CRITIQUE OF MARXISM:
FROM COLD WAR IDEOLOGY TO GLOBAL PRAXIS:
THE UNIFICATION CRITIQUE OF MARXISM

by

William R. Garrett
Professor of Sociology
St. Michael's College
Colchester, Vermont, USA

The Eighteenth International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences
Seoul, Korea
August 23-26, 1991

©1991, International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences
FROM COLD WAR IDEOLOGY TO GLOBAL PRAXIS: THE UNIFICATION CRITIQUE OF MARXISM

"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is the change it."¹ This famous closing proposition from Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach" might well serve as an orienting principle for the analyses of Sang Hun Lee in both his monographs, Explaining Unification Thought and The End Of Communism.² Although Dr. Lee clearly is engaged in interpreting the world in a philosophical manner, he also is committed to an agenda which includes a design for changing the world. Moreover, if Dr. Lee's title to his second book was not prescient, it was at least prophetic. For less than four years after its publication, the end of communism was rapidly becoming an established fact around the globe. Eastern Europe rapidly sloughed off Soviet hegemony and then disestablished Marxist parties, Germany achieved unification, Marxists in Latin America staged a retreat, and even China launched an economic policy pressing toward capitalist principles over a decade ago—and after the student demonstrations for democracy in 1989 will almost certainly be forced willy nilly to liberalize her political system as well. In light of all these changes, when Gen. Colin Powell was recently asked why cutting the military budget was becoming easier, he adroitly replied: "Think about it....I'm running out of villains. I'm down to Castro and Kim Il Sung."³

Indeed, there is a sense in which reading The End Of Communism now appears as an assault on an empty castle—very few folk any longer stand prepared to defend the substantive ideology which Dr. Lee was intent on critiquing in that volume. Of course, Marxist
thought cannot be entirely written off as an aberration devoid of social significance, since both philosophy and the social sciences have been permanently influenced by the critique of idealism which Marx bequeathed to subsequent generations. Politically and economically, however, Marxism represents a bankrupt social theory whose validity as the basis for a viable social order is now everywhere subject to doubt.

In view of the empirical failure of Marxist regimes and the ideological delegitimation of Marxist social theory, an analysis of Dr. Lee's critique of Marxism is somewhat less newsworthy today than it would have been, say, a decade or so ago. What I propose to do in this research endeavor, therefore, is to develop a social scientific perspective for understanding both the factors which contributed to the demise of Marxism and the factors which helped give rise to the Unification movement. Specifically, I intend to argue that the emergence of globalization processes had the effect of exposing the anti-modern nature of Marxist social theory and, hence, its asynchronic "fit" with the contemporary age. By the same token, Unification thought with its emphasis on fostering linkages among the world religious traditions resonates with the processes of the emerging global order in a manner that is almost unique among the New Religious Movements. For neither movement will the reductionist claim be advanced that their thought-forms, processes, and ultimate efficacy are simply a function of macro-social, historical trends. Rather, the setting of both movements into an historical framework defined by globalization theory is designed to illuminate aspects of each orientation and facilitate
the assessment of, at least, certain aspects of both movements which might otherwise elude our critical evaluation.

THEORETICAL ALTERNATIVES FOR UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL ORDER

The fundamental concern that precipitated the rise of modern sociological theory was the effort to comprehend those complex processes which had given rise of modern, industrial society. Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Simmel, Troeltsch, Toennies, et al., among the founding fathers of the discipline, all devised the basic constructs of their distinctive theoretical systems in response to this critical Problemstellung, namely, what are the underlying causes of and the resultant structures constitutive of modernity? Sociological theory is confronted today with an interpretive issue of similar magnitude and significance with the emergence of the global age as a maturation—and perhaps completion—of the modernization project.

Three salient paradigms currently compete in the marketplace of ideas for understanding the structures and processes inherent in the emerging global order. And collectively they possess the potential for breakthroughs in theory construction on a scale perhaps unmatched since the age of the Founding Fathers. Each of these alternatives will be briefly sketched out before turning to a more lengthy explication of the variant paradigm employed in this investigation.

The World-Systems Model One of the earliest and certainly one of the most widely known among the theories trying to come to grips with the current global circumstance is Immanuel Wallerstein's world-system theory. Embarking from a neo-Marxian set of
presuppositions, Wallerstein contends that the expansion of European capitalism from its metropolitan centers in the "long century" between 1450 and 1640 has had the effect of initiating an evolutionary process aimed toward integrating the nation-states of the world into a single socio-economic system. Wallerstein's efforts to trace out the circuitous route of capitalist patterns of development have brought him, in his most recent volume, to the French and American revolutions as well as the early decades of the nineteenth century. True to his Marxian heritage, however, Wallerstein is convinced that the capitalist world-system cannot endure for very long once its ultimate limits of growth are attained. At this point, the system will begin to devour itself in competitive struggles among leading nation-states and multinational corporations, and the fruits of such a struggle will almost certainly be the rise of a successor socialist order.

