COMMITTEE V
The Search for Global Ideology

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NIETZSCHE'S STRICTURES AGAINST PHILOSOPHICAL FINALITY

by

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1.

In comparison to earlier centuries our planet earth has become one in many respects. There is a world traffic, a worldwide commerce, a net of media is spread all over the continents and islands, and two "world wars" have been fought in the course of our century - just to single out some of the most obvious and outstanding phenomena. Symbolized by the UNO, there is meanwhile even a kind of world politics, controversial though it is. Thus it is neither arbitrary nor does it give expression to the intentions of only one group to search for a "global ideology".

But what does that mean? What can it reasonably mean? The ambiguity of such a general term is obvious. A "global ideology" may simply consist in the growing consciousness of human beings to be unalterably connected with one another. Or it may be regarded as an all-embracing thought-system, held and shared by all mankind. In between these two extremes there are, of course, countless other possibilities. Scholars, esp. philosophers, cannot be content with just noticing the fact but have to ask, to discuss, and to try to answer questions as e.g. the following: What does "to conceive of reality", let it be "all of reality" mean? In what way could it be achieved by human beings? What could, on the other hand, be objected against the actuality, or even the possibility of such a knowledge? And is it something, individual human beings vid. mankind should strive for? Actually it is the goal of our gathering to come to terms with some

such problems.

Naturally we are not the first ones to ask, discuss, and try to answer these questions. At one of the preparatory conferences for our present meeting it has rightly been pointed out that aiming at a "unifying global philosophy" we look back to many predecessors and may resume their results.[1] The titles of most of the papers we will discuss here suggest that they will take up, and continue past or contemporary unifying endeavours.

But we also might point out a nearly equal number of philosophers who doubted the possibility of philosophical unificationism, rejected it, and even found it perilous. Nietzsche, whose "strictures against philosophical finality" I shall state and discuss here, was by no means the first one. He himself claimed heritage of, inter alia, Greek sophism and skepticism, of French moralism, of Enlightenment's empiricism and skepticism, of Kantian criticism, of positivism, pragmatism, and 19th century's scientific philosophy. We could add to this list some mystics who have come out with highly skeptical epistemologies and, of course, some prominent 20th century's schools such as Analytical Philosophy, Critical Realism, and Critical Theory.

Nietzsche was among the first thinkers to realize the fast development towards a global unity. Some hundred years ago he pinned down the following sentence which could still serve as

a motto for our conference:

> The task of an earth government is imminent, and with it the question how we want the future of mankind[2].

This Nietzschean awareness of the problem is one reason why I take his philosophy as an example in stating and discussing the problems mentioned above. Another reason is that he took up the arguments of previous critics and drew some more radical consequences from them. In order to keep my paper within the limits I shall take most of my evidence from one special book, namely from Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil which is one of the most important works of his mature philosophy. Moreover the first two sections of the book are nearly exclusively dedicated to the problems we are interested in.

Before I go into more detail I would like to add a few remarks to the term 'finalism'. It is widely agreed that the finalistic, or teleological interpretation of the world belongs to philosophy's mythological heritage. Long before philosophers have adopted this mode of thinking it was used by religion and mythology. It gives expression to an anthrpomorphic image of God, or the Gods. For human society is the original sphere of planing and creating according to plans, esp. craftsmanship and technology. What is not agreed upon is the question to what extent finalism may legitimately be used for an interpretation of the world. Three different positions may be, and are held. The first one is convinced that the world as such is characterized by a purposive order and, accordingly

should be, or even must be interpreted in teleological terms. The second one regards finalistic thinking as an important, or even indispensable tool of human understanding but at least leaves open the question if the world itself is characterized by a finalistic structure, or even rejects that view. The third one, at last, denies the meaningfulness of finalism for scholarly efforts at all.

Nietzsche did, of course, not share the first position. Cf. e.g. the following line:

> We invented the concept of 'purpose': in reality a purpose is lacking[3].

