



EPISTEMOLOGY:
REFLECTIONS ON UNIFICATION EPISTEMOLOGY

by

Frank R. Harrison, III
Department of Philosophy
University of Georgia
Athens, Georgia USA

The Eighteenth International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences
Seoul, Korea August 23-26, 1991

©1991, International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences

Abstract

REFLECTIONS ON UNIFICATION EPISTEMOLOGY

by
Frank R. Harrison, III
Department of Philosophy
University of Georgia
Athens, Georgia 30602
U.S.A.

Professor Lee appreciates the importance of epistemology as he develops Chapter 4 in Explaining Unification Thought. As Professor Lee sees his task, he must develop an epistemology, not merely in harmony with the teachings of Reverend Sun Myung Moon, but deduced from them. Further, he must show what is wrong with previous attempts at epistemology. Moreover, even though all of the positions he examines (and those of the western medieval period are conspicuous in their absence) are basically in error, he attempts to bring them together, especially modern empiricism and rationalism, into a system of Unification Epistemology that he sees as correct. Having presented his view of epistemology, Professor Lee argues that it is substantiated, indeed verified, by contemporary findings in neurophysiology.

In my paper I suggest several difficulties facing anyone attempting to assess critically Professor Lee's synoptic work. I then present an overview of what I consider to be the more salient points of Unification Epistemology, after which I present several worries I have concerning Professor Lee's position. For instance, I hypothesize that Professor Lee views epistemology as some sort of empirical science, or quasi-science. He also holds that (many of)

his conclusions are verified by recent findings in neurophysiology. I suggest that whatever philosophy is, it is not an empirical science and that Professor Lee's position is, therefore, misguided. Professor Lee advances the concept sense-image as an essential one in his explanation of the act of cognition. The concept prototype is also introduced. I argue that both these concepts are logically flawed in a way that prohibits them from doing the work they are suppose to do, or that in doing their conceptual jobs they lead to other impasses. Professor Lee also uses the concepts brain and mind as designating ontologically distinct entities. However, he then writes of the interaction of the brain and the mind. It appears old Cartesian problems begin to show themselves here and that Professor Lee does not, and perchance cannot, resolve these problems. Hence, while greatly appreciative of Professor Lee's work, and very admiring of his goals, I conclude the he is not successful in presenting us with a viable epistemology.

REFLECTIONS ON UNIFICATION EPISTEMOLOGY

by
Frank R. Harrison, III
Department of Philosophy
University of Georgia
Athens, Georgia 30602
U.S.A.

I have been invited to assess critically Explaining Unification Thought by Professor San Hun Lee.¹ In particular, I am to comment on Chapter 4, "Epistemology." It is with a sense of pride and humbleness that I accepted this invitation to continue my sojourn into the thought of Dr. Lee and Unificationism.² Further, my task is important to the extent that epistemology is taken to be at, or near, the apex of the philosophic enterprise. Above all, many would say today, one must have a viable epistemology -- one that is consistent, coherent, relatively simple in its basic assumptions, and applicable in clarifying and solving various philosophical queries. Professor Lee, himself, recognizes the importance of epistemology in his own work when he says --

-- we must, nonetheless, formulate a Unification Epistemology to clarify our standpoint on human knowledge and cognition and to point out the inadequacies of the epistemologies presented in the past.³

Later Professor Lee stresses --

-- Epistemology is so crucial to any philosophical system that without it the whole system of Unification Thought might be in jeopardy.⁴

Equally, my task is not pleasant. While admiring what Professor Lee is attempting in Explaining Unification Thought in general and Chapter 4 in particular, along with his heroic efforts in this attempt, nonetheless, in the end, I must submit that Chapter 4 is

not successful. Furthermore, some things that go wrong with Chapter 4 are very deep seated -- no easy matter to repair. If my observations are at all well-founded and not answered, then Chapter 4 must be abandoned and the more general principles on which it is based seriously reexamined. However, to substantiate my claims is not a simple matter. In this paper I only give bold strokes on a canvas needing greater detail and attention than one paper can provide.

Difficulties In Criticizing Unification Epistemology

One difficulty in assessing Chapter 4 is rooted in Professor Lee's synoptic view of philosophy. To suggest what I wish to stress by this remark, consider the Positivist and Post-Positivist movements in English speaking countries. Within these movements there is the desire to show the needlessness of, indeed the meaninglessness of, talk about God or gods, souls, minds, values of any sort, Platonic forms, Aristotelian essences, and the like. Inheriting the physics of Sir Isaac Newton as applied in philosophy and psychology by David Hume, these thinkers wished to make minimal existential assumptions of only "matter-in-motion" and reduce talk of anything else to claims about particulars in a material, atomistic world. This love affair with materialistic reductionism is coupled with a concentration on method, symbolic logic, and language. In this concentration, divisions of philosophy -- metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and axiology -- are seen as fundamentally unrelated.⁵ One can specialize in ethics, for instance, without

having any concern for logic. And certainly one does specialize in epistemology without any regard for metaphysics. Over the years this radical specialization has led to a trivialization of philosophy both within the profession and as viewed by the layperson.

Professor Lee senses the fundamental absurdity of this sort of specialized division based on a narrow range of materialistic and reductionistic assumptions. His writings are of whole cloth, creating a tightly woven fabric of postulates and corollaries that place only different emphasis in the areas of metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and axiology. I applaud him in his eschewing narrowed minded, unprofitable specialization leading to philosophical skepticism. Yet, given Professor Lee's synoptic vision, to ask someone to comment on a particular chapter of Explaining Unification Thought is to invite that person to assimilate and comment on the whole of Professor Lee's inclusive philosophical view! There is, then, the problem of separating one area of Professor Lee's thought from others in order to comment on it without interjecting straw men or chasing red herrings.

