DISCUSSANT RESPONSE

by

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Ruegg, Bernholz, and Lawson

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NATIONALISM AND WORLD UNITY
EDUCATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

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Chapter 1.
EDUCATIONAL NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXTS

Comments on the three foregoing papers: P. Rüegg
P. Bernholz
R. Lawson

by W. WIELEMANS

The three papers discussed in this first chapter are treating Educational Nationalism in three different contexts. Notwithstanding these differences the conclusions and options of both Rüegg and Bernholz are on one line. As I will show later, this unanimosity is based on common premisses and presuppositions. On the other hand Lawson's article is characterized by another approach and is, as regards content, difficult to compare with the two other articles.
Before trying to interrelate these three articles, I first will comment on each separately.

RÜEGG's POLITICAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES

The abstract of Rüegg is very clear and needs no repetition. However, a careful reading of his paper brings many questions to the fore. Among others I opt for the following:

1. What are the main reasons allowing Rüegg to choose for the maintenance of nation-states on the one hand and for the rejection of the idea of a world government on the other?
2. To what extent could the arguments and options of Rüegg be situated in the recent European history of universali- lism versus particularism?
3. The evolution of mankind needs diversity. To what extent does this diversity require a national expression?
4. What is still the relevance of 'humanistic education' to the problem of Educational Nationalism and to the future of mankind?
1. WHY THE CHOICE FOR NATIONS AND INTERNATIONALISM?

Throughout his paper Rüegg produces several reasons for the maintenance of both nations and internationalism. Implicitly, but sometimes also explicitly, Rüegg uses these reasons also aiming to reject the idea of a world government. In his paper the following motives are mentioned:

1. Political motive

   The nation-state includes structural components of such fundamental importance for modern societies that if a liberal and peaceful order of the world is to exist it must be conceived as an international federation of states (p. 6).

2. Socio-psychological motive

   Nationality is an extension of primordial-group identity and solidarity with larger social units which cannot be experienced immediately (p. 10). The individual needs to participate in a kind of national self-consciousness. The self-consciousness of a society of a global size would be too big (p. 11). Human psychological and social development needs concrete, recognizable, socializable common memories, particular religious traditions, inspiring national heroes, common symbolic actions and common value orders.

3. Educational-sociological motive

   The national self-consciousness plays a crucial (socializing) role in the formation of self-images of individuals and groups (p. 16). Consequently, individual self-images and national self-consciousness will not contradict each other; on the contrary, to a great extent they will overlapp. Moreover, the internalized (via education) national self-consciousness is an essential condition to move into, to accept, and to contribute positively to larger (international) units.

4. The irreducible importance of a COMMON PAST and symbolic actions

   The existence and desired survival of nations and nationalism are legitimized by emphasizing that nations have a partially real, partially fictional common past, and by saying that they both create and strengthen a national identity as well as the will for national cooperation through symbolic actions (p. 8). A global nation or world government does not have such strengthening common past, nor are they (ever?) able to produce a group identity and a will for global co-operation through symbolic actions.
5. **Priority given to national values**

Rüegg seems to accept that "... interests and values of a nation take priority over all other interests and values ..." (p. 7; one of the basic assertions put forward by the British historian John Breuilly).

My CRITICAL COMMENTS on these arguments could be summarized by saying that neither each of these reasons on itself nor all together are sufficient to adjudge them a decisive and convincing - let alone an absolute - status. They only demonstrate the author’s personal choice. If he would have been in favour of a movement towards a world-superstate, he could easily have found arguments of relative weight. As a matter of fact, the reality of the existing nations has the empirical edge over the rather fictional future of a world government.

In more concrete terms I mean the following:

1. It is not shown that an erosion of nationalism and a shift towards a gradual development of a global nation would endanger a liberal and peaceful order of the world. If we hold on to an international order in which the nations keep to their own identity (therefore abandoning the idea of a world government) how far then can nations go in transferring increasing parts of their sovereign rights to those international organisations and courts without losing their own identity? What is the 'minimum' identity of a nation to be (to remain) a state?

