FAMILY LIFE AND FAMILY VALUES IN MODERN SOCIETY

by

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In this paper I try to delineate the situation of the family as it exists in the most advanced societies of the present day. We call these societies advanced -- or modern -- because they are being continually transformed by a compounding of three quite unabating revolutions: the scientific, industrial and democratic. Each of these brings a distinctive ethos with which family life, as much as the rest of life, is being made to conform. An ethos spreads pervasively and often silently, but always persistently and imperiously. It can be a long time after its first appearance that some of its most dramatic effects show. The recent overflowing of feminism, for instance, is one expression of the democratic revolution that has been at work for some centuries. The family car and television set are spectacular latter day conquests of the scientific revolution. Robotization and computerization are latter day conquests of the industrial revolution that are having widely ramifying effects in our time.

I. IDENTIFYING THE MOST ADVANCED SOCIETIES

By using a combination of indices, it is possible to isolate a small group of present-day societies that could be called the most modern -- modern in this sense of being the furthest revolution-driven. Since the lengthening of life is a result of the application of many sciences, let scientific advancement be indexed by a life-expectancy for males of 72 years or above. Let industrial advancement be indexed by three summed factors: (i) a per capita Gross National Product (or Gross Domestic Product if GNP is unavailable) above US$12,000, (ii) a labour force in
agriculture less than 10% of the total force, and (iii) an urban population greater than 75% of the total population. Let democratic advancement be indexed by an established system of stable, elective parliamentary government. If all of these indices are required in combination, the societies selected in are Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and West Germany (considered always here is the West Germany that existed prior to the 1990 German reunion.) Underlined in Table I are the placements of these societies in regard to these factors. Since certain other societies present some interesting comparisons, their placements are shown without underlining. Like it or not, the process of modernization, driven by these three revolutions, is homogenizing. It is making nations from different traditions look increasingly alike in their social organization and culture. As other countries come to qualify for underlining in such a table, we can expect they will come to resemble those already underlined here. For, nowadays, if we want to celebrate the distinctiveness of a society we have to turn to its past, to its traditional arts and crafts, costuming, cookery, and so on. But we will likely find that it resembles many other societies in its city skylines, its highways, automobiles and service stations, its airports and planes, its media of communication, its film entertainment, its university teaching and research, its medical services, its library collections, its defence arsenal, its election procedures, its ways of doing
business -- and much else besides. It is thus that the making of one modern world proceeds apace.

II. THE MODERN FAMILY IN IDEAL-TYPICAL DELINEATION.

When I go on now to generalize about the modern family, it will be to the family in the societies underlined in the table that I expect my words to apply. But it must also be understood that I am delineating that family as an ideal type. Sociologists will know that ideal-typical knowledge is knowledge in what we might call the interrogative mood (Weber, 1949; Fallding, 1968:24-34). That is to say, it equips us to approach actual cases with one cardinal question in mind. We ask: are the actual cases altogether like this or are some or all of them quite systematically otherwise? The ideal-type that is thus used is itself constructed from real evidences, from studies made and impressions gathered. From these evidences, plus traits their tendency would seem to imply, a composite picture is generated. That picture is idealized in the direction of rationality, since the observer and the social actor both know that rationality is a condition of effective social action. That is, for action to be effective, it has to be consistent and employ means that can secure the ends sought. Like the accused person who is presumed innocent till proven guilty, the subjects brought under this kind of sociological scrutiny are assumed rational till found to be otherwise. And, of course, otherwise is what they are not infrequently found to be.

The families of these industrially advanced societies, then
are of a kind that is generally designated the *conjugal family*. They are so named because they are one- or two-generation families launched by a marriage and having property inheritance from parent to child. Since the grandparent generation cannot control major resources under such an arrangement the importance of the extended family dwindles. The conjugal family is correspondingly that much more on its own. Support and control from within the kin group tend to be limited to what the particular family actively fosters. At the present time these conjugal families present a *dual aspect* that is little short of tormenting to watch.

