LOGIC:

THE LOGIC OF UNIFICATION THOUGHT

by

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1. What was, and is to be done

My mandate was, and is: first to attend to Unification Thought, with special reference to Logic; and then to say something about it which would, and will, be positive and constructive. I therefore set myself to study what was recommended to me as the standard expository treatise - Dr Sang Hun Lee's Explaining Unification Thought (New York: Unification Thought Institute, 1981). Having done this, and taking account of the fact that one of the author's three main purposes was "to provide an effective way to overcome Communist ideology" (p. xvii), I had no doubts but that the most useful and appropriate task for me would be: to start from Dr Lee's treatment of dialectical materialism in general and of the 'Dialectical Logic' of Hegel and Marx in particular; and then from this go on to develop a more comprehensive undermining of the philosophical foundations of Marxism/Leninism¹. Although this exercise did not depend upon any Unificationist premises, it nevertheless appeared to be consistent with everything which Unificationists want to assert; while its anti-Communist object is most certainly as dear to Unificationist hearts as it is to mine.

It was, therefore, a draft on these lines which I presented to the pre-ICUS conference in early December 1990. At that meeting, and during the four months which followed, no objection
was raised against that original approach. Indeed I received no suggestions at all, constructive or otherwise. Instead it was only April 22nd - eight days before the April 30th deadline and about a week after I had airmailed what I had believed to be an acceptable TS to the New York office - that I got a call to say that they had just received and would be forwarding a communication from the Chairman of Committee VI, urging a radical reconstruction. What was now wanted was a more direct and systematic critique of Chapter 5 in Explaining Unification Thought. So that is what I then obediently and immediately set myself to produce.

Like its predecessor the resulting successor starts not from the beginning of Dr Lee's Chapter 5 but from his treatment there "of dialectical materialism in general and of the 'Dialectical Logic' of Hegel and Marx in particular". This is in part, but only in part, because of the need to complete the work of reconstruction with all possible speed. The main reason, however, is that - as I believe - Dr Lee goes wrong throughout that entire chapter, quite unnecessarily giving hostages to fortune, by setting Unification Thought in the context of a disastrously reactionary philosophical tradition - the same tradition indeed as that from which Marx himself sprang. One reason for adopting a somewhat indirect approach in my original paper was to put this suggestion to Dr Lee in the gentlest and most eirenic possible way.
2. **The heritage of "German classical philosophy"**

"Karl Marx was a German philosopher." It is with this seminal sentence that Leszek Kolakowski begins his great work on *The Main Currents of Marxism: Its Rise, Growth and Dissolution* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978). Both the two terms in the predicate expression are crucial. It is most illuminating to think of Marx as originally a philosopher, even though nothing in his vastly voluminous works makes any significant contribution to philosophy in any academic understanding of that term. It is also essential to recognize that for both Marx and Engels philosophy was always primarily, indeed almost exclusively, what they and their successors called classical German philosophy. This was a tradition seen as achieving its climactic fulfilment in the work of Hegel, and one which they themselves identified as a main stimulus to their own thinking. Thus Engels, in *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, claimed that "The German working-class movement is the inheritor of German classical philosophy."²

(i) So we have to presume that neither Marx nor Engels ever studied Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding* or the philosophical works of Hume. Certainly, even if the Founding Fathers of Marxism were in any way acquainted with these books,
they never realized that they needed to come to terms with challenges contained therein. For both men were to all appearance totally innocent of Hume's fundamental distinction between propositions stating, or purporting to state, only "the relations of ideas", and propositions stating, or purporting to state, "matters of fact and real existence".

Never having addressed themselves to Locke's this-worldly, empiricist account of the origins and development of our conceptual equipment, and never having been subjected to probings by what among English-speaking philosophers is now nicknamed 'Hume's Fork', Marx and Engels were at no time forced to appreciate that substantial discoveries of "matters of fact and real existence" cannot be made by studying only particular ideas and "the relations of ideas". Nor, it seems, did they ever make the crucial distinction between logical and physical necessity; the former belonging to the world of language and discourse, the world of the relations of ideas and of propositions; whereas the latter is a matter of fact and real existence in the Universe around us. Much of the prophetic writing of Marx and Engels must in consequence fall under the ban imposed by Part III of the concluding Section XII in Hume's *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding.*