Although Wallerstein's analyses are rich in historical detail, his enterprise suffers from a lack of theoretical balance. Material factors are consistently given priority in terms of historical causation, while cultural factors are summarily relegated to relative obscurity. The upshot is a decidedly one-sided account of the evolving processes of global economic development.

The World Polity Model The central claim of this entry into the realm of globalization theory is that, although an international political system—a la the United Nations—has not emerged, there does exist a world polity defining the interrelations among nation-states. The central architect of this perspective is John
Meyer, along with his colleagues and students from Stanford.5 Whereas this perspective takes into account ideological factors more proficiently than Wallerstein, the fixation on political dynamics to the exclusion of other cultural or material processes results in a less than adequate portrait of the full panoply of forces combining to construct the global circumstance.

The Globalization Theory Model Roland Robertson and his associates in what has recently been labeled the "Pittsburgh School" are responsible for the distinctive paradigm of globalization theory.6 Robertson proceeds from the analytical observation that the world is now coming to be viewed as a "single place," that is, the world is rapidly emerging as an interlocking network of economic, political, communication, transportation, and cultural forces. The least developed among these networks, thus far, are the cultural norms and precepts—which means that there is still time for humankind to fashion the sort of cultural canopy of meanings its citizens choose to embrace. Moreover, as a consequence of these evolving patterns, several identities are emerging as critical foci for locating oneself in the world. Included herein are such features as: an intensified personal identity as selves slough off prescribed roles and appropriate achieved roles in their stead. This means that contemporary selves are taking a larger and larger responsibility for determining who they are and what life-style they will fulfill. Closely allied with this process is the attaching of greater importance to ethnic and national identities. While it might at first blush appear as though attaining one’s own personal identity is antithetical to an
intensified ethnic and national identity, the fact is that each builds on the other. Accordingly, Robertson argues, an intensified ethnic identification is crucial for establishing one's place in the context of a nation-state, just as nation-state loyalty is critical for defining one's place in the global arena. Each of these identities, in other words, integrates a self into a higher level of organizational structures. And finally, one is able to identify with humanity itself, the most encompassing of categories in the global order.

The advantage attending this particular conception of the globalization process is that it accommodates material, structural, historical, and cultural forces simultaneously. Moreover, Robertson has been able to utilize his model to account for a vast array of diverse contemporary movements—from the rise of global fundamentalisms, to New Religious Movements, to the increased importance of oriental religious currents, the influence of liberation theology, and the impact of shifting geo-political affairs on religious affiliations and sentiments. As with the other perspectives briefly introduced above, however, a number of crucial issues still remain unresolved, not the least of which pertains to the likely role which religion will play—organizationally and culturally—as the global order matures.

A MODIFICATION OF GLOBALIZATION THEORY

The following analysis represents something of a variant to Robertson's globalization theory by virtue of its pressing beyond the sorts of issues and the articulation of a number of claims others in the school have not explored. Nonetheless, the argument
below is consistent with the basic parameters of the Pittsburgh School's basic interpretive thrust, especially with respect to the analysis of the emergence of global order over the course of the last century. Perhaps the most radical feature of the interpretation developed herein is the reperiodization of the last eight to nine hundred years in Western social experience, and, more specifically, the assertion that the roots to the modern project extend back not to the Reformation with the emergence of the Protestant Ethic a la Weber nor to the Enlightenment a la Troeltsch, but to the revolution in canon law during the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries. The significance of this event, meanwhile, was that the codification of canon law transformed the church into a corporation founded on legal principles. In dialectical progression, the need arose for royal law to be codified as a means for incorporating the state and setting it on a legal foundation. A third legal revolution occurred between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when the human rights tradition emerged to provide a basis in law for individual perogatives and rights vouchsafed from even state abrogation. These three legal revolutions set the stage for the take-off of a modern capitalist economy and the rise of the democratic state, two hallmarks of modern societal life. And all of this provided the preparatory stages for the subsequent development of a global order in our own time. Fleshing out the empirical, historical details attending this evolutionary process is the central concern of the next three sections of this essay.

The Revolution in Canon Law
As Western civilization entered its second millennium, the Church had deteriorated to what was, perhaps, its lowest estate ever. The office of Pope was regularly bought and sold, secular princes appointed high church officials—and reaped much of the benefits in the form of income attached to these ecclesiastical offices—and the direction of the church in terms of its creedal, liturgical, and administrative matters was regarded by laity and clergy alike as a royal responsibility. Indeed, church and state were conceived as merely the spiritual and temporal dimensions of a singular societal order.