For this opinion he referred to Spinoza as his great forerunner. But if he was no finalist, or even anti-finalistic to a certain extent, he did not totally reject the usefulness of the finalistic approach. On the contrary, he did not accept Schopenhauers concept of 'will' precisely because in it the intention, or aim of all longing is neglected:

> there is no 'willing,' but only the willing of something: you must not eliminate the goal from the state of affairs, as epistemologists do[4].

Thus, Nietzsche does not belong to the third group but rather to the second one. He denies the actuality of goals while maintaining the usefulness of some finalistiv interpretations.

In consequence, Nietzsche doubted the cognizability of the world - and this is the aspect of his strictures against finalism we are interested in here most. Therefore, next

I shall give a short outline of his idea of a future philosophy (2), to trace it then back to Kant(3); these considerations will be followed by a discussion of Nietzsches doctrine of "will to power" (4); in conclusion I shall sum up Nietzsche's arguments against a global ideology or, to be more precise, I shall point out, in what way a unifying - unificationist philosophy is possible and desirable at all in his view, and in my view, and in what way it is not (5).

2.

Nietzsche regarded his time as a time of transition characterized by nihilism - and in that it may still be our time. The age-old values of Western tradition - truth and truthfulness, beauty, goodness, faith, etc. - are widely doubted and, until now, neither have there been established new values effectively nor have the attempts been successful to reenforce the old ones. Nietzsche in his thinking tried to analyze nihilism, to overcome it, and to give outlines of a future philosophy. He called himself a "herald and precursor" of the "philosophers of future,"[5] for though (in his own view) he had fundamentally overcome nihilism he felt still strongly affected by it, while the alleged new philosophers would be free of such a heritage.

Let me, therefore, start with pointing out some major features of those who, according to Nietzsche's hopes, should take up the task of thinking. Nietzsche attached great imp-

ortance on the difference between his "free spirits" and the "ésprits libres" of (French) Enlightenment. While the latter have adopted the principles of traditional morality and criticize by them all those who appeal to them without living up to their standards, the former take serious the impacts of nihilism and doubt these very principles.

In introducing the philosophers he hopes for Nietzsche stresses their ability to remain open and to endure uncertainty:

> A new species of philosophers is appearing: I venture to baptize these philosophers with a name not without danger in it. As I divine them ... these philosophers of the future might rightly, but perhaps also wrongly, be described as attempters. This name itself is in the end only an attempt and, if you will, a temptation (42; p. 52).

A "philosopher of the future", or "free spirit", will not primarily, let it be totally, be a thinking being but a human being who uses his body, his senses, etc. - in sum the whole sphere of possible experiences as means of cognition. Furthermore he will be strong and independent (29, p. 42; cf. 41, p. 52), will have his "secret citadel" to hide in and to keep there his esoteric ideas (26 and 30, pp. 39sq. and 43), will suspect morality (33, p. 46) and the alleged relation between truth and a good human life (39, p. 50). Above all he should provide an effective disguise, since

> ... every profound spirit needs a mask: more, around every profound spirit a mask is continually growing, thanks to the constantly false, that is to say shallow interpretation of every word he speaks, every step he

takes, every sign of life he gives. - (40, p. 51).

In the light of this description: May these future free spirits still be regarded as "philosophers", i.e. as friends of and seekers for wisdom and truth? Nietzsche does not reject that title, but wants to give it a somewhat new meaning. His protagonists will not, he is convinced, stick to one fixed truth and defend it in a dogmatic way, on the contrary,

> ...it must offend their pride and also their taste, if their truth is supposed to be a truth for everyman which has hitherto been the secret desire and hidden sense of all dogmatic endeavours (43, p. 53).

Obviously Nietzsche does not want his successors to bring about a unification of previous, contemporary, or future ideas and thought systems, but rather to multiply their number. He himself provided a good example by working out his somewhat enigmatic philosophy according to which the world is will to power eternally recurring and aims at creating a superhuman being called Uebermensch (superman or, perhaps less ambiguous and more in Nietzsche's sense, overman).

