UNIFICATION METHODOLOGY

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Abstract

This paper deals with issues raised by the discussion of philosophical method in chapter 11 of Explaining Unification Thought. The author sets forth a brief description of Unification method, then discuss problems and possibilities of the method in terms of two conceptions of Unification thought: (1) that it is a search for the foundations of thought; (2) that it is an experimental or pragmatic proposal of how human beings might think, should they wish to achieve certain ends. The author concludes by asking for clarification of the nature and purposes of the project called Unification Thought.
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Introduction

Chapter 11 of Explaining Unification Thought sets forth the perspective of Unificationism thus far on philosophical methodology. The chapter is, in a sense, Unificationism's effort to teach humanity how to think. Although the discussion is exceedingly compact, the central, relational character of Unification thought, already apparent in most of the chapters, is reiterated. Unificationism teaches us to ponder the various relations within and between God, human beings, and the world, as these exemplify the law of give-and-take. The proposals of thinkers from Heraclitus to Husserl are, for the most part, said to reflect a partial and imperfect (because incomplete) analysis of these relations. Unification method directs human thought to a more complete picture, and thus constitutes proper therapy for the intellectual enterprise of fallen humanity.

In reading this chapter, one wants above all a fuller exposition of what it means to think in give-and-take terms—a notion which is, at one and the same time, both appealing and mystifying in its simplicity. I hope that Theodore Shimmyo, whose assignment is to respond to this paper, might shed some light on this topic. For my own presentation, however, I shall discuss two issues which, to my mind, are raised by the project of Unification
thought in general, and by the exposition of Unification method in particular. The first is a problem from the history of philosophy; it has to do with the possibility of establishing the "view from eternity" in human affairs. Since Explaining Unification Thought teaches humanity to structure its thoughts in terms of the give-and-take relations between things, we may signify the issue in this way: "Why these relations? What considerations enable Unification thought to establish the 'law of give-and-take' as an "absolute" rule of thought?" The issues are similar to those raised in section two of my essay on Unification ethics. Here, as in that essay, I want to suggest that maintaining Unificationism's tendencies toward "foundationalism" requires that the philosophical work begun in Explaining Unification Thought be further developed.

The second issue involves an alternative theme in Unification thought; what has been described by some of our respondents as the "experimental" character of Unification thought. As I shall indicate, this theme may allow Unificationism to avoid certain foundationalist difficulties. Nevertheless, problems will remain, in particular associated with the question: "Why this experiment?" Why should human beings, confronted with a great variety of intellectual options, choose to follow the instruction of Explaining Unification Thought? Here, as in my comments on ethics, I suggest that the answers are more religious than philosophical—and that this indicates the importance of clarifying the nature of the project called Unification thought.
History and Absolutes

Whatever happens, every individual is the child of his own time; so philosophy is its own time apprehended in thoughts. It is just as absurd to fancy that a philosophy can transcend its own contemporary world as it is to fancy than an individual can overlap his own age, jump over Rhodes.²

With this quote from Hegel, the organizers of the Committee on Unification Thought and the Global Transformation of Consciousness intended to set the tone for our discussions. There is, they noted, a certain irony in such sentiments. For philosophers as different as Plato and Aristotle, Descartes and Kant have always sought, in one way or another, to "overleap" the culture of their day--to discover a basis from which to make judgments about the relation of that culture's conceptions of truth, beauty, and goodness to those unchanging realities that exist behind or beyond, as well as within our particular uses of such terms. Nor was Hegel without such ambitions. In his case, the dialectic of thesis-antithesis-synthesis was the key to discovery of the workings of Absolute Spirit. And while the philosopher could only see clearly such workings in historical perspective (that is, after the fact), it is nevertheless true that Hegel, as most other philosophers, considered his project to be the
exposition of a Thought which, transcending all others, is itself the ground of all thinking.

In a similar vein, Unification Thought seeks to establish and discuss the foundation and meaning of "absolute values," and to indicate their relevance to the contemporary world. This is no less true for the discussion of method than of any other aspect of thought. Here, reflection on the give-and-take relations within and between all things is the key to making the "jump over Rhodes." Such relations are the characteristic of Reality: "From the smallest particles to the massive heavenly constellations, all things exist and develop according to inner give-and-take action and outer give-and-take action." As Explaining Unification Thought indicates, this proposition has a natural connection with ethics: "If all these relationships are not conducted in a harmonious, principled way, the result will be confusion and ruin." Nevertheless, the point is not only that moral agents should act according to the "law" of give-and-take. It is that all existing entities are governed by this law. The fact of give-and-take is prior to its value, as Unificationism has it. In this way, give-and-take relations are the key, not only to moral imperatives, but to Reality, and thus to thought.

