Concentric Overlapping and Competing Loyalties and Identities: the Implication for Education

by Christie Davies

The links between the individual and the nation state such as nationalism and the implications of these for education cannot be studied in isolation but should be analysed in relation to the more complex total set of concentric loyalties and affiliations held by individuals. These may be schematically depicted as in Table I.

Even this concentric schema is an over-simplified model of a social reality in which different levels of loyalty impinge, overlap and merge like the orbits of comets and asteroids rather than (or in addition to) those of the tidier major planets. Nonetheless it is a great advance on the crude dichotomous models [see Palmer 1986] of nationalism versus internationalism, the man versus the state or unitary versus multi-cultural education, that some educators have used in the past. In particular it locates the nation and nationalism within broader sets of powers and rights as well as loyalties and affiliations.

Humankind
Regional or Pan-Ethnic Block
Nation State
Sub-nation, ethnic group, tribe
Local community, kin
Nuclear family
Individual

Table I
The individual feels a sense of attachment to each of the social layers indicated in Table I which in theory could be closely integrated to form a single system but in practice are more likely to be also a source of contradictions and of conflicts between any pair of levels. Conflicts between adjacent levels and corresponding alliances between alternate levels are particularly likely and interesting phenomena. It would be unwise to assign a preponderant weight to any one of these layers (such as the nation state) nor can they be arranged in some kind of a *a priori* order of ethical preference. I shall argue rather that our ideal should be to achieve some kind of balance between them and that the task of education is to make individuals aware of the different levels of affiliation, loyalty and power and the different sources of roots and rights that exist and of the conflicts between them that can occur, in order that they can make rational ethical choices. Moral education can and should instill in pupils such basic precepts of *personal* morality as the wrongness of violence, theft, envy and malice, the need for foresight and self-control and the value of such virtues as charity, kindness, good-nature and human decency but on more complex social issues it would be presumptuous to try to tell them what their moral choices should be. The task of the educators is to suggest alternatives, provide information and indicate difficulties, not to set themselves up as preachers, prophets and single issue or single layer fanatics. To press the exclusive claims of, say, internationalism, nationalism, multi-culturalism, ecology individual rights, isolationism, holy war or
pacificism is either dangerous or self-defeating. Rather education should allow people to remain reasonably secure in their existing pattern of loyalties but to be able also to recognize that other patterns exist and that concession and compromise are often necessary. At all times we should remember Balfour's alleged riposte to an emotional demand for justice: 'the trouble with justice is that there is never enough of it to go round'. One person is or group's justice can often only be attained by an injustice done to others. In the world of material goods we can often avoid this problem by the use of technical innovation and the market place to convert positional goods into expanding production and zero-sum games into games where all can have prizes, even the booby, but ironically it is much harder if not impossible to manipulate human symbols, loyalties and values in such a way as to be fair to everyone.

The key point that can and should be got across is that the focussing of an excessive or deficient amount of loyalty at any one level (with knock-on effects at other levels) is undesirable. This may be illustrated either from the experience and history of the local society or from the study of very distant countries with which there are neither ties of affection nor of hostility and thus the possibility of a more reasonable, universal, disinterested and dispassionate study of the relevant issues. Sometimes charity begins abroad.
The Man versus the State

A world of allegianceless individuals bound together only by freely chosen contractual obligations exists only in the work of libertarian sociologists such as Herbert Spencer for whom the nuclear family was the only necessary fixed institution (because small babies cannot survive alone and because no one can choose their parents). In his early work Spencer [1904 pp.567, 709; 1969 pp.39, 286] argued that with the Darwinian evolution of industrial society the state and military institutions would wither away. Later in life he was alarmed at the revival of collectivism, nationalism and militarism in late nineteenth century Europe which he had earlier dismissed as mere survivals of past barbarism [Spencer 1904 pp.569-579, 1969 p.45]. Spencer's ideal, though attractive, was and is unrealistic and unattainable, (a) because of the short-term advantages that can accrue to any group of individuals that bands together to use force. Only with the gaining of a monopoly of the use of legitimate force by the nation state has it been possible to achieve internal order and safety for individuals and to suppress war-lords, robbers and pirates. This does not, however, prevent and may even exacerbate violent conflicts between states, and it could make it easier for a tyrant to impose and excercise despotism. (b) because strong local, ethnic, national and religious loyalties exist and, though their forms change, 'groupism' shows no sign of disappearing. It makes more sense to deal with and to try to understand and moderate a group-ridden
world than to hope that it will be or can be reduced to an aggregate of rational and tolerant individuals; (c) our economic and social activities create external problems notably pollution and over-population which cannot easily be solved through contracts between individuals alone. Admittedly these problems have been at their worst in socialist countries [see Butterfield 1982 pp.15-17, Davies 1991, Komarov 1978], as with the gross pollution of Bohemia, Poland and many parts of the Soviet Union and the population crisis in China resulting from Mao Tse Tung’s dogmatic anti-Malthusian Marxism. Nonetheless it is difficult to see how the choice of family size or of the means of generating energy can be left only to individual choice. Solutions based on the use of market forces may well be the most effective ones but decisions to make the polluter pay or to impose fiscal penalties on the begetters of large families are ultimately political ones.

**Individual Rights and Collective Autonomy:**

**Some Costs and Benefits**

In a world of fierce collective loyalties Spencer’s work does though provide a useful alternative ideal and antidote. It should also help us to remember the **central** significance of the **individual** in many of the contentious issues that arise from group conflicts. The leaders of groups such as regional blocks, nations, sub-nations, or even religions, quite naturally tend to want more power for their own group and level at the expense of other groups and levels and often couch their demands in terms of the individual rights of their
adherants as well as the autonomy of their group. Yet a transfer of power to their group as a group may well result in a diminution of the individual freedom of action of those who make up the group. To take an unlikely but possible example: suppose that the tiny Welsh fascist party, Meibion Glyndwr⁴ (the sons of Owain Glyndwr, a medieval Welsh hero, the 'Owen Glendower' of Shakespeare's play Henry IV Part I) best known for their arson attacks on the homes of English "immigrants" in Wales, were to seize power in Wales. They would then presumably put into practice the view that Welsh people can only be free if Wales secedes from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and all English people and other "foreigners" are driven out. In doing so the sons of Glyndwr would be deliberately or unconsciously blurring the distinction between the collective autonomy of the Welsh as a nation or tribe and the freedom of Welsh individuals to pursue their own lives and interests. Should the sons of Glyndwr come to power they would establish a separate one party state in which the freedom of speech, freedom of movement, freedom to buy and sell in the market place and freedom from arbitrary arrest and punishment currently enjoyed by all who live in Wales whether Welsh or English were all extinguished and they would then declare that Wales was now free. There are ambiguities and contradictions here that it is the duty of educators to explore. Individual human rights are often suppressed not because rulers and ruled belong to different groups but because they have a strong common national, ethnic or religious identity. A lack of respect for the rights and autonomy of the individual can exist because group loyalties and identities are too strong regardless of
whether the individual belongs to the same group or a different one from those infringing his or her rights.

My personal view is that many **individual** rights such as those to life, liberty, safety and property should not be dependent on group membership. Also the question of the rights of the individual as an individual cannot be omitted from any discussion of nationalism and we should not allow the said rights to be hijacked by those who seek to propagate the collective demands of particular national or ethnic groups. There may in many cases have to be a trade-off between individual rights and collective autonomy and it is the business of education to unpack vague ideological syntheses and wordy **Weltanschauungen** and to make people confront and discuss trade-offs and choices.