There is another difficulty in discussing Professor Lee's view of epistemology. Briefly, this problem can be focused by asking the seemingly innocent question, "What is epistemology?" Permit me to suggest at once that the term, 'epistemology', as used today, is a family term denoting assorted things done by diverse thinkers at various times in the development of western thought since, in particular, the Sixteenth Century.

For instance, influenced by his Jesuit teachers, who themselves were the inheritors of the ancient western world as seen through the eyes of persons such as Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas, René Descartes emphasizes the question, "What can we know?" Furthermore, it is assumed that knowing is tantamount to knowing with certainty. It does seem nonsensical to suggest that I know something but, nonetheless, could be mistaken about what I know. If I do know something, then I know it with certainty. Here the notion of certainty is to be spelt out in its most stringent terms of the impossibility of a contradiction asserting anything. So, Descartes sets the task of epistemology as establishing unassailable foundations for all of our knowledge and reasoning. Descartes stresses epistemology as being that discipline which discovers those unquestionable fundamental elements of knowledge, provides a justification for calling these the fundamentals, and shows how all other knowledge claims are related to these fundamentals.

Strongly influenced by the Cartesian program, nonetheless, the focus of David Hume is different, in part, because of his strong attachment to the works in physics of Isaac Newton. The concerns of Hume focus on the questions, "What is it that we can know, i.e. know with certainty?"⁶ "What kinds of knowledge are there?" and "How do we know what we do know?" In addressing his questions, Hume distinguishes between relations of ideas (syntax) and matters of fact (semantics). Completely separating the nature of logic from that of empirical knowledge, Hume nonetheless confuses logic in the sense of syntax (relations of ideas) and semantics (the

conditions under which a statement is true or false) with what are more appropriately the concern of empirical sciences, and particularly psychology and neurophysiology. Thus, epistemology takes on the characteristics of a quasi-science, the science of the mind (later to be identified with the brain) where the method of searching for and elucidating the underlying assumptions of knowledge and reasoning is seen as empirical in nature. Thus, epistemology becomes a different subject for Hume than it is for Descartes.

Greatly influenced by the Cartesian program and the writings of Hume, Immanuel Kant, nevertheless, takes still a different approach to the subject of epistemology. If, 'as Hume declares, real knowledge is of matters of fact, that is empirical knowledge, which is not certain, while relations of ideas which are certain are based solely on arbitrary definitions, rules, and the like, then it seems that one needs to raise the question, "What are those preconditions necessary for knowing any matters of fact? What are the necessary preconditions of empirical knowledge?" Furthermore, we need to ask, "How are these preconditions justified?" Of course such preconditions cannot be simply more matters of fact, nor their justifications the same type of justifications that we could give in support of factual claims. To suggest that this is the case is to beg the question. For Kant, then, epistemology takes a new turn, moving to concerns dealing with "transcendental" categories and "transcendental" arguments for those categories, and coming to a climax in the doctrine of the synthetic a priori -- a logical howler, if there ever was one, for the traditional Humean and his

philosophical descendants. Be that as it may, the Kantian view is yet another notion of what epistemology is and how it should be approached.

Yet a fourth view of epistemology is found in the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and especially in his later works. To this point it had been rather much assumed that there is a commonly acceptable and accepted primary, or essential, definition for terms such as 'knowledge', 'knowing', and 'to know'. For instance, 'knowledge' might be essentially defined as justified true belief. Wittgenstein was discourteous enough to interrupt hundreds of years of philosophical debate by asking, "What is it that we are discussing?" -- "What do we mean by knowledge, to know, and knowing, and how are these concepts related to others such as certainty, belief, and truth?" These are not the primary questions of Descartes, Hume, and Kant, although answers to such questions seem to be assumed by these thinkers. So, Wittgenstein's view is yet another notion of what epistemology is, namely clarification of the meaning of key concepts used in raising the questions of more traditional epistemology and how these concepts are related to a host of others we use in our daily language.

In discussing Chapter 4 of Explaining Unification Thought we need to keep before us at least these four -- and there are others, such as found in American Pragmatism -- different views of epistemology. One reason for this is that each view raises a different set of topics, introduces different specific methodologies, and establishes different sets of criteria by which we are to judge

whether some epistemological claim is meaningful and, if so, whether correct or not. Another reason is that Professor Lee attempts to bring several of these diverse approaches together in his Unification Epistemology.

Before presenting any critical comments, I shall give a brief overview of some of the more salient features of Unification Epistemology. Doing this might show some weakness I have in grasping Professor Lee's complex views. Thus, you can be on guard for any straw men or red herrings I might introduce based on a faulty understanding of his work, and be in a better position to be critical of my evaluation of Unification Epistemology.

An Overview of Unification Epistemology

There are several fundamental postulates of faith and revelation upon which Professor Lee bases his work in epistemology. These postulates are part of the Unification Principle:⁷

- 1) There is a supreme deity of whom humans can know nothing as He is in Himself.⁸
- 2) Humans, however, can know the attributes of God and various relations of these attributes in a figurative and metaphorical way. That is, man can know the Original Image of God, if not God Himself.⁹
- 3) The Original Image of God is made up of Sung Sang and Hyung Sang related in give-and-take actions.¹⁰
- 4) God created all things in His own Original Image; that is, He created in accordance with His Sung Sang and Hyung Sang and the various give-and-take relationships holding between them.¹¹
- 5) Man is created in the image of God in a more full way than any other created thing, God created all things in the image of man.¹²

6) Man holds a particular place in the created order, for every created thing is the object¹³ of man; that is, every created things exists for man.

7) Man can only find joy in that which he can know, and thus, since everything is created¹⁴ by God for the joy of man, man can know everything.

How are these postulates related to and developed in the area of epistemology? Professor Lee begins to answer this question by turning to the topic of cognition. Notice that more traditional questions such as "What can we know?", "How do we know?", or "What are the conditions necessary for knowledge?" are not raised. Rather emphasis is placed on the concept cognition. Of course, the concepts cognition and knowledge are not synonymous. For instance, cognition is more closely related to awareness than to knowledge, and knowledge is closer to understanding than to cognition.