Give-and-take action is the foundation both of the Quadruple Bases and of the Origin-Separation-Union Action or Chung-Boon-Hap (C-B-H) Action. The Quadruple Bases represent the structure of the attributes of God; the C-
B-H action, on the other hand, describes the process of forming the Quadruple Bases from the perspective of time.5

In the "sphere" of the Eternal and in the realm of time, the law of give-and-take applies. To think in such terms enables human beings to comprehend as interrelated certain aspects of the universe which, from other perspectives, appear to be irreconcilable: individuality and connectedness, permanence and change, spirit and body. In this way, according to Explaining Unification Thought, "Unification Methodology...[is] a methodology that has unified traditional methodologies."6 Again: "Truly, all phenomena occur through the give-andtake laws, and we [Unificationists] can say that we have a unique and universally true methodology."7

One way to proceed with a discussion of such claims would be to compare and contrast Unification methodology with those of other movements and/or thinkers, the issue being to identify relative strengths and weaknesses of Unificationism and the other proposals. Explaining Unification Thought itself engages in such inquiry, in Chapter 11 as in other places. If one takes the passage from Hegel seriously, however, it seems there is a larger issue at stake. What would it mean to construct a "universally true methodology?" As Dr. Lee himself implies, it is always possible, in retrospect, to identify and critique the arguments of various philosophers as partial, or better particular representations of truth relative to the vocabulary, ideas, and experiences of a given historical
context. Should we not suspect that the same will one day be said of Unification thought? Why not regard all philosophy, Unificationist perspectives included, under the judgment articulated by: the "attempt to step outside our skins—the traditions, linguistic and other, within which we do our thinking and self-criticism—and compare ourselves with something absolute" is "impossible." Even better (for Rorty) the attempt to "jump over Rhodes" is not useful. Wait long enough, and everything turns to dust—Heraclitus, Husserl, even Rhodes itself.

What Rorty points to, along with a number of contemporary thinkers, is the possibility that philosophy, considered as the search for correct statements about "truth, goodness, and beauty as eternal objects which we try to locate and reveal..." rests on a mistake. Those engaging in that search find themselves immersed either in a series of infinite regressions ('You say x is true? How do you know? x rests on y? How can that be? z is the clue? Why?' and so on) or in an effort to end discussion (e.g., 'No one can doubt x and still be human'; 'y is a self-evident proposition'). Better to think of "truth, goodness, and beauty...as artifacts whose fundamental design we often have to alter..."," of philosophy as "a confused combination of the love of wisdom and love of argument," and philosophical method as consisting in "reinterpretation of our predecessors' reinterpretation of their predecessors' reinterpretation." History, not eternity, is the philosopher's proper schoolmaster. And this instructor does not deal kindly with students who claim to have discovered an absolute
or a "universally true methodology."

We need not take Rorty as the last word on such an important topic as the nature and possibilities of human thought. His comments do pose a challenge, though; and the challenge is one Unification, as other ways of thinking that seek to promulgate Truth must answer. How can human thought overcome the problem of historicity? How can one develop ideas that have absolute validity—in a word, how can one jump over Rhodes?

Among twentieth century intellectuals, no one has focused on this issue more consistently than Ernst Troeltsch. While most of Troeltsch's inquiries dealt particularly with Christian thought, his efforts speak more generally to the difficulties experienced by anyone interested in the intellectual and spiritual life of human beings. A general summary of Troeltsch's quest thus seems in order, as I try to illustrate some of the difficulties involved in the identification of absolute values.

Best known to students of religion as an historian of Christian social thought, Troeltsch considered himself first and last a theologian or even philosopher of culture, a fact indicated not least by his last academic appointment: to a chair in philosophy at the University in Berlin. His scholarly life was dominated by the attempt to identify and provide intellectual grounding for those values important to Western culture, and (as he thought) to humanity as a whole. For Troeltsch, these values could be summarized in terms of "the personalist idea," which refers most simply to the notion that the lives of persons have
intrinsic value. As further developed, the personalist idea is related to notions of human rights, religious liberty, restraints on war—in short, the heart of Western morality, political theory, and law.