The argument that it is the individual who is the crucial bearer of human rights has as a corollary the view that in the event of a foreigner, outsider or member of a minority being assaulted or robbed, this is wrong for exactly the same reasons that it is wrong to attack or rob a member of one's own group. On this view it is neither better nor worse to infringe the individual rights of an 'outsider' and such infringements should not be treated as an aspect of inter-group relations in law or in an educational discussion. The key points are rather, (a) that the rights which each individual enjoys in a particular society should not be suspended or denied by reason of his or her membership of an unpopular group, for to do so is to undermine the rights of all, including the aggressors and (b) that the
question of who is a member of a majority or a minority or of a popular or an unpopular group is arbitrary and often merely a function of location. Do not ill-treat the foreigner (or come to that member of an ethnic, political, religious or even football supporting minority) because you yourself would not wish to be ill-treated were the situation reversed.

At a pragmatic level I would also argue that it makes far more sense to educate people to understand and apply this ancient principle of reciprocity\(^5\) [Exodus 23,9] and in consequence to treat each individual on his or her personal merits regardless of the views they may hold concerning the group to which he or she belongs, than to try to use the educational system as a means of undermining majority group loyalties in the hope that this will lead to better treatment of 'outsiders'.

**Local Ties and Communities:**

Societies may be characterized by an excessive or a deficient regard for kinship or local community. In Northern Europe today this 'layer' of society has been weakened by the centralization of state welfare and education which has resulted in a rapid growth in crime rates and in the incidence of illegitimacy [Davies 1983]. The main effective social controls over individuals are by family and kin and by those who exercise authority in their own local community and know them personally. An impersonal state welfare and educational system is nothing like as effective, particularly when
many of its personnel are unwilling to coerce or even chide deviant individuals into compliance with the basic rules of the society. Switzerland and Japan are the only advanced industrial countries with low and stable rates of crime and illegitimacy. In those countries alone have the local institutions of kin and community retained their influence over individuals [Clinard 1978, Segal 1986]. At the same time it must be noted that both the Japanese and the Swiss have a strong sense of national identity so that 'localism' does not threaten to undermine nationalism.

Elsewhere 'familism' and 'localism' have been perceived as problems, for example in Italy, where these forces have been blamed for the difficulty experienced in creating a secure national identity, for the repeated failures in war-time of the Italian army (in contrast to the great success of small units such as midget submarines or bands of guerilla fighters), for the inefficiency and nepotism of government and public services in contrast to the effectiveness of private industry, for the backwardness of the far South and for the organized criminality of Sicily and Calabria [Almond and Verba 1963 pp.402-3, Barzini 1964 p.198, Cesaresco 1892 p.17, Davies 1982B, Greeley and McCready 1975 p.219, Lewis 1964, Sertorio 1982, Willey 1984 pp.61-67]. Sociologists have described the code of the latter backward regions as 'amoral familism' [Banfield 1958] because there is a relative absence of regard for the public or national interest. In some places a locally based and organized lawlessness exists because there is no respect for state authority or for the rights of those outside a particular criminal network.
Strong local and kinship based loyalties can undermine both governments and the rights of individuals because they may make impartiality impossible. Judges, tax officials or examination invigilators cannot discharge their functions with fairness and efficiency if there are strong pressures on them to favour those who are related to them or who come from the same locality [e.g. see Eberhard 1977 p.269]. It is a problem that ought to be discussed openly in schools and colleges in relation to local issues but in many places it may be much too explosive an issue. The politicians who control local authorities are willing for all manner of distant radical issues concerning ethnic and national identity to be aired in schools and colleges and indeed may recklessly encourage this but any suggestion that their own actions may be biased and corrupted by group loyalties is likely to be subject to censorship and reprisal. All manner of peculiar national and ideological views are exchanged in Welsh schools without incurring the wrath of local politicians but, had there been any serious discussion of these same politicians' propensity for handing out jobs in the state educational system to their relatives [Davies 1978A], one of their minions would have intervened to say that critical discussion of this kind of group loyalty was forbidden. In a democracy such as Wales people need only fear for their jobs or their promotions but in more authoritarian countries even their lives may be at stake. It is difficult to evade repression of this kind but it is important to try, for nepotism and partocracy (rule by an unchallengeable party) [Shtromas 1989] are as much an infringement of that central principle of democratic individualism, la
carrière ouverte aux talents as the holding of a monopoly of power by a particular racial, ethnic or religious group or caste. Perhaps the educationalists in each country should devise syllabuses involving the less controversial corruptions of another country. In the past I have tried to assist in this enterprise by writing about corruption in local government in Wales for the journal New Quest [1978B] published in India by my friend, mentor and colleague the late Professor A.B.Shah. I have no doubt his Indian readers could in turn have provided materials for use in the Welsh educational system. Such exchanges would bring the peoples of the world together in that unique mood of sympathy and understanding that some sociologists call 'filthy togetherness'.

Sub-Nations and Nations: A Question of Self-Determination?

The next highest layers of analysis, the sub-nation/ethnic group/tribe and the nation state are best considered together, and in relation to one another. It is necessary to make this point because as already indicated above, much thinking about minority rights confuses (a) the rights of individual members of the minority group to be treated equitably, i.e. not to be deprived of the individual rights and opportunities enjoyed (or which should be enjoyed) by citizens belonging to the majority group because they are members of a national or ethnic minority and, (b) the obligation of the majority to allow or even assist the minority as a collectivity to exercise a degree of autonomy and to maintain its distinctive identity.
Objectives (a) and (b) are not necessarily in harmony, nor do they have the same implications for education. A clash can exist between them, if for instance individual members of a national or ethnic minority are forced to lead a restricted existence because of the nature of the culture they share with other members of the minority which cuts them off from opportunities available in the wider society. Such restrictions can stem from national or ethnic traditions that discourage effort and ambition, that fail to value, even respect education and learning and which may specifically deny opportunities to a section of their own community such as girls and women or to members of a despised internal caste. Under these circumstances should the members of an (assumedly) powerful majority uphold individual rights or the relative empowerment of the leaders of the minority who seek to preserve and promote its culture and traditions?

The language of freedom and equality as used by the leaders of the minority may lead to paradox or contradiction if they are demanding 'freedom' and 'equality' in order to deny it to others. They are at the very least being morally inconsistent in demanding freedom and equality but being unwilling to extend it within or beyond their own ranks. The Afrikaner myth of the Great Trek of the nineteenth century when they left the British ruled Cape Colony to found the Orange Free State and the Transvaal because they resented being forced to give up slavery and being accountable to the courts for their mistreatment of individual Africans [de Klerk
1996 p.33] is an example of this kind of inconsistency. However, any group that seeks and achieves independence or autonomy from another group and then proceeds to establish or join a more authoritarian regime than the one under which it lived previously is open to this criticism. Such shifts are inherantly likely since (a) secession may create a more ethnically homogeneous state in which it is easier to establish political and moral hegemony than in a looser multi-national state or empire (b) new nations with a tradition of being ruled and humiliated by others are likely to be especially oppressive to their own minorities particularly if these were attached to or sided with the former ruling power (c) settlers from a distant country are likely to wish to oppress and exploit local aboriginal peoples in ways that gain the disapproval of the metropolitan politicians who can be more detached and impartial. As Dr. Johnson was fond of pointing out [Boswell 1792, Halliday 1968 p.98], settler-independence is a license to disregard these constraints. As examples of (a), we may cite the Republic of Ireland [Inglis 1987] or Pakistan of (b) Hungary in relation to Croatia and Slovakia after the establishment of the dual-monarchy of Austro-Hungary or Bulgaria in relation to its Turkish and Pomak minorities [Macartney 1962 pp.183-9] of (c) Rhodesia. It is important to study such cases in order to explode the sometimes cheap rhetoric of liberation. National self-determination like the revolutionary overthrow of traditional autocracy can lead to the creation of a society in which individuals are less safe, less free and less prosperous than they would have been if no such change had occurred.° What is needed in education is not critical thinking which
is all too often merely the preaching of a different ideology, but sceptical thinking in which all actual and projected political arrangements and ideals are subjected to similar degrees of doubt. They will not all attain similar scores when subjected to the test of sceptical reasoning but it should always be the same test.