In any event, according to Professor Lee --

-- Cognition is the result (United Body) of the give-and-take action of collating the content and form of the subject (prototype) with the¹⁵ content and form of the object, centering on purpose.

How are we to understand this passage?

Cognition entails a necessary, not accidental, relationship between a subject and an object. The necessity of this relation is based on Unification Ontology grounded in the Divine Principle. First, man, like the entire created order, is made in the image of God. Yet, of all creation, man holds a special place, for in the world of idea (Logos) he is the standard of all creation and it is in terms of this standard that God created. But, second, in the divine plan, while man is in the created order, he is not merely another part of that order. According to the Unification position,

the universe is created for the joy of man, and seeking his joy is a proper goal of man. But, it is necessary for man to perceive the world in order to find joy in it. So the necessary relation holding between man, as subject, and the world, as object, has both a cognitive and practical (the end of obtaining joy) aspect. Now, what are we to understand by (1) saying that man is created in the image of God, and (2) after his creation man serves as the "Ideos" by which God creates everything else?

According to the Divine Principle, while we can never know God, we can know His attributes; i.e., the Original Image of God. From this viewpoint, God has two characteristics that are eternally related in a give-and-take way. There is the Sung Sang (form or mind) and the Hyung Sung (matter or body) of God.¹⁶ The Sung Sang of God has the three functions of intellect, emotion, and will, where 'intellect' refers to the function of cognition of which there are three stages; viz., sensibility, understanding, and reason. Now, the intellectual function, Sung Sang, of God is manifested through the sensibility, understanding, and reason of the mind of created man.¹⁷ So, the sensibility, understanding, and reason of man are the actualization of latent potentialities within the Sung Sang of God.¹⁸ Moreover, the Sung Sang of God is also manifested in differing degrees in the Sung Sangs of all the different created entities, for everything is created in accordance with the Original Image of God.¹⁹ The Hyung Sung of God, in contrast to His Sung Sang, is that Divine attribute constituting the fundamental cause of the material aspect of all things. In God,

Hyung Sang is a kind of latent, or "prior-stage energy" that will actually, and eventually, appear in the physical world in various forms.²⁰ These things appearing in the physical world, however, are not God, but they are in the image of God.

In that everything is created in the image of God, the Sung Sang, Hyung Sang, and give-and-take actions of God are topologically mapped on all created things. Each particular has a Sung Sang, Hyung Sang, give-and-take structure. Thus, we can think of the created order as a universal field containing many particulars but all related through partaking in the Original Image of God, this universal field being the body of God. Professor Lee stresses this insight:

-- Every existing being in the universe has its own position. But there is one (united) position within God; hence, the whole universe forms a united, organic body. ... Consequently,²¹ all the existing beings in the universe are related. --²¹

While different, Sung Sang and Hyung Sang can, and do, interact in a give-and-take way, multiplying into the created order. Thus, form and matter, or mind and body, are brought together into all of the various elements of creation, but especially in man who is the microcosm of the universe,²² and where the Sung Sang/Hyung Sang relation is found even in his every cell.²³ One type of bringing together in a give-and-take way is cognition.

Suppose that I, a subject, experience something, an object, outside my library window. I am now simply perceiving that something in the "here-now." At this stage of cognition I have not yet judged what that something is -- only that it is something. Of

course, it is not the actual something, out there, that is in me as a perception. I do sense something, however. Namely, I have a sense-image; that is, a mental picture of that object.

(i) The information from the outside world comes through the sensory organs and nerves to various sensory areas, where it gives rise to visual images, auditory images, and so on.²⁴

What I directly perceive, and only what I directly perceive, is my sense-image that relates directly to the object in the objective (outer) world.²⁵

-- The objective world cannot be recognized by man's mind directly, but must first be perceived by man's senses, which relate directly to the objective world. We can say there is a flower in the objective world when we experience it with our senses. Seeing a flower means perceiving it through the sense of sight. --²⁶

So it is, then, that the --

-- Sensible qualities [of a particular object in the objective world] are perceived by our senses. This information is transformed into ideas (images) in the cerebral cortex. These images correspond to what philosophers have traditionally called "sense-impressions." --²⁷

But, unlike the view taken by Hume, in perceiving a particular object in the objective world, I do not only perceive its content (i.e., its various qualities), but also its form. That is to say, I perceive those forms, or categories, necessary for it to be an object. Here 'form' is understood as those conditions of existence that every created being must have as an individual truth body.²⁸ For instance, when I perceive an object, I perceive that this thing, as object in the objective world, necessarily is spatio-temporal, has position and settlement, has relation and affinity, etc.²⁹ No object is merely a random collection, or heap, of free-

floating qualities of content. These qualities coalesce together; there is structure to the object and this is a perceivable structure.

How is it that I can perceive both the form and matter of an object in the objective world? Because I, also, as a subject, have these same formal and material constructs in me, 'albeit in a manner different than in the object.³⁰ As I understand Professor Lee, perceiving is a type of matching of my Sung Sang and Hyung Sang with that of the object I am perceiving. The ability to do this traces to the notion that God created man in His own image and then created everything else in the image of man. So, man contains as the pattern by which God created, all things in himself in prototype.³¹ Hence, when I perceive something, a kind of matching is occurring between the matter and form of the object and those same elements in me, the subject, in terms of which that object was created.

And so the first stage of cognition is perception by a subject of both the content and the form of some object in the objective world. But this is only the first stage, for as yet there is no specific judgment of what that object is. Insofar as I have a cognition of a particular object as a specific sort of something, I must not only perceive the content and form of that object "out there," I must also be able to judge, i.e., identify, specifically what it is that is there. Cognition clearly involves both sensations and judgment. How does Unification Epistemology account for the stage of judgment in cognition?