There is abundant biographical evidence to show that all the social and political ideas peculiarly associated with Marx, all
those so enormously influential ideas which were presented most dramatically in 1848 in the *Communist Manifesto* - the ideas, that is to say, of an inexorable yet always conflict-torn historical development, a development which is bound in the not impossibly remote future to find its blessed consummation in the revolutionary triumph of the class to end all classes - all these ideas were originally derived, by what Marx himself described as a philosophical analysis from apriori manoeuvres with various abstract concepts - concepts which are always taken to be somehow authoritatively given.⁴

For the truth is - to borrow oft-quoted and revealing words from his friend Engels - that it was "by the philosophic path that the atheist Marx arrived at his secular revelation."⁵ Moses Hess had been the first to reach Communism by that path, and a year or two later Marx made his own way along the same route. The framework of the philosophical ideas of Hegel and his immediate successors and perceived predecessors was for Marx formative and crucial. It is with this insight that we may best hope to understand besetting errors and deficiencies in the Marxist system.

Three features of this German philosophical background are especially relevant. The first is the hardest to characterize. Feuerbach was pointing to it when he said that all speculative philosophers are priests in disguise, and that all the classical
German creations — Hegel's Idea, Fichte's Ego, and Schelling's Absolute — were simply substitutes for the Deity, reduced to a more abstract form. The whole climate of opinion was suffused with a profound, providential, Christian or post-Christian conviction that in the end all manner of things will be well; a usually unstated and therefore never examined or abandoned assumption that, ultimately, the Universe is not indifferent to human concerns. The two further features are inseparably connected. There was, second, an equally profound and equally unexamined assumption that apriori reasoning can discover necessary truths about both the structure of the Universe and our true and proper life within it. Third, such rationalist reasoning — reasoning which is rationalist in the technical philosopher's sense, in contrast to empiricist — is typically all-the-balls-in-the-air juggling with terms referring to abstract and indeterminate collectivities.

We may best indicate the atmosphere by quoting here one or two sentences from Hegel's Inaugural Lecture at Heidelberg, noting that in a passing moment of infidel insight Marx himself spoke of the drunken speculations of this master wizard: "We shall see... that in other European countries... Philosophy, excepting in name, has sunk even from memory, and that it is in the German nation that it has been retained as a peculiar possession. We have received the higher call of Nature to preserve this holy flame,
just as the Eumolpidae in Athens had the conservation of the Eleusinian mysteries, the inhabitants of the island of Samothrace the preservation of a higher divine service..."

3. Dialectical Materialism and Dialectical Logic

Dr Lee's first reference to Dialectical Materialism comes at page thirty three, where he follows its spokespersons by pointing the contrast with the Mechanical Materialism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. That, supposedly, "did not recognize development in the universe"; whereas "dialectical materialism emphasizes development, with the specific purpose of justifying the changing of capitalist society into a communist one." He proceeds to quote Stalin: "Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that nature is not a state of rest and immobility, stagnation and immutability, but a state of continuous movement and change,...where something is always arising and developing, and something always disintegrating and dying away."

At this point Dr Lee is too kind, or perhaps too preoccupied with consideration of 'The Inner Structure of the Logos' (p. 34), to raise what should be the obvious awkward questions: 'Who were these Mechanical Materialists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who somehow contrived not to "recognize development in
the universe"?'; 'Who are the twentieth century metaphysicians who, in the spirit of the Pre Socratic Parmenides of Elea, allegedly assert that there is no such thing as change or motion?'; and 'Why is a general emphasis upon development - as something which is in fact always occurring - thought to justify the particular change from Capitalism to Communism - as one which ought to occur?'

To emphasize "development in the universe", even with the specific purpose of justifying the changing of capitalist society into a communist one", could scarcely constitute an appropriate or sufficient *fundamentum divisionis* between dialectical materialism and materialism without prefix or suffix. Nor should we carry things much further forward if we were - like Engels in *Anti-Dühring* - to add to the emphasis upon change and development an insistence upon connectedness, upon 'the altogetherness of everything'. But, of course, there is more to it than that. For "The Marxist dialectic maintains that development is realized by the unity and struggle of opposites" (p. 41). So Dr Lee quotes Lenin: "The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute."