As far as Nietzsche adhered faithfully to his idea of being a precursor of the future "attempter"-philosophers, all these ideas and concepts could not be meant as dogmatic statements about the essence, and the goal of the world as such. Rather they express the world seen in Nietzsche's "mirror"[6]. As said before, Nietzsche's own philosophy, and the philosophies of his hoped for successors, do not encourage finalism and unificationist efforts. What we are interested in here is, if he

offers any evidence for this overall attitude. In stating, and discussing his arguments we might find out questions and problems which render it difficult, if not impossible, to bring about a unified thought system. But, just as Nietzsche does not totally reject teleological interpretations, he does not fully abandon unificationist endeavours either. While I shall come back to this statement in the last paragraph of this paper, I first shall try to work out Nietzsche's criticism in more detail.

3.

Nietzsche did not wantonly destroy values, thought systems, etc. - in sum: traditional unities, or unified ideas, in order to create chaos and to indulge in it. Rather he experienced the decline of long believed in unities of Western tradition. Nietzsche was neither the only one nor even the first one to take notice of that process he called "nihilism". He was, moreover, fully aware of some terrible and problematic consequences of nihilism and suffered deeply from them. In proclaiming the "death of God" Nietzsche's famous "madman" leaves no doubt about the enormous and perhaps perilous changes this event will bring about:

> "Whither is God?" he cried; "I will tell you. We have killed him - you and I. ... But how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, foreward,

> in all directions? Is there still any up and down? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night continually closing in on us" ...[7]

The "madman", another forerunner of the future philosophers, is more moved by this "tremendous event" than his thoughtless listeners are, and he wants to overcome its consequences. But let us first ask how he came to know of nihilism long before others became aware of that deadly process? One answer could be that he had read with more care and with better understanding some main works of modern philosophy and poetry, above all those of Hume and of the old ("critical") Kant. When we throw another glance at Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil we learn that the first section of this book deals with the "Prejudices of Philosophers". Here Nietzsche sums up central insights of modern time's critical philosophy. He stresses the notions of development and evolution (2, p.9) and tries to give evidence that the ideas of truth (1 and 2, pp. 15sq.), of logical identity (3 and 4, pp. 17sq.), of a thing-in-itself (11 and 12, pp. 23-26), of will (16, pp. 27sq.), of an atom (12, pp. 25sq.), and others are but fictitious products of our human minds, brought forth by philosophers in order to escape the threats of becoming. With regard to our central question we might say that Nietzsche does no longer allow for any per se existing unity but only for unifying concepts of our mind by which it takes out, more or less arbitrarily, something for some time of the continuous

flux of becoming and regards it as a "thing". Above all, Nietzsche claims, there is no unifiying first cause of all beings and events (be it causal, or final); there is no personal unity of a human ego, or self; and there is also no unity of the world, neither of the world as a whole (a universe) nor of its elements (atoms).

This is obviously a radical, somewhat popular form of Kant's "transcendental dialectics" and its critical account on theological, psychological, and cosmological ideas. These ideas, God, the human Self, and the World, give expression not to existing things, but only to human mind's projects that are not and never will be actually achieved in reality. Accordingly Kant had distinguished between two kinds of unity, a synthetic one and a systematic one. While the first type, synthetic unity, is continually brought about by the a priori forms of human sensuality and understanding, the other type, the systematic unity of all material things (world), or of a person (ego, or self), or of the perfect being that comprises all reality (God), is always aimed at but essentially never realized. Thus, the chaos of given impressions may be unified by the spatio-temporal structure of human perception; or the many individuals of a species may be united into the unity of an abstract concept; but no experiental evidence can be found for the actual reality of any systematic unity.

