ETHICS:

ETHICS IN UNIFICATION THOUGHT

by

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Of the many concerns connected with contemporary ethics,¹ I shall focus on two. The first, which might be called "comparative casuistry," involves a description of the general perspective on ethics offered by Unification thought, particularly as related to practical issues of morality. I argue that Unification ethics demonstrates a teleological orientation, and that love is its principal norm for practical judgment. What love means in particular cases is less certain; on this point I make less of an argument, and instead focus on raising questions.

The second concern addressed here has to do with what is currently called "foundationalism." I discuss the relationship between Unification thought and some contemporary perspectives on such questions as "Does practical judgment have a foundation? On what basis do human beings presume to judge the rightness or wrongness, praise or blameworthiness of certain behaviors?" If comparative casuistry consists largely in the analysis of different strategies employed by persons and groups to justify evaluative judgments, the discussion of foundationalism involves the attempt to distinguish between strategies which are better and worse, true and false. As I understand it, Unification thought intends to provide guidance in this attempt. In effect, it wants to propose a new theory of practical judgment. As I indicate, many of the most interesting (in the sense of widely read and discussed) contemporary perspectives in ethics (as in other branches of
thought) are anti-foundationalist, and tend to view practical judgment in pragmatic terms—useful, that is, to a given group of people in light of their shared interests and common heritage. Those articulating an anti-foundationalist perspective do not think, as Unification teaching does, that there is a single, universal or absolute notion of value which accords with human nature and thus provides a foundation for universally valid moral judgments. Indeed, they suggest that there is no such thing as a univocal perspective on human nature. My purpose is to ask how Unification thought might respond to this trend. I suggest that the best mode of response might be to deemphasize the search for the rational foundations of practical judgment, and to make more of the importance of charismatic or providential figures in the justification of moral judgments. To say this another way: Unification thought might make its best contributions to ethics by being less philosophical, and more religious.

**Unification Thought and Comparative Casuistry**

That Unification thought offers a teleological orientation to ethics is implied from the "General Introduction" to the Divine Principle.

Everyone, without exception, is struggling to gain happiness. The first step in attaining this goal is to overcome present unhappiness. From small individual affairs to history-making global events, everything is an expression of human lives, which are constantly striving to become happier. How, then, can happiness be attained?²
The teleological thrust of the system runs throughout the discussion of the Original Image, Human Nature, Axiology, and History in *Explaining Unification Thought.* God, it is said, created the world with a purpose or goal (telos)—to attain joy through give and take relations, especially with humanity. The purpose of human beings, in turn, is to experience joy in give and take relations with God and with one another. The Fall of humanity has interfered with the achievement of God's purpose; but God still seeks to fulfill the goal and to bring about an ideal state of affairs— the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth. The desire of God is that human beings become aware of this and orient their lives around the attainment of the original purpose.

Within this teleological perspective, the regulative principle or norm for action is reciprocal love (give and take action). Indeed, love is not only a norm—it is a part of the description of the goal which God has in mind for humanity. When the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth is achieved, human beings will live in a state of reciprocal love with God and one another—that is so, by definition. Along the way, however, love serves as a guide for action. It has several characteristics. First, as an ideal, love signifies the chief virtue of a true human being. The goal of life is to become like God, whose disposition to love remains constant, even when persons or groups act to thwart the attainment of the original purpose. This kind of love flows from the unification or integration of the elements of the self (heart, reason, and potential) and is demonstrated in the maintenance of harmonious
relations. Second, as a **principle**, love provides a general action-guide which can be applied (in theory) to the evaluation of particular acts. To put it another way, love is not only characteristic of persons who have attained the ideal; it is also the guide for persons "on the way." Finally, and in a way underlying the notion of love as ideal and principle, love is a force by which agents are moved toward the goal of creation. Love, says the author of *Explaining Unification Thought*, is "the emotional **impulse** to give to others and to become united with them." Love is thus the goal, the motive, and the norm of proper behavior on the part of human beings—and, one may add, on the part of God.