I am deliberately questioning here the popular ideologies of nationalism and national self-determination by suggesting that the value of what they achieve depends on the worth of the nation created. The universal measures of that worth are the security, freedom, prosperity and achievements of the individuals in that society and also the benefits these convey on the individual citizens of other societies. It is these that entitle one to be 'proud' to be an X or a citizen of Y. It makes no sense to express pride in one's group or one's collective ancestors for one didn't choose or create them. It is reasonable to feel affection for the mores and traditions of one's country or tribe and to wish to defend or preserve them because they are friendly and familiar but it is only possible to feel pride if (a) outsiders have objective grounds for admiring important universal qualities displayed in the culture (such as German scientific achievement, the artistic traditions of Italy or Benin, Japanese technology, Indian spiritual insight or Mexican church architecture) and (b) the individuals who claim to be proud of their country are themselves contributing in one way or another to the maintainence and enhancement of these qualities.
Good Minorityship

It is very important that educators question simple and indeed often simplistic power-relations theories of majority duties and minority rights. It is a theory which is valid in cases of straightforward oppression such as Ceausescu's attempt to crush the Transylvanian Magyars and Saxons [Davies 1989 and earlier Ionescu 1964], but in most cases minorities and the individuals who belong to them do have some degree of power and of responsibility and I wish here to discuss two inter-related issues neglected by educators, viz the duties and responsibilities of minorities and majority rights.

If the members of a minority have formal access to the free market and property ownership, to skills and education, to the courts and the ballot box, then they also have corresponding duties and responsibilities. Their most basic duty is to refrain from trying to destabilize the state whose citizenship they hold and from having stronger loyalties to a state other than the one in which they live. Many minorities fail or have failed this test such as the Sudetenlanders in Bohemia [Shirer 1960 p.358], or the Muslims in India.7 The second duty of minorities is to create a sub-culture in which its members can prosper by their own efforts and thus also finance their own communal institutions rather than demanding subsidies from the majority. Ideally, minority leaders ought to be able truthfully and legitimately to claim for their people the respect that is due to a group that overall contributes more to the economy
and culture of the nation than it takes out. It is a nobler objective than the sterile politics of envy [Schoeck 1969] and wingeing and it is unfortunate that the leaders of majorities all too often persecute the members of creative entrepreneurial minorities and placate those who are the architects of their own failure. The very worst persecutions of minorities in history have often been directed at minority group members who have prospered by dint of work, thrift, skill and education [Hagen 1962 pp.60, 249] such as the Jews in Europe [Reitlinger 1967], the Armenians in Turkey [Toynbee 1915], the Chinese in South East Asia [von der Meldon (1976)], the Asians in Uganda [Davies 1972, Theroux 1967], and the Ibos in Nigeria. In each case their success has been misrepresented as conspiracy, disloyalty and "blood-sucking" and they have been massacred. It is the ethnic equivalent of the socialist politics of envy used to justify the murder of millions of city dwellers in Cambodia and kulaks in the Soviet Union [Barron and Paul 1977, Conquest 1986]. These are the inevitable vicious consequences of the application of crude power-relations based ideologies to politics. The prosperous members of a successful but precariously balanced minority are represented by demagogues as powerful and malign exploiters whom it is ethically permissible to disposess or even murder; the people are persuaded that they, the majority, are powerless and exploited and have no duties and responsibilities towards such a minority. The majority is thus installed in the reckless, ruthless, antinomian category to which progressive opinion allocates minorities and if such a majority has the numerical and political power to carry out the most evil and
vindictive fantasies of a "downtrodden" minority, the result may be genocide.

The leaders of minorities whose members are disproportionately successful are usually unwilling publically to affirm that their success is rooted in those traditions of their group that stress work, thrift, entrepreneurship, skill, learning and respect for law and order, lest this should anger envious populists among the majority. Also many of them are muddled egalitarians who confuse the formal equality of opportunity that is good for their members with equality of outcome which is either utopian or procrustean and is thoroughly bad for their members. The leaders of minorities whose members are disproportionately unsuccessful in a free society often blame the members of the majority because it is a cheap and easy route to political influence and thus to becoming the brokers who distribute the subsidies gouged from the majority by a mixture of egalitarian rhetoric and threats of political turmoil. In the long-run this policy is disastrous for their own people who are never able to acquire the habits of self-reliance and deferred gratification that are the basis of the success of members of other minorities. Indeed, the subsidies may perpetuate or even create self-destructive patterns of avoiding work, dependence on welfare, unstable families and a high birth rate, a large part of which is illegitimate. The very act of blaming one's misfortunes on the majority undermines the possibility of individual self-help and legitimizes idleness, crime and the quest for immediate excitement. Those majority group members who pander to such views are the real exploiters of such a minority.
Only if the members of such a minority group receive a thorough education in the duties and responsibilities of the individual that stresses work, enterprise and the gaining of marketable skills are they ever going to be emancipated from their present conditions.

The Public and the Private

A further duty of the members of a minority is to accept a reasonable degree of assimilation to majority standards in the public aspects of life while, if they wish, retaining their own private customs and beliefs as a matter of right and choice. The boundary of these public and private worlds is of course arbitrary and negotiable and the majority has the duty not to assail aspects of minority life that are central to the members of the minority but of only marginal public significance to the wider society. An instance of this would be the treatment of turban-wearing Sikhs in Britain which initially was ignorantly intolerant because of a failure by the British to understand how the turban fitted into a general pattern of Sikh loyalties and values. Sikhs were barred from working as bus conductors or enrolling in certain schools because they refused to wear the official head gear of these occupations and institutions and were not allowed to ride motor-cycles because they wouldn't wear crash-helmets. In the end British legal decisions in favour of the Sikhs declared that for institutions to ban the wearing of turbans by Sikhs was discriminatory and thus illegal and Sikhs were exempted from wearing crash helmets provided they took out extra insurance to cover the additional risk. However, it should never have been
necessary for the Sikhs to have had to invoke the law, for the British, when ruling India had encouraged turban wearing orthodox Sikhs to enrol in the army and police because the turban was a symbol of and part of a way of life emphasizing a this-worldly morality based on self-control. The Sikhs' uncut hair and beard symbolize acceptance of the normal social world (in contrast to ascetic withdrawal) and the comb, turban and snood that keep the hair in place symbolize the need for self-control within it [Uberoi 1967]. Thus the highly visible public appearance of the Sikhs which English people found bizarre was not a repudiation of British society but an affirmation of a set of social values of which they (the English) could not but approve.