According to Unification Epistemology, a judgment is a comparison between subject and object. Empiricists make the fatal mistake of stressing sensations only. Sensations are necessary conditions for cognition, though neither individually nor collectively are sensations sufficient. They must be brought together in a give-and-take manner forming another element in cognition. This bringing together is collation. I, the subject, compare my sense-image of the object with a standard, a prototype, existing in me.³²

For --

-- When the requirements of the subject and those of the object are met, cognition can take place, through a process of matching the content and form of the subject (prototype) with the content and form of the object.³³

To judge that the particular thing I am perceiving is a tree is to compare the sense-image that I am having with a standard, or prototype, TREE. Since I am created in the image of God and a microcosm of all creation, I have within me prototypes of every created object. For, as man is created in the image of God, so all things are created by God in the image of man.³⁴ When I perceive something, I obtain a sense-image and compare this sense-image with the various "prototypes" that I have within me. When my sense-image matches the prototype, TREE, I judge that what I am perceiving is a tree and not something else. Professor Lee is clear when he says --

-- Sensible qualities--such as shape, color, sound, and fragrance--as well as existing forms--such as Sung Sang and Hyung Sang, and Subjectivity and Objectivity--are perceived by our senses. This information is transformed into ideas (images) in the cerebral cortex. These images correspond to what philosophers have traditionally called "sense-impressions." The subject compares this image

with the prototype existing in himself. This is called collation. When³⁵ the prototype matches the image, cognition occurs.

So,

-- Cognition is the result of the give-and-take action of collating the content and form of the subject (prototype) with the content and form of the object --³⁶

The function of prototypes is central in Professor Lee's epistemological position. What is, then, a prototype? Professor Lee asserts that --

-- Before the ovum is fertilized by the sperm cell there are no prototypes. When a baby is born he already has prototypes, even³⁷ though he has no experiences of the outside world.

Prototypes, then, are not to be confused with either the Forms of Plato or the a priori concepts of Kant, even though they do function as standards of judgment against which we compare our sense-images.³⁸ What more can be said concerning the nature of prototypes? A hint is given by Professor Lee concerning their nature --

-- He [a person]³⁹ can have prototypes because he has a physical body.

In keeping with this, and other comments of Professor Lee, I submit that prototypes are to be viewed as the "hardwiring" of the complete nervous system of the human body. This system encompasses the various preceptors in the area of the outer body, the peripheral nervous system, the central nervous system, the brain, and the central cortex itself. Interrelated clusters of cells, themselves each structured, and each cluster being related to many more clusters, form Professor Lee's prototypes. And all of these structures, on every level, are topologically identical in terms of

Sung Sang, Hyung Sang, and give-and-take actions.

While relatively little is yet known about such matters, it is commonly held by neurophysiologists that neural clusters grow and develop in terms of at least two causal influences. One of these is the original, and unique, DNA/RNA code of the individual received at the time of conception. From this viewpoint, prototypes are a priori -- before any experience of the objective world. The other causal influence in the development of prototypes is external stimuli. Nerve paths can be, and are, changed through repeated sensing of objects in the objective world and from repeated activities within that world. So, every individual is born with an indefinitely large set of prototypes that can be shaped and more fully actualized through various experiences with the objective world. I believe that Professor Lee is indicating something like this when he suggests --

-- prototypes comprise two types of contents: (i) "a priori ideas," on intrinsic ideas, which originate from the individual's intrinsic experience of his own physical body (cells, tissues, organs, and so forth): (ii) "pre-experienced ideas," which derive from actual experiences with the outside world through a learning process. ... Man's prototypes, obscure during his childhood, develop as he grows (both in the aspect of "a priori ideas," through the growth of his nervous system and cells, and in the aspect of "pre-experience ideas," through the expansion of his experiences) until they finally become complete.

So, cognition now seems to be understood in the following way. When I see an object what is really going on is that, beginning with my eye balls, certain electro-chemical impulses are sent through various neural paths in my body. If certain paths are not in my body, I cannot perceive something. For instance, I cannot

perceive light of certain frequencies. Nor do I imagine that I could perceive anything that is non-spatial and non-temporal. That is to say, some general sense of space and time is part of my physical make-up.⁴¹ The "conditions for existence" found on page 149 of Explaining Unification Thought seem to be part of the "hardware" of the individual human as well as conditions for the existence of things in the objective world. But, this appears, in part, to be what Professor Lee means when suggesting that everything is created in the image of man. Moreover, when I recognize an object as a specific type of thing or as a specific particular thing, my sensor impulses seek out a very specific organizational path from among the multitude of such patterns in my neurophysiological structure. Once the electro-chemical impulses activate that neurophysiological pattern, a match (collation) is made and I recognize the thing as a tree, a particular person, or whatever.⁴²

Cognition, then, cannot be understood merely in terms of sensory experiences, nor merely in terms of a priori structures. What cognition is can only be grasped when we understand the nature of sensory experiences, a priori structures, AND the necessary give-and-take relation holding between them and the form/matter of the object in the objective world. All cognition is, thus, bi-polar between the subject and the object, but also between the form and the matter of the subject and object, and the topology of these forms and materials.

Thus, in the formation stage of cognition there is perception. Here the sensible qualities of the object are received into the

brain through the senses, producing an image in the mind.⁴³ However, in Unification Epistemology there are three stages of cognition. Understanding occurs in the second; that is, growth stage. Understanding occurs when a match (collation) is made between the sense-image and a specific prototype. It is then that I recognize the object perceived as what it is -- a tree. The final state of cognition is the completion stage, or that stage when a person is able to think about various objects independently of any image of those objects.⁴⁴ Here I am bound to no sense-images. So cognition, from Professor Lee's viewpoint, is three-staged beginning with perception, moving through understanding, and culminating in abstract thought.