From this general description, a number of questions follow. Most of these relate to the function of love as principle. How is love related to particular behaviors, on the way toward the ultimate goal? Are there behaviors which are **intrinsically** related to the attainment of give and take relations? Thomas Aquinas' ethics (and Roman Catholic ethics in general) sometimes has this character. One cannot, for example, commit murder (defined as the deliberate and intentional killing of an innocent) and consider one's action to be good. It is this intrinsic or unqualified relation of certain acts to the ultimate goal of life which sometimes gives Roman Catholic casuistry the appearance of an ethics of duty, even though the overall system is teleological. On the other hand, some systems of ethics apparently regard all acts as permissible—for example, Joseph Fletcher's *Situation*
Ethics involved an argument that love makes all things good, and that the end of love always (and only) justifies the means. On Fletcher's account, love becomes a shorthand for the principle of utility, and the more particular judgments of acts embodied in rules such as "do not kill" or "do not steal" are at best rules of thumb or maxims indicating the usual lines love may (or may not) take.⁵

Where does Unification thought stand on this question? The answer is not entirely clear. One does not find, in Explaining Unification Thought, any notion of acts whose relation to love is intrinsic (as in Thomas Aquinas). And while one sometimes hears persons associated with the Unification movement speak in terms reminiscent of Fletcher's Situation Ethics, it is clear that Unificationism's understanding of love does not lead to an affirmation of the principle of utility. (Indeed, the author of Explaining Unification Thought explicitly presents the system as an alternative to Bentham's appeal to the "greatest good for the greatest number" as a criterion of goodness.⁶) What Unification thought offers is a notion of "positional" or "relational" love, in which certain behaviors are characterized as "in accord with loving behavior" when expressed by the appropriate persons. Thus, when we turn to family life, which is the model context for the expression of love, we find that love is realized or actualized in a variety of ways, depending on the position one occupies in relation to others.

The kind of love man experiences in a family changes as he
grows. When young, a man actualizes love from the position of a child; this is children's love. The love he actualizes when he grows up and marries is conjugal love; when he becomes a parent, he actualizes parental love. Children's, conjugal, and parental love are the three basic forms of love. These, however, can be further subdivided into father's love, mother's love, elder brother's love, younger brother's love, elder sister's love, younger sister's love, and so forth. Each type differs from the others. Even a child's love toward his parents, as well as the parents' love toward their child, changes in nature as the child grows through the various stages of life from infancy to adulthood, and also as the parents themselves grow. Conjugal love, also, changes, as husband and wife grow.

Again,

Each type of love needs a different form of expression. Parents need to use warm-hearted words to their children, even when scolding them; if scolded lovingly, children will not be damaged in any way. On the other hand, children should be polite and respectful toward their parents. They should not say, for instance, "Hurry up, Father! Sit down here and eat!" This would be impolite, however dutiful the child might be. There must be a certain standard of conduct, and the child should be more polite, using such words as, "Father, please come here and have something to eat." There are different positions at the table. A child should not sit at the head
of the table and say, "Hey, Father, look sharp and sit down!" because he would be reversing the father-child position. It is important that children respect their parents and use suitable words and actions to show their respect. Husband and wife, also, must follow a certain standard of conduct in their mutual relationship. 8

The author of Explaining Unification Thought goes on to say that this last passage indicates that there are "rules to be followed in each position..." 9 The great value of family life, morally speaking, is that it is the context where people learn to behave according to right standards. To put it another way, members of a rightly-ordered family develop certain habits or character traits that dispose them to act in ways which accord with the principle of give and take love. When the members of such a family participate in society as employers, employees, citizens, and rulers, they can recall the training they have received and seek harmonious (that is, rightly ordered) relations with others. This ultimately is what God desires for the whole world; it is an expression of the Unification Principle.

There are rules, then, that specify the meaning of love in given contexts. But one needs more information to determine the content of such rules, and how they function. In particular, one needs to know how Unification thought approaches such practical problems as

truth-telling—Sissela Bok's Lying 10 provides a model discussion
of the problems posed by the fact that most religious and moral traditions indicate that lying is wrong, truth telling right, but also recognize that, in certain cases, lying is justifiable, or at least people who lie may be excused. How would Unification thought respond to the alternatives posed by the following statements?