By contrast, many of their own English male youths who grow their hair very long or shave their heads are being deliberately antisocial and provocative. To refuse to employ or work with an English skin-head is fairly reasonable in that this appearance is often intended to convey aggression, hostility and bloody-mindedness, just as that of a long-haired hippy, conveys a lack of reliability and of the conventional work-ethic. To treat all individuals with such an appearance negatively is unfair because (a) only some of those with bizarre hair lengths relative to the norms of their society are habitually awkward and difficult and, (b) each individual has the right to be treated on his or her merits and not as a mere representative sample of a group. Nonetheless, there is a degree of rationality in excluding belligerant skin-heads or long-haired weirdos, for such people are somewhat more likely to give trouble
than individuals drawn from a random sample of the population. In the case of the turbaned Sikhs, by contrast, it was totally irrational to try to exclude them or to force them to confirm to local custom as regards hair (and thus headgear) since their turbans were the badge not only of their identity but of a Punjabi version of Weber's Protestant ethic [Uboeri 1967 pp.91-4]. The mindless bureaucratic requirements of a bus company or the petty traditions of a private school are of trivial importance compared with the central rites of an ethnic and religious community that if properly integrated into British life should be an asset to the host society. Besides, the fate of Mrs. Gandhi should have taught the British that it is foolish as well as wrong to try to squash the Sikhs.

**Bad Minorityship**

Where a few Sikhs have behaved contrary to the rules of good minorityship is in using the territory of countries to which they have emigrated such as Britain or Canada as a base for terrorist activities against India [Jiwa 1986 pp.195-20]. This is one of the worst forms of the active disloyalty mentioned earlier as the first minority sin. Terrorism is wrong in and of itself and can only be justified under very rare and extreme circumstances. It is also an embarrassment to the host country which will not wish to be involved with the internal ethnic conflicts of another (and in this case friendly) country. If the British or Canadian Sikhs wish to agitate for the formation of an independent Khalistan this is, of course, permissable and part of their
democratic right to freedom of speech and assembly but there are clear limits to the action they can take, which must not include attacks on Indian citizens, British or Canadian Hindus or lukewarm British or Canadian Sikhs who doubt the wisdom of a confrontation with Delhi. These restrictions apply equally to all minorities and to the majority too. Enthusiasm or sympathy for one’s compatriots in another country is no excuse for acts of terror which apart from their inherent wrongness may precipitate an international conflict. The alternative is another Sarajevo.

The members of a minority also need to realise that both home and foreign policy have to be made in the interests of the nation as a whole and cannot be treated as a way of buying the votes of particular ethnic pressure groups. As private individuals the members of a minority may, if they choose, hold dual or divided loyalties but good minorityship demands that in general they should refrain from bringing them into the public arena. It is also unwise to do so, as can be seen from the wave of anti-Muslim feeling that occurred in Britain following the demonstrations of support by British Muslims [Cohn-Sherbok 1990] for an Iranian Ayatollah’s death-sentence on Salmon Rushdie the author of the Satanic Verses [1988]. The two central public values of British society are (a) the safety and security of the individual from arbitrary physical harm whether inflicted by the state, by the representatives of ethnic majorities or minorities or by random individuals. The state has a monopoly of the use of legitimate force but may only use it in ways strictly laid down by the law (b) freedom of speech. Any strong
direct challenge to these principles is as obnoxious to the citizens of Britain as Rushdie's foolish book is to Muslims. Freedom of speech allows the destruction of people in effigy (as with the traditional British bonfires on which effigies of Guy Fawkes, Governor Lundy or the Pope are set alight) but not of people. Perhaps the people of Bradford (a British city with a large Muslim population mainly of Pakistani origin), whether Muslims, Christians or pagans, should celebrate November 5th together by burning a guy dressed to look like the odious Rushdie.

The rule of moral reciprocity operates here too. Muslim bookshops in Britain sell books such as 'The Protocols of the Meetings of the Learned Elders of Zion' [1978. Also see Murad 1985] or 'Crucifiction or Cruci-fiction?' [Deedad1985] which are just as offensive to Jews or Christians as Rushdie's book is to Muslims. Indeed, the Protocols is more than a merely offensive book, it is a threatening book. A reader of Salman Rushdie's book may in consequence deride or despise Muslims (as he or she has every right to do in a free society) but is not going to be galvanized into hating and physically attacking them as the readers of the Protocols have the Jews [Cohn 1979]. In a free society everyone has to put up with the publication of material that they find offensive or even abusive but the Protocols amount to incitement. When Muslims have been killed in demonstrations against Rushdie's book in Rushdie's home-town of Bombay, it has not been because Rushdie's readers have been incited to attack them, but because they themselves turned violent in response to a perceived insult. In regard to the Protocols
my argument is not that the Muslim bookshops should cease stocking or selling it but rather, that if they continue to sell such books, Muslims can no longer claim as a moral principle that others should not stock or sell Rushdie.

Understanding Other Peoples' Conflicts

The entire question of what is a fair balance of power between nations or ethnic groups is a difficult one both in principle and as a subject for discussion within education and this is especially the case during war-time or when some other form of violent conflict breaks out. In every continent there are ethnic, tribal, religious and national conflicts and these often hit the headlines and screens of newspapers and television sets all over the world - Armenians versus Azerbaijanis, Serbs versus Croats, Ulster Protestants versus Irish Catholics, Israelis versus Palestinians, Hindus versus Indian Moslems, Greeks versus Turks, Iraqi Arabs versus Kurds, Eritreans versus Amhara - the list is endless. Discussion of these problems whether in an educational setting or any other is hindered both by sheer ignorance of the causes of such conflicts and by a tendency to want to take sides. Paradoxically it often seems to be the case that an initial growth in knowledge of and familiarity with a situation of conflict leads to an increase in irrational partisanship. The first response of many individuals to a distant ethnic, religious or national conflict is to view it as a piece of mindless violence - 'why can't they compromise, then everybody would be better off?' This may well be a sensible observation, yet it is often rooted in a failure to
understand the nature of the divisions between the two sides and a crude inability to distinguish between distant foreign groups; what looks like common sense may really only be ethnocentrism. The Buddhist who is puzzled as to why two groups of Christians should want to fight each other in Ireland, the Yorkshireman who can't tell the difference between Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims, the Allied politicians who created Yugoslavia after World War I are or were not so much urging tolerance as expressing ignorance and indifference. We are all able to make fine discriminations between groups close to and similar to our own, whether ethnic, political or religious, but distant groups tend to all look the same [Rokeach 1960 pp.38-9]. The differences between Christian denominations are not salient for a Hindu, the differences between the English, Welsh and Scots don't matter to a Japanese, Englishmen fail to see that Gwynedd differs from Gwent and civil servants in Edinburgh confuse the Orkneys and the Hebrides to the extent of offering a bonus to Gaelic speaking teachers on the former islands even though their inhabitants were Norwegian speaking before they switched to English. The view that a particular ethnic conflict is senseless may well be a reasonable one, but only if it is based on a study and knowledge of all the circumstances - which is after all the business of education. One way of educating people to be able to view more objectively the immediate local ethnic conflicts in which they themselves are directly involved is to study parallel distant conflicts that can be viewed dispassionately [cf.2 Samuel 12, 1-10]. Yet in practice all too often the opposite happens, i.e. other peoples' conflicts merely provide an extra opportunity for partisanship. Sometimes this is
merely due to a sense of distant affiliation as when Yemenis side with Palestinians or Jews in Los Angeles with Israel or when New Zealanders supported Britain in the Falklands war whereas many Mexicans sympathized with Argentina's claim to the Malvinas. Also involved here is a mixture of historical empathy and fears for the future. The New Zealanders' isolated, sparsely populated islands in the far south are vulnerable to trans-ocean invasion and Mexico has lost wars and territory to the 'Anglos' of the United States.

