel." This event left a decisive and an indelible impression on the community of Israel. Professor Uffenheimer further observes

that modern biblical research has concluded that the Sinai covenant ceremony between God and Israel has a close affinity to the covenant treaties employed by Hittite suzereigns of the second millenium in order to assure the fealty of their vassal kings.

Biblical scholars have more or less arrived at a consensus that the "Hebrews" and the "mixed multitude" that left Egypt under the leadership of Moses were not a single people but a group of hostages and escaped slaves of diverse religious and ethnic background. <6> They shared a common hatred of their Egyptian overlords and a common yearning for liberation but little else. As soon as they found themselves in the wilderness, their survival depended upon their finding a new and compelling basis for unity and trust beyond shared antipathy and outcast status.

In the ancient Near East only religion could provide the basis for such unity. Absent kinship, the diverse peoples could only become one if they were united by a common God. This God could not be the ancestral god of any of the diverse peoples who had together escaped from Egypt nor could He be the God of a particular location. Kinship and place were sources of division and mistrust. Moreover, the God would have to exceed the power of the gods of the Egyptian pantheon as well as the Egyptian god-king. At Sinai the voice of this God was heard, proclaiming that he was

indeed the Author of their shared experiences: "I am the Lord your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage." (Exod. 20:2). The God of Sinai demanded that the fugitives abjure the gods of their ancestors and become one people in loyalty to him: "You shall have no other gods before me....for I the Lord your God am a jealous God." (Exod. 20:3-5).

God's insistence on exclusive worship had both political and religious implications. It united the fugitives and barred them from returning to the worship of their ancestral deities. Perhaps for the first time in human history strangers were able to enter into a shared community which was not dependent upon kinship and ethnicity. After the "Hebrews" were united under God, it was natural for them retrospectively to interpret their old gods as manifestations of the God they now worshipped and to claim that they had been kin all along. For our purposes it is important to recall once agan that the monotheistic exclusivism of the Bible functioned initially to include rather than exclude and that only religion was capable of creating a new, inclusive community. Without the binding force of religion, the only basis for community would have been utilitarian rationales based upon shared need and comparative advantage. Even if it had been possible to form a community on such a basis in the ancient Middle East, a questionable assumption at best, the community would have

sundered apart as soon as some of its members of perceived that altruistic loyalty to the community was inconsistent with their individual or familial interests.

We must, however, take note of the cost involved in the creation of new communities by Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The problem has been succinctly stated by Professor Gedaliahu Stroumsa at the end of his paper: "There is no identity without boundaries and no boundaries with(out) someone on the other side." <7> Inclusion inevitably entailed exclusion.

As noted above, the Hittite covenant treaties served as a model for the biblical covenant. The Hittite suzereign required a credible device by which he could be assured that vassal rulers, who shared neither his gods nor his origin, could pledge their fealty. The Hittite treaties involved the suzereign's rehearsal of the past benefits he had bestowed upon his vassals, the promise of protection to loyal and obedient vassals, and dire threats concerning the consequences for the vassal of infidelity. At the conclusion of the lord's discourse, it was incumbent on the vassals to take an oath, that is, a conditional self-curse, in which the vassal's own gods, not the suzereign's, were called upon to punish to the utmost any failure to abide by the treaty. We can discern a similar pattern in the covenant ceremony at Sinai save that the "Hebrews" pledged their fealty to God

rather than an earthly suzereign and call upon him to curse them should they be wanting in fidelity.

The biblical doctrine of covenant and election and the radical transcendence of the God did not take hold because of the intuition that monotheism's ascription of a single, ultimate source to all phenomena constituted a fundamental advance in rationality. On the contrary, an important reason for the communal acceptance of these ideas was that they enabled believers to meet an overwhelmingly important practical need, the creation of a shared community of trust and obligation that transcended kinship and past history. As technology facilitates ever greater communication and contact between the peoples of the world, that need has become even more urgent today than it was in ancient times.