Light is thrown on these dark sayings when, much later, Dr Lee explains: first, that, according to Marx, "Material development
itself follows the process of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. Marx's dialectic is, therefore, materialistic, while Hegel's is idealistic"; and, consequently, that his followers have developed what is called 'dialectical logic', which maintains that "the principle of contradiction is wrong", because "the change and development characteristic of all things imply that things contain negation in themselves" (pp. 177-8).

Once again Dr Lee is too kind - or perhaps too concerned to get on to his Unificationist point that (always? or only often? or best?) "development is realized by...harmonious give-and-take..." (p. 193) - to launch what is the most elementary and overwhelming objection. That has perhaps never been put better than by Herr Eugen Dühring, in the very Course of Philosophy against which Engels directed his most famous polemic: "Contradiction is a category which can only appertain to a combination of thoughts, but not to reality. There are no contradictions in things, or, to put it in another way, contradiction applied to reality is itself the apex of absurdity."

Engels quotes these two sentences in the first paragraph of the first of the two chapters specifically devoted to this subject in that polemic, and then complains: "This is practically all we are told about dialectics in the Course of Philosophy" (p. 134). Yet, at any rate for the non-specialist, though a very short way
with dissent, it surely is, nevertheless, sufficient? For Dühring was absolutely right to insist that it is radically and irredeemably wrongheaded thus to collapse the fundamental distinction: between, on the one hand, (verbal) contradictions, which can obtain only between propositions asserted; and, on the other hand, (physical) conflicts and tensions, which can occur only between animals or inanimate objects or other phenomena of the non-linguistic world. And, furthermore, if anyone wants to say that all developments in organisms or societies or anything else do in fact result from conflicts within whatever it is which is said to be developing, then this rashly universal generalization can indeed be falsified - easily and most persuasively - by referring to Dr Lee's own favourite example of the egg evolving into first a chick embryo and then an actual chick (pp. 195-6).  

Allowing to our present public at least some modest measure of specialist interest, a little more should perhaps be said not about 'dialectical logic' but about dialectical materialism as supposedly somehow scientific. As Dr Lee notes, "It was Engels who approached dialectical materialism through the natural sciences" (p. 62). So, in the unfinished manuscript eventually published as The Dialectics of Nature, Engels maintains that, whereas "the laws of dialectics" were by Hegel developed "as mere laws of thought", his own concern was to show that they "are really
laws of development of nature, and therefore are valid also for theoretical natural science."⁹

There are three of these putative dialectical laws of nature: (a) "The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa"; (b) "The law of the interpenetration of opposites"; and (c) "The law of the negation of the negation." These are listed in the first paragraph of Chapter II 'Dialectics', after which Engels proceeds to list what he sees as some of "the most striking individual illustrations from nature" of their operation. For wherever Engels looked he found such illustrations, some perhaps more impressively persuasive than others but all always further perceived confirmations for his theories.

To anyone who has ever been to school with Popper this itself provides sufficient reason for suspicion.¹⁰ For the semantic content of these "dialectical laws" is so elusive and so indeterminate that prejudiced ingenuity will have little difficulty in interpreting anything whatever which is found actually to happen as constituting the \( n + 1 \)th confirming instance of the truth of such a law.

To possess the logical form of a law of nature a proposition must imply that, under conditions of such and such a sort, it is physically necessary that conceivable events of one kind must occur, and physically impossible that conceivable events of another
kind could occur. And, since every proposition is equivalent to the negation of its own negation ($p \land \neg p$), the extent and content of what is asserted by asserting any proposition is precisely proportionate to the extent and content of what is denied by denying that proposition. We have, therefore, to conclude: that, first, until and unless our dialecticians can specify some sorts of conceivable phenomena which their "dialectical laws" preclude as physically impossible, those 'laws' will remain perfectly vacuous; and that, second, if and when such sorts of conceivable but practically precluded phenomena have been specified, the substance and importance of the resulting laws must be precisely proportionate to the extent and nature of what is thereby precluded.