**Displaced Patriotism**

Among the more bigoted left-wing intellectuals, at least in the West, there is also to be found an anti-patriotism or a displaced patriotism that has pretensions to objectivity but is really only either another form of chauvinism or else perversity for its own sake. George Bernard Shaw's New Statesman article of October 7th 1939 equating Churchill and Hitler [Bethell 1976 pp.190-1, Shirer 1960], for example, was on a par with his opposition to vaccination and his denial that there had been a famine in the Ukraine under Stalin. They were all instances of his distinctive kind of silly-clever buffoonery that did very well on the stage but has no place in serious political analysis. Nineteen thirty-nine was not a good year for close-Shavianism. The same point may be made in relation to those German intellectuals during the first World War who from the safety of Switzerland helped to spread false atrocity stories about their own country ["A German" 1915, Fernau 1916, Muehlon 1918].
Down with my country right or wrong and I'll only believe the wrong is just as irrational as its opposite.

One of the causes of displaced patriotism is adherence to an ideology that is espoused by some other country but is unpopular in one's own. A displaced patriotism of this kind can only be judged in relation to the merits of the ideology. It is reasonable for the citizen of a totalitarian country such as the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany to flee to a liberal democratic country and to support it in conflicts with the totalitarian homeland. Thus we can admire Willi Brandt, Thomas Mann, George Mikes, Tibor Szamuely, Andrei Amalrik or Armando Valladares. By contrast, those men and women who adopted totalitarian ideologies and betrayed their own democratic countries are contemptible. People like Vidkun Quisling, Leon Degrelle, Ezra Pound, Burgess, Maclean, Philby and Blunt, Alger Hiss and the Rosenburgs were doubly vile - traitors both to their countries and to human decency. One can feel sorry for those who are trapped in a conflict between loyalty to their homeland and loyalty to freedom and democracy for it is not an easy choice to make but the double traitors deserve no such sympathy. Those citizens of the free world who deluded themselves that the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, Mussolini's Italy, or at a later date, China, Cuba, Albania or Nicaragua were utopian paradises were either fools or scoundrels and sometimes both. The only reason for studying them and their writings is so that they may be fairly and accurately condemned as persons who provide an evil and disastrous model of behaviour.
Underdoggery and Topdoggery

Behind many forms of displaced patriotism or the taking of sides in distant conflicts lies one of the two extreme poles of a dimension I shall call underdoggery - topdoggery. It is a Pareitian residue [see Bucolo (ed) 1980, Homans and Curtis 1970], a gut feeling of sympathy either for the underdog (the weaker or losing group) or for the top dog (the stronger or winning group). The dangers of topdoggery are more easily perceived but both extremes lead to a loss of balanced judgement. Much of the tendency for intellectuals in liberal democratic societies to admire or support the Soviet Union [e.g. Johnson 1943] or Nazi Germany stemmed from their admiration of sheer strength and power. [Orwell 1968 (1946)] Some of them were willing to admire almost any strong, tough, ruthless nation or ethnic group. A good example is the case of the British Fabian socialist Beatrice Webb who has been falsely accused of racism [Leech 1982] because (inter alia) she despised the Chinese and the Koreans and wrote denigrating accounts of Chinese life in the diary she kept during her visit to China in the early years of the twentieth century.9 However, a careful perusal of her diaries shows that she was not a racist but impartially unpleasantly and tidily authoritarian. In her diary she calls other Europeans living in China racists because they tended to side with the Chinese people in their attempts to withstand Japanese penetration of their country. Beatrice Webb wrote that in her view Europeans preferred East Asians to be 'weak
and disorganized' like the Chinese to whom they could feel superior than to be modern, efficient, disciplined and determined, like the Japanese who could demand to be treated as equals.\textsuperscript{10} Considerations of race were less important to her than the urge to support well organized top-dogs of any hue. In later years she and her husband were to become extravagant admirers of Lenin and Stalin's ruthless and vicious Soviet Union. [Webb and Webb 1937]. Beatrice Webb is a monument to the dangers of top dog displaced patriotism.

The dangers of underdoggery are less obvious but in consequence more insidious and involve the dangerous argument that the apparently weaker party in a dispute has no moral responsibilities. If the ideologues of underdoggery among the majority or stronger party come to power, the underdogs can often obtain far more than their due because the new rulers drawn from the top dogs either sympathise with them or feel morally unable to try and thwart them. Thus it was a feeling of guilt and indignation among British Liberal politicians about the Boer War and particularly its last and most brutal phase that led to the setting up of the Union (later the Republic) of South Africa in such a way that Boer hegemony and apartheid were the inevitable long-term result [Rowland 1968 pp. 96-7, 104-6]. Similarly the British policy of appeasement when faced with Hitler in the 1930s was in some measure a result of the guilt and uneasiness felt in ruling circles about the unfair and one-sided Versailles treaty that had been imposed on Germany in 1919 [Bethell 1976 pp.13-14, 180,190]. Self-
determination and full national sovereignty were in theory the basis of the new post-war order but the losers' legitimate claims under these principles were denied. Thus subsequent German demands to remilitarize the Rhineland and to annex the Sudetenland, were in principle just and reasonable. However, the granting of these just and reasonable claims led to disaster because of the insatiable appetite that lay behind them, which soon led to the unjust and unreasonable gobbling up of the whole of Bohemia and Moravia. In the country of the just the hypocrite is king.

The Politics of Humiliation

From this last example it is also clear that rapid changes can occur in the balance of power so that an appeased underdog becomes a ravening and oppressive top dog overnight. It is also a special case of what I have hinted at earlier - the politics of humiliation. Where the citizens of one or more countries have a national myth that stresses their past humiliation by another country, this is likely to lead to a situation of chronic conflict in which, as the fortunes of war shift to and fro the winners impose humiliations on the losers, who in turn return the hurt when it is they who are on top.

Just such a pattern existed between France and Germany from the seventeenth century until the Adenauer-Schuman rapprochement after World War II. French intervention in the thirty years war (1618-48) led to the annexation of Alsace and helped to reduce the German people to starvation (in some areas well over half
the population died) and Germany to a shatter belt of small states [Calleo 1978 p.4, Gerrard 1917 p.57, Nelson 1971 p.33, Perris 1914 pp. 46, 93, 232, Shirer 1960 pp.91-2, Tower 1913 p.13]. Later Louis XIV, the builder of Versailles [Ogg 1948], exploited continuing German weakness to annex further territories whose inhabitants were German-speaking. Eventually the balance of power shifted and following the defeat of France by German armies in the Franco-Prussian war, the King of Prussia was in 1871 crowned Emperor of the Germans in Versailles [Howard 1968 p.433, also pp.347,430], the palace of the same French King who had earlier harassed Germany, a palace which for forty years past had been a French national museum. Nearly fifty years later when the French were again victors over the Germans, a Versailles treaty was deliberately imposed on the vanquished in the very same palace, beneath a scroll that read Le roi gouverne par lui meme [Nicolson 1933 p.367, see also pp.365-371]. For the French this was a means of imposing a humiliation on their ancient enemy and thus erasing their own. Earlier, in the time of Napoleon I the French had occupied Germany and oppressed its peoples to the point where they eventually rose and drove the French out in an angry war of national liberation [Balfour 1975 p.14, von Bernhardi 1914 p.64, Nelson 1971 p.317, Perris 1914 pp.255, 266]. These events provided later German nationalists with a sense of resentment and images of eventual triumph. It was "the time of 'Germany's Deepest Humiliation'" according to a contemporary German pamphlet which is commemorated in the monument in Braunau-am-Inn to Johannes Palm the patriotic bookseller executed by the French for selling it
[Hitler 1968 pp. 17-18 and Murphy's notes pp. 9, 18]. Between 1871 and 1914 it was the French who harboured resentment and a revanchiste wish to regain control of their lost German speaking but French feeling provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. In 1919 they regained these provinces and imposed on Germany an impossible burden of reparations which was in turn a revenge for the reparations France had had to pay after losing the Franco-Prussian war. When the Germans were unable to pay, the French deliberately occupied the Ruhr with black colonial troops, which in an era when Africans were seen in Germany as an inferior race, was an extra humiliation. For many Germans it was Napoleon all over again and Leo Schlageter executed by the French for sabotage was the new Johannes Palm [Heiden 1945 pp.134-141]. In 1940 the French army was easily defeated by the invading Germans and the French had to ask for an armistice. At Hitler's insistence it was signed in the same railway carriage brought from its siding in Compiègne in which the German leaders had surrendered at the end of the First World War [Shirer 1960 pp.741-3]. The carriage was then taken to Berlin and placed in a museum where it was later destroyed in an air-raid. The entire saga is a remarkable example of the politics of cyclically repeated and competitive humiliation in which yesterday's humiliation can only be erased by imposing today's. It is very much to the credit of the political leaders of France and Germany during the period since the Second World War that they have been able to break out of the cycle and establish a co-operative relationship between their two countries.
We can see here as in so many other cases the weakness of the simple version of the ideology of underdoggery that seeks to reverse the position of the dogs. Underdogs as a result of their experiences of being underdogs make very oppressive top dogs. Their experiences far from endowing them with qualities of empathy and restraint may be a source of ressentiment, of revenge, revanche and resentment that discharges itself in violent self-assertion if ever the positions are reversed. Moral number one - do not humiliate an under dog. Moral number two - if they have been humiliated do not let them suddenly become top dogs.