**III.** ONE SALIENT ASPECT OF THE MODERN FAMILY: ADAPTATION TO THE REVOLUTIONS WITHOUT

On the one side we see these families reeling before the challenges to adapt brought on by the triple revolution. Many role changes are demanded if family life is to be brought into conformity with this. Many family casualties are the result of their not being able to effect the needed change. Possibly the most traumatic impact of this compounding of revolution is its demand for individualism in the society’s members. A number of sociology’s pioneers -- Spencer, Marx, Durkheim, Weber and Simmel especially -- insightfully discerned that this individualism would make something like a hallmark of modernization. Not individualism in the pejorative sense of self-absorption, but individualism in the sense of individuals making the self-reliant centres of initiative and action on which society would have to
call. For every individual will is viewed by the modern society as a resource that it cannot afford to forgo. Such an individual is who will amass and dispose of property in the ways it requires and acquire the competences that it demands. Each member of any family, specialized as a result in his/her own way, will make appearances in many social situations that other members of the same family may never enter. These individualists must be flexible enough, responsive enough, assertive enough and foreseeing enough to take the appropriate on-the-spot and on-the-moment decisions. They must be motivated by an ambition that hungers for personal success, the measure of that success being their ability to match what scientific thinking, industrial enterprise and democratic participation require. They must be moveable, both geographically and social-class-wise; since they must be so self-propelling as to take themselves to the places where the crowns of success for their particular contributions are being held out. They must keep in step with the incentive system, so planning their lives as to make unfolding careers of them, with increments of self-enhancement added all along the line.

Since the family is the only social institution charged with transforming the biological organism into the serviceable social being, it is to the family that the challenge to produce such individualists is thrown. Parents must mould their children to this design. More than that, they must hastily reshape themselves in so far as the changes so rapidly accruing have outstripped
their own socialization. And let us not suppose that these individualists will be against society simply through being that. For they have been shaped this way by modern society’s own prescription in order for them to make its distinctive kinds of effort. Moderns need community as much as their forebears did, but it is not to be realized by a renunciation of this modern individualism; rather is it a type of community that affirms that. A not inconsiderable burden unloaded on modern spouses is the obligation to plant themselves in such a community. So, simultaneously with the pursuit of the career of one or both of them, they have to make domestic arrangements that are fully commensurate with those being made by the Joneses. Most likely at marriage transferring to an unfamiliar neighborhood, whether in inner city or more spacious suburbia, they have to take steps to tie their family into it. If it is the advantages of the more open suburbs they have chosen, the balancing disadvantage of commuting will most likely be exacted. They may also, in the midst of all this, be urged to read a book or attend a seminar on stress management, lest they appear so resourceless as to be cracking under the strain.

Another unsettling impact of the revolutions has been to move the locus of power in the family from a traditionally ascribed one to a realistically earned one. While the view has been questioned (Clayton, 1975:346-365), it does seem that the net result of interchanges in the family today is to leave that person most in control who is most able and willing to contribute
resources to its life (Blood & Wolfe, 1960:11-46). Another shift that has been very evident to everyone, of course, is the growth in the number of wives working outside the home (Blau & Ferber, 1985; Cole, 1979; Davis, 1984; Gerson, 1985; Hayghe, 1984; Kessler-Harris, 1982; Oppenheimer, 1982; Pleck, 1985; Smith, 1979; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1983). Freedom to pursue this work has followed the great changes in infant mortality, infant feeding, fertility and access to education. The availability of women’s work greatly reduces any necessitous economic dependence that would tie them to the family. By around the year 2,000 that dependence may have gone entirely, since it has been estimated that the earnings of young men and young women will be about equal by then (Smith & Ward, 1984). Besides this, the woman’s retirement, like the man’s, will draw support from retirement funds. Unsettling for modern families also is the imbalance introduced by the fact that there is no direct return to the parents from their often very considerable investment in equipping their offspring for careers. Even without career costs, the cost simply of raising children is continually escalating (Espenshade, 1984). Possibly, the children’s most direct repayment is one made to their grandparents, in that pension contributions of the young can be used to fill out the pensions paid to the elderly. Yet this is more an exchange between cohorts than persons, of course, and in any case can only be effected if fertility and/or migration are kept at a sufficiently high level.