Reflections on the Views of Professor Lee

I wish to begin my reflections by emphasizing that I have only incompletely presented the position found in Chapter 4 of Explaining Unification Thought. It is also quite possible that I do not grasp all the intricacies of Professor Lee's position. His views are, after all, complex, subtle, and far reaching. Having said this, I shall turn to my more question-raising remarks.

My first reflection is based on my views of the nature of philosophy and science, and their relations. It may be that Professor Lee and I simply disagree at this point, and would have to discuss our separate positions more fully. In any event, I mentioned earlier the importance that Professor Lee places on cognition as opposed to knowledge.⁴⁵ Moreover, Professor Lee emphasizes the act

of cognition rather than the concept cognition. Several observations stem from this emphasis. One of these is this. Professor Lee appears to be giving an explanation of the act of cognition instead of an explication of the concept, cognition. It seems to me that insofar as Professor Lee is attempting to give this explanation, he is not engaged in a philosophical pursuit but rather a "quasi-scientific" one.

Without foolishly attempting to give a complete and logically satisfactory definiens for 'philosophy',⁴⁶ I shall say that a necessary condition for the proper use of 'philosophy' is that philosophy is not an empirical science nor substantiated by any evidence from the empirical sciences. Whatever the history of thought has taught us since Hume, this must be one of its important lessons. Philosophy might attempt to clarify concepts and to explore their logical interconnections, or lack of them, in a given network of concepts. But, it does not set forth hypotheses that are subject to scientific confirmation and falsification. Philosophy might explore the most general presuppositions necessary for any application of various concepts in the empirical world. For example, the concept knowing-an-object, as it is generally used in our language, arguably presupposes some concepts space and time, although not necessarily Newtonian ones. Yet, once more, this is not something the results of which are open to scientific confirmation or falsification. Philosophy might even investigate various methods, qua methods, that are used in the various empirical sciences. An example is the so-called 'hpothetico-deductive method',

one that many philosophers have tended to find under every scientific rock over the last several decades. Nonetheless, to investigate the way a cabinet maker makes a table is not to make a table, even though the results of this investigation, if read by the cabinet maker, might help in making him a better artisan.

My comments are not intended to support a view that philosophy has nothing to do with the empirical world, and, in particular, our study and understanding of it. Indeed, I should argue that philosophy, in a real sense, is empirical. It helps us to come to grasp those basic concepts, and their multiple relations, in terms of which it is logically possible to talk about particular things in the spatio-temporal world. Divinity, person, freedom, space, and time are but five examples of such basic concepts. But, even if philosophy is empirical in the sense at which I am hinting, then it is not scientific in the sense that neurophysiology is, or that can be substantiated by neurophysiological findings.

Now, of course, one can disagree with the claim that philosophy is not an empirical science nor substantiated by any scientific evidence. And, Professor Lee does appear to disagree.⁴⁷ If, however, one does disagree, then there are consequences to be faced. One of these is that the results of one's philosophizing must be put to rigorous scientific scrutiny and test. Indeed, Professor Lee seems to welcome this possibility.⁴⁸ The findings of neurophysiology appear to verify his explanatory position of cognitive act, that act apparently demanding certain general physiological structures that map themselves on, not only the human as

a whole, but on each individual cell -- indeed, a structure traceable through all of reality, and having its genesis in God.

Now, if Professor Lee's view is presented as a scientific hypothesis (that is, one amenable to being substantiated by scientific evidence), then to confirm scientifically such an hypothesis, that hypothesis must be sufficiently specific in terms of the science in question to be empirically tested. Such testing requires far more than observing general agreement of the science with a particular hypothesis. This sort of general agreement does not constitute verification, or confirmation. Even if it did, to speak of verification or confirmation is to ignore an important point about scientific hypotheses. Following Carl Popper, it is not confirmation that is the touchstone of scientific testing, but rather falsification -- and this also may be an over-simplification.

Suppose I suggest, as a serious scientific hypothesis, "All objects are spatio-temporal"? I receive a large government grant to fund the testing of this hypothesis. Acquiring a sizable laboratory and a dozen or so graduate student assistants, I begin. My assistants travel far and wide collecting all sorts of objects and bring them back to the laboratory for controlled observations. We carefully study every object and find that each one is, in fact, spatio-temporal. So, my original hypothesis is confirmed. Indeed, with each new examination of a particular object, the probability of the truth of the hypothesis is increased.

But, is my hypothesis -- "All objects are spatio-temporal" -- a scientific one? Only if we are willing to allow the possibility of the hypothesis being false, or predictions derived in using it in connection with specific scientific observations being false. While the probability of falsification might be very slim, nonetheless we must -- and this is the 'must' of logic -- recognize that possibility, and be able to say, at least in general scientific terms, what would count as an instance of falsifying the hypothesis.

It appears to me that when a person says something like "Every human cell is composed of a Sung Sang, Hyung Sang, and give-and-take actions resulting in collations," this is much like saying, "All objects are spatio-temporal." Neither are scientific claims for neither can be falsified. So I submit that Professor Lee is not engaged in empirical science, that no contemporary findings of any empirical science can have the least bearing on confirming or falsifying his claims, nor that his position can be useful in directing particular scientific research. In this scientific sense, Unification Epistemology is not applicable to science nor science to it. Professor Lee is simply misguided when he claims --

After completing my exposition, I found that cybernetics supports our theory scientifically; I was reassured that Unification Epistemology is indeed correct.⁴⁹

None of my observations is to deny that Unification Epistemology (or perhaps better, "philosophy of mind" or "philosophical psychology") is not "correct" or at all related to empirical science.

But, if it is either, it is not as scientific hypothesis to laboratory findings.