The reform movement intent on purifying the church and separating it from the secular prince's control was led by Cluny monks, and especially Hildebrand (who later became Pope Gregory VII). The Cluniacs appealed to Emperor Henry III to dismiss the claims of three contenders to the papacy and place his own candidate on the throne, a candidate who would immediately undertake the task of reforming the church. Central to this endeavor was the elevation of the Papal office to a position of authority over all the church and the clergy. The vehicle for effecting such a change was the codification of canon law—a procedure based on the models afforded by both Roman and Stoic natural law. And the immediate upshot of the attempt to extent Papal jurisdiction over all clergy was to precipitate the Investiture Crisis, wherein the Pope and secular princes vied for the right to invest clerical personnel with the insignia of their offices.
Armed with only the power of legal suasion, it was ultimately the Papal forces which won this protracted contest. By the thirteenth century, the right of investiture was securely held by the Pope, celibacy for clergy was now the rule, and the buying and selling of church offices was declared anathema. The most important sociological consequence to arise from the Papal Revolution in canon law, however, was that it fostered the transformation of the Church into a legal corporation and it set the Church on a solid foundation in law. Hereafter, the Church enjoyed a status clearly differentiated from the state and, hence, acquired protection from the interference of secular princes in its purely ecclesiastical affairs.

Meanwhile, the legal incorporation of the Church prompted the crown to engage lawyers trained in canon law to codify royal law, with the effect that now the state, too, enjoyed the status of a legal corporation firmly established over against the Church. Legal revolutions of the magnitude exemplified in the Church and state swiftly prompted a succession of other changes which resulted in the codification of feudal law, manorial law, commercial law, and urban law. Hence, by the end of the thirteenth century, Western culture was realigned on a solid legal base and the foundation for the take-off of modernity was laid.

The Emergence of the Human Rights Tradition

The predication of the Church and state on a legal precepts as well as the emergence of contract law in the economic realm still left one major area of social life relatively unprotected, namely, the rights and perogatives of discrete selves. The emergence of
the human rights tradition completed the legal revolution by vouchsafing the integrity of the individual from violation by an aggressive state apparatus. The peculiar notion that individuals enjoyed god-given rights which could not be abrogated by the state first appeared in the colony of Rhode Island during the 1640s, when Roger Williams introduced his concept of "soul liberty" to protect freedom of conscience. Similar ideas were afoot in England during the same decade among members of the Levelers and other radical groups which comprised a part of Cromwell's New Model Army. The English agitators for human rights were considerably less radical in their claims than Roger Williams, however, and far less successful in carrying their claims through to political recognition. Cromwell and Parliament summarily crushed the efforts of the Levellers and their colleagues among the Ranters, Diggers and allied groups to secure religious liberty and toleration, while granting a Charter to the Narragansett Bay settlements that left open the way for democracy and freedom of conscience by affording citizens to right to rule themselves by whatever form of "civil" government they found most suitable. And when the Rhode Island general assembly approved a guarantee of religious liberty under the aegis of the Charter's broad powers, its supporters argued that this principle had been a part of Williams' request for the charter and its enactment a manifestation of the "true intent" of those who had granted the Charter.

From these small beginnings in Rhode Island, religious toleration and freedom of conscience defined as a god-given right pioneered in the development of an ever enlarging panoply of
legally sanctioned individual perogatives. Although other colonies such as Maryland and Pennsylvania also embraced a limited religious toleration, the full flowering of the human rights tradition awaited the coming of the Constitutional era. Widespread agitation for religious rights followed hard on the heels of the First Great Awakening, and especially among the ranks of the lower status, evangelical supporters of the revivalist movement. Baptists, New Light Congregationalists, and a smattering of Methodists who had suffered under the burden of state taxation to support an established church in which they did not participate led the fight for disestablishment, freedom of worship and greater religious toleration. From their numbers were recruited the rank-and-file for the Sons of Liberty, a group formed in the throes of the Stamp Act crisis of 1765 and fervently in support of American independence as a means for securing a whole range of economic, political, and religious freedoms. 17

Meanwhile, a second social carrier for the notion of god-given rights emerged out of a more cosmopolitan, upper status elite who were influenced by Lockean political philosophy and the religious tenets of Deism. Franklin, Jefferson, John and Samuel Adams, Washington, Hamilton, Mason, and Madison were among the central leaders of this group. Thus, when Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of Independence, "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are the rights of Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness," these Lockean sentiments immediately resonated with what lower status
evangelicals already believed, not on the basis of being schooled in the finer points of Lockeian political theory, but as a result of listening to their preachers rail against the abuses of Standing Order and established churches. The coalition between liberal and evangelical thinkers during the Constitutional era in order to press for the acceptance of the Bill of Rights was made possible in large part because neither side fully understood the religious presuppositions of the other. Jefferson held a deep contempt for Calvin and all things Calvinistic, but he thoroughly approved the Baptists, Separatist Congregationalists, Methodists, and New Side Presbyterian laity for their earnest support for human rights, apparently quite unaware of how deeply steeped each of these groups were in Calvinist theology.