2. Rüegg's socio-psychological argument needs to be proved, among others on the basis of developmental psychological research. One of the hypotheses being or to be tested could be that not children (and to what age approximately?) but mature adults are (to be) able to transcend their limited group-consciousness to a larger and perhaps global size (e.g. the growing ecological awareness and the 'Gaia theory' of J. Lovelock). Rüegg is refers to sociological surveys showing that in most West European countries nationalist values are shared only by a small minority of the population. The fact that the victories of national soccer teams accumulate to still existing nationalist feelings does not obscure the fact that ecological catastrophes stimulate a new and 'global' consciousness, far beyond, and even to the detriment of national boundaries.

3. As to the educational-sociological argument, I agree with Rüegg both on some theoretical insights provided by sociology of education and on the pedagogical assumptions that the development of a self-image has to start from and has always to be connected with, a much larger collective self-consciousness. This is even more self-evident if we stop defining man as an 'individual' and if we conceive him more realistically as 'a nodal point of
relationships'. However, this network of relationships constituting man does not necessarily have to be a national one. It could be of a (sub)cultural, international or global character. E.g., the rapidly spreading youth-culture is neither confined to national boundaries nor to specific national values based on common memories and nationalist symbolic actions.

Anticipating the comments in the announced point 3, I would like to draw attention to a presumable confusion in Rüegg's paper between the notions of 'nation' and 'culture'. In the scientific literature the need for education and socialization to be based more on a specific culture than on a specific national identity is generally recognized. Both could overlap but could also be contradictory and mutually exclusive.

4. The emphasis on a common past seems to be both possible and successful for some, but not for all.

Indeed, many nations have very strong unifying common memories and a collective self-consciousness strengthening them in their national identity as well as in international co-operation.

However, many countries in the world don't have a heroic common past at all and are (colonia) 'designed' in a very artificial way (e.g. many African countries). Even in Europe (the old continent) the common past of nations is remarkably different and not always supplying with the essentials for the (educational?) culture of a national identity (e.g. Belgium).

Moreover, in many (West-European) countries more than 10% of the population is of a distinct cultural descent. Rüegg's 'alien peoples and their cultures' (p. 17) are a daily neighbouring reality. A desired and workable understanding between different (sub)cultures of one nation does not seem to be served very well by referring to the common past of only part (although maybe still the majority) of the population.

It is surprising that Rüegg is not advancing the idea of a possible common future to become a strong cohesive force. This common future could be nationalist designed; but some new aspirations have already acquired world-wide dimensions including common symbolic actions, e.g. the ecological concern interwoven with so-called 'New Age' elements. This growing planetarian awareness, distrusting at the same time the prioritized national interests and values, is of course not referring to national common memories, to national heroes and to national symbolic actions. The inspiring (mythological) past is taken over by ideas of a new generation that is more concerned with the future, especially the survival and the well-being of our living planet.

Does the nation-state provide us with essential components in order to guarantee the realization of these new aspirations?
5. Is the psychological and social reality of a nation strong enough to prioritize its interests and values over all other interests and values, both within the nation and outside? Or is this assertion to be understood as a political and juridical one in order to secure especially the sovereignty of the nation? But what kind of very specific national values do we have in mind? Did we not agree already on 'universal human rights'? Is the existence and influence of organisations such as 'Amnesty International' not a subtle and even effective infringement of the 'priority given to the interests and values of a nation'? How to confront this assertion with the fact of sending foreign 'soldiers' to the north of Iraq after the war officially finished?

In other words, it seems that nations are not any more the ultimate sources of unquestionable interests and values. A brief sketch of the main 'levels of consciousness' in recent European history could illustrate this statement.

In the 18th century classical liberalism succeeded to emphasize the value of the 'individual' regardless of descent. Consequently, the individual became the cornerstone of rights and duties. Individual human life was one of the highest values in the western ethical hierarchy. In the 19th century marxism introduced the notion of the 'collectivity' and laid the foundations of the 20th century's welfare states. Thus, not only the individual but equally the peoples, organized in legal states, acquired legitimate power to (re)structure the ethical hierarchy. As a consequence, rights and values based on the concept of the individual lost their 'absolute' character.