Furthermore, it can be acknowledged that an empirical explanation of some phenomenon is not even necessary to use a general term correctly. A typical example is the phenomenon of lightening as contrasted with the use of 'lightening'. Presumably the average citizen of Periclesian Athens could use 'lightening' in a meaningful way, and in many, but not all, the same ways as we use that term today. "Lightening struck that tree yesterday" would be understood by both Socrates and Professor Lee in much the same way even though they each have a different causal explanation of the phenomenon of lightening. Now, in that such causal explanations are parts of wider explanatory systems -- conceptual or world views -- what is compatible with the accepted truth of "Lightening struck that tree yesterday" is different for Socrates and Professor Lee. Socrates may speak of the wrath, or carelessness, of Zeus while Professor Lee of discharging electricity. And, indeed, our changing understanding of phenomena and their scientific explanations has brought about changes in our use of 'lightening'. A full explication of the term, 'lightening', would certainly take note of the different explanatory contexts in which the term is used. But, in general, a causal explanation of the referent of a term is not necessary for a correct use of that term.⁵⁰ A contemporary child born and raised in a scientifically advanced society, but knowing nothing of Benjamin Franklin and electricity, can still say and

understand, perfectly correctly, "Lightening struck that tree yesterday."

Does Professor Lee's position act as an empirical, though not scientific, one in that it clarifies those basic concepts and assumptions by which we view ourselves, the world, and our place in that world? That is, to what extent is Professor Lee's view of epistemology applicable? I believe that the answer to this important question rests on a further one; namely, to what extent does one accept the teachings of the Reverend Sun Myung Moon as revealing certain basic truths about reality? To the extent that one does accept such views, within that worldview, I suspect that Professor Lee has a great deal to show, although his position may not be the only viable one, in the same sense that St. Thomas has a great deal to show the Christian believer but is not the only interpreter of The Faith. The members of the Unification Communion are the ones rightly to judge Professor Lee's work from this perspective, but to judge it ultimately under the criteria of rationality; namely, consistency, coherence, simplicity, and applicability.

Nor does one need to be a "Moonie" to accept some parts of the Divine Principle. So, Professor Lee's work could be seen as empirical in the sense of exploring accepted world views of a certain sort, as applicable, for some people even though they do not embrace either the Reverend Moon as a religious prophet having some special epistemic status or the Unification Church as their preferred expression of religion. On the other hand, if one does not

accept any of the teachings of the Reverend Moon, I doubt that Professor Lee's stance is at all enlightening; that is, it is not applicable in such a context.

My second reflection on Professor Lee's position finds its beginning in one of his intended purposes of Chapter 4. This purpose is to avoid the difficulties of both traditional empiricism and rationalism while, at the same time, preserving that which is insightful in both. This program sets Professor Lee on a collision path with consistency. I shall develop only two examples of this, although I think that there are others.⁵¹ The first of these has to do with comparing images with prototypes, and the second with the relation of the mind and the brain.

In that Professor Lee suggests that what I perceive is my sense-images of the objective world, he is squarely in the Humean camp. A traditional problem with this is that if all I do ever perceive is my own sense-images of the objective world, then what sense can it ever make to say that I perceive the objective world? Indeed, as we know, Hume is forced into a position of radical skepticism and solipsism. Professor Lee, however, is in a seemingly better position than Hume to avoid such results. From the viewpoint of Unification Epistemology, in the first stage of cognition I can perceive the objective world precisely because everything in it is made by God in the image of man. The basic inter-relationships of the objective world are the same as those of the individual human. Perception becomes a kind of mapping of relations, or patterns, of the objective world onto the patterns of the indivi-

dual human. While the actual tree, when I perceive it, does not internalize itself in me objectively (in the sense of "object"), nevertheless, its formal and material patterns do structurally internalize themselves in me. And, they can do this because my formal and material patterns are structurally, though not objectively the same as that of the tree, or any other perceivable thing. Is this an ad hoc position?

Has Professor Lee saved himself from some of the most serious charges against traditional empiricism by force of definition? In the first stage of cognition, perception is explained in terms of the mapping of various structures of the object onto those same structures of the human subject. But, now, how is one to define "perception"? It would appear in this way:

A person perceives an object just in case that --

-- the structure of the object is mapped onto the structure of the person.

But, now the explanation --

A person perceives an object because the structure of that object is mapped onto the structure of the person

is to say --

A person perceives an object because he perceives an object.

If there is a hoc reasoning here, then Professor Lee is engaging in "apriorism," but not in either description or explanation of the mechanisms of perception.⁵²

In the first stage of cognition there is perception but not understanding. Understanding comes in the second stage. It is in this stage that I recognize, if I do recognize, the object as what

it is; for example, as a tree.⁵³ In the act of understanding (recognition), I compare my sense-image of a particular object with various standards, or prototypes, that I have as an embodied human being. When there is a "collation" between my sense-image and a particular prototype, then I understand the object of which I have a sense-image to be of a particular type. That is, I recognize the object as a tree. Now, I have suggested that prototypes are various ways in which the neurons, dendrites, axons, and other paraphernalia of various areas of the nervous system are joined together. Prototypes, therefore, are a part of our actual physical anatomy. But, if this is the case, then to say 'a mental image is compared to (collated with) a prototype' must have a rather special meaning.

I can collate pages in a manuscript, I can compare this color with a palate of colors, I can compare this playing of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony with another playing of it. I compare, or collate, "likes with likes." But I cannot normally speaking, compare, or collate, pictures with wires, even wires attached in a certain way, unless the picture is a diagram of, say, an electric circuit. But, then, the picture is a picture of an electric circuit and not of something else that is being "collated with" the electric circuit.⁵⁴ Or one might wish to talk about comparing a recorded symphony, as heard, with the surface of the disk in the playing machine. "When I hear the violins playing that A-flat in the fifth measure of the third movement, there is this groove here" someone might say. But, this is a technical use of 'collate with' and 'compare to'. More importantly, this technical use does not help

Professor Lee. For Professor Lee wishes to explain how I come to recognize that the sense-image I am having is an image of a tree. But, notice that I do not come to recognize that the violins are playing A flat by looking at a groove in a disk, or by saying anything concerning the electronic schemata of the sound reproduction system I am using.⁵⁵ I do not come to recognize, or understand, that this particular sense-image is an image of a tree by comparing it with anything.