Moreover, if one examines closely the substance of the Bill of Rights as enacted in the first ten amendments to the Constitution, one discovers that they reveal precisely those vested interests which evangelicals were intent on securing. No where is this demonstrated more clearly, perhaps, than in the writings of the Congregationalist-turned-Baptist minister of the Constitutional era, Isaac Backus. Disestablishment and the free exercise of religion were, of course, two of Backus' main objectives, but in addition he also lobbied for freedom of assembly so that churches other than the established order could gather, for freedom of the press because Standing Order clergy could publish their sermons in the newspaper but dissenters could not, for trial before a jury of one's peers because many judges hearing cases of dissenters were upper status Standing Order church members, for freedom from
illegal search and seizure because many evangelicals were having their property taken from them to pay church taxes to established churches, for freedom of speech so that dissenters could preach without harassment from civil authorities who only tolerated the established church, and so forth. Indeed, the substantive content of the American Bill of Rights and the subsequent human rights tradition intimately reflect the vested interests of evangelical groups within a specific historical context immediately after the American revolution when the legal foundations of the nation were being laid. Identifying the vested interests served by these particular claims is not to suggest, of course, that the rights so enumerated lack inherent validity. Rather, our concern is merely to show that these rights were precisely those perogatives which evangelicals required in order to practice their faith with some degree of security. On balance, however, it also happens that they articulate the needs for all people to enjoy a requisite measure of freedom and self-determination in an open social order.

The adoption of the Bill of Rights and their addition to the American Constitution had, as it turns out, a revolutionary influence in world affairs. Not only did other emerging nations embrace a similar set of politically guaranteed rights, but the United Nations also adopted a Universal Declaration of Human Rights based ultimately on the American model. What this has accomplished in sociological terms is the predicating of human freedoms on a legal foundation, every bit as important and far-reaching in its implications as the legal revolution that placed both church and state on a legal foundation. To be sure, rights once achieved are
not forever vouchsafed from abuse by subsequent generations. However, it is easier to contest rights violated than it is to claim rights never recognized by the relevant legal authorities. In this respect, then, the American human rights tradition has played a crucial role in promoting the inviolate integrity of the individual self and in fostering the growth of modernity.

The Development of a Global Order: The Last Century

The setting of the Church, state, and individuality on legal foundations provided crystallizing moments in the maturation of the modernization project. These legal developments occasioned, in turn, the flowering of the industrial revolution, the rise of the modern nation-state, and, over the last century, the emergence of a global order. Limited space precludes a chronicling of the social history attending the rise of an industrial economy in the West and the subsequent appearance of the modern nation-state in the nineteenth century—and such an account is rendered largely unnecessary given the widespread familiarity with the broad outlines of both these events. What does require brief explication, however, is the historical fashioning of a global order as a consequence of these economic-political processes.

The argument to be advanced in this section is that globalization processes were initiated almost one hundred years ago in the 1890s. Indeed, the last century can be analytically divided into four periods—the first and last of which reveal a smooth curve development insofar as cultural-economic-political processes are concerned. The two interregnum periods constitute "breaks" with
the overall developmental pattern of the last century created by somewhat ideosyncratic historical forces. 22

The Take-off of Globalization Processes: 1890-1930 The "Gay '90s" represent a critical period in Western cultural history by virtue of the attack launched in that decade against the staid bourgeois sentiments of the Victorian age. The almost neurotic repressiveness of Victorian culture was challenged initially by an burgeoning youth peer group in the elite universities of Europe and the United States and by an intellectual bohemian subculture spawned by artistic and literary figures. 23 What was at stake in this enterprise was the liberation of individuals from the confines of middle class cultural norms. Participants sought through their pursuit of alternative life-styles, sexual experimentation, intellectual creativity, and the like, to expand the range of discretionary behaviors and to garner a broader range of life experiences than Victorian culture permitted. Although the defenders of cultural propriety tended to condemn these efforts undertaken primarily by the young as mere examples of self-indulgent hedonism, a more sympathetic reading discloses that important cultural advances were being achieved.