Moreover, both Christianity and Islam met the same need for their initial constituencies. When Paul of Tarsus asserted that "There is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor freeman, male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus" (Gal. 3:28), he was breaking with past tradition and creating a new community under God. According to Montgomery Watt, a primary social function of early Islam, as with all religions which began with a decisive break with past tradition, was to create a community for those who had no community or whose community had disappeared. <8> Commenting on Watt, George E. Mendenhall adds that a further function

of such new religions was to create a community for "those whose community was no longer adequate to meet the stresses placed upon them by rapid change. <9>

In his paper on "The Hindu View of Monotheism"

Professor P. L. Bhargava offers the following comment on the concept of God in Judaism, "It is even said that He had a contract with His people only if they would serve Him. This, however, does not represent the essential feature of God in Judaism." <10> In reality, the idea of a covenant between God and his people is, as Benjamin Uffenheimer has pointed out, fundamental to Judaism. Although we cannot go into detail in this context, the idea of covenant and election is also fundamental to Christianity. <11>

It is not surprising that Professor Bhargava finds such an idea of God strange. He begins his essay by describing Hinduism as Arya dharma, the way of the Aryans. There is evolution and change in the way of the Aryans, but there is no radical break between the oldest religious traditions of the Hindus and their contemporary traditions. Admitting an exclusivist element in Hinduism, Professor Bhargava nevertheless chides western religious thinkers for "their exclusivist attitude...according to which no non-Semitic religion possesses the idea of monotheism." <12> He concludes his essay with the assertion that "...the Hindu concept of God agrees in essentials with that found in the

three monotheistic religions of the west.... " Apart from the fact that the radical transcendence of the biblical God has no real counterpart in Hinduism-Professor Bhargava asserts that the conception of God as antaryanin or inner controller ... is distinctly Hindu-, the insights of contemporary biblical scholarship reveal that there are vast differences between the Judaeo-Christian conception of God and the Hindu conception. At least in their inception, the respective communities created by Judaism and Christianity were artificial communities which originated with radical breaks with their members' ancestral traditions. To this day no person is born a Christian. One becomes a Christian by dying to one's natural self and being reborn through baptism in Christ as Paul of Tarsus taught: "You have been buried with him when you were baptized; and by baptism, too, you have been raised up with him through your faith in the power of God who raised him from the dead." (Col.2:12; see Rom. 6:3,4) Every Jew and every Christian knows that the God whom he or she worships is not the same deity originally worshipped by his or her pagan ancestors. When Joshua assembled the tribes of Israel at Shechem to renew the covenant, he charged them to reject the gods originally worshipped by their ancestors and worship God alone: " Banish the gods whom your fathers worshipped besides the Euphrates and in Egypt and worship the Lord." (Josh. 24:15)

One is born into the Hindu community and, if, as

Professor Bharvava asserts, Hinduism has a monotheistic high
god, that god is in no sense a stranger to their most

archaic memories. To the extent that Hinduism is ultimately
monotheistic, its monotheism satisfies a need which is at
once religious and an intellectual, the need to discern
rationality, coherence and unity in a single ultimate
principle of being and explanation underlying all reality.

Semitic monotheism also satisfied that need. Nevertheless,
as we have seen, another need was decisive in both the rise
of these religions and their polemic attitude toward nonScriptural religions, namely, the need to find a rationale
that would permit strangers to organize themselves into
communities which transcended race, kinship and ethnicity.

This is in no sense to fault Hinduism or any other non-western religion. The origins of Hinduism were rooted neither in the theo-political needs of desert outcasts nor, in the case of Christianity, an urbanized congery of individuals of mixed ethnic and social background whose dominant characteristic was "status inconsistency," that is, their achieved status was higher than their attributed status. <13>

In reality, the difference between a natural religion and an artificial religion of covenant and election remains an issue of overwhelming importance to our day. Although the

United States has a population which is very largely of western and Christian origin, it has been able to absorb millions of Asians whereas it has been almost impossible for Japan to absorb any Asian immigrants. Usually, the insular character of the Japanese people living in a very small space is given as the explanation of this phenomenon. While this is undoubtedly an element, the religious difference between the two countries may be more to the point. Japan is in a very real sense a "family nation" whose indigenous religion and imperial dynasty go back to its most archaic roots. There have been changes and development in Shinto, but nowhere do we find the kind of radical discontinuity between archaic roots and contemporary religion which characterizes the biblical religions. One must be born a Japanese. There is nothing "artificial" about indigenous Japanese religion and society. <14> By contrast, more than any other western country, the United States is the cultural and religious heir of the covenant tradition of Scripture which has enabled people of diverse origins to share in a common community. With the rarest of exceptions, the process of legal naturalization by which today's new Americans and the ancestors of most living Americans became citizens is unknown in Japan. Moreover, in no other western country does a written constitution play so continuously important a role in the nation's political life as the United States. Americans are willing to allow the authoritative interpreters of that constitution to decide without resort

to force on issues in which cherished social patterns can be overturned and billions of dollars can become forfeit. Given the diverse origins of the American people, this willingness to abide by the authority of a written document rather than by unwritten ancestral custom may very well be a reflection of America's biblical heritage.