Historically speaking, Christianity—and especially the Reformed or Calvinist movement within that tradition—provided the foundation for personalist values, especially through its appropriation of aspects of Platonism and the Stoic version of natural law. This affirmation cannot be made, however, without due attention to the qualifier: "historically speaking." According to Troeltsch, the political, economic, and especially intellectual or spiritual reforms affected by the Enlightenment have helped to create a type of society in which various human interests—political, economic, and intellectual—no longer require the legitimating power of the Church. In theory, modern industrial society requires that the churches compete with other "centers of value" for the loyalties of persons. This is so even where there exists a "state church," so long as toleration is extended to minority faiths; it is especially characteristic, however, of societies where the separation of church and state is far along—for example, the United States of America.

According to Troeltsch, there is great advantage in this development, not least because it has enabled a fuller recognition of the values inherent in the personalist idea. At the same time, the social and intellectual tendencies of modern industrial society constitute a great spiritual and moral crisis for human beings.
The competition between the churches and other centers of value creates new possibilities with respect to freedom of choice; but there is no guarantee that this choice will be exercised wisely or well. Twentieth century humanity stands in need of substantive moral guidance; Troeltsch believed that Protestant Christianity, as the religious tradition having the greatest affinity for the personalist idea, stood the best chance of providing that guidance—in effect, of fostering an intellectual and spiritual consensus in favor of human liberty and dignity.\textsuperscript{11}

This is the starting point for Troeltsch's discussion in \textit{The Absoluteness of Christianity and the History of Religions} and other works.\textsuperscript{12} The question he addresses is: Can Christian thought serve now, as in the past, to provide the intellectual and spiritual foundation for the personalist idea? Troeltsch thinks so. But in order to make this point, he has to answer a number of questions. In particular, Troeltsch feels he must deal with issues posed by the growth of an historical understanding of Christianity—indeed of the general phenomenon of religious thought and practice. Pre-Enlightenment intellectuals (some of them, at least) could argue for the validity of Christianity in "absolute" terms. For them, the surpassing value of Christian faith rested on a unique revelation, one which (as Martin Luther put it) shows other alternatives to be "vain blasphemy and the greatest of all the sins which [humanity] commits."\textsuperscript{13} Christianity is \textit{sui generis} in teaching the kind of piety which "restrains itself from sinning, not out of dread and punishment alone; but, because it loves and
reveres God as Father, it worships and adores him as Lord. Even if there were no hell, it would still shudder at offending him alone.\textsuperscript{14}

According to Troeltsch, post-Enlightenment intellectuals can no longer say such things with credibility. Christianity is not \textit{sui generis}; historical inquiry demonstrates this. The sayings of Jesus are also sayings of the rabbis; the Christological formulations are paralleled in the mystery religions, and so on. The task of providing foundations for human liberty and dignity in the modern world requires a different conception of Christianity; in particular, Christian thought must take into itself the findings, and even more the mindset of modern historical inquiry.

The modern idea of history is no longer merely one aspect of a way of looking at things or a partial satisfaction of the impetus to knowledge. It is, rather the foundation of all thinking concerning values and norms. It is the medium for the self-reflection of the species upon its nature, origins, and hopes.\textsuperscript{15}

It is the effort to deal with history, according to Troeltsch, that gave rise to the great attempts by nineteenth century scholars to develop an evolutionary apologetic for Christianity. Schleiermacher provides a convenient example. Here, the approach is to identify an "essence" of the phenomenon, religion. For Schleiermacher, this is found in the experience of seeing oneself and one's work as part of a Whole. Religion is, in effect, a way
of seeing all things united in the Infinite.\textsuperscript{16}

If all religions have a common root, they do not thereby have equal value, however. According to Schleiermacher, modes of religious thought are better or worse as they reflect and foster the experience of wholeness. Some modes of religious thought are "childlike," in that they focus on the life and career of a particular people, and thus do not really mediate a sense of the Whole. For Schleiermacher, Judaism was such a religion, and "is long since dead."\textsuperscript{17} The validity of Christianity rests on the fact that it mediates a tube sense of the Infinite, pointing to the "Universal resistance of finite things to the Unity of the Whole, and of the way the Deity treats this resistance."\textsuperscript{18} The great idea exhibited by Jesus of Nazareth is simply this: the resistance of finite things to the Deity is resolved by the mediation of a higher power. The Infinite redeems the finite, thus bringing about the immediate consciousness of the Whole. Or so Schleiermacher argues. According to Troeltsch, the difficulty of such an approach lies foremost in its overly schematic view of the history of religions. Evolutionary apologetics is superior to the orthodox model in that it no longer rests on appeals to supranatural revelation. But it does not go far enough; the modern student of culture, schooled in the method and results of historical method, cannot with integrity identify a single essence that constitutes religion. Much less can he or she argue for the absolute superiority of one religious tradition to others, without begging the question. In a sense, a thinker like Schleiermacher constructs his "essence" of religious
experience in such a way that it cannot help but serve the case for Christianity.