The collegiate peer group did more than simply legitimate the drinking from hip flasks at football games, raising the hemline for skirts from the ankles in the 1890s to above the knees in the 1920s, or even the sexual revolution of the 1920s. In addition, it critiqued the propriety of ascribed statuses based on race, gender, or social class; it opened the way for a wider participation of women in a broad range of economic, political, and social events;
it overturned conservative Protestant ethical norms; and it fostered a fuller exploration of both emotional and intellectual human experiences. Indeed, between 1890 and 1930, the liberalization of cultural norms with respect to life-style behaviors accelerated with a quickening speed almost unmatched in any other comparable period of time in American history.

To be sure, this liberalization of culture would not have been possible without the earlier expansion in societal affluence that was a part of the early pay-off of the industrial revolution. Once the drive toward cultural reformation was underway, however, it had the effect of forcing selves to take greater responsibility for defining who they were and to assume a larger role in forging their own identity. Herein lies the empirical basis for the claim that globalization processes intensify the search for personal identity, indeed, globalization processes necessitate such a quest as a means for allowing selves to locate their "place" within the expanding parameters of the "world."

The Interregnum Years: 1930-1945 The frenzied nature of that cultural change inspired by the progressive era was suddenly put on hold by the stock market crash in 1929 and the onset of the Great Depression. Although there were continuing social movements afoot in American society during the 1930s, their central concerns were limited to peace and isolationism on the international front as well as the economic crisis at home. Moreover, economic recovery was only accomplished finally by the gradual shift of the American economy to the production of war materiel for allies and domestic stockpiling in anticipation of the inevitable outbreak of World War
Confronted with first an economic and then a military/political crisis of enormous proportions afforded activists with little time and energy to carry on the cultural reformation launched earlier. Since the very life of the nation was at stake in both the 1930s and the first half of the 1940s, life style experimentation appeared decidedly less important in comparison.

The Aberrant Fifties: 1946-1964 Undisputed success in the war effort crowned by an unprecedented economic prosperity at the conclusion of hostilities should have meant that, when American society returned to "normal," the liberalizing tendencies put on hold in the 1930s would reappear to continue shaping the basic contours of American cultural life. That did not happen; instead, we experienced a prolonged period of rampant conservatism—the aberrant fifties. The designation "aberrant" warrants some explication.

The usual conception of the fifties—which we are labeling that slightly elongated period between 1946 to 1964—is that this decade represented the high mark of normalcy in American life. According to this familiar perspective, the sixties—with the emergence of the youth counterculture, war protests, the sexual revolution, and, indeed, radical movements of all sorts—constituted a sharp cultural break with the dominant trends of American social experience. Our contention, however, is that it is not the sixties which need to be explained, but the fifties. Given the cultural ferment at the opening of the century, the fifties should have signaled a resurgence of liberalizing trends. The failure of
such patterns to materialize represents perhaps the most imposing interpretive conundrum of the post-war period.

One way to begin making sense out of the fifties is to reverse our conventional wisdom and regard the fifties as deviant rather than the sixties. In addition, of course, we need to provide an account for why the fifties evidenced such a pronounced cultural conservatism, especially when the prevailing economic conditions would appear to have been conducive to sustaining a new era of liberal experimentation. Indeed, the conservative fifties and the radical sixties both rode the crest of the most sustained period of accelerating affluence human history has ever witnessed—a fact that should cast some doubt on the efficacy of any vulgar economic explanation of post-war social experience.

At the risk of being overly simplistic, the following account of the fifties will be proposed—with the caveat that much of the supporting data will have to be glossed over in the interest of brevity. Two governmental programs introduced after World War II really hold the key to understanding the cultural trends unleashed over the course of the fifties. These include the G.I. Bill and the VHA loan program.

The G.I. Bill provided the opportunity for vast numbers of returning working and middle class servicemen to attend collegiate institutions, earn degrees and enjoy upward social mobility. Between 1945 and 1965 the ranks of higher education were more than doubled, in part to accommodate G.I. Bill recipients. In more than a few instances, colleges were created or small schools were vastly expanded for the explicit purpose of meeting the needs of former
servicemen. The infusion of massive numbers of young men and women from working class backgrounds into institutions previously the preserve of upper middle class students dramatically altered the cultural ethos of academe.

Simultaneously, the VHA made possible low interest loans which prompted large numbers of working class families to flee their neighborhoods in the city and move to the suburbs. The suburbanization of America constituted a major, if not the major, structural/demographic change of the fifties. Moreover, members of the working class carried their culture with them when they moved into the university and the suburbs. Indeed, it is not by accident that the dominant cultural norms of the fifties--familism, religiosity, and economic/political conservatism--are also the hallmarks of working class culture.27

There is significant evidence, then, that the conservatism of the fifties was to a very large extent a direct function of the newly acquired strategic importance attained by the working class in American society during the 1950s. The discovery of this upwardly mobile group by the media, the univesity, political party bosses, advertisers, the business community, and even the churches provided the working class with a latent power and influence which they had not really sought, nor fully recognized they possessed. Nevertheless, working class ideals held sway over popular culture in America for well over a decade.