Communists make much of the necessities and impossibilities involved in laws of nature, and especially of the (in Popper's sense\textsuperscript{11}) Historicist laws of historical development which they believe were discovered by the Founding Fathers of their faith. Since its revelation of the alleged inevitabilities supposedly guaranteed by those Historicist laws has been and remains the chief attraction of their system, that is scarcely surprising. What is surprising, and somewhat disturbing, is that a Unificationist, generally concerned to emphasize both the reality and the importance of necessarily unnecessitated choice, should maintain:
"Marxism has *rightly* asserted that human history has developed according to certain laws" (pp. 315-6: emphasis supplied).

Presumably the passage from which this unfortunate sentence is quoted is to be interpreted as embracing an unnoticed and illicit slide: from a strong Marxist understanding of laws as physically necessitating laws of nature; to some other and weaker understanding in which the word 'law' is taken, either to mean merely some sort of unnecessitated *de facto* regularity, or to refer to a prescription which may or may not actually be obeyed. Certainly there is something here which needs to be tidied up.

4. **The heart of the matter**

When at what may to some have seemed excessively long last we begin to attend directly to Chapter 5, it becomes easy to appreciate that and why Sections 2 and 3 constituted an appropriate propaedeutic. For it at once becomes obvious: both that Dr Lee has here chosen to set Unification Thought in the context of the "German classical philosophy" of Section 2; and that we are in this chapter going to find urgent need for all the distinctions laboured in Section 3.

(i) The two opening sentences read: "Logic is the study of laws and forms of thinking. Formal logic, started by Aristotle,
dealt with universal laws and forms of thinking which are variously
different in content, while dialectical logic, especially that
proposed by Hegel and Marx, dealt with the laws and forms of
development of nature and thinking" (p. 171). Part I then follows:
'Traditional Logic' is subdivided into: 'A. Formal Logic', B.
Dialectical Logic', 'C. Symbolic Logic'; and 'D. Transcendental
Logic'.

Those first two sentences collapse two crucial distinctions:
both that between merely contingent, brute fact regularities on
the one hand and true laws of nature on the other; and that between
prescriptive laws or principles, laying down what it is thought
ideally ought to be the case, and would be descriptive laws or
principles, purportedly reporting what actually was, is, or will
be the case. If all our thinking really were determined by laws
of nature, then there would be no such thing as unnecessitated
choice - or, as many people misguidedly prefer to say,
(libertarian) freewill. In that case it would be physically
necessary for us all always to think and to behave exactly as we
actually do think and do behave, and physically impossible for us
to think or to behave in any other way. Presumably, when push
comes to shove, Dr Lee is no more willing than I, either outright
to maintain such an universal necessitating determinism, or to
defend any proposition which carries it as an entailment.
Since - as Dr Lee goes on to glimpse - Logic in the Aristotelian tradition is not a branch of empirical psychology but an investigation of the normative principles of valid argument, students of either the earlier formal logic or of its later development into modern symbolic logic can aspire only to produce: not natural laws describing the necessities supposedly determining every step in our actual thinking; but only structures of logically necessary truths and/or prescriptions for those who wish to argue validly.\(^{13}\)

Once we have achieved understanding of the nature and - if you like - the limitations of the discipline of Logic, it becomes clear that the fourfold subdivision of Part I embraces an ambiguity and, consequently, a confused classification. For under the heading 'Traditional Logic' we here find not only 'Formal Logic' and 'Symbolic Logic' but also 'Dialectical Logic'; which is subdivided into '1. The Dialectic of Hegel', and '2. The Dialectic of Marx'. Engels, as we have already seen, if not perhaps Marx,\(^{14}\) thought that what he was pleased to call "the laws of dialectics" were not, as Hegel is alleged to have asserted "laws of thought", but were "really laws of development of nature". Regardless of where they may be believed to apply, however, the search for such laws cannot properly be accounted a kind of Logic; nor, at any rate in the traditional Aristotelian understanding of that term of art.
And in any case, as we also saw in Section 3, the principles of dialectics or anything like them are altogether unacceptable as any sort of candidate laws of nature.

(ii) If now we turn to a standard history - William and Martha Kneale The Development of Logic (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962) - we find in the Index no entries at all either for Hegel, or for Marx, or for Engels, or for the revolutionary new Dialectical Logic supposedly fathered by that famous three. Yet in the text the authors do make a protesting comment on Kant's introduction of the expression 'Transcendental Logic' in The Critique of Pure Reason: "The concern which Kant shows here for the purity of Logic is difficult to reconcile with his own practice in the body of the work. For it was he with his transcendentalism who began the production of that curious mixture of metaphysics and epistemology which was presented as logic by Hegel and the other Idealists of the nineteenth century" (p. 355).