If any, in fact, do this: either teach men to do evil that good may come or do so themselves, their damnation is just. This is particularly applicable to those who tell lies in order to do good thereby. It follows, that officious lies, as well as all others, are an abomination to the God of Truth. Therefore there is no absurdity, however strange it may sound, in that saying of the ancient Father "I would not tell a willful lie to save the souls of the whole world." (John Wesley)

What harm would it do, if a man told a good strong lie for the sake of the good and for the Christian church... a lie out of necessity, a useful lie, a helpful lie, such lies would not be against God, he would accept them. (Martin Luther)

friendship—as many writers have noted, friendship is one of the great divides between the classical and biblical traditions. The Anglican divine Jeremy Taylor wrote that "When friendships were the noblest things in the world, charity was little." As I try to tell my students, the ideal of friendship cherished by Aristotle is in tension with the biblical emphasis on neighbor-love.
Friendship is a love which is unabashedly focused on a particular person; neighbor-love is a summons to universal beneficence. Friendship begins as an attraction to or appreciation of particular qualities in the beloved; neighbor-love, in theory, is given without respect to the merits of the other. Friendship is a relation characterized by mutuality; the norm of neighbor-love, extended far enough, calls for self-sacrifice and does not depend on a notion of reciprocity. It would be interesting to see how Unification thought, with its emphasis on love as a give and take relation, might deal with these tensions.

the use of force—one of the best places for comparative casuistry to begin is with the question of distinguishing just from unjust uses of force, in discipline, criminal justice, and war. With respect to the last, I find interesting the following statement in Explaining Unification Thought:

Whenever there is a struggle between good and evil, the evil side always attacks first. In the Korean War, it was North Korea who attacked first; based on this principle, we can say that North Korea was on the evil side. In all struggles in history, the good side retaliates against the attacks of the evil side and sooner or later wins victory. The good side tries to subdue its opponents with words and with love; the evil side, however, usually brings out physical weapons and provokes a physical battle. By observing who initiates violence, therefore, we can often find out which one is the evil side. 14
I realize it stretches the author's point; but no one trained in the ways of the just war tradition can help but be reminded here of one of the most important divides between the modern law of war and the tradition of just war thought: viz., the former's stipulation that force is only justified as a response to aggression, whereas the latter has always held out the possibility of a just yet pre-emptive strike against an enemy.

I could go on, but my point is only to identify some of the issues one might address in order to determine the ways love functions in Unification ethics. It is, of course, not necessary that Unification thought provide "hard and fast" guidance on such issues. Given the stress on positional or relational love, and the telos of harmonious order characterized by give and take relations, it might be that Unification thought puts less emphasis on the cases I am thinking about, and more on the techniques by which people of good character can be formed. This emphasis might be developed as follows: people trained to practice give and take love according to the positions they occupy in well-ordered families will learn discernment, understood as an ability to sense the direction of "fitting" behavior. When such people act, they do so less in terms of the guidance provided by rules, or even in terms of love as a principle, and more in terms of the ideals suggested by the purpose of God. Such people are, in a sense, creators of a moral life—they are less motivated by the question "what must I do?" than by concerns about what they will be. They will want, in the end, to be able to say "I was faithful in my
attempt to bring about the purpose of God for the world." Such notions would resonate with some of the ideas of contemporary philosophers like Alisdair MacIntyre, of theologians like Stanley Hauerwas and (in a somewhat different way) James Gustafson. Borrowing from Gustafson, in particular, one might want to say that Unification ethics is less concerned with revealed morality— that is, with the standards that govern our evaluations of particular acts—than with revealed reality—that is, with providing a view of the world which sets human actions in their true context.  

Unification Thought and the Foundations of Ethics

Whether this last suggestion is precisely correct or not, it seems clear that Unification thought does want to offer a normative model for thinking about God, the universe, human beings, and history. It is an ambitious system, which thinks it possible and necessary to provide ways for human beings to distinguish truth from falsehood, right from wrong, good from evil. In the language of contemporary ethics, Unification thought wants to offer a view of the foundations of practical judgment. For example, the "General Introduction" to Divine Principle notes that "democracy today is not equipped with a theory or practice powerful enough to conquer communism." One goal of Unification thought is the development of such a theory, which should point in the direction of a democracy of love. Again, the chapter on ethics in Explaining Unification Thought proposes to develop a new theory of goodness which will supplant those offered by philosophers like Bentham and
Kant." With particular respect to Bentham, one reads that "utilitarianism is no longer important, because it was not effective in solving man's fundamental problems." 18

With respect to ethics in the contemporary world, there are a number of interesting questions to be raised about the Unification project. As regards the need for a new theory of democracy, for example, it is interesting to consider how Unification thought might respond to writers like Richard Rorty (and, on Rorty's interpretation at least, John Rawls) who say that there is no such thing as a univocal theory of democracy; that in fact there cannot and should not be such a theory; that the enterprise of developing such a theory is necessarily imperialistic and undermines those aspects of life in a democracy which make it attractive. And as to the judgment about utilitarianism, what might Unification thought say to the insight of Max Weber and others that utilitarianism of a certain type is the functional, if not the cognitive moral theory of modern industrial cultures?