However, a third 'level of consciousness' is now pointing to the 'living planet' as both the ultimate source and norm concerning the construction and the realization of a new ethical hierarchy. The value of both the individual and the collectivity (the nation-state) becomes relative and is toned down by the ultimate rights and values of the living planet.

2. UNIVERSALISM versus PARTICULARISM in Rüegg's paper

The argument of Rüegg in favour of the maintenance of nation-states and internationalism could gain more understanding if it would be situated on the historical continuum of universalism on the one side and particularism on the other.

In Europe universalism is represented by the Enlightenment (mainly the French ideals of the 18th century). By these ideals European intellectuals were invited to strive for universalism and cosmopolitanism. (Strangely enough, Rüegg starts his paper by quoting Voltaire (1740), one of the most remarkable spokesmen of the 'enlightened universalism'.

About one century later Romanticism (mainly Germanic-inspired) invited the European intellectuals to serve the truth of their own nation. Reason is tempted to give up its claim to universality and to become only an acute manifestation of the spirit of a specific people or race. The capability of universalist thinking is denied and reason is remixed of its rooting in tradition, in the spirit of the people, and in the national culture. (Strangely enough, Rüegg is referring to Herder (1774), one of the most remarkable figureheads of German Romanticism.) According to Benda, a French author of the well-know book 'La trahison des clercs' (Paris, Gallimard, 1927), the nationalist-minded intellectual is a German invention that has infected the rest of Europe, and even France (p. 72). Opposed to French rationalism and cosmopolitism, spread over a considerable part of Europe by napoleonic expansion, the German romanticists emphasized the (re)discovery of custom, vernacular and tradition, the weight of an 'organic' grown history and the influence of non-rational elements on life. The individual and his reason draw from the collective unity, which is the people, possessing a unique soul and spirit. This unity is, therefore, not so much based on a social contract as on the sense to be part of a larger (esthetic, cultural) wholeness, and thus having the same roots.

In short, Germanic intellectuals developed, in defense of a German identity opposed to the cosmopolitan— or imperialist—mission of revolutionary France, an image of man and society which left very deep traces in human sciences. Because, what else could they do but empirically investigate the concrete forms wherein individuals are determined by their own particular social, cultural and historic environment? It is not accidentally that the German humanities are pointedly historically oriented; and on no other place in Europe the historic consciousness developed more than in 19th century's Germany. The French (universalist) historical philosophies of Voltaire, Turgot and Condorcet were opposed to the (particularist-minded) Germans such as Herder and later Hegel. The French critical reason tried to deny tradition, but historians and other specialists in customs and traditions made it their task to rehabilitate tradition as a kind of collective reason.

Germanic romanticism, and sciences inspired by it, confront universalism and cosmopolitism with the irreducible diversity and equality of cultures; the abstract idea of the culture is opposed to the concreteness of specific cultures; man as the creator of culture is confronted with men as creatures of their culture. Man is a product of the particularism of his own culture. Thus, nationalism undermines the idea of a universal culture by accepting the modern opinion of the equivalence of all cultures.

The remaining question seems to be: what is the right way to the emancipation of peoples all over the world? Do peoples have to break away from their own cultures, adhering to the (creative construction of a) cosmopolitan ('enlightened') culture? Or is it better (and why) to turn away from the culture, identifying themselves with their specific indigenous
cultures of which the lost identity has to be rediscovered? Anyhow, the insistent reality of the increasing pluricultural societies all over the world gives an unexpected turn and a new topicality to the idea of cultural relativists. A variety of sometimes conflicting life-styles and forms of thought stand side by side in the same society/country. The anthropological contribution to education striving for a cosmopolitan attitude, because of the idea of an equality/equivalence of all cultures, is thus even more applicable than ever.

At this point, however, we meet with some strange paradoxes. Trying to battle with racist prejudices based on 'naturalism' (i.e. differences between human beings and societies are mainly determined by the biological nature) anthropologists and educationists are emphasizing the importance of cultural traditions to such an extent that they again end up in a 'culturalism' that seems to adopt the essential characteristics of the contested naturalism. Cultures and national identities are presented as closed, autonomous totalities legitimizing themselves. The individual finds his identity only in and thanks to his adherence to a particular culture. Consequently, culture relativists are tending to distrust intercultural contacts and to keep watch over the purity of the separate cultures against the 'infection' by alien elements.