In the end, Troeltsch writes, one cannot overcome history either through orthodox or evolutionary apologetics. If one is to establish the value of Christianity for modern industrial society, one must do so in terms of history itself. But here also one confronts difficulties. To begin, there is no such thing as presuppositionless history. The very act of historical inquiry is motivated by a value or values held by someone. Nor can it be said that any particular description of an historical phenomenon has final or absolute validity.

The problem faced by the modern approach to history is not that of making an either/or choice between relativism and absolutism but that of how to combine the two...how to discern, in the relative, tendencies toward the absolute goal. Or, to state the problem more accurately: How does one work out a fresh, durable, and creative synthesis that will give the absolute the form possible to it at a particular moment and yet remain true to its inherent limitation as a mere approximation of true, ultimate, and universally valid values?¹⁹

Such considerations lead Troeltsch to propose an adjustment in the terms of his project. If the apologiae developed by
orthodox and evolutionary thinkers for the absolute validity of Christianity were ever appropriate, they are so no longer. At this point, however, Troeltsch's argument has shifted: the problem is not simply that such apologetics do not resonate with the historical consciousness of post-Enlightenment humanity. The very quest for absoluteness rests on a fallacy. Following the logic of his historical emphasis, Troeltsch argues that the quest for absoluteness, while understandable, is ultimately self-destructive. All Christian apologetics is actually an attempt of believers to recapitulate the simple sense of value found by the first disciples in the presence of Jesus of Nazareth. The result is at best an "artificial absoluteness" which reflects less the original vitality of faith than the need of believers (who do not live in the presence of the Founder) to assure themselves of the superior value of their faith. For those who lived at the beginning, it was not so. They enjoyed a conviction of "naive absoluteness," in which the presence of a charismatic leader overwhelmed their questions and established the value of following him. The quest for absolute validity is a natural phenomenon, but ultimately is self-destructive, even unnecessary. For, according to Troeltsch, Christianity's enduring value does not depend on its absoluteness. Rather, it depends on the relationship of Christianity to a particular culture--that of Western civilization--which has, at its heart, taken in the unique, personalistic values of Protestant Christianity. Thus one need not and should not say that Christian thought (or any other expression of value) has absolute validity.
One should say that it has "normative" value. In a sense, this prefigures the famous conclusion reached in Troeltsch's 1923 lecture on the place of Christianity among the world religions: Christianity cannot be described as an absolute value. But it is true "for us" [the heirs of Western civilization]. "Its primary claim to validity is...the fact that only through it have we become what we are, and that only in it can we preserve the religious forces that we need...We cannot live without a religion, yet the only religion we can endure is Christianity, for Christianity has grown up with us and has become a part of our very being."\(^{20}\) The enduring power of Christianity in Western culture indicates that it is "a manifestation of the Divine Life itself."\(^{21}\) But that does not indicate the absolute validity of Christianity for the whole of humanity.

For our purposes, Troeltsch illustrates as well as any single modern thinker the difficulties inherent in the attempt to "jump over Rhodes" and establish the absolute, universal validity of a particular idea or method. Indeed, one could argue he provides a better example for those who seek absolutes to ponder than a more thoroughgoing skeptic like Rorty. Throughout his career, Troeltsch never gave up the attempt to establish values that could stand the test of history. But his honest wisdom, particularly at the end of his search, was that the most one could claim for his or her ideas was "normative" value. How can one speak of knowing the Absolute, save as a very abstract possibility, so long as history continues?
Experimental Philosophy

My comments thus far are intended to spur Unification thought. I have my own sympathies with the project of identifying absolute or universal values, and one need not suppose that Troeltsch has the last word. In order to make the argument of Chapter 11 (and indeed, the whole) of Explaining Unification Thought, however, one needs to deal with Rorty's, and even more Troeltsch's arguments. Perhaps Theodore Shimmyo will show us the way.