The Return to Normalcy: 1965 to the Present

The eruption of the counter-culture around the mid-1960s following hard on the heels of the civil rights movement, student
revolts at Berkeley and elsewhere across the country, and the mounting violence associated with the Viet Nam war, signaled the reclaiming of control over the youth peer group's cultural apparatus by upper middle class youth. The object of attack was the staid culture of the fifties which was assaulted on a variety of fronts. Middle class norms relative to dress, drug use, premarital sexuality, cohabitation, achievement orientation, and delayed gratification of needs were all challenged. At the same time, basic institutions were vigorously critiqued, including big government, the military-industrial complex, the bourgeois family, the mega-university, and even the main-line churches. And finally, the peer group declared war on racism, sexism, militarism, and ecological pollution.28

A coherent theme resonated throughout these diverse activities of rebellion and revolutionary fervor, a theme fully in keeping with the earlier period of radicalism between 1890 and 1930. And this was a clarion call for greater individual freedom, self-determination, a relaxation of normative guidelines, and a heightened responsiveness of institutional structures to human needs in their concrete particularity. The infamous slogan urging youth to "do your own thing" was not simply the expression of an anarchist, hedonistic self-indulgence; it was also a plea for greater latitude insofar as the expression of discretionary behaviors was concerned.

There were, on balance, a number of casualties to be credited to the revolutionary break-throughs registered by the counterculture. Many youth experienced permanent damage from drug use,
alcohol abuse, premarital pregnancy and abortion. The suicide rate was elevated, family relations were often strained between parents and children, and the delegitimation of academic achievement prompted some downward social mobility. Yet, the emergence of countercultural concerns and the ultimate diffusion of a significant portion of its reform agenda throughout the various levels of American society has left its permanent mark. Ethnic minorities, women, and youth in particular have profited disproportionately from fundamental societal changes first unleashed in the sixties. Moreover, we would claim that the trajectory of cultural modifications achieved by the sixties cohort has not been substantially redirected during the recent reactionary backlash symbolized by Reagan economic policies and Republican political ascendancy. The liberalization of American culture insofar as personal freedoms, life style experiment, and identity creation are concerned now appear to be a permanent legacy of the chaotic decade of the sixties.

Moreover, we need to underscore the fact that the counterculture revolution was not merely an American phenomenon. Simultaneously and with similar cultural objectives, youth groups erupted in Europe and, indeed, every advanced industrial nation. Clearly, this was global event of considerable significance and, again, reminiscent of the global character of the first liberalizing tendencies introduced between 1890 and 1930. Indeed, if one compares the first outburst of radicalism to the second period of cultural liberalization, one discovers that there is a smooth curve development between 1890-1930 and 1965 to the present. These two
periods congeal into a remarkable "whole," separated only by the interregnum years of Depression and World War and the aberrant fifties.

**UNIFICATIONISM AND MARXISM: A CRITICAL COMPARISON**

The foregoing theoretical/historical sketch of a paradigmatic model for understanding the "modern project" provides a context for assessing both Marxism and the Unification Movement, and especially the latter's critical stance toward Marxist ideology and political theory. The argument to be advanced in this section will contend that Marxism as a philosophical stance and Marxism as a political/economic system are ill-suited to the thought-forms and cultural trends of the modern/global order. The Unification movement, on the other hand, enjoys a somewhat more ambiguous relationship to modernity, that is to say, selected aspects of Unification belief and practice clearly synchronize with globalization processes, while other features of the movement, just as clearly, stand at odds with the dominant scientific, liberal orientation of global culture.

**Marxism in a State of Decline** Across the twentieth century, Marxist regimes have scored a succession of triumphs, beginning in the Soviet Union and culminating in Asia and Latin America. During the last decade, however, Marxist politics began a rather precipitous decline as a result of enduring economic problems or a demand for greater political participation on the part of the populace. Peter Berger is undoubtedly correct is his claim that Marxist success in attracting adherents was due in large measure to the potent myth socialism has historically been capable of generat-
ing. 30 Marxism promises both the material rewards of an advanced industrial economy and social relations putatively typical of premodern times, social relations characterized by unalienated primary group bonds, social equality, and a just distribution of privileges.

The reality of Marxist regimes proved to be decidedly different. Not only could no extant Marxist economy solve its problems relating to agricultural production, but industrial output also suffered from a lack of worker incentives and the bureaucratic lethargy of command economy dynamics. The upshot was an enduring failure for Marxist economies to "pay-off" with the sort of material dividends promised in the mythic enticements.