It was in this very different understanding of the term that Hegel's Logic and those of his numerous Idealist successors later in that century were treatises on logic. And it is, I think, in something like that same different understanding that Dr Lee entitles Part II of Chapter 5 'Unification Logic'. Thus he begins by explaining that "Unification Logic" - unlike "The traditional logics" - begins by "considering the starting point of thinking".
He continues: "Man's existence is generally thought to be fortuitous. By the time we become aware of our own existence, we are already living and do not know why. As Heidegger says; it seems as though we are meaninglessly thrown out in the world (Geworfenheit) by somebody unknown."

Oh dear; Dr Lee has, I fear, been keeping bad philosophical company! And was Heidegger really an unplanned child, who never knew his natural parentage? Surely that was not at all what Heidegger had in mind in uttering that lament? He must have intended to speak for the whole of humankind rather than either for himself alone or for some small subset of egregious unfortunates. The factitious complaint of Geworfenheit or Abandonment is presumably supposed to afflict us all equally, regardless of any differences in our individual circumstances.

But now, that understood, we have to press the questions why we are thus being asked to think of ourselves: either as having been "thrown out into the world...by somebody unknown", when for many and I would hope for most of us this was happily not the case; or as living without knowing why, when everyone -except for members of the tiny minority contemplating immediate suicide - is presumably well able to give what is to them if not perhaps to others a completely satisfactory answer to the question why they go on living.
Once again, just so soon as these questions are properly and persuasively put and pressed, the answers are obvious. Those who try to upset us all with talk of an universal Gewordenheit or Abandonment want to generate an equally universal felt need for a Divinely provided purpose or purposes. For reasons indicated in the two previous paragraphs such talk fails to generate that felt need in me. But that is not, of course, good grounds for believing either that God does not in fact harbour any purpose for my life or that there is in any case not in fact a God at all.

If, however, anyone offers to inform me of the existence, nature and purposes of their God, then as a would be rational person I should want with polite curiosity to respond to that gambit by myself putting three questions. First, what evidencing reasons can they offer for believing in the existence of such a God? Second, what evidencing reasons can they offer to support their claim that that God has for me whatever particular purpose it is which they propose to specify? Third, and by no means to be neglected, what motivating reasons can they deploy to persuade me to adopt that purpose as also my purpose for myself?

(iii) Since Dr Lee has not undertaken to answer any of these three questions anywhere in Chapter 5 I may with a good conscience proceed now to Part II, 'B. The Logical Structure of the Original Image'. But I have to, and can only, confess that my study of this
leaves me completely at a loss. On page 181 there is a blessedly brief but apparently crucial paragraph which reads: "The Inner Sung Sang and Inner Hyung Sang engage in give-and-take action centering on Purpose. The result is Logos, or reason-law. Thus a quadruple base is formed, called the inner developing Quadruple Base. The relative importance of reason and law (original law) vary, however, between the logos of man and the logos of animals and plants." The purport of this paragraph is supposedly illustrated and illuminated by a diagram: 'Fig. 21 The Inner Developing Quadruple Base'.

If I am ever to come to understand what is or would be at issue between persons accepting and persons rejecting that paragraph, then what I need is, not so much any attempted explication 'in other words', but instead some indication of what Dr Lee and his coreligionists would admit as relevant even if perhaps inadequate or mistaken reasons for either acceptance or rejection.

(iv) In Part II 'C. The two stages in the process of thinking and the formation of Quadruple Bases' the first sentence reads: "There are three stages of cognition: the perceptual stage, the understanding stage, and the rational stage." Dr Lee then proceeds to characterize these three stages. Yet he does not, it appears, think to tell us: either what is the point of distinguishing these three stages; or whether it is all kinds of knowledge (and, if not,
which particular kinds) which are alleged to be attained in such successive steps.