My reason for itemizing adaptations like the foregoing is
that they are of such a nature as to erode the customary incentives for making a permanent family. Statistics do not suggest that all or most people eligible for marriage have been dissuaded from marrying by them. But they do suggest that may indeed be occurring for a widening fringe. In the U.S.A. over the last thirty years free liaisons have become commoner, first marriages have been made later in life and divorce has increased. At the same time, the incidence of remarriage has decreased as has the fertility rate (Huber & Spitze, 1988).

For what purpose, then, will couples now make a contract to stay together for life? Romantic love and/or companionship have been given as the reasons for some considerable time now. But I would like to suggest these are simply elements in a much larger complex. I want to lead us to the point where we can appreciate that fact, by taking a look at a second salient aspect that the conjugal family now presents.

VI. A SECOND SALIENT ASPECT OF THE MODERN FAMILY: JEALOUS PRESERVATION OF A PRIVATE VALUE-WORLD WITHIN

A second arresting aspect of the conjugal family today is something like a grim hope entertained there that it will not have to give unduly of its resources to its adaptive assignment. For those who have gone to the trouble and expense of creating families have commonly done so in the expectation that a quality of life will be realized there that public life can know very little of. Within its private world there will be intimate exchanges, mutuality in care, sympathetic support, encouragement
and the bestowal of esteem, and much else besides. But above all, and even though it is scarcely articulated in many cases, there has commonly been the expectation that true values, as the partners understand them, will be realizable within its borders. But before venturing into this question, a word about values themselves is needed. I do not think social science has been distinguished by having a clear and consistent understanding of what values are (Fallding, 1965).

I think we have to take values to be *satisfactions* that a person seeks for their own sake and without limit, because the person judges them to be intrinsically good. They cannot be proven good apart from the tasting, except that one may have the reports of other people that they have tasted and been satisfied. Obviously, since we can and do seek a great variety of satisfactions, we could exalt almost any one of them to the status of a value. It is this exaltation to self-sufficient status that makes a value of anything sought, not the inherent nature of the thing sought. For the same satisfaction may be sought in different ways: as good in itself or simply as a means to whatever else is made good in itself. Because this is so we find it possible for us to choose false values as well as true values. We then distinguish between these by accepting as true values only those that we find worthy of the worship we give them. All else in our lives is made into means once we elect a value. It is this consideration that makes values clearly distinguishable from norms. Values are above situation and
unvarying. Norms can tell us to do different things in different situations in order to realize the same values there. If we believe in being always fair, for example, we will impose no restrictions on the competition of equally able competitors, yet will handicap the stronger when unequal competitors meet.

If we make a value of more satisfactions than one we are in a disabling contradiction. Are we then in such a contradiction if, for instance, we acknowledge beauty, truth and goodness all to be values? We would indeed be unless we revered them only in combination, so that our experience of them transparently exposed the one identical reality to us; these being like three doorways leading into the same temple. That is, beauty induces a feeling experience, truth one of intellect and goodness one of will -- whenever the unitary pattern of the ideal possibility in all things makes its claim on us through them. It might help to make a comparison with the Christian triune Divinity. These are not identical trinities but they are similar in their internal connectedness. For the separate Persons of the triune God, the Father, Son and Holy Spirit -- these are the separate roles needed to give full effect to the total Divine initiative. The valid response to any one Person is the response that reveres the Persons only in combination. It is altogether a different matter, but may I while here unload the thought that beauty, truth and goodness may be this same Divinity’s impersonal names.