There is never enough justice to go round

What is needed in the case of amplified ethnic conflicts such as those discussed above are social devices for damping them down and defusing them before there is another round of excesses, even if one side ends up feeling that its historic grievances have gone unredressed, much as the ending of a feud or vendetta may leave one faction with a sense that they have received less than justice. Indeed in many, though by no means all, disputes between nations or sub-nations a just solution does not exist, for all possible outcomes are unfair to one side or the other.

In the case of the divorce laws an attempt has been made in many jurisdictions to avoid this problem by granting no-fault divorce
without morally evaluating the relative behaviour of the parties in order to decide who is the guilty and who is the innocent party [Davies 1975, 1980]. This change has not necessarily resulted in outcomes that are more just and indeed it is a reasonable criticism of this procedure that it may lead to a resolution of a marital dispute that is flagrantly unjust. However, these more recent procedures based on compromise, concession and conciliation are in certain respects superior to the old-style search for justice and do provide an alternative model for analysing and possibly settling disputes, particularly if money values can be assigned and compensation paid to buy off those who end up as the main losers [Davies 1990].

Given the huge cost of the Falklands-Malvinas war between Britain and Argentina over a few rocks in the South Atlantic it is clear that a cash settlement in the market place would have been better [Davies 1990A]. Had the Argentine government offered each of the 1,200 British inhabitants of the Falklands a sum of 5 million Deutschmarks payable in Frankfurt-am-Rhine to leave, they would all have left. A compromise deal over sovereignty would have been possible giving the Argentinians most of what they wanted at a cost vastly less than that of a war. In the market place violence is rare because any piece of real estate has its price. Nations or sub-nations by contrast see their territory as sacred and inviolable and it is this that leads to war in the name of competing assertions of justice.

There are, of course, some conflicts where justice lies almost entirely on one side but these are limiting cases. Justice is not an
absolute value, like say, the search for truth which should never be compromised. Rather it should be seen as a constraint line that rules out certain solutions to disputes as being grossly unjust by any definition of justice. It is, however, futile to try and maximise 'justice' for once certain grotesquely unjust solutions have been excluded (a) there is no even-handed way of resolving the competing demands for and definitions of justice of the parties concerned and (b) there are other equally valid competing objectives besides justice to be sought in arbitrating most disputes.

A Question of Language

Nowhere is the rhetoric of equality and justice more misplaced than in disputes over language, which is of course a defining characteristic for many nations, sub-nations, tribes and ethnic groups. Whereas questions of race, appearance, ancestry or religion can, in principle at least, be banished from many of the impersonal public spheres of life, so that individuals and corporations can interact solely on the basis of their particular interests, purposes, and relevant talents, this is not the case with language. Given that individuals must communicate, a decision has to be made as to which language they should use and even what version of a particular language. At this point disputes arise and groups that fear that their language is going to lose out [See Adler 1977, Allison 1978, Davies 1988A, Mercer 1965, Petersen 1975], such as the French, the Cymru, the Flemings or even those who speak and write in local dialects, are
apt to protest in the name of justice and equality. Scholars trained in
linguistics now rush in and claim quite irrelevantly that one language
or dialect is a good as another in the sense that each and every
language or dialect can be used to make any manner of necessary
subtle distinctions of meaning. This is entirely beside the point, for
these distinctions of meaning can only be perceived by someone who
has a thorough knowledge of the same language or dialect. There is
no point in wasting a sonnet on a sheep-dog.

Languages are in practice unequal for two quite different kinds
of reasons that stem from either (a) the spontaneous order that
emerges from the interaction of individuals in the market place or
through the process of scientific discovery and (b) the constructed
order that is imposed by political authority [Barry 1982, Polanyi
1951 pp.156,185]. The use of the latter is often associated with
tyranny as when the rulers of the Soviet Union have sought to
impose the use of Russian on the Ukrainians or Lithuanians or when
the Hungarians under the dual monarchy arbitrarily changed the
language of law and administration in Croatia from Latin to Magyar
to the great disgust of the Croats [Macartney 1962 pp.183-9].
Actions of this kind are at best zero-sum games. The group whose
language is imposed gains greater access to government jobs at the
expense of the subordinate group. It may even be a negative-sum
game as administration becomes less efficient and inter-group co-
operation more difficult.
By contrast men and women willingly switch languages if there are gains for them as individuals which stem from the dominant patterns of spontaneous interaction. The ancestors of today's Welsh people consciously switched to speaking English instead of Welsh not because of political pressures from outside, but in order to take advantage of economic and educational opportunities. English is the most usual language of commerce and of scientific and technical journals. English and Welsh are thus (a) in an objective sense not equal languages and (b) are related within an asymmetric positive sum game such that those Welsh people who became fluent in English gained enormously whereas English people learning Welsh will have gained very little. You can't speak Welsh to a Norwegian, an Indian, a Nigerian or an American.

The consequence has been that the proportion of people in Wales able to speak any Welsh at all has steadily declined [Adler 1977] from 50% in 1900 to about 18% by 1990 and most of the bilingual 18% have a better command of English than of Welsh. Today there is a panic attempt to prevent the language from dying out as the closely related Cornish language did. The benefits the Cornish gained from losing their language and becoming scientists, engineers and hard rock miners to the world are quite forgotten. Wales has produced no one to match Newcomen, Trevithick or Davy. The Cornish invented the steam engine and made it go, while the Welsh merely sing songs about the Cornish engine of Nant-y-glo that allegedly wouldn't go: "Was you ever see such a funny thing before?" Educators even hold the deluded belief that Welsh could be revived
to the point where the population of Wales became entirely and fully bilingual and the two languages symbolically but spuriously equal. Attempts are now being made to use political power and even clandestine arson to offset the objective linguistic inequalities of the market place, of knowledge and of the world of international interaction. At enormous expense all road signs are now bilingual with the Welsh version very prominent, so that a visiting Japanese motorist is quite likely to drive into a ditch while trying to puzzle out what 'Arafwch nawr' means while doing 110 kilometres per hour. 11 In the schools the main result of teaching Welsh has been to drive out the study of other more important languages and especially German which is the second most important language after English for science and technology and Spanish which is the language of much of Latin America, to say nothing of Arabic or Japanese which ought to be taught but are not. The high-minded rhetoric about equality is of course really about the politics of jobs, since although there are no tasks for which a knowledge of Welsh is necessary or even particularly useful, it is possible to write it into the requirements of local government employment. This creates an arbitrary and unfair inequality between individuals which is then justified as an attempt to erode the background inequalities between languages.