Though Nietzsche was very critical of Kant's ethics and aesthetics, he followed him in his epistemology, above all

he accepted the limitation of the legitimate use of metaphysical ideas. In his works and notes Nietzsche now and then pointed out the fictitious character of all "Einheits-Metaphysik" (metaphysics of unity)[8], e.g. in the following note:

> We need unities in order to be able to calculate; but this does not allow for the assumption that there are such unities. We have derived the concept of unity from our concept of "ego" which is our oldest dogma. Did we not regard ourselves as unities, never would we have formed the concept of a "thing". Now, rather late, we are thoroughly convinced that the conception we have from the notion of an "ego" gives no evidence for an actual unity.[9]

In such statements Nietzsche is obviously expressing not only his personal opinion but summing up central insights of modern philosophy. According to Descartes our first and fundamental evidence is the "ego cogito - ego sum" which cannot be doubted in any reasonable way without rendering impossible thinking (in the form of doubting) itself. This is very well true, adds Kant, but following this line of evidence you never arrive at an empirical ego, but only at a transcendental one whose unity is never given and cannot be proven, but is, on the contrary, in every act of thinking necessarily presupposed. Nietzsche, in turn, even radicalized Kant's position insofar as he questioned not only the reality of systematic unities (of transcendental ideas) but also of synthetic unities (of a "thing", of a concept, of sense-data, etc.) - in that resuming the epistemologies of pre-Kantian English empiricism,

and skepticism.

It could be objected that Nietzsche himself introduced a kind of unity, namely that of the will to power. Does not the very section one of Beyond Good and Evil from which I took much of my evidence end with the claim that Nietzsche conceived of

> ... all psychology ... as morphology and development-theory of the will to power (23, p. 35)?

And does not, according to Nietzsche, the will to power exhibit a purposive structure? While this is true, Nietzsche understands his last "unit" not as something that is per se and lasting a unity. He uses the term rather to design the idea of a unifying-destroying flux which again and again gives birth to temporary unities and again and again dissolves them. While every temporary unit is a will to power, it also consists of wills to power and may, in turn, be part of another, more comprehensive will to power.

It is, thus, exactly in his conception of a world consisting of will(s) to power that Nietzsche finally rejects our hopes for a per se existing and lasting unity. Wherever and whenever we point out units they are temporary products of the never ending "game" of the will to power. - Interesting though it would be, I cannot enter here in a detailed discussion of Nietzsche's doctrine of a world consisting of power quanta[10]. But it might be helpful, in my opinion, to mention and discuss two aspects of this doctrine that are closely related to the subject of our conference. The first one refers to ontological and

conceptual questions. The other spotlights psychological problems.

4.

To claim that "this world is will to power and nothing else" while at the same time denying an actual (cosmological) unity of the world as a whole or of its elements, as Nietzsche does, seems to be irreconcilable. Likewise, to deny the reality of goals and maintain that every will to power is characterized by its specific intention might be regarded as contradictory. Or should it, on the contrary, be a possible (perhaps even the only possible) way open to human mind to grasp a systematical unity (of the world)? This seems to have been Nietzsche's view. Again we might add that he was not the first one to understand that problem and to offer this solution. But his doctrine of will to power gives a good account to both.

In order to grasp <u>something</u> our intellect has to single it out from many others and to regard it <u>as one</u>. Doing this it makes use of the transcendental idea of unity which, according to an old principle, is the same with the idea of being, or something (<u>ens et unum convertuntur</u>). But what does "to grasp something as one" mean? It means conceiving of it as different from other units vid. from the whole world, and to see it <u>as a unity of different aspects</u>. For the one grasped by our mind, i.e. a <u>thing</u>, has predicates, is related to others, falls under a concept, may be itself part of a more comprehensive unity, etc.

Following the logic of common sense we could argue: If we continue the process of analyzing to ever smaller parts, eventually we had to arrive at something which does not allow for further analysis and is a per se one (an a-tom). Likewise, if we go on with synthesizing simple things to more complex ones, eventually we had to arrive at the most comprehensive thing that includes everything else (world, or cosmos, or universe). We would have disregarded, it is true, that a-tom and world are cosmological ideas. The general consideration, therefore, leads us back to one of the fundamental metaphysical ideas the reality of which Kant, and Nietzsche (and, of course, not only Kant and Nietzsche) had denied. What is wrong with these ideas or, better, with the way common sense makes use of them. It is self-defying insofar as a tension arises between what is claimed and what is actually achieved. The concepts become "dialectical" as Kant put it.