Goodness, in the beauty, truth and goodness trinity, is by many taken to be the satisfaction of losing oneself in a group’s
shared struggle to survive and thrive, provided the group's membership remains open to all rightful claims on it from outside. It brings an exhilaration in which self-consciousness and self-concern are shed. It is this that many family-choosers see the family to provide rich opportunity for. It is presumably a sense of this that Canada's star actor Michael J. Fox, for one, and her hockey star Wayne Gretzky, for another, are indicating when they publicly make occasion to exalt the family above the wealth and applause of the success they so liberally enjoy. This is essentially a satisfaction to be found in giving service, whereas the external pressures we saw impinging on the family are insistent that its members be motivated to maximize personal achievement. When I said at the outset that the plight of modern families can be almost tormenting to watch, I had in mind this inharmonious alliance of mutual service and individual advancement. The members of a family that breaks down by reason of its failure to adapt to some facet of the triple revolution can thereby be left without the positive benefits of a private world as well. But in the family that does weather the storm and stays together, the mutual support that is so essential to its inner life can be forced to stretch to cover all its members' individualist careers. That can be a very taxing undertaking. But its difficulty is not the troubling thing. What is troubling is that it can be distasteful to accomplish very often. That is because support can thus be sent out to features of the public arena that are not in harmony with the true values that, it had
been expected, would be realized in the family's life. And this, of course, is entirely alienating.

Is it partly a further development from this predicament that both the wider society and the family have seemed to be in a conspiracy to sharpen and strengthen the boundary between private life and public life? In a variety of contexts the person is given to understand that so many things, including the most significant to the person, have to be bracketed out of his/her public interaction. For example, in deciding on a person's suitability for certain employments, one must not inquire as to age or sex, marital status, race or ethnic identification, physical type or sexual orientation, family connections, political or religious persuasion, war service, property owned or money in the bank. This restricting of the criteria applied to persons to the most immediately relevant is, of course, intended to minimize unfair discrimination and streamline our cooperation. But it does also result in the public person being reduced to a two-dimensional cardboard cut-out. There is so much of the person excluded from his/her largely anonymous public encounters that s/he has to have a private world where the complete self can be endorsed, nourished and invited to expand. Typically, this world is the family, of course: the companionship of a man and a woman that endures from marriage till their separation by death, with the production and raising of dependent children and making provision for them. But there is one modern development which may appear paradoxical against this background -- although an
observation to be made later might make it seem more expected. I refer to the practice, becoming widespread, of governments intervening in family life when that is needed to protect its members from suffering neglect or abuse at the hands of one another. It is as though the state revokes the licence the community has given the family to live a life apart, when the family is judged to be abusing that licence.

Many who are unwilling or unable to make the investment that the family-of-all-out-deal-requires today, do nevertheless create private worlds that reproduce some features of a family's interior life. So we have liaisons with their various degrees of commitment to living and sharing and continuing together (Spanier, 1983). We have single-parent households and homosexual couplings (Macklin, 1980; Peplau, 1982; Tanner, 1978; Tuller, 1978). As we use the prefix "quasi" for members of a class of things that lack the full complement of traits of that class, quasi-families is what we may fairly call these relationships. They are like a lived-out commentary on the family life they exist beside. They compliment it in their partial imitation of it, they protest that its full complement of ties is not valid for everyone, sometimes they intimate that it is better not to enter into contract than to end with a contract broken. It is possible to view these developments as some of the more advanced outcomes of being socialized to individualism. In pulling its individuals to where it wants them, society is not necessarily going to pull all of a family's members to the same social location. Some people allow
themselves to be pulled into singlehood totally. Others there are who value the support of intimate relationship so greatly, they resist total singlehood, but want a commitment limited in such a way that it will allow the move into singlehood should the call for it come. I find it hard to read these developments as being against family. They are more like votes cast in favour of the special quality of life that the family can generate, some of them the votes of people who feel they dare not aspire too high.