A similar point may be made in relation to South Africa where the riots in Soweto which began a new phase in the struggle of the black Africans against apartheid were triggered off by the attempt on the part of the South African government to force the black
children of Soweto to receive their education through the medium of Afrikaans instead of English [Wilkins and Strydom 1980 pp.214-234]. The Sowetans quite rightly resented this attempt to push them into the cultural cul-de-sac inhabited by South Africa's Afrikaner political bosses and to deprive them of the opportunities offered by a thorough knowledge of a world language.

In discussing these cases of language conflict, I have once again deliberately undercut the rhetoric of equality and justice used by the leaders of sub-nations or minority ethnic groups and moved the point of emphasis downwards to the rights and opportunities of the individual and upwards to the universal values and requirements of a culture of human achievement that transcends the boundaries and identities of groups. If ethnic self-assertion collides with either of these, it may well not deserve our support, nor, if it is eventually defeated, our sympathy.

Above and Below the Nation State

The established nation states and nationalisms of Europe are currently under strong pressure from above and below, both from sub-nations seeking secession or autonomy and from multi-national institutions whose leaders seek aggrandisement at the expense of the nation state. It is perhaps hardly surprising that a coercive empire like the Soviet Union should show signs of collapse. The U.S.S.R. has
always been a socialist prison house of nationalities and only in 1991 have such conquered and illegally annexed nations as Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania regained the independence they enjoyed prior to the Ribbentrop-Molotov National Socialist-Soviet pact [Bethell 1976 pp.26,200,350,380]. The British have long since ceased to rule India or the French Africa, so why on earth are the Russians still ruling Central Asia as the last of the European colonial empires [Caroe 1967, Conquest 1967]. Likewise it is easy to see why an artificial aggregate like Jugoslav should fall apart. They are no Jugoslavs. There are only Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, etc.

What is more surprising is the emergence of centrifugal tendencies in the democratic nations of the European Community such as France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, the United Kingdom and Italy. Politicians in such sub-nations as Bavaria or Scotland see the enhanced powers of the E.C. and other Euro-institutions relative to the established nation states as an opportunity for those below to gain in power also. The argument sometimes employed is that the existing nation states of Western Europe are arbitrary historical creations and the product of past dynastic or national ambition in contrast to the allegedly 'pure' ethnic sub-nations now seeking autonomy or even independence. Yet sub-nations such as Scotland or Wales or the Pais Vasco are as units just as arbitrary as the nation states of which they form part. Scotland was historically divided between Gaelic speaking, half-pagan Highlanders organized into clans and the more advanced English speaking Presbyterian Lowlanders who had very little in common with the hill tribes. In the end only
the help of an English army representing a German Hanoverian dynasty enabled the Lowlanders to prevail over and later to subdue and convert, civilize and exploit, sentimentalize and copy the savage Highlanders. At an earlier time in Scottish history there was even greater diversity and disunity for in addition to the Northumbrian English who occupied the Lothians and the Irish Scots who invaded the Western Isles and Highlands, there were Picts in the North-East, Welsh speakers in Strathclyde and Rheged in the South-West and Norwegian speaking Vikings in the far North of Scotland. Scotland is just as much a hodge-podge legitimized by myth and history as the United Kingdom.

Likewise, the apparent unity and universalism of the European Community must be challenged both because so many democratic European nations such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Norway, Sweden and Finland, are still excluded from it and because many of the common European policies held up as evidence of Europe's having at last risen above selfish nationalism are merely means of discriminating against the rest of the world in order to placate particular economic pressure groups with electoral leverage inside their own individual countries. The Common Agricultural Policy (strongly favoured by nations of peasants such as France) which prevents the importing of cheap food from outside Europe is the most notorious instance of this. Meanwhile the farmers of the United States, Canada, Australia, Poland and the developing countries, are angry at the unfair trade barriers that stifle their agriculture in order to protect the farmers of Europe and are threatening to
retaliates. The resulting trade war could wreck the world economy [Common Agricultural Policy 1991].

Europe is an old sow with five big and seven little piglets. Unfortunately there are more Europigs than Euroteats and further enthusiastic potential Europiglets are snuffling outside the door of the sty. There is nothing odd or scandalous about this. It is a normal aspect of quotidian democratic politics. However, we should not deceive ourselves into thinking there is anything heroic, historic or idealistic about it. The Americans have long openly recognized this dimension of politics and have developed a suitably low-minded rhetoric to describe it. The Europeans would do well to adopt and adapt such American phrases as "the county park barrell", "fingers in the till", "hornswogling", "boondogling", "log-rolling" and "Tammany Hall", rather than to hide behind pompous slogans. If the pretense is kept up that decisions based on a crude weighted average of national self-interests are somehow the will of all, then the Eurosow will in time eat her own farrow.

Rights and Roots

A further interesting erosion of the position and power of the nation state with a corresponding empowerment of both 'Europe' and the individual is provided by the work of the European Court of Human Rights. Individuals who feel that their rights and interests are being suppressed or neglected can now appeal over the heads of the own country's courts and Parliaments to have verdicts and
legislation set aside as contrary to basic rights. In many cases this involves the striking down of laws that have been enacted or retained as an assertion or a metaphor of national or sub-national identity.

In 1967 male homosexual behaviour was decriminalized in England and Wales [Davies 1975] and some time after in Scotland also. However, the old British laws still applied in the British province of Ulster and also in the formerly British but now independent Republic of Ireland (in the Republic the English common law and also statutes passed prior to the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922 still apply unless specifically repealed). Such laws have been used to punish the victimless crime of homosexuality as a means of maintaining the boundaries and separate identity of ethnic groups and nations since at least the time of the Book of Leviticus [Davies 1975, 1980, 1982A]. Laws against homosexuality and transvestism by emphasizing the need to keep separate and unblurred such basic natural categories as male and female are a metaphor and reminder of the need to maintain the clear identity of the ethnic or national unit itself. In the all-male sacred hierarchies of church, army (and in one party states, the party) that are the core of a nation, male homosexuality is prohibited in order to prevent the formation of unsuitable intimate ties between those inside and outside the organization or at different ranks in the hierarchy [Davies 1982A and 1990B].
Laws against homosexuality are most likely to be enacted and enforced in nations where the leaders feel that the boundaries of their people are vital and important yet fragile and threatened. In many European countries, such as Germany or Britain, the laws have been repealed in recent years as these peoples' sense of being exclusive nations set apart from their neighbours has declined and secularism and demilitarization have weakened the influence of the 'sacred hierarchies'. These changes have not occurred in Ulster and the Republic of Ireland where an intense sense of being part of a separate nation with a distinctive religious allegiance has remained strong. Both Protestant Ulster Unionists and Roman Catholic Irish republicans fear that they could be politically absorbed or culturally infiltrated by their larger and potentially overwhelming neighbours. Here, as elsewhere tough laws against homosexuality expressed the fears and determination of threatened but resolute minorities and this was reinforced in each case by the strong links between ethnic identity and traditional religion [Bruce 1986, Martin 1978 p.107]. 'Ulster says "No"' and 'Save Ulster from Sodomy' proclaimed the Reverend Doctor Ian Paisley for the Protestants. Homosexuality is fundamentally disordered behaviour said Pope John Paul II. *Roma locuta est; causa finita est.* [Saint Augustine ] said the Irish Catholic hierarchy [Bruce 1986 pp.150-1, Inglis 1987].