So, the outcome seems to be a disconcerting conformity between the opposites: racism (or naturalism) as well as culturalism lead to the fixation of differences. What racists put in terms of race, relativists now argue in terms of culture: cultures are incomparable and incommensurable entities. The jargon has changed, but the message is still the same: the differences between human beings are more important than the similarities. While the Enlightenment calls up mankind and human reason to turn away from tradition (as a whole of 'prejudices'), relativism and particularism yields to the power of tradition over the reason. Culture (each particular culture) has its reasons which reason does not know!

Indeed, it could be very fruitful to integrate Rüegg's arguments in the ongoing (mainly anthropological) discussion on universalism versus particularism in the evolution of mankind.

3. DOES DIVERSITY NEEDS A NATIONAL EXPRESSION?

It is generally accepted that life in his manyfold expressions needs diversity. The citation in Rüegg's paper (p.11) of K.W. Deutsch could be interpreted in that way. In 1953 Deutsch stated that national separation and differentiation is "to some extent fundamental in the nature of communication". Indeed, it is an essential law that life shrinks from uniformity. So, the conclusion could be that a lasting pluriformity of national identities and cultures is the best way for the planet to counteract sometimes desired, sometimes threatening levelling.

Also for anthropologists a global civilization, which is in a process of (self-)development, can only be conceived as a
'unity within diversity'. The true wealth of mankind consists in the whole of its differences. Progress and creativity in human history is possible only thanks to the interaction of many heterogeneous traditions, and profits most from an optimal cultural diversity. Lévi-Strauss even says that too much understanding and communication between cultures undermines the differences which are necessary for the survival and the riches of the world as a whole. (Réflexions sur la liberté. In: Le regard éloigné. Paris, Plon, 1976, 1983a, p. 381-382.)

Are all these advices and warnings leading to the conclusion that a 'moderate particularism' would be the best choice, because of the inevitable dialectics of unification and diversification?

It is obvious that in the history of both the planet and mankind massive processes of (geographical, biological, cultural, international ...) unification and levelling alternate with processes of diversification. However, this dialectical process does not provide us with the irrefutable knowledge that distinctive national entities and identities need to be maintained in order to contribute to a desirable future of mankind. It is known that the erosion of traditional diversities on one level often results in new forms of diversification on another level. Thus, national identities may weaken whilst new identities are created by e.g. a modern youth culture, a women culture, etc. The expansion of the world market, modern technology and sciences, the impact of the media seems to result in a more homogeneous infrastructure all over the world. However, this process of levelling does not exclude an increasing diversity in the suprastructure, whether or not expressed in syncretisms.

It may well be that some particular diversities, such as nations and national identities, must disappear before new forms of diversities can emerge. The obliteration of a national common past and common values as a (legitimizing) basis for the maintenance of nation-states may well result in the creation of a common future as well as in new values and new solidarities far beyond and even to the detriment of national boarders.

And so, it does not seem impossible that the nation-state is severly eroding, being "only a transient phase of the historical process of political integration which moves from tribal agglomerations and dynastic states to the world-superstate" (Rüegg, p. 6). For the time being, nationalist feelings and national identities are trying to survive on a turbulent sea, but ultimately enfeebling as increasing parts of the national sovereign rights are transferring to international organisations and courts. Indeed, the survival of the world and the well-being of mankind need diversity which does not necessary include the maintenance of separate nation-states.
4. THE RELEVANCE OF 'HUMANISTIC EDUCATION'

In order to prepare the (nationalist) individuals for an international co-operation Rüegg's humanistic education aims "at the understanding of other nations' humanity, expressed by their value orders and by the symbolic forms of their self-consciousness" (p. 1).

I suppose that Rüegg is referring to 'humanism' as the spiritual movement of the 14th - 16th century which later was introduced in education. Since then, 'humanistic education' is conceived as a moral, basically a philosophical study, best understood by grasping the wisdom of the past (e.g. the Greek culture), especially the way it has been expressed in the principles of education outlined by major thinkers (Greek and other spiritual ancestors).