Buddhism resembles Judaism and Christianity in that it involves a break with an earlier religion. It functions ultimately to liberate men and women from all ties of community which must inevitably intensify pain and suffering rather than to create a new community out of the dissolution of old ones. The Buddha is said to have taught, "Let therefore no man love anything; loss of the beloved is evil. Those who love nothing and hate nothing have no fetters." <15> This is hardly the basis upon which the bonds of group solidarity can be forged. Nevertheless, as we shall see, Mahayana Buddhism does offer a basis for the unity of the diverse peoples and creeds of humanity.

Like Professor Bhargava, Professor Masao Abe stresses the exclusiveness and intolerance of biblical monotheism and contrasts Buddhist nondualistic oneness with monotheistic oneness. According to Professor Abe, monotheistic oneness is realized in the God who is the transcendent ruler of the universe, a God who is over against us, an idea conveyed by

the German term for "object," ein Gegenstand, that which stands over against. Professor Abe points out that the transcendent quality of the monotheistic God separates divinity from the particularity and multiplicity of the concrete world. By contrast, non-dualistic oneness is realized in the here and now. When monotheistic oneness is overcome, we arrive at the point which is "neither one nor two nor many, but which is appropriately referred to as "zero". Professor Abe reasons that, "Since the 'zero' is free from any form of duality, true oneness can be realized only through the realization of the 'zero'. <16>

Professor Abe points out that Mahayana Buddhist counsels, "Do not abide in samsara or nirvana." If one is capable of attaining nirvana, one is likely to forget the suffering of fellow human beings still involved in the process of transmigration. Instead, one should, without reification of either samsara or nirvana, proceed from the one to the other. No religion overcomes the temptation to idolatry, that is the absolutizing of that which is relative, transient and insubstantially, more completely than does Buddhism. In the Buddhist denial of the absolute character of all communal ties, we have an alternative path to unity fostered by covenantal religions. Abe counsels followers of the three Semitic monotheistic religions "to place more emphasis on the nonsubstantial aspect of their 'God" than on God's self-affirmative authoritative aspects."

Professor Abe's paper invites comparison with the papers of Professors Syed Ausaf Ali, Adriaan Peperzak and John Cooper. Professor Cooper argues that the divisiveness of religion can be overcome by the "perennial philosophy" thesis, that there has been a permanent core teaching in the great world religions (namely, 'the unity of the knower and the known')." <17> Professor Cooper follows the work of Frithjof Schuon in formulating his position. <18> Cooper argues that the distinction between the "exoteric and the esoteric" is crucial to the "perennial philosophy" approach. Most human beings have been exoterics who have attached themselves to "the specific forms" of their traditions. They are more or less the literalists who take their traditions at face value. There is, however, a "spiritual elite," the esoteric minority, who have "transcended in diverse ways specific communities, creeds, and form. At the esoteric level, there is, according to Cooper and Schuon, a transcendent unity of the world religions.

Cooper is a non-mystical Protestant. If they are not themselves mystics, both Professors Ali and Peperzak have a profound sympathy for and understanding of the mystical tradition within their respective communities. Professor Ali takes a position not unlike Cooper's distinction of the exoteric and the esoteric when he writes, "To seek real unity, one must go beyond the historical and dogmatic straightjacket. This is possible in only one way: to rise

above the sensory perceptions and try to discover Reality through mystical, spiritual, intuitive experience." <19> Although time will not permit, I believe it can be demonstrated that in its essentials the union of the Infinite Reality and the finite mind to which Professor Ali refers resembles very closely the non-dualistic unity to which Professor Abe refers. Similarly, a case can be made that there is a common core of religious experience underlying the via purgativa, the via illuminativa, and the via unitiva described by Professor Peperzak and Buddhist nondualistic unity. <20> Moreover, Professor Peperzak implicitly accepts the distinction between the exoteric majority and the esoteric elite when he describes the words "mystic" and "mystical" as referring to the "mystery" of Christian faith and the special "uncommon" aspects of mystical experience. The expteric-esoteric distinction is also implicit in Suddhist conception of non-dualistic enlightenment (bodhi). At the esoteric level, Professor Ali is undoubtedly correct when he refers to the unity of "the mystics of the different traditions."