Rorty's views on democracy are succinctly stated in his article on "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy," 19 though one should note that they form a part of a larger project which seeks to offer a pragmatist critique of foundationalism in epistemology, philosophy of science and other disciplines of thought. "Democracy" begins with the notion that the Enlightenment architects of liberal society--people like Thomas Jefferson--thought it right and good to separate politics from judgments about religious truth. As Jefferson put it, "it does me no injury for
my neighbour to say that there are twenty Gods or no God." In the democratic state, religion is irrelevant to questions of public order, though it may be relevant to the lives of private persons. For Jefferson, the central point is that, should democracy and religion conflict, citizens are obligated to sacrifice their private pursuits of excellence in favor of the public good. Indeed, the State may compel them to do so.

As Rorty admits, Jefferson and his contemporaries were able to think this way because of a theory of human nature. In particular, Enlightenment intellectuals were able to privatize religion because they believed that human beings had the capacity to think morally, without benefit of revelation. In one sense, "natural law" replaced religion as the guarantor of good public order. The beliefs necessary for civic virtue "spring from a universal human faculty, conscience--possession of which constitutes the specifically human essence of each human being. This is the faculty that gives the individual human dignity and rights." It is also the belief that has been under constant attack by philosophers of the twentieth century, most of whom tell us that there is no such thing as a "universal human faculty" or a "specifically human essence of each human being." Or, if such philosophers do think such things exist, they believe that Jefferson and the Enlightenment failed to provide an adequate description. The search for a new theory of human nature preoccupies thinkers from Heidegger to MacIntyre. As the latter put it in *After Virtue*, we now live with the choice--Aristotle or
Nietzsche? Virtue or the will to power? Only the former will save our humanity. And thus we "are waiting not for a Godot, but for another--doubtless very different--St. Benedict."22

Rorty shares the suspicion of twentieth century philosophy that Jefferson was wrong in supposing the existence of a univocal human nature. He does not, however, think the experiment of liberal democracy is thereby doomed. The theory of universal human nature was not the only part of Jeffersonian democracy. There was "also a pragmatic side. This side says that when the individual finds in her conscience beliefs that are relevant to public policy but incapable of defence on the basis of beliefs common to her fellow citizens, she must sacrifice her conscience on the basis of public expediency."23 Rorty takes this "side" of the argument for democracy to be more important than the idea of natural law. And this points, as he sees it, to the priority of democracy to philosophy. Liberal democracy began with the privatization of religion. Now, we must (according to Rorty) proceed with the privatization of philosophy. If persons or groups wish to debate theories of human nature, the true ontology of the self, and the like, they may do so. What they may not do is advance such theories as justifications for policies which their fellow citizens do not approve. Interpreting John Rawls as an exponent of similar views, Rorty writes:

Rawls puts the democratic politics first, and philosophy second. He retains the Socratic commitment to free exchange of views without the Platonic commitment to the possibility
of universal agreement—a possibility underwritten by epistemological doctrines like Plato's Theory of Recollection or Kant's theory of the relation between pure and empirical concepts. He disengages the question of whether we ought to be tolerant and Socratic from the question of whether this strategy will lead to truth. He is content that it should lead to whatever intersubjective reflective equilibrium [i.e., consensus] may be obtainable, given the contingent make-up of the subjects in question. Truth, viewed in the Platonic way, as the grasp of what Rawls calls 'an order antecedent to and given to us', is simply not relevant to democratic politics. So philosophy, as the explanation of the relation between such an order and human nature, is not relevant either. When the two come into conflict, democracy takes precedence over philosophy.\(^\text{24}\)