It is, however, incumbent upon anyone who introduces a distinction to show not only that it can be but also when and why it should be made. Nor is it exactly manifest that, when I look out of my study window, there are three distinguishable stages in my consequential coming to know - or, if we must, to cognize - that our ginger cat is currently in his favourite position of front of the yew hedge. In all probability it is not in the coming to compass such very modest everyday items of knowledge that Dr Lee wishes to distinguish his three stages. Fair enough. But if so, or even if not, readers do require to be told what is the proposed scope of application for this distinction.

(v) Part II 'E. The Basic Law of Thinking' begins from the statement that "In Unification Thought the most fundamental principle is the principle, or law, of give-and-take action, or in short, the give-and-take law, or coaction law." Dr Lee then proceeds to try to explain how the traditional stock exemplary syllogism about the humanity and mortality of Socrates "is subject to the give-and-take law" (p. 188).

"Not very shamefacedly" - as my sometime Supervisor Gilbert Ryle loved to say - I confess that I do not know what for Dr Lee was the object of this exercise. If and in so far as it was to
show that and how valid syllogistic inference constitutes a confirming instance of "the give-and-take law", then it is exposed to the same objections as were deployed in Section 3, above, against the manoeuvres of Engels with The Dialectics of Nature. If, as the inclusion of 'Fig. 24 Collation-Type Give-and-Take Action between Two Propositions' might suggest, it is to throw some light upon and to increase our understanding of such valid inference, then I am at a loss to conjecture how anyone could contrive to persuade themselves that Figures of that sort might do anything which is not already done much better by Venn Diagrams.

It is indeed hard to believe that, had Dr Lee himself been humbly prepared to draw the relevant Venn Diagrams, he would have provided so perverse and unenlightening an account of the immediate inference from 'All Koreans are honest' to 'Some Koreans are honest'. What he actually maintains is: "Immediate inference is actually an abbreviated kind of syllogism (mediate inference). In the example above the minor premise 'some people are Korean' is omitted" (p. 189). This suggest that Dr Lee mistakes his major premise to be a logically necessary truth. Here he continues: "Thus, even immediate inference is based on the give-and-take law. In fact, so is the premise 'All Koreans are honest', which is the result of comparing 'All Koreans' and 'honest' through the give-and-take law."
(vi) Part III of Chapter 5 offers 'A Critique of Traditional Logic'. If only I knew what withers were and what it would be for them to be wrung, I could be inclined to suggest that the withers of formal logicians will, and indeed should, be unwrungly the objection deployed under 'A. Formal Logic'; namely, that "formal logic itself has only dealt with the logical... without paying attention to other structures" (p. 190).

Perfectly true, of course. But whatever is supposed to be wrong with that? Is it not a defining characteristic of the professional activities of the physicists, the chemists, the psychologists and of all the other sorts of scientists that each lot attempts to deal only, albeit comprehensively, with certain particular aspects of those always richer realities which are the objects studied?

(vii) The general drift of subsection 'B. Symbolic Logic' is similar. It concludes: "We cannot but say that symbolic logic is one-sided, because it disregards the factor of pathos in normal language" (p. 192). But such 'one-sidedness' is not, surely, a fault in a discipline which deliberately abstracts from the world of everyday language to produce uninterpreted calculi? Where it would be a fault would be a study of everyday communication.

In philosophical discussions in Oxford during the later forties, in my time as an undergraduate there, reference was
continually made to the difference between descriptive and emotive meaning. But in order not to exceed the 6,000 word limit too grossly, and in order to show that I did derive some lasting benefit from those discussions, I will forthwith conclude by urging that, with regard to the illustration offered by Dr Lee, the crux is not emotion but context: "For instance, if someone shouts 'Fire!' we do not know from the word itself whether he means, 'This is a fire' or 'There is a fire burning now', or something else. We can understand the meaning, however, because there is an emotional factor in his expression" (p. 192).

Shouted to artillerymen or to soldiers on a rifle range 'Fire!' will be presumed to be a command. Shouted in a crowded theatre it will, equally inevitably, be construed as an informative warning. These shouts in those contexts would have the same meanings even if it so happened that the shouters were emotionally indifferent and detached.