There are aspects of Unificationist thought, however, which suggest another way--another concept of philosophy, if one will. Set forward more by the Unificationist commentators at the pre-ICUS meeting than in Explaining Unification Thought, the idea is this: Unification thought is a grand experiment. It presents a perspective on God, human nature, and (of special interest in this paper) the nature of thought which, if adhered to, will bring individual and group concord at every level of existence. Indeed, the scope of the experiment is such that Unification thought promises the accomplishment of harmony between all aspects of Reality--the world of spirit, and the world of matter.

The experimental argument implies, in effect, that "the proof of the pudding is in the eating." And, it seems to me, this suggests a way to avoid the "high road" of foundationalist philosophy, with its concerns to establish universally valid rules of thought, reflecting on the Real relations between things. Unification thought might take the "low road" of pragmatism, with its deep suspicion of the search for absolutes, identified with
such traditional philosophical concerns as the distinction between "real knowledge" and "mere opinion" or the apprehending of the Real. In this case, Unification thought becomes one perspective, or perhaps a set of perspectives, offered as a contribution to the contemporary discussion of questions like: "What are (some of) the possibilities for human beings in ordering social life? What kinds of happiness do these various possibilities engender? What possible behaviors do they inhibit? And what do such possibilities demand of us?" Unificationism, in particular, invites human beings to participate in a community led by a charismatic Founder who seeks to implement a vision of humanity governed by the law of give-and-take action. One aspect of its demand is that we begin to focus our thinking in terms of this law. If I understand the experimentalism of Unificationists correctly, they are saying that the ultimate vindication of the Founder's vision—or in this case, of the method of thought derived from the Founder's vision—would be the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth. If we want to be thoroughgoing pragmatists, I suppose we should rather say that the vindication of Unification methodology will stand or fall with its ability to foster consciousness of the essential relatedness of all things—things on earth, and in heaven—and thus to establish world peace.

To take the pragmatic option avoids a great many philosophical quandaries. In particular, pragmatists claim that their approach does away with the interminable arguments of philosophers over the nature of Truth, what constitutes an accurate account of Human
Nature, what ultimately is the Good, and what is the essential aspect of Beauty. The point, as Rorty has it, is not so much to say that such questions have no answers, so that pragmatism becomes a kind of nihilistic alternative to philosophers like Plato, or Kant, or (in his metaphysical moments) Hegel. The point is that such questions, and the model of philosophy reflected in them, are not useful. Pragmatists offer a different conception, not of the nature of Truth, but of philosophy.

Philosophy is best seen as a kind of writing. It is delimited, as is any literary genre, not by form or matter, but by tradition—a family romance involving, e.g., Father Parmenides, honest old Uncle Kant, and bad brother Derrida.  

Following Rorty, all Unification thought has to do, should it wish to be "philosophy," is to articulate its perspectives according to certain literary conventions. It has to show the similarities and differences of its approach to the "family members" identified above, and to many other relatives of various persuasions. What it cannot do is pretend to establish absolutes. To be an honest pragmatist, one must suppress the urge to identify a "universally valid methodology," or universal laws of nature and morality.

To be an honest pragmatist, one must also admit that new problems arise, which appear to be every bit as difficult to resolve as the old, foundationalist ones. In particular, a
pragmatic or experimentally oriented Unification thought would have to deal with the question: Why this experiment? Why should human beings choose this method of seeking peace? Why not stay with Protestant Christianity and its notion that reflection on Holy Scripture is the proper method of thought? Why not build the world envisioned by a certain type of ethical humanism, with its focus on the unique character of individuality as the guideline for thought? Or why not seek the "post-Philosophical culture" envisioned by Rorty and others, in which pluralism is the fact of life, instrumental rationality the fundamental norm, and philosophy comes to stand simply for the discipline of comparing and contrasting cultural traditions? "Thinking" is then guided less by an overarching method, and more by the ordinary conventions of conversation. And philosophers would be less experts in the "rules of thought" than "all-purpose intellectuals...ready to offer a view on pretty much anything, in the hope of making it hang together with everything else."23

I do not suppose that Unificationists will really want to carry experimentalism to such a conclusion. The real heart of Unification thought, so far as I understand it, lies in the hope of developing a system of thought that does establish absolute values, a "universally valid methodology"--a way of apprehending and understanding the Real. But I point to the experimentalist way, and to the difficulties of foundationalism, in order to raise further questions--and thus to learn more about--Unification thought. Faced with foundationalist claims for a method that calls
us to reflect on the give-and-take relations between all things, one asks "Why these relations? Why this particular mode of thought?" Faced with experimentalist invitations to participate in the creation of a particular kind of society, one asks "Why this experiment? Why this way?" In introducing his project, Dr. Lee writes