Yet, the more pervasive problem of Marxist regimes centered in the contradiction between political ideology and empirical reality in terms of income distribution, social equality, individual freedoms. This was due in no small part to the central flaw in Marx's basic vision of the utopian order socialism would create. Marx was genuinely committed to human liberation, but, following Rousseau, he envisioned a social order in which everyone was free to will the same time. J. L. Talmon has aptly labeled this stance "totalitarian democracy."31 Not only did this conception of the proper means for achieving freedom ineluctably preclude any meaningful exercise of human liberties, but it also reflected a deep-seated, romantic preference for premodern social life. Put simply, Marxism carries with it a profound bias for Gemeinschaft and an equally profound aversion to Gesellschaft. What Marx ultimately failed to understand—although certainly Durkheim,
Weber, Simmel, and Toennies among the founding fathers of sociology understood it very well—was that the traditional, village culture typical of Gemeinschaft was inherently repressive of individual freedoms.

From its inception, then, Marxist social theory was on a collision course with modernity, for within it there coursed a strong reactionary current against the salient cultural impulses of the modern world. And in the midst of the organizational problems confounding the smooth operation of Marxist regimes in their economic and political spheres, the anti-modern cultural features have also become increasing evident. Prior to the coming of the global age, these limitations within the Marxist political economy could be dealt with through repression of the citizenry. Today, that is simply no longer possible given the nature of modern technology; and more to the point, it is now simply no longer tolerable. The myth of Marxist has been shattered not only by its dismal organization performance, therefore, but also and perhaps more tellingly by its moral bankruptcy, its failure to honor its commitments to human integrity and freedom.

The Advent of Unificationism The Unification movement was born out of the adversity, hardship, pain and death of the Korean War and it attained adolescence in the aftermath of the Cold War. It is little wonder, then, that Unification thought early in its development struck a stark anti-Communist stance. Moreover, Unificationists have not limited their critique to simply the atheistic character of Marxian thought. In his wide-ranging analysis, for example, Dr. Lee attends to the philosophical,
anthropological, political, economic, and organizational dimensions of Marxist social orders, replete with an historical critique of the Soviet example.  

A critical reading of Dr. Lee's meticulous examination of Marxist thought reveals, however, that there is, in the final analysis, a fundamental concern shared by Marxists and Unificationists, namely, salvation from the problem of human alienation. Dr. Lee's denunciation of Marxism devolves not into a right-wing political attack on socialist atheism, but into a carefully marshalled argument that Marxism actually intensifies the problem of human alienation rather than overcoming it. Although there may be room for quibbling over the efficacy of Dr. Lee's handling of, say, Marx's labor theory of value or his refutation of Marx's concept of surplus value, disputes about particular technical matters are not likely to obscure the basic point of his analysis, namely, that Marxism has, in fact, historically manifested a penchant for demeaning the human spirit. Meanwhile, Marxism affords Dr. Lee a foil for introducing Unification theology as a system of belief that is capable of redeeming selves from their alienated state, so that "...if the solution of the Sung Sang aspect (the reformation of the human spirit with truth and love) is attained, then the Hyang Sang aspect (the solution of economic problems) will follow."  

What makes this point particularly trenchant is that Unificationists have, of late, opened a number of relations with leading nations in the Communist world. Negotiations with the People's Republic of China have resulted in an agreement for agencies of the
Unification Church to open an automobile parts factory on the mainland. And Rev. Moon recently visited the Kremlin where he met with Mikhail Gorbachev to discuss, among other things, the reunification of Korea. Clearly, these events indicate something of a rapprochement between Unificationists and Marxist regimes. Moreover, it is doubtful that such openings to the Communist world will soften very appreciably the anti-Marxist sentiments articulated by Dr. Lee and others within the movement. What these events do signal is something of a pragmatic approach in those stances Unificationism takes toward regimes whose political ideology differs drastically from its own belief system.

Meanwhile, the decline of Marxist regimes as well as the substance of that Unificationist critique of Marxist thought raises the corollary question: is Unification thought more likely to promote the recovery of the human spirit and overcome alienation as Dr. Lee contends? Although this question is, in essence, a theological query, I will avoid the theological issues for the moment and propound a sociologically informed response.

Moreover, the analysis above relative to the emergence of a global

movement identifies the distinct features of the Unificationist movement which situate it as one of the more palpably "global" of the New Religious Movements. Rev. Moon's conception of the Church's role in fostering an ecumenical movement which enlists the participation of persons who are not and will never become Church members is not only novel, but potentially quite visionary. Furthermore, the funding of international conferences to address global issues of religious and secular import, the proposal relative to an interna-
tional highway linking the continents, the forays into transnational economic ventures, and a variety of other activities, all reflect an intuitive appreciation for, and a concern to foster, globalizing trends in the contemporary era.