If, as said before, to conceive of something, in general, means to conceive of it as the unity of a manifold, to conceive of something which is one and nothing else or, to put it in other words, something which contains nothing than itself and lacks all relations, would of course alter the meaning of "to conceive of something". Moreover, we cannot imagine how something that is just one could be grasped at all. To refer to a unity that comprises everything else, would also lead to desastrous consequences. We are, of course, able to say that we mean the world as last, all-embracing unity (just as we are able to say

that we mean an atom as a-tom). But again we are not able really to conceive of such an "object" without falling into a contradiction. When our intellect tries to grasp the whole it must, at the same time, distinguish itself from it, thus denying the wholeness of the alleged whole. And if it actually succeeded in integrating itself into the whole, it would immediately loose its ability to grasp it.

The problem is in fact much more complex and complicated than I am able to demonstrate here. My point is that it is exactly this inability of common sense to escape the dialectics of unity what Nietzsche, inter alia, wanted to reflect in his doctrine of will to power. Reality is a process of conceiving and, in turn, being conceived. This process neither allows for a last, irreducible entity nor for one, all-embracing being. It is a never and nowhere ending flux of interpreting forces which by their very essence - will to power - cannot arrive at an ultimate, or first unity. At least we human beings are not able to transcend these limitations.

If this is true, it has important implications for our quest for a unifying global ideology. It would mark a certain limitation. A unificationist philosophy would have to acknowledge that all ideas of a last, or first unity are, and remain mythological images which cannot be known in a strict sense and which, moreover, cannot even be stated without difficulties and contradictions.

My second point is less abstract but of equal importance. It concerns some psychological problems connected with human striving for unity. The German 18th century poet and philosopher Lessing spotted down a parable on that problem. Invited by the Lord to choose between two gifts, either possession of all the truth, or perpetual striving for truth combined with perpetual error, he would plea for the latter saying: "Father, give me perpetual striving for truth, because its full possession remains your prerogative."[11] This simile provides a good transition from the ontological and conceptual aspects of our problem to its psychological implications. For, on the one hand, it confirms in an allegorical manner the inability of human beings to conceive of all the truth, i.e. of a first, or last unity. On the other hand it alludes to an additional human weakness. Even if we were capable of grasping the per se one - possessing the truth would we still remain humble and tolerant? The complaint is as old as mankind that nobody treats his erring neighbour worse than who is convinced to know, and possess the truth. For the others remains only one hope: that he will not gain power, too! The history of religion provides examples galore, and even philosophers who dreamt that they, at last, had discovered the truth, became immediately tyrranic. This is well enough known and it will, therefore, suffice to quote but one recent voice. In F. Sontag's What God Can Do? the Lord addresses his people in the following way:

I would like to trust religion and religious leaders,

> but like political power, religion too easily corrupts into an arrogant self-righteousness. A God cannot be too careful with whom he associates or what commitments he makes when dealing with human beings.[12]

Nietzsche suspected that the belief in the possibility of human beings to arrive at an ultimate unity, or possess all the truth, let alone the assurance actually to have arrived at it, or possess it, was the outcome of a weak personality's striving for power. This comes out to his widely known theory of resentment which I cannot further discuss here.[13] Suffice it to say that his decided verdict of Christianity was based on his conviction that it was a religion of resentment. If it is proven that Christianity has not or, at least, not entirely grown out of resentment, as I believe, Nietzsche himself would have to rethink some of his judgements.[14] Be this as it may - at any rate Nietzsche was fully aware of the dangers intrinsic in an alleged possession of truth. He, therefore, advocated the "free spirit" who remains ever open for objections and for correction of his insights. "We should not let ourselves be burnt for our opinions", he writes: "we are not that sure of them." He adds, however: "But perhaps for this: that we may have and change our opinions."[15]

5.