Particularly at risk, however, in this whole modern scene of family conjecturing is the status of the child. In contrast to an earlier era where the child was on object of sentimental veneration and a later era where a study of the child’s development needs was a parent’s fun preoccupation, what we witness today is an evasion of the child -- a flight from the child even. Some couples, married or not, choose not to have children and almost all of them take steps to limit family size (Veevers, 1980). Actually having children is not found to make for happier marriages (Glenn & McLanahan, 1982; Monahan, 1955; Spanier & Lewis, 1980). The presence of children in single-parent families is largely the reason for the practical and financial difficulties those families so often experience. The chance of white American children born in 1980 spending some time in such a family was estimated to be 70% (Hofferth, 1985). Evidently, in the completer families too, the child introduces problems. For time and other resources directed to the child’s development are in competition with the parents’ career needs, the uncertainty of
being able to find suitable pre-school supervision being one major cause of chronic anxiety. In so far as supervision at that level has been made available, we have seen a curious phenomenon emerge. In order for some women to be freed from child-minding to follow a career, other women have begun to make a career of child minding. There are, indeed, many different relationship patterns the child born into modern society can be forced to cope with, much of this diversity being the consequence of serial unions (Cherlin, 1978, 1981; Furstenberg & Spanier, 1984). Because of this, from birth, children can be unequally advantaged. One conformation that can occur is particularly out of step with the norm of making a wholly planned small family. This is the household with a large number of children made up of offspring from three or more unions, the present union plus the former union(s) of both partners.

There are yet other expressions of the trend to take some of the family without taking it all. One is the practice of making a thing in itself of romantic love. This is the staple diet of the soap operas and they present its peculiar ethic very accurately. The ethic asserts that one may look for love anywhere and if it is true love that eventuates, anything is justified. One may follow it at any cost, be that a cost to oneself, to one’s family, or to everyone around. The fatuous lyrics of many popular songs make this dissociated romantic love their theme ad nauseam. There are some lyrics, though, that might seem to come closer to that even more extreme dissociation we see occurring, that of
sexual attraction purely and simply. The ethic invoked for this refers us to nature. Since nature has endowed us with a sexual capacity no expression of it, it is asserted, can entail guilt.

And so it goes. Before the whirlwind of change we find most individuals entering some partnership agreement or other to erect whatever private world the combined resources will allow, there to pursue the good life that is too tender a plant for the public domain. It seems that domestic life and privacy may have enjoyed greater favor at different stages of history, but it also seems that our era must surely be one of them.

V. HISTORY HAS FAMILY-FAVORING TIMES

Is it possible that, as the private and sheltered domain, the family becomes especially valued when involvement in the public domain holds out little hope of satisfaction -- perhaps because of its disorder, or the impossibility of predicting its course, or the unpleasant and alienating nature of the transactions that transpire there? It is not irrelevant to understanding our own family situation to remember there have been such family-favoring times. Because of the need for brevity I shall refer to only two of these. The Early Middle Ages in the Roman Empire’s western provinces is one period when the family was so prized (Rouche,1987). This is the era that has also been called the "Dark Ages", since it began with the great Germanic invasions of the Fifth Century. As a result of the invasions the orderly public institutions of Roman Antiquity were undermined irrevocably. The conquering Germanic people themselves, from the
King down, then lived mainly private lives. Their great preoccupation was procuring and securing whatever family fortunes they could make a claim to. Another yet very different period when the family was greatly valued runs from the late Eighteenth through the first half of the Nineteenth Century in Europe (Hall, 1990; Perrot, 1990). In this instance it was a response to the disturbances entailed in the very rapid industrialization. It came almost like a rescue operation for an institution unexpectedly found to be slipping. The family popularity of our own era has come as a response to the accelerating pace of the compounded revolution we have taken note of. A special fillip came as part of the heartfelt determination to resume normal life after World War II, another came after the Korean War. Boosts have come with the successive troughs of the roller-coaster economy and the now seismic international scene.