The problem rests with the notion of sense-image. Professor Lee has identified sense-images in this way --

These images correspond to what philosophers have traditionally called "sense-impressions." --⁵⁶

But, philosophers never came to agreement concerning what they meant by 'sense-impressions' or 'sense-data'! At best this notion was a deus ex machina attempting to supply whatever technical machinery a particular writer using the term needed to solve his problems with a materialistic and reductionistic epistemology. When I see a tree, I do just that. I do not perceive my sense-images, sensory impressions, sense-data, or whatever. Sense-image, and its synonyms, are examples of Wittgenstein's levers that, when pulled or pushed, do nothing. Here language is on holiday! Professor Lee would do best to abandon this empty concept as it is traditionally used in philosophizing. Now, once having introduced the notion of sense-images as a referring concept, that to which the concept refers must "have a place" to be. Enter, the mind.

As Professor Lee points out --

-- sensible qualities are received in the brain through the senses, producing an image in the mind. The mind calls up corresponding a prototype.⁵⁷

The sense-images are then collated with the prototype in, and by, the mind.⁵⁸ There is a strong suggestion in Professor Lee's work that the brain and mind are ontologically different. Indeed, Professor Lee asserts --

-- Although mind and brain interpenetrate, they are actually different, for mind (spirit-mind) leaves the physical body upon a person's death. Mind, therefore, is not a product of the brain; its origin is the cosmic consciousness, which is the manifestation of God's Sung Sang.⁵⁹

Prototypes are "part of" the brain, whereas sense-images are "part of" the mind. If the mind and brain are ontologically different, then old problems inherited from the rationalistic side of the attempt to meld traditional rationalism with traditional empiricism begin to emerge. So, if the brain and mind are ontologically different, they cannot do the job that is required of them by Professor Lee's position, for there can be no relations holding between them.⁶⁰ If, on the other hand, they are not ontologically different, they cannot do the job that Professor Lee requires of them because he needs the distinction to make sense of his claims concerning collation. Nor, can Professor Lee, without begging the question, fall back on the possible use of topological mapping of various things to resolve this problem, for it is the mind that calls up these patterns to use with other things.⁶¹ Perhaps Professor Lee might give us an explicit and unambiguous definition of 'mind' and 'brain' so that we can clearly grasp how they differ, but at the same time see how they can interact to perform the work

required of them by his epistemological views.⁶² In doing this, of course, he must avoid apriorism and ad hoc reasoning.

Conclusion

I have pointed to a few areas that are worrisome to me in reading Professor Lee's work concerning Unification Epistemology. But, if my comments are at all well-founded, they are sufficient to substantiate my original claim that Professor Lee's view of epistemology is not successful. If this is so, then there might be serious doubts concerning his overall philosophical position and/or the principles from which this position is derived. Certainly, I might be wrong in my assessment of Chapter 4. Indeed, as I have indicated previously, my criticisms could well grow out of my lack of a full understanding of what Professor Lee is saying. Even so, if Professor Lee does wish to present a case for the philosophical hypothesis that "relational language" is preferable to "object language" in coming to understand oneself, our world, and our place in that world, I would heartily support that effort.⁶³ This, however, is a topic for another day. In the meanwhile, reflecting on the critical remarks I have raised concerning Chapter 4 might contribute to the clarification of that chapter, Explaining Unification Thought, our discussions and, hence, everyone's eventual enlightenment. And this, I submit, is a large part of what it is to be in a community of scholars who are also people of good will seeking understanding, and perhaps some unification, in their views and lives.

--- Ad majorem gloriam Dei ---

ENDNOTES

1. Lee, Sang Hun, Explaining Unification Thought (New York: Unification Thought Institute, 1981). I shall use 'EUT' in further footnotes when referencing this book.

2. Many of my comments in the following essay can perhaps be better understood against the following three articles of mine:

- 1) "Epistemic Frames and Eschatological Stories," in The Return of the Millennium; Edited by Joseph Betts and S. K. Johannessen (Barrytown, New York: New ERA Books, 1984) pp. 59-86.
- 2) "On Hearing God," in God: The Defense of God; Edited by John K. Roth and Frederick Sontag (New York: Paragon House, 1985) pp. 68-83.
- 3) "Language, Knowledge, and God," in God: God in Language; edited by Robert P. Scharlemann and Gilbert E. M. Ogutu (New York: Paragon House, 1987) pp. 12-34.

3. EUT, p. 133.

4. EUT, p. 157.

5. These distinctions were unknown to Plato and Aristotle, for example. They were only later introduced in the Ancient World by editors and librarians to organize the works of Aristotle. Thus, such distinctions suggested no real divisions in the fabric of understanding the world, oneself, and one's place in the world.

6. The answer to this is that I can only know my own sensory perceptions with certainty.

7. While Professor Lee refers to the Unification Principle, he does not state, in a short creedal manner, this Principle. For the reader who is not familiar with the Unification Church and the insights of the Reverend Sun Myung Moon, it would be helpful if the Unification Principle were stated in a summary way in an appendix to EUT.