I hope to have demonstrated by now to what extent Nietzsche's critical philosophy is related to the general subject of our meeting. Resuming an important tradition of Western thinking

Nietzsche rejects all attempts in philosophy and theology to establish one, all-embracing theory. Like many of his predecessors Nietzsche backed his objections with ontological and conceptual arguments as well as with psychological ones. At the end of my second paragraph, however, I promised more than that, saying that Nietzsche did not fully abandon unificationist endeavours and that he even made suggestions in what way a unity could be achieved. Since this is not evident from what I have said so far, I would like to conclude my paper with some remarks to that point.

If you are convinced that there is no ultimate unity or, at least, that human beings are not capable to conceive of it. And if you, moreover, are aware of the desastrous consequences the belief to possess all the truth might have; one would not expect you to aim at a unified global ideology. Thus it does not come as a surprise when Nietzsche claims in Beyond Good and Evil:

> "My judgement is my judgement: another cannot easily acquire a right to it" - such a philosopher of the future may perhaps say. One has to get rid of the bad taste of wanting to be in agreement with many (43, p. 53).

If we are convinced, then, by Nietzsches Kantian epitemology, have we simply to abandon our quest for unification and for a possible global ideology? In a certain sense we have, but this does not necessarily come out to a pladoyer for discord, or even for struggle. Nietzsche, it is true, often made use of

rather martial similes. Best known perhaps are his following sentences from Thus Spoke Zarathustra:

> You should seek your enemy, you should wage your war - a war for your opinions.
>
> And if your opinion is defeated, your honesty should still cry triumph over that!
>
> You should love peace as a means to new wars. And the short peace more than the long.
>
> I do not exhort you to work but to battle. I do not exhort you to peace, but to victory
>
> May your work be a battle, may your peace be a victory![16]

Though it is not without danger to address the audience in that way, esp. an audience that neither knows the language of religion (often using similar images) nor the philosophy of Nietzsche, these words clearly enough aim at a spiritual battle of opinions. And, moreover, the last goal of this fight is not, for good or bad, one's own victory, but the victory of the best opinion. What can Nietzsche mean by that? If he really wants the victory of the best, he must admit a certain criterion. For as long as I strive for nothing else than dominance - how could I ever be happy and proud about somebody else's opinion? From what we have found out up to now there is only one candidate Nietzsche might accept as criterion: power. The "best", then, had to be the "most powerful" opinion. We learn that Nietzsche, too, aimed at some sort of unification or at a global ideology of his own. All opinions should temporarily submit to the most powerful one. Here it becomes obvious that

Nietzsche's was only a mitigated anti-finalism.

If the will to power is, however, neither a last nor a lasting unity, as stated before, "the most powerful opinion", or ideology, must follow the same line. Thus, a unity brought about by Nietzsche's philosophers of the future must be temporary, must be ever open to new challenges. It will be a product of art rather than of scholarship. Can it, then, be regarded as a global ideology at all? Nietzsche presumably would accept that title as far as it could have any meaning and relevance for human beings. If we are not content with such a unified philosophy, if we long for more, e.g. for all the truth, we neglect the limitations and dangers discussed above. Actually we will not achieve more, but less, insofar we are bound to deceive ourselves in order to believe to have arrived at truth itself.

But why strive for unity, truth, global ideology, and finalism at all? Since the world is as it is, would it not be better to plea for diversity, error, individual opinions, and chaos? Why look for the best, i.e. the most powerful opinion? If we again follow Nietzsche, there are two reasons to do so, at least. The first one is based on the Kantian proof that "unity" is a necessary idea of human mind. We cannot get rid of this idea. It continually compells us to unify the manifold and various data of experience. If those who have come to understand this compulsion fail to correspond to our mind's inner structure, others will certainly be less hestitating and they will claim anew

to have got access to truth as such and to an existing unity.