Concerning both this proposed type of education and some related aspects mentioned in Rüegg's paper, I would like to make the following five comments:

1. Rüegg's conclusion is that the prerequisites for freedom and peace in the world are best met by nations which are as independent as possible and retain political sovereignty (p. 13). This conclusion also sets the norm for education. Education in itself does not seem to have any normative power. It is to be 'used' as a 'means' to reach the objectives formulated by interests from outside, i.e. the maintenance of legitimized nations and nationalism.

Since, according to Rüegg, nations are legitimized by their common past and specific values, one could expect that also education has to be rooted in the wisdom of the past and to be inspired by the spiritual ancestors and heroic founding fathers. Consequently, humanistic education is chosen because it is a specific type of education which fits into the construction of preparing the individuals for both nationalism and international co-operation.

From the field of educational sciences we know (first) that education, to a certain extent, is able to formulate its own objectives and/or is always invited (or pushed) to listen to a manifold of expectations and interest groups; (second) this implies that education not only, and not necessarily has to be rooted in a common (national) past and in common (national) values, nor has it necessarily to serve the objectives of the nation-state.

2. As mentioned above (see 1, comment 3) we throw doubt upon Rüegg's concepts of nation(al identity) and culture(al identity). The distinction between these two is not always clear and the implicit definitions seem to overlap. Someone's nationality or nationalist feelings are not always coincidental with someone's (sub)cultural identity, nor is it self-evident that cultural or national values are congruous with humanistic values or humanistic education.
3. Reading about Rüegg's choice for a humanistic education an imposing impression arises that this type of education presupposes an 'alien culture' since it has to assure the socializing basis for the development of a national identity. If the (cultural) differences between peoples and nations obscure, then the necessity for a humanistic type of education will enfeeble too. In the foregoing we emphasized that increasingly in many countries in the world, and particularly in European metropolitan areas, the active and influencing presence of 'the alien peoples and their cultures' is a daily and 'normal' reality. 'Alien people' are not as 'alien' as they used to be. Many spiritual ancestors and value orders (could) inspire one and the same individual or group. At the same time one can observe that some (new) symbols and important life-principals are rooting in images of man and world which (tend to) transcend national circumscriptions. Thus, is 'humanistic education' still appropriate to 'socialize' the new generation for a quickly changing world wherein the future is and will be at least as important as the (common?) past?

4. The foregoing comments introduce the question whether the (national or cultural) identities, mentioned in Rüegg's paper, are sufficiently perceived as being dynamic by their very nature. It is beyond doubt that identities and self-images are changing throughout the socio-psychological development of individuals and (peer-)groups. It is equally known that national or cultural identities are subject to considerable changes and could even become historical fossils. It is, therefore, questionable whether, and to what extent, a collective self-consciousness, built on common memories, and on the wisdom of spiritual ancestors, has to be educationally elected as the nourishing womb of the new generations.

5. Rüegg is right to mention the question of learning (world) languages in a paper on nationalism and internationalism. But here again, the importance of learning languages is subordinated to the need to understand correctly alien symbolic orders. Understanding them may indeed contribute to a better co-operation between nations (and cultures). However, this rather sensitive problem could be approached from another angle. The question could arise: how could we both intensify and improve the communication between peoples all over the world? Is the 'voice of the planet' going to be English? If so, why shouldn't we select English as the language to be spoken by each individual in international and intercultural exchanges? (Undisputed the unchangeable value of mothertongue!) Why should 'humanistic education' aspire any longer to impose the four or five most important languages (Rüegg, p. 19) on the new generations? There is no reason to doubt that we will always have enough specialists in (world)languages and in explaining and translating the 'alien symbolic orders without falsifying them too much' (Rüegg, p. 19).
BERNHOLZ's ECONOMIC SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES

Before commenting on Bernholz's paper, I would like to draw attention to one of his citations, viz. "intellectuals are mostly hostile to a capitalistic market economy. They are outsiders without practical experience and without concrete responsibility in economic and business affairs, but often live or at least benefit from their critique of economic and social institutions" (p. 18). Notwithstanding the expectations of Bernholz to educate future generations for "a positive attitude towards a free market economy with private property" (p. 18), it is my task to critically comment on his paper.