With what a passion now is home-making pursued by multitudes of people. A reduction in working hours leaves more time to work on it, more leisure to enjoy its results. A raise in salary yields more to spend on it. Newspapers, journals, advertisements, radio, video, television -- they all deliver information to the home. There it can be trapped, then sorted, evaluated and acted on as individual choice dictates. Life can hardly be lived without a car, so essential is it for journeying out from the home on routes and at times of one's choosing. A telephone seems no less indispensable, for one must be at home for people wanting to reach one and one needs to reach them at home in turn. Sears'
department store in Canada sorts parcels in its mail-order pick-ups by the last three digits of the shopper's telephone number, as if no one with money to spend could possibly be without a phone -- or, for that matter, a home to instal it in. We have only of late in Canada admitted to having a fringe of homeless people. That we are still struggling with the enormity of such a condition is a measure of how closely we associate home with life itself. How often now do we hear the praises of family life sung by people whose involvement in public affairs has deprived them of it. Resignations and retirements from politics, the arts, sport, the professions and voluntary associations, can all be accompanied by the always moving refrain: "it is in order to give more time to the family." How many declined invitations are justified by protesting one's prior obligation to the family. How many author's acknowledgements recognize the sacrifices undergone by the long-suffering family for the book's sake.

VI. TRUE VALUES FROM WITHIN THE FAMILY CARRIED WITHOUT

I have pointed out that many people see true values to consist of losing oneself through embracing membership in a larger worth-while endeavor, provided the members remain open to all rightful claims on them from without. Persons typically get their best and longest-lasting taste of these values in the family or the quasi-family equivalents. As a consequence, family unity comes to make the prototype of true values in the imaging of countless people. Since the satisfaction in a value is sought without limit, people who endorse family unity can look for
opportunities to generate its equivalent elsewhere. This may simply serve to heighten the awareness that much if not most of public life is a denial of the true values of membership that the best in family life exemplifies. Consequently, people can be found to be continually bringing home for discussion the question: how far in the public world can true values be applied? They may also be found musing on the obverse of that: how far into the family can the outer-world attitudes be allowed to penetrate? As a result of these considerations a large part of domestic interaction becomes a discourse on values which can amount to a continuous reassessment of their validity. I imagine that some families or family equivalents do now virtually become refuges from a distasteful world. But I would guess that most of them are not that. They tend rather to be points of considerable turbulence where the effort is made to have something to answer back to public life, answers to signal to it regarding value questions.

One perennial answer that is always finding its defenders is that family values must be extended to the whole of life; that is, right throughout the public arena. For if values are true, people have often and not unreasonably concluded, they must be universal in their application. But the single family alone frequently feels that it cannot significantly impact the public arena when it wants to see family values implemented there. There can then arise a quest to gather a community of like-minded people which will reinforce one another’s conviction about values
and also, at the same time, confront the public world with its obligation to embody true values in its life. We might well take note of what happened in this regard in the two family-favoring periods selected above (Rouche, 1987; Hall, 1990; Perrot, 1990).

After the Fifth Century invasions, what transferred the family concern of Western Society into a public domain was basically the organization of the societies as Kingdoms. For monarchy sets at the apex not a royal personage only but a royal family. The leaders exercise their authority in society at large as family members. Supplementing this was the family character of the organization generated by the religious orders. Brotherly and fatherly roles were as basic to the life of the Church as to the life of the Kingdom. There was also the institution of the familia. This was a ramifying kinship structure in which widows, young orphans, nephews, nieces and slaves of both sexes, would live together under a male family head who would assure them of protection. Such an arrangement was, apparently, altogether indispensable. For, whereas women and children were themselves defenceless, they made up three-quarters of the population -- and those were still extremely precarious times in which to live. The monks were able to make the nature of their religious communities understood by adopting this same term "familia" to name them. These communities could have laymen as well as monks for members, not all of the members being required to live within the cloister. Thus was imprinted a family paradigm that bridged the cloister and the town.
What of Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Europe? The crying need for such a family-value florescence as bridged those centuries, was brought home to many when they witnessed the license and licentiousness to which aristocratic men were abandoning themselves in the face of an industrialization that offered them no place. In England, there then developed amongst the bourgeoisie a new discipline in personal and family conduct. The most conspicuous vehicle of it was the Evangelical Movement within the Church of England which had for two of its best known exemplars William Wilberforce and Hannah More. Concurrently with this the Utilitarians encouraged the family virtues. The hope and expectation within both movements was that the whole society would be morally transformed through their influence and, to a marked degree, that did occur.