> What is Unification Thought? Some say that it is the unification of traditional thoughts; others, that it is a system of ideas based on the Unification Principle. Since the purpose of the Unification Principle is to unify religions and thoughts, both opinions are acceptable. Unification Thought, then, which is based on the Unification Principle, also addresses itself to the unification of thoughts. It is not formed, however, from the synthesis of traditional thoughts; it is a new-dimensional, revealed thought, which encompasses traditional thoughts.²⁴

Why these relations? Why this experiment? It seems the answer—at least a part of it—must be this: Because of the revelation given to a person—the Rev. Sun Myung Moon. The power of Unificationism to persuade rests less on philosophical discourse than on the charisma of the Founder. Just as Jesus' disciples experienced a kind of "naive [i.e., unsystematic] absoluteness" of value in the presence of their charismatic leader, so response to
the Unification Principle must rest in some sense on the appeal of Reverend Moon. To develop a system of Unification thought seems already to be a step removed from such an experience. And thus one asks: What, exactly, is the purpose of Unification methodology? For whom is it developed? Is the proposal of a method focused on give-and-take relations supposed to serve the cause of convincing and persuading nonbelievers? Is its purpose to provide instruction and encouragement for those already convinced? Is the method itself a mode for the revelation and/or discovery of Truth? Or is it a proposal modeling one possible way for human beings to approach the activity of thinking? Perhaps Unificationists will respond "All of the above, and more. The alternatives proposed are not mutually exclusive." And yet, as I have tried to show, such alternatives do impose certain limitations; each in its turn requires answers to different questions and presents distinctive difficulties to the sort of systematic intellectual activity envisioned and presented in Explaining Unification Thought.
NOTES


4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., 338.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., 345.

8. From the "Introduction" to his *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), xix.


10. Ibid., 92, 91, and 92.

12. **Absoluteness** is readily available in the translation by David Reid (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1971), from which I will be quoting. It is noteworthy, though not important to the discussion in this paper, that **Absoluteness** went through some changes between the first (1902) and second (1912) editions. Suffice to say that the Troeltsch's sense of the difficulties created by the historical consciousness for the project of identifying absolute values grew stronger as the years went by, reaching its culmination in the lectures published posthumously under the title Christian Thought, trans. by various scholars, ed. Baron F. von Hugel (Westport, Conn.: Hyperion, 1979).

13. Sermons on I Peter 1:18f.


15. **Absoluteness**, 47. It is worth noting here Claude Welch's succinct summary of Troeltsch's understanding of the essentials of the method of modern history: there are three, which may be termed the principles of criticism, analogy, and correlation.

   The first means that all tradition is to be placed under critical scrutiny, on the basis of the independence and autonomy of the historian, though of course the data must be approached with empathy. It further means
that in the historical realm only judgments of probability can be made, and with widely varying degrees of likelihood. The second principle indicates the means by which criticism is possible, namely, the ability of the historical critic to discern analogy between events in the past and what happens in the present. This is the key to criticism. One interprets the unknown of the past by the known of present experience. The historian must assume a homogeneity of the human mind, not in the Enlightenment sense of a universal humanity, but in the sense of similarity in the historical activities of human beings. The third principle, correlation, refers to the interplay of all happenings in historical life. No alteration can at one point take place without consequences for what precedes and what follows. Every distinctive and autonomous event has a context, so that all historical happening is knit together in embracing correlation. An event is singular and nonrecurrant, yet is related to all others.

It is also interesting, by way of comparison with the discussion of the "identity-maintaining" and "developing" aspects of give-and-take action in Explaining Unification Thought, to note Troeltsch's continuing struggle with the relationship between individuality and universality in history.

16. See, for example, the second discourse of his famous "speeches" On Religion, trans. J. Oman (New York: Harper & Row, 1958). On 36, we read

The contemplation of the pious is the immediate consciousness of the universal existence of all finite things, in and through the Infinite, and of all temporal things in and through the Eternal. Religion is to seek this and find it in all the lives and moves, in all growth and change, in all doing and suffering. It is to have life and to know life in immediate feeling, only as such an existence in the Infinite and Eternal...Wherefore it is a life in the infinite nature of the Whole, in the One and in the All, in God, having and possessing all things in God, and God in all.

17. Ibid., 238.

18. Ibid., 241.


21. Ibid., 55.