The obvious objection is that this leaves the liberal state without foundations. If that state constrains persons and groups to act in certain ways, as Rorty says it may, on what basis does it do so? Only on the basis of pragmatic agreement. Participants in the liberal democracy called the United States may believe many things about the foundation of their republic. In the end, what holds it together is a shared set of interests, traditions, and historical experiences; not a common human nature. Jefferson and his contemporaries in the eighteenth century may have believed there was such a thing as "human nature." But that, according to Rorty, is a belief we are better off without. If liberal democracy
is philosophically superficial, so be it: "such philosophical superficiality and light-mindedness helps along the disenchantment of the world. It helps make the world's inhabitants more pragmatic, more tolerant, more liberal, more receptive to the appeal of instrumental rationality."25

Instrumental rationality (zweckrationalitat), of course, was Weber's term for the form of reasoning which dominates modern industrial cultures. It is specifically a type of means-ends reasoning; David Little suggests we think of it as "a this worldly and relativistic form of consequentialist reasoning."26 Further borrowing from Little, we may consider five characteristics of zweckrationalitat which provide a key toward Weber's understanding of the situation of moral discourse in the modern world. First, actions are justified in consequentialist terms. Results make the difference in determining a rational or justified act. Second, zweckrationalitat refers to formal or procedural norms which are thought to issue in results which can be quantified. Economic activity is paradigmatic in this regard; we (the participants in an economic system) agree to observe certain formal norms (no bribery, etc.) because experience shows that these function to increase efficiency and profit for the greatest number. Third, zweckrationalitat is "polytheistic." Modern industrial society is organized in spheres, each of which has its own formal norms and modes of measuring results (its "gods"). There is no way, rationally speaking, of resolving conflicts between the spheres and their diverse norms. Conflicts are inevitable; where persons or
groups stand with respect to these reflects their own, arbitrary choices of priorities. Fourth, zweckrationalitat is deliberately impersonal. That is, in fact, its genius. In politics, for example, the modern magistrate "performs his duty best when he acts without regard to the person in question, sine ira et studio, without hate and without love, without personal predilection and therefore without grace, but sheerly in accordance with the factual, material responsibility imposed by his calling, and not as the result of any personal relationship." Finally, zweckrationalitat is "this-worldly," referring to the priority of material, as opposed to spiritual well-being.

There is a sense in which Weber's analysis of instrumental rationality, as the dominant ethic of modern industrial society, poses the same challenge for Unification thought as does Rorty's argument for the priority of democracy to philosophy. Both are saying that there is no way to build, on purely rational grounds, a univocal theory of value in the modern world. To put it another way, ethics in the modern world is and must be "without foundations." If one believes in a theory of value, or desires to debate and discover the foundations of ethics, one can pursue it privately (Rorty) or can assert it through a variety of means (Weber). But the choice to elevate such a theory over other points of view must in some sense be irrational.

At the same time, there is an important difference between Rorty and Weber in the way they evaluate the situation of modern humanity. For Rorty, the theory-less world is good, the result of
a "world well-lost." We are better off without a (publicly valid) theory of human nature, even as our forbears were better off once they gave up the notion of a (publicly valid) conception of God. For Weber, the situation is much more ironic. The world of instrumental rationality came to prominence on the wings of a particular religious and moral theory which, despite its power, contained within itself the seeds of its own demise. We cannot get that theory back, nor can we yet create another. The theoretical basis of modern industrial society—the Calvinism Weber identified with "inner-worldly asceticism"—was an unstable blend of instrumental rationality and more transcendent notions of value. It was the catalyst for a great movement in world history. But once set in motion, the society built on Calvinism "needs its support no longer. The rosy blush of its laughing heir, the Enlightenment, seems also to be irretrievably fading, and the idea of duty in one's calling prowls about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs." To live in the world of zweckrationalität is not all bad. But it is not all good, either. For the theory-less world leaves a vacuum which can be exploited for purposes which must, by the standards of liberal democracy itself, be inhumane. From a Weberian perspective, one must admit the theory-less nature of the modern world. But unlike Rorty, one does not celebrate it.