There the matter might have remained but for the existence of a higher level of appeal, the European Court of Human Rights. An Ulster homosexual, Mr. Dudgeon and an Irish homosexual senator, Mr. Norris in turn took their cases to the Court and obtained a ruling
that the laws of their respective countries were a denial of and interference with the individual's fundamental right to personal privacy. The judges of the European Court of Human Rights sitting in these cases were drawn at random from justices representing each of the West European democracies that subscribe to the Court, i.e. they represent a diverse and heterogenous set of people. Whereas a homogeneous nation or ethnic group can be held together by the enforcement of a particular code of personal morality, in a larger more diverse unit it may well be universal rules such as the rights of the individual that are basic to the formation of solidarity. Individuals and nations in Europe submit to these more universal rulings even if they strike down a law enforcing a cherished national morality. This can be seen as a shift from a mechanical form of solidarity based on a common sameness to an organic form of solidarity between very varied individuals (who are citizens of several liberal democratic states) based on the interdependence of people who are different [cf. Durkheim 1964]. Once again there has been a shift away from the nation or sub-nation simultaneously upwards to an international institution and downwards to the individual and his or her rights.

A Summing-Up

In outlining the complexities of the relationships between the different layers of belonging and loyalty experienced by the individual, I have tried to provide educators with a model of how nationalism can be discussed. In doing so I have deliberately made
extensive use of concrete examples rather than pure but cloudy abstractions. Most of the examples are taken from the societies and history of Europe simply because I am more familiar with them than with their counterparts in other continents. My colleagues from outside Europe are welcome to substitute other examples as are my European colleagues who may well disagree with my interpretation of particular cases. The examples have been chosen to demonstrate a method which is based on two principles (a) the placing of nationalism and the nation within a complex hierarchical system rather than making it one half of such simple dichotomies as nationalism versus internationalism or nation state versus ethic minority (b) a sceptical view of claims made by collectivities at all levels including those that hide behind the label 'critical' (which merely signifies a partial scepticism directed against one particular institution or layer). I am not concerned that others may use the same sceptical method against a position I may have taken on any particular issue for my main interest is not the "winning" of particular arguments but with establishing general rules as to how arguments should be conducted. The aim and result of a searching but balanced scepticism is not nihilism but reasonableness, consistency, and flexibility.

Sceptical analysis can be brought to bear against a unit at any level in my scheme. I have used it to cast doubt on the defenders of collective loyalties at levels other than the nation state mainly because educators (at least in Europe) are selectively critical [Palmer 1976] of the nation state and nationalism and (a) fail to see that the
same types of criticism apply at other levels too (b) do not distinguish between universal values (such as the rights of the individual or the achievements of the human species) and particular values, (such as the customs and traditions, powers and privileges of a particular nation, sub-nation or other collectivity). I am not arguing that the universal values are necessarily superior or should always prevail, but merely that the two kinds of appeals and claims are different in kind and should not be confused. Universal values are not the same as absolute values and although they may enjoy a certain priority it is possible to make a reasoned case for allowing particularist values to over-ride universal ones in specific circumstances. For the educator absolute values and the unity of the sciences should reside rather in the process of rational thought and analysis which splits ideas and ideologies up into their component parts and subjects them to a sceptical and comparative scrutiny.

It is reasonable for the sceptical educator to take seriously Acton's dictum that "power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely" [Grigson and Gibbs-Smith 1959 pp.300-302]. The evils of totalitarian dictatorship are obvious. However, it does not follow that there is a simple relationship between power and corruption and contrary to what is usually stated, Acton never said that all power corrupts. The beliefs and impulses of many relatively powerless groups can be more corrupt than those of the powerful and it is often just as well that the powerless are not in a position to enforce policies based on their convictions. Those who think they lack power altogether and those who exercise absolute power often
share a dangerous lack of responsibility and may even lack any sense of responsibility at all; in their own way both are the opposites of the accountable holders of limited constitutional power. It is often necessary to distrust those who claim to be the leaders of the powerless, for even today they probably have some power and tomorrow they may exercise absolute power. It is for this reason that it is necessary for educators to identify and draw attention not only to the corruptions of the powerful but also to the often unrecognized corruptions of those who lack power. This can be done through the kinds of analysis I have termed good minorityship, underdoggery and the politics of humiliation. Anti-patriotism is not enough.
Notes (to Christie Davies: Concentric Loyalties)


2. This may be apocryphal. If the attribution is correct (1973), the remark was probably made when he was Secretary of State for Ireland, see Zebel (1973).

3. Yet Spencer could also be very pragmatic for when the Japanese asked his advice (as one of the world's most distinguished sociologists) on how to transform Japan into a modern, industrial society, he did not force upon them his own creed of liberal individualism, but rather advised them to conserve and use their own strong tradition of hierarchical nationalism and ability to subordinate the individual to the group. See Duncan (1908) pp. 161, 319-20 for Spencer's meeting with Arinori Mori and Letter to Kentaro Kaneko.

4. By a bizarre coincidence, this group received coverage in the Korean press at the same time that ICUS was held in Seoul.

5. It should be noted that the Croatian mistreatment of their own minority, the Serbs of Slavonia, led the Serbs to side with the Hungarians (Macartney (1962) pp.188-9). My minority's minority is my friend.

6. By any standard, Lenin and Stalin's Russia was far worse than the latter years of the Tsars, likewise Khomeini was worse than the
Shah and the Ba'athists were and are worse than Nuri el Said and King Feisal (See Al-Khalil (1990) The same kind of before and after comparison should be applied in cases of national self-determination. Consider for instance the regimes during World War II of Monseigneur Tiso (hanged for war-crimes) in Slovakia or Cardinal Stepinac (who should have been hanged for war-crimes) in Croatia.


9. See entries in Beatrice Webb's Diaries for 22nd October 1911 Pyng Yang Heijo pp.2870-2 "The Koreans strike us as a degraded disagreeable people" ... a "nation of dirty, uncivilized peasants". See also p.2881. On 25th-28th October 1911 when at Mukden she wrote on p.2887 the Chinese are "repulsive, dirty, disingenuous and coarse-looking and sensual and there is a general appearance of inefficiency and drift". See also entries for November 1st 1911 in Peking, November 6th 1911 pp.2898 and 2916 and November 18th 1911 p.2941 on board a steamer in the China sea for further anti-Chinese ravings.

10. See entries in Beatrice Webb's Diaries for 23rd August 1911 in Tokyo p.2766, October 19th 1911 in Seoul p.2866; For October 22nd 1911 when in Pyng Yang Heijo p.2870 her diary entry says that Japan's mission to civilize Korea,"denounced by some as Imperialism,
is something of which Japan has every reason to be proud." On pp.2877 and 2881-2 there are further statements asserting the superiority of the Japanese to the Koreans and her entries for October 25-28th October 1911 pp.2886-7 and 2890 in Mukden and for November 1st 1911 pp.2898 in Peging and 2940 at sea, again spell out her belief in the superiority of the Japanese over the Chinese and denounce those Europeans who sided with the Chinese as being racists.

11. For the benefit of Japanese readers it means 'slow down, now!' See also the brilliant Welsh play 'Sticky Wicket' by Fletcher Watkins.


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