On the interpersonal level, the Unification movement has also pioneered in trying to address the problems of meaning, value, and personal identity in the global age, while also waging war on the enduring scourges of humankind, namely, racism, poverty, political impotence, educational deprivation, inadequate housing, famine, and disease. Moreover, this social engagement transcends religious affiliation to proffer aid to those in need, rather than simply those who hold the same beliefs as the caretakers.

All of these endeavors on the macro- and micro-levels of social life tend to place Unificationists in the vanguard of those religious movements who are trying to devise strategies for coping with the emerging processes of the new global age. Yet, the movement is not without its ambiguities. Undergirding this variegated assortment of visionary efforts is a theological infrastructure comprised of premodern precepts. Unificationism is not unique in this regard, of course, many pentecostals in Latin America, Mormons, and other theologically conservative groups also share a set of theological doctrines which liberally educated theologians can no longer embrace and, in fact, dismiss as essentially mythic notions rich in meaning but not to be confused with objectively derived facts.

The overriding question, then, is whether the Unification movement can survive in the global age when its theological symbol
system retains such a strong affiliation with premodern concepts. This problem may well become more acute for certain members of the movement who have earned degrees at some of the finest—and most liberal—graduate schools of theology in the country. There is, however, a flip side to this coin. If Unificationists did embrace the liberal, scientifically sound, rationally informed theological stance typical of graduates from the finest theological schools of the land, it is unlikely that they would manifest the degree of commitment or endure the sorts of hardships necessary to achieve the sort of global goals for which the Unification movement currently strives.

This observation prompts one final comment. Both Marxism and Unificationism share this additional feature: they are two competing myths. One is thoroughly secular, the other is religious. Each movement seems to understand, however, that it is more often myth that motivates rather than rationality. What the decline of Marxism may well signify, however, is that allegiance predicated on myth alone may well be difficult to sustain in the emerging global age. Discrediting the Marxist myth, even on scientific grounds as Dr. Lee largely does, may not suffice to warrant the plausibility of alternative myths, including those with visionary aspirations.

CONCLUSION

This brief exercise has undertaken an impossible task, namely, a reperiodization of the last nine hundred years or so in Western social history in order to provide a basis for making essentially one simple point. We have claimed that the "modern project" was
initiated by the revolution in canon law which transformed the church into a corporation founded on legal precepts. This, in turn, triggered the codification of royal law as a means for incorporating the state. The culmination of these legal revolutions was realized in the emergence of the human rights tradition wherein selves finally attained legal guarantees for their perogatives vouchsafed from abrogation by the state. All of this set the stage for the maturation of the modern age in the industrial revolution and the rise of the modern nation-state. And finally, modernity has culminated in the emergence of a global order wherein questions of personal identity, ethnic affiliation, nationalism, and our participation in the transcendent category of humanity have become paramount.

Situated within this process, Marxism has been tried and found wanting. Not only have Marxist regimes been unable to deliver the material benefits promised by socialist ideologues, but they have also not afforded the kind of equality, freedom and personal liberty which proponents envisioned. We have suggested that this has resulted, in part, from the fact that Marxism was from the outside a reactionary movement against the cultural sentiments of modernity.

The question of whether Unificationism will fare any better at the hands of globalization processes remains blowing in the wind. Certainly, there are numerous facets of the Unification movement which readily synchronize with global trends and processes, facets which set the Unification movement in the vanguard with respect to both New Religious Movements and the mainline churches. The
conservative theological infrastructure to the Unificationist movement may in the long run, however, generate too much cognitive dissonance for its adherents to persevere, given the high levels of commitment which Unificationism exacts.

Any well-trained sociologist of religion would predict that the current cultural trends do not bode well for the long term survival of the Unificationist movement. These same scientifically trained sociologists, had they been around in, say, the year 75 C.E., would have rendered a similar verdict with respect to the fledgling Christian movement. Perhaps it is true that humankind does not live by cultural trends alone.


26. A similar claim that the fifties were deviant and the sixties are return to normal has been developed by Andrew J. Cherlin. 1981. *Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

27. Ancillary support for this thesis that working class culture predominated in the fifties can be gleaned from various family patterns. For example, during the fifties age at first marriage reversed a century long trend as young people married earlier. Another major change was the sudden increase in the fertility rate producing the baby boom—both patterns consistent with working class attitudes toward the appropriate marriage age and procreation expectations. See, Cherlin. 1981. op. cit.; and Paul C. Light. 1990. *Baby Boomers*. New York: Norton.