Nevertheless, there is no unity. Apart from the fact of intra- and inter-communal strife which has until now always carried over into the religious sphere, there is the further fact that religious communities are more likely to be shaped decisively by the exoteric majority than the esoteric minority. That is why I began this paper with the suggestion that only the committed religious leader and not the

historian or theologian could create the basis for interreligious unity. I would now add that such a religious leader must have the capacity to move the exoteric majority, I would further argue that enhanced domains of religious unity and harmony can only come, if indeed they can come at all, through religious transformations in the mass of human beings. I have no idea what these transformations might be like, save that they will, in all likelihood, take the form of some new variant of either Scriptural religion or Buddhism and that they will come when we least expect them. Moses, Buddha, Confucius, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Jesus, Paul and Mohammed were able to foster the dramatic, mass religious transformations their times called for. I have no doubt that we have by no means witnessed the end of that process.

Notes

¹ Raphael Patai, "In Search of Unity Among the Monotheistic Religions," Unpublished Committee Proposal for the Sixteenth International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences.

² Ernst Troeltsch, *Die Absolutheit des Christentums* (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1902), p. 41. For a contemporary investigation of the problem, see Van A. Harvey, *The HIstorian and the Believer: The Morality of Historical Knowledge and Religious Belief* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966).

³ Donald W. Dayton, "Fundamentalism in Christianity: Problems and Trends: The Problem of Definition" and "Women and Equality in Islam," unpublished papers presented at Committee VII of the Sixteenth International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences, Atlanta, George, November 26-29, 1987.

- 4 See Richard L. Rubenstein and John Roth, *Approaches to Auschwitz: The Holocaust and its Legacy* (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1987), pp. 38-65.
- 5 Benjamin Uffenheimer, "Judaism-A Way of Life," unpublished paper presented at Committee VII of the Sixteenth International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences, Atlanta, George, November 26-29, 1987.
- 6 See George E. Mendenhall, *The Tenth Generation: The Origins of the Biblical Tradition* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 19-20; Moshe Greenberg, *The Hab/piru*, American Oriental Series, vol. 39 (New Haven: 1955), pp. 55-57.
- Gedaliahu G. Stroumsa, "Outsiders: Identity and Intolerance in Monotheistic Religions, Some Preliminary Remarks," unpublished paper presented at Committee VII of the Sixteenth International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences, Atlanta, George, November 26-29, 1987.
- 8 Montgomery Watt, *Mohammed at Mecca* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 151-53.
- 9 George E. Mendenhall, op. cit., p. 64.
- 10 P. L. Bhargava, "The Hindu View of Monotheism," unpublished paper presented at Committee VII of the Sixteenth International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences, Atlanta, George, November 26-29, 1987.
- 11 See Richard L. Rubenstein, *My Brother Paul* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 136 ff.
- 12 P.L. Bhargava, op. cit., p. 18.
- 13 See Wayne A. Meeks, *The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 51-73.
- 14 For a discussion of the contrast between western biblical religion and indigenous Japanese religion, see Richard L. Rubenstein, "Religion and the Rise of Capitalism: The Case of Japan," *The World and I*, February 1987, pp. 627-641. See also Isaiah ben-Dassan, *Japan and the Jews*, trans. Richard L. Cage (Tokyo: John Weatherhill, 1985). Ben-Dassan is the Israeli pseudonym of a Japanese writer.
- 15 F. Max Muller, trans., Sacred Books of the East: The Dhamma-pada, Vol. X, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1881), XVI.211.
- 16 Masao Abe, "A Buddhist View of Monotheism: Monotheistic Oneness and Nondualistic Oneness," unpublished paper presented at Committee VII of the Sixteenth International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences, Atlanta, George, November 26-29, 1987.
- 17 John W. Cooper, "The Christ-Logos in Jesus and Beyond: A Christian Perspective on Unity Among the Monotheistic Religions," unpublished paper presented at Committee VII of the Sixteenth International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences, Atlanta, George, November 26-29, 1987.

18 Frithjof Schuon, *The Transcendental Unity of Religions*, rev. ed., trans. Peter Townsend (New York: Harper and Row, 1975),p. 25.

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- 19 Syed Ausaf Ali, "The Mystical Way to Unity in Islam," unpublished paper presented at Committee VII of the Sixteenth International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences, Atlanta, George, November 26-29, 1987.
- Adriaan Peperzak, "Christian Mysticism," unpublished paper presented at Committee VII of the Sixteenth International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences, Atlanta, George, November 26-29, 1987.