The Continent was to see its own developments. The Germans, characteristically, expected to have the question of family and society examined thoroughly. They were, accordingly, to have the benefit of their philosophers’ reflections on the indispensability of the family to the general good. Hegel aimed to show how the family safeguards the natural morality without which society is impossible. It also provides, he maintained, one of the interaction circles of civil society. It is only through the mediation of such action circles that the state can relate effectively with individuals. Kant aimed to persuade his countrymen that it is the anchoring and discipline of
domestication that makes the family important. In taming our wild nature it lays a foundation of morality for the whole social order. Both Hegel and Kant saw the benefits of family experience to include the assumption of clearly differentiated roles by the mother and father and an introduction to moral authority through the other members' subjection to the father as head.

France was at this time open to outside influences, and one can observe the thought and practice of England and Germany leaving their mark there, like grafts onto France's own rich growth of social and political philosophy. But in France, and again characteristically, the concern for family values was given a mainly political expression. We can see its three distinct political movements of this time each being made a champion of one major virtue of family life. The liberals made the sphere of family life serve as a prototype of the non-governmental domain that would have to be preserved at any cost so that free citizens could construct society by voluntary action. The conservatives strove to have the family revived in its most traditional form, with divorce abolished and wives in subjection. This the conservatives desired essentially as a defence against the moral degeneracy of the Restoration. Very original in having his own kind of conservatism was Le Play. Civil society would be made wholesome again, Le Play believed, if attention is given to making families happier. For he was convinced that private life stamps public life with its character. This leavening he
apparently considered automatic, so the state could have no stronger foundation than that which the current condition of the family allowed. The happy family is the one so encumbered that it can, at one and the same time, observe the moral law and adequately fulfil its material needs. As for French socialism, that was, of course, a many coloured thing in itself, running from pink to the deepest red. But all positions expressed intentions concerning the family. They shared the view that the family, no less than the other social institutions, was amenable to reconstruction, and that reason more than tradition would show what form it must take if it is to aid the quest for the socialist ideals of freedom and equality. In some of its expressions, at least, this quest was seen to entail a new deal for women. Proudhon, at the anarchist wing, as good a located mankind's redemption in the family. For the good life to be realized, he insisted, the private sphere must grow until it devours public life and the state, and the family is the place where that conquest is already fact and whence the continuing assault can be launched and provisioned.

I have been maintaining that in a similar way to these two historical instances, a contemporary family-life affirmation has blossomed and has also had its shot at sending a family-value infusion into the wider society. The two or three generations that have carried it were short on rhetoric and long on action so its family sources sometimes went unlabelled. But careful scrutiny can see the vision of a family-like unity as the guiding
ideal. The hippies of the sixties made a part of this family-value infusion -- so conspicuous were they their part in it was almost symbolic. These hippies felt a revulsion from public life that was exceptionally acute. Urging everyone to make love instead of war, they dropped out of the economic process to try to establish self-sufficient domestic units in which all relationships would be familial. As we all know, these ventures were to prove unsuccessful in the long term. Other people who set up living arrangements for groups of families to live in communes made another part of the infusion. Part of it also has been the unconventional marriages where people have written their own vows and services, thereby hoping to have their marriage impact more meaningfully on the society of the day. Part of it has been the widespread substitution of informal relationships for the formal, a change that has quite transformed the style of our dealings with one another in business, public administration and the delivery of services. Part of it has been the aggressive internationalism that is striving on a variety of fronts to make the family of nations materialize now: internationalism in science, the professions, the arts, the religions, trade, business and sport. Part of it has been that more direct pursuit of universal brotherhood and sisterhood undertaken by the peace movement. Part of it has been the environmental movement that affirms the human being's kinship with and responsibility for all creation. Government checks on intra-family abuse are a part.