But there is also a second reason which, in my opinion, is even more convincing, and should be a guideline for all attempts towards a (temporary) global ideology. History teaches us that all efforts to bring about systematic unification of a group of human beings, let it be mankind as a whole, have failed up to now. It is also not very difficult to find out the main reason for this failure. Those who developed a new unifying doctrine either lacked the power to force their fellow men who sticked to other doctrines or ideas to take over the new one. Or they had the power and, by making use of it, became unreliable or, even worse, betrayed their original insights.

In contrast, imagine a situation when all men and women are aware of our (transcendental) human need for unity and, at the same time, of our essential inability to arrive at any once-for-all unity. Would not, then, everybody strive for unity him- or herself, encourage others to do likewise, and tolerate the diverse results of the joint striving? No doubt: there would be discord, battles would arise between the different views. But there would be a much greater chance than nowadays that these battles were fought in the spirit of reverence, love and tolerance, aiming together at the temporary victory of the best, i.e. the most powerful opinion. For all combatants would know and acknowledge that "full possession of all the truth is your prerogative, Father!"

N o t e s

1 Cf. e.g. D. Foster's paper (prepared for and delivered at the Martinique Conference in February, 1985) Plurality Towards Unity. On the Idea of a Unifying Philosophical Stance, esp. part II ("Precedents and Allies").

2 Nietzsche's Posthumous Notes are quoted from the Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Werke, ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari, Berlin and New York (de Gruyter) 1967sqq., quoted herafter as KGW. - Spring 1884, KGW VIII/2, p. 86 (my translation).

3 Twilight of the Idols, tr. by R.J. Hollingdale: Penguin Books, p. 54.

4 Posthumous Notes: 1887/1888, KGW VIII/2, p. 296 (my translation).

5 Beyond Good and Evil. Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, tr. by R.J. Hollingdale, Penguin Books, 1973, aph. 44, p. 53. - From here on references to this book are given in brackets.

6 In a posthumous note from June/July 1885 (KGW VII/3, p. 338) Nietzsche asks his readers: "And do you know what 'the world' is for me? Should I show it to you in my mirror?", to answer: "This world is will to power - and nothing else" (my translation); cf. The Will to Power, nr. 1o67.

7 The Gay Science, tr. by W. Kaufmann, New York (Vantage Books) 1974, nr. 125, p. 181.

8 Posthumous note from 1886/1887 (KGW VIII/1, p. 287, cf. The Will to Power, nr. 275), my translation.

9 Posthumous note from spring 1888 (KGW VIII/3, p. 51, cf. The Will to Power, nr. 635), my translation.

10 In the course of the last fifteen years or so a discussion on this problem has been going on, in Germany as well as in France, Italy, and the States. The first one to stress the intrinsic multiplicity of Nietzsche's power quanta was the German philosopher W. Mueller-Lauter, cf. above all his Nietzsche. Seine Philosophie der Gegensaetze und die Gegensaetze seiner Philosophie, Berlin and New York (de Gruyter) 1971.

11 Cf. W. Kaufmann, From Shakespeare to Existentialism, Garden City, N.Y. (Anchor Books) 1960, p. 196sq.

12 Fr. E. Sontag, What God Can Do? Nashville, Te. (Abingdon) 1979, p. 117.

13 Cf. W. Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher Psychologist Antichrist, Princeton, N.J. (Princeton University Press) ^{4}1974, esp. pp. 371sqq. and passim.

14 Cf. Studies in Nietzsche and the Judaeo-Christian Tradition, ed. by J.C. O'Flaherty, T.F.Sellner, and R.M. Helm, Chapel Hill and London (The University of North Carolina Press), 1985, esp. my contribution "Dionysus versus the Crucified One: Nietzsche's Understanding of the Apostle Paul", tr. by T.F. Sellner, l.c. pp. 100sqq.

15 The Wanderer and his Shadow, nr. 333, quoted from Basic Writings of Nietzsche, tr. by W. Kaufmann, New York (Random House: The Modern Library), 1968, p. 166.

16 Thus Spoke Zarathustra, tr. by R.J. Hollingdale, Penguin Books 1971 (part I: "Of War and Warriors", p. 74).