8. See, e.g., EUT, p. 6.

9. EUT, p. 39.

10. EUT, p. 6 ff.

11. EUT, p. 8.
12. EUT, pp. 144-145.
13. EUT, 143.
14. Outline of the Principle: Level 4 (New York: The Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, 1980) p. 28.
15. EUT, pp. 153-154.
16. The concepts of Sung Sang and Hyung Sang are, at best, difficult to grasp. Professor Lee gives some insight into the use of these terms on pages 6 and 16 of EUT. The following pairs of terms are offered as elucidating these concepts: Spirit/matter, internal/external, invisible/visible, cause/ effect, subject/object, and vertical/horizontal. And might I add 'mind/body'? Important as these concepts are for Unification Thought, I do not think that I need to pursue them here in detail to develop my points in this essay.
17. EUT, p. 7.
18. EUT, p. 7.
19. EUT, p. 8.
20. EUT, p. 8.
21. EUT, p. 40.
22. EUT, p. 145.
23. EUT, p. 166.
24. EUT, p. 160. See also p. 146: "The material element of an object does not enter the subject (man) as it is. It stimulates the nerve, causing an impulse that forms an idea in the brain."
25. Note such claims as "... the red pigment on the retina of our eyes corresponds to the red color of that flower ..." in EUT, p. 146.
26. EUT, pp. 133-134.
27. EUT, p. 152.
28. EUT, p. 149.
29. EUT, p. 149.

30. " -- we are able to recognize the content and form of objects only because we already possess a corresponding content and form in our consciousness." EUT, p. 146.

31. EUT, p. 145.

32. EUT, pp. 152-153.

33. EUT, p. 152.

34. EUT. p. 144.

35. EUT, pp. 152-153.

36. EUT, pp. 153-154.

37. EUT, p. 156.

38. See EUT; e.g., pp. 145, 150, and 152.

39. EUT, p. 156.

40. EUT, pp. 156-157. On the other hand, Professor Lee also speaks of prototypes as images -- " -- cognition is reached by the give-and-take action between prototypes (image) of the subject and the image of the object." And it is these two images that are collated to see if they coincide in cognition. EUT, p. 169.

41. Perhaps my sense of space originates in early tactile sensations I have and my sense of time in my perceived body rhythms.

42. See the third full paragraph, beginning "When we observe an object ...", on page 150 of EUT.

43. EUT, p. 155.

44. EUT, p. 155.

45. See above, p. 9.

46. -- if such a definition is even (logically) possible -- no small assumption!

47. See, for example, the last full paragraph on page 157 of EUT. On page 161 he concludes that cerebral physiology supports various claims in his epistemology. And on page 164 Professor Lee speaks of presenting a scientific base for the existence of proto-consciousness.

48. EUT, p. 157.

49. EUT, p. 157.

50. And, certainly, some concrete general terms do not have a referent. So, no causal explanation can be given. Nonetheless, that term, e.g. 'unicorn, can be correctly used.

51. For instance, the empiricists have an odd notion of perception, that is, itself, filled with difficulties. It seems that Professor Lee uses something like this concept in context with both the material aspects (compare Locke's secondary qualities) of an object in the objective world and the formal aspects (compare Locke's primary qualities) of that object. I do not understand how the word 'perception' can be used, without a radical shift in meaning, in both contexts. No doubt I can meaningfully say, "I perceive the color of the trunk of the tree" and "I perceive that the tree is in space." We do use 'to perceive' to mean, roughly, the same as either 'to visually see something' or 'to understand something'. But, these are not the same meaning of 'perceive'.

52. The fallacy of apriorism occurs when it is suggested, explicitly or implicitly, that a factual claim -- a claim that could be either true or false -- is absolutely beyond any possible doubt whatsoever; that no evidence can count against that claim.

53. 'Recognition' would be a better word to use than 'understanding' in the context of the second stage of cognition. To say 'I understand x' entails being able to give reasons for x. These reasons could be various explanations -- causal, motivational, etc. -- or evidence presented in support of x if x is some claim or another. To say 'I recognize x' does not involve these entailments. Rather 'I recognize x', when true, suggests that I can say what sort of thing x is, say where I have seen (heard, tasted, etc) it before, compare it with similar and dissimilar things, and the like. It is this notion of comparing that is central in the second stage of cognition, while giving reasons is at the heart of the third stage.

54. I do not wish to suggest that the brain is a complicated electronic circuit, and especially one that is mapped by Boolean algebras. That would be to suggest a scientific hypothesis, and one that is probably far from correct. I am suggesting a logical point about the use of such terms as 'collate' and 'compare'.

55. And note, that there are different technologies for reproducing what we should call 'the same sound'. So; am I to recognize A-flat as played by those violins by comparing it to digital information of a compact disk, or by various "wiggles" in grooves on a 33 1/3 record? Such questions are misguided precisely because the sense of 'collate' or 'comparison' demanded here is not this technical sense.

56. EUT, p. 152.

57. EUT, p. 155.

58. Professor Lee says, " -- in the mind, give-and-take action appears between the prototype and the image of the object. This means that we collate the two images to see if they coincide. The mind, or consciousness, does the collating; consciousness, therefore is necessary in cognition." EUT, p. 169. .

59. To help avoid the mind-body dichotomy of Descartes and post-Cartesian philosophy, Professor Lee introduces two sorts of mind; namely the physical mind and the spirit-mind. " -- mental activity is understood as the synthesis of two give-and-take actions; first, that between the spirit-mind and the physical mind; second, that between mind and brain." I suggest that this distinction only further complicates the problem of the relation(s) of the mind to the body, whichever mind is mentioned. EUT, p. 170.

60. Of course Professor Lee asserts that there IS a relation, a give-and-take relation, between mind and body. But, what this assertion means is quite another thing. And, given an unambiguous meaning, whether the assertion holds up under rational criticism is still another problem.

61. I am reminded of the old question, "Can the mind know itself and if so, how and in what sense of 'know'?"

62. I do not think that Professor Lee has done this in Chapter 4. He seems to sway between a Cartesian notion of mind and a more Humean one, sometimes stressing one view and sometimes the other.

63. Another way of putting the matter is perhaps to say that Professor Lee is urging that the "individual variables" of our various predicate logics range over relations rather than individuals. That is, facts are to be understood as relational instead of atomic. I have a great deal of sympathy with this recommendation.