Yet it is possible that no expression of this modern family
concern has reached an intensity and vividness that can compare with those displayed in the Unification Religion. This remarkable movement has already received a considerable amount of attention from students of human thought and behavior (Barker, 1984; Bryant & Hodges, 1978; Grace, 1985; Horowitz, 1978). What justifies reference to it once again here, is that I think a new and fuller perspective can be given to it when it is understood in relation to modern society as a whole and to the other expressions of the same family-value concern that can be identified both in the contemporary world and throughout history. Significantly enough, the movement emerged in the mid-nineteen fifties in industrializing South Korea, and in Seoul, its populous capital city. It was in Seoul in 1954 that "The Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity" was founded, its founder being an electrical engineer and a former Presbyterian Sunday School teacher, now known world-wide as the Reverend Sun Myung Moon. Whatever future the title of that Association might have seemed to raise hopes of, the Association actually proved to be the anlage of a religion in its own right that has spread well beyond Korea, including into countries of the kind we are considering. Unificationism is a gnostic religion with a very intricate doctrinal system that fuses Calvinist and eastern thought forms, a religion only to be embraced through study of the gnosis. All that will concern us in this paper is to appreciate the central place the system gives to the family in the expected transfiguration of society as a whole.
Unificationists believe that a special revelation made to the Reverend Moon permits mankind to know for the first time the true source of original sin. Sin entered the human race through — not sexuality itself but an illicit, perverse sexuality wherein Eve copulated with Satan. The resulting defilement has infected all human kind, removing them from the perfection God intended. That perfection lies in the attainment of three simultaneously present maturities: maturity of body, of mind and of spirit, the coincidence of which would render the person sinless. Reinstatement to that sinless condition is now made possible through an indemnity paid by the Reverend Moon’s suffering and by his blessing of marriages. This marital blessing is but the second of three blessings whose effects combine to secure the redemption of the world. The Reverend Moon’s redeeming work in this regard is empowered and authorized by his having been made the Lord of the Second Advent. Any one of the blessings can only actualize on the basis of establishing a Four Position Foundation. In the case of the marital blessing, the Foundation comprises God, husband, wife and child. The First Blessing has secured the perfection of individuality. With the Second Blessing the ideal marriage and family are established, the children born into this family being — like their parents now — sinless. In the Third (and final) Blessing, man’s dominion over all creation will be assured.

So here is a contemporary view of the family that anticipates its sanctification and makes that sanctification a
stepping stone to nothing less than world redemption. Whether or not this expectation is fulfilled is what will decide whether Unificationists have believed to good effect or in vain. But what is incontrovertible is that amongst them the desire to transform the whole society by extending family values to it, has once again blossomed forth.

**VII. CONCLUSION**

It is clear that the modern family has to be a very hardy plant if it is to continue its perennial life, producing for its members and society year in and year out. To the innovations flowing from the scientific, industrial and democratic ways of life it can only adapt. Some families are able to accept these as enriching, yet only in the realm of means, means that are made to serve the quality of the life they are making together, that being the end for which they live. Through this strategy a family may remove or at least alleviate the unhappy discrepancy in its own bosom that results from its having to present modern society with achieving individuals. But, in addition to this response, there may at times also come the greater response, might we call it the heroic response?, of seeking to sow the seeds of a family unity everywhere.
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Insert for "Family Life and Family Values in Modern Society," by Harold Fallding.
REFERENCES


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