NOTES

1. This more comprehensive undermining is now to be published as 'Communism: The Philosophical Foundations' in Vol. LXVI No. 257 of Philosophy (July 1991).
2. **Selected Works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels** (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1951), Vol. II, p. 361. In 'Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism' Lenin wrote similarly: "The doctrine of Marx...is the legitimate successor of the best that was created by humanity in the nineteenth century...German philosophy, English political economy and French socialism."

3. The final paragraph begins: "When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make?" Then, referring to the sort of work to which the embargo applies, it concludes: "Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion."


5. Compare **Marx before Marxism**, p. 67: "It was precisely this gap between what is and what ought to be that Marx considered to have been bridged by the Hegelian philosophy." Those wishing to discover the truth about this controverted topic

6. Friedrich Engels *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science (Anti-Dühring)*, translated by Emile Burns (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1934), Ch. 1. Compare too David Guest *Dialectical Materialism* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1939), a work recommended by his fellow believer Professor J.D. Bernal as "the best short study of dialectical materialism that has appeared in English".

The outstanding critical study, unlikely ever to be superseded as a treatment of the period which it covers, is the Jesuit Father Gustav Wetter's *Dialectical Materialism: A Historical and Systematic Survey of Philosophy in the Soviet Union* (New York: Praeger, 1958).

7. Yet he is, as the rally-drivers used to say, going a bit quick in immediately inferring conscious purpose from all and any teleological development: "There is purpose in every development. Communists, however, will not recognize purpose. They say that there is only law, necessity and direction in development" (p. 89). He would, I suggest, be better advised to follow Aristotle in accepting that further steps of argument are required if we are to advance from the observation of such development in all organisms to the
conclusion that these must have been consciously and intentionally designed; which is to say, in a word, designed.

8. Friedrich Engels *The Dialectics of Nature*, translated by Clemens Dutt (New York: International, 1940), pp. 26-7. This Edition contains a Preface and Notes by J.B.S. Haldane, who was at the time both Britain's leading geneticist and a member of the National Executive of the local Communist Party. He suggested that Einstein's low opinion of the work should be disregarded on the grounds that Einstein probably saw only the admittedly worthless essay on electricity. So compare the Appendix to Sidney Hook *Dialectical Materialism and Scientific Method* (Manchester: Committee on Science and Freedom, 1955), which prints a letter from Einstein saying that Edward Bernstein showed him the entire manuscript.


11. Compare, for instance, my 'Choice and Rationality', in *Reason Papers No. 10* (Santa Barbara, CA: Reason Foundation, 1985),

12. See for instance, my *Thinking about Thinking: or Do I sincerely want to be right?* (London: Collins/Fontana, 1975 - also as *Thinking Straight* from Prometheus of Buffalo, NY).

13. Marx himself sometimes regarded dialectics as no more than a convenient device for concealing inconvenient falsification. Thus we may read in a letter to Engels, dated 15 August 1857, that "I took the risk of prognosticating in this way, as I was compelled to substitute for you as correspondent at the Tribune....It is possible I may be discredited. But in that case it will still be possible to pull through with the help of a bit of dialectics. It goes without saying that I phrased my forecasts in such a way that I would prove to be right also in the opposite case."

Can we, should we, refrain from repeating the concluding sentence of the obituary tribute paid by Engels to Marx: "So war dieser Mann der Wissenschaft"?

15. See, for an examination of most of the reasons traditionally offered, my *God: A Critical Enquiry* (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1984); and, on the question of the meaninglessness of life without a Divinely provided purpose, compare, 'What Does it Mean to Ask: ''What is the Meaning of Life?''' in my *God, Freedom and Immortality* (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1984).


17. And what else can we possibly make of the paragraph: "Even a single proposition, such as 'Man is mortal', is based on the give-and-take law. The subject 'man' and the predicative adjective 'mortal' are connected by the logical term 'is' One concludes that 'man is mortal' by comparing 'man' and 'mortal', according to the give-and-take law" (p. 189)?

18. Dr Lee adds, as a concluding sentence to this paragraph: "We can similarly show that inductive inferences, also, are based on the give-and-take law." That he thus maintains that "the give-and-take law" applies to both inductive and deductive inferences suggests that it is to be construed as a principle of all valid reasoning. Hence what he ought in his previous sentence to have been "comparing...through the give-and-take
law" was: not 'All Koreans' and 'honest'; but 'All (Koreans)'
and 'Some (Koreans)'.