There are, no doubt, ways to address the issues raised by Rorty and Weber in philosophical terms—some writers, for example, suggest we revive a version of the idea of natural law, while
others consider that a theory of human rights, perhaps built on the foundations of the kind of intuitionism associated with H.A. Pritchard and others offers the most promising road for contemporary ethics to take. At this point, however, the ethical theory envisioned by Unificationism does not engage either of these options. Nor does it, so far as I can tell, address the depths of either Rorty's or Weber's analysis of the situation of ethics in the modern world. What such writers are saying is that there is no theoretical—that is to say, rational—foundation for ethics which can serve to unite disparate groups and their interests. There can, of course, be pragmatic grounds for cooperation between such groups. There can also be relationships of power by which one group can compel others to cooperate with its will. The point is, these "cooperative" endeavors rest on factors other than ethical theory.

The strongest possibilities for ethics in Unification thought actually seem to point in a direction different from that usually taken by moral theorists. From a Weberian perspective, we are currently "trapped" in a "theory-less" world. Yet it is possible for new theories to be borne and to come to dominate a given culture. One way, perhaps the primary way for them to do so is through the agency of charismatic leaders who exercise a fundamentally irrational (or "extra-rational") type of authority. We might say it this way: theories of ethics follow upon the insights of charismatic leaders who are able to command loyalty, not because of their philosophical perspicacity, but because of
their ability to inspire human beings to see the world in a different way. The Unification Principle clearly points in a similar direction, especially when it posits the importance of selected persons (providential figures) who move the world to a new stage in the plan of God. Such leaders, gifted with the ability to inspire loyalty to themselves and to a mission they feel impelled toward, speak to the "heart" of human beings, bringing about a reordering of the self in accord with God's ultimate purpose. They speak to the heart first, convincing it to redirect its love. Instruction in ethics, as in other matters, follows. After all, according to Explaining Unification Thought, fallen humanity is restored to its original state in part by "obeying the providential figure" of the age.\(3\) Alternatively, ethical discourse might help us to know how we can recognize a true religious authority. But the importance of charisma makes this less a matter of ethical theory as conceived by philosophers than of religious insight and spiritual power. Thus I suggest that Unification thought might make its best contributions to ethics by being less philosophical (that is, concerned with ethical theory per se) and more religious (that is, concerned with charisma, and how people come to recognize the "providential figure" of their age.)
Notes

1. A definitional point seems in order here. Sang Hun Lee, *Explaining Unification Thought* (New York: Unification Thought Institute, 1981) stipulates that ethics "is the standard of conduct for family life," while morality "is the internal standard of conduct for individual life." (p. 232) Contemporary academic use of these terms is rather different. A typical example would be John Ladd's distinction: "moral statements" refer to specific evaluative judgments; "ethical statements" involve reflection on and justification of moral statements. See *The Structure of a Moral Code*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1957); also David Little and Sumner B. Twiss, *Comparative Religious Ethics*, (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1978). If Ladd's distinctions were to be qualified, it would be in the direction of widening the notion of ethical statements to involve reflection on and justification of practical judgments per se—thus ethics not only reflects on moral judgments, but also on religious and legal ones. I do not know that there is any right way to settle such differences of definition. But I generally work with the distinctions reflected in contemporary academic discussion, and have done so in this essay.


3. supra, nt. 1. Some chapters from the forthcoming revision of this text (Fundamentals of Unification Thought) have been provided to me; where it seems appropriate, I will make reference to the revision. For the most part, however, references in this essay are to the published text.

4. Ibid., p. 231. My emphasis.


8. Ibid., p. 235.

9. Ibid.


11. In a sermon, as cited by Bok, ibid., p. 32.

12. As cited in Bok, ibid., p. 47.

13. As cited in Gilbert C. Meilaender, Friendship: A Study in


17. In the draft chapter of Fundamentals of Unification Thought, the alternatives to be supplanted or corrected are expanded to include analytic philosophers (e.g., Moore and Ayer) and pragmatist thinkers (e.g., James and Dewey).


20. In Ibid., 279.

21. Ibid., 280.

22. After Virtue, p. 263.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., 291. Those familiar with Rawls' A Theory of Justice may find Rorty's interpretation a bit strange. However, in light of the clarifications Rawls has offered of his position in such essays as "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14 (1985), Rorty's estimation of Rawls' position seems correct.

25. Ibid., 293.


29. I will not go into examples here. The point is well articulated in Richard L. Rubenstein, *The Age of Triage*, (Boston: Beacon, 1983).