I first try to summarize the main aspects of his paper.

SUMMARY

In his short abstract Bernholz expresses the intention to complement the political and sociological analysis undertaken by W. Rüegg.

His paper sets bounds to the two well-known existing extremes of economic systems, viz. the democratic market-coordinated system on the one side and the centrally planned or socialist market regimes on the other.

He stresses that only the former type can guarantee freedom, efficiency, innovative capability and thus welfare for the whole population.

Bernholz expresses also some hesitations concerning certain types of democracy. If democracy is unrestricted, then government activity tends to grow to unsupportable levels and to erode the efficiency, productivity and innovative capability of the capitalistic market system. The author creates the impression that both democracy and education have to meet the requirements of the (normative) capitalistic market economy.

Consequently, the main task of education is to transmit sufficient knowledge to students on economic and political relationships so that a realistic outlook concerning different systems is provided. Only such an outlook can provide a firm basis for furthering international understanding.

COMMENTARY

1. The foundations of the arguments

The author tries to base his arguments on 'empirical evidence' (p. 2; 3; ...), he calls for 'realism' and warns for 'idealism' (p. 2; 18; ...), he distrusts 'rationally, uninformed and ignorant citizens or voters' (p. 12; 15).

However, it is not clear whether this empirical evidence, this realism, and the expected rationality are critically conscious of the presuppositions (paradigms) upon which the capitalistic market economy is based. In his paper, Bern-
holz never refers to the antropological and philosophical (ideological) assumptions underlying this preferential type of economy. Criticism on the free market economy is published in many languages and is not always written by (neo-)Marxist intellectuals. Confining my critical bibliography to some English writing authors only, I mention the following:


To know both this criticism and the underlying paradigm(s) is, of course, very important in an educational context. To be 'informed' about 'economic realism' is far from enough since in education one of the objectives is to develop a critical mind. Equally postulated without any paradigm-criticism is the emphasized evidence that centrally planned socialist economies have failed (p. 3). Yet, in Europe there are still some partly centrally planned states which do not call themselves 'socialist', though they could be perceived as (remaining) welfare states, such as Sweden, The Nether-
lands, and to some extent also Belgium. Their political principals are democratic and they have (as much as possible) critically informed free voting citizens. The ideal of a capitalistic economy seems to be blend with a strive for a collective well-being.

In this regard, the author seems to be aware "that free market economies only work adequately if certain conditions are met" (p. 3). I suppose this is equally true regarding both welfare states and rather centrally planned economies. Perhaps some socialists inspired (market) economies have failed because the very important conditions, suggested by Bernholz, were not sufficiently met. Saying that capitalist or centrally planned economies are (un)successful by their very nature is not the same as saying that they are unsuccessful for want of conditions.

2. The ultimate goals of economy

From the foregoing comment we learn that in education it seems to be very important to cultivate the capability to identify ideologies underlying to economic theories and systems. Equally important is to know very explicitly what economies are basically striving for; and in this endeavour whether economy is a means or an ultimate goal.

Bernholz is quite clear in saying that a free market economy is a (unique) means to "guarantee freedom, efficiency, innovative capability and thus welfare for the whole population" (p. 1).

In order to be successful, this means needs to be accompanied by its institutional preconditions, such as the rule of law, freedom of markets, private property, limited jurisdiction of government and absence of too many governmental regulations and interventions.

The ultimate goals are thus: freedom and welfare for the whole population.

But new generations are striving for other (new) aims such as justice, equality, unspoiled nature, eradication of poverty, peace ... These objectives may be pursued on condition that the mentioned institutional preconditions are not endangered.

Bernholz suggests that both democracy and education are subordinated to economy. They are expected to support economy in order to strengthen it in its endeavour to realize the indicated ultimate goals.

Because of its typical characteristics as well as its institutional preconditions, the free market economy requires also an image of man which seems to be very close to the so-called 'social Darwinism' including the legitimation of meritocracy and competition.
The rationale of Bernholz could be presented in the following scheme:

The numbered axes suggest tensions which are seldom mentioned in Bernholz's paper. I confine myself to formulate one question on each of these axes.

**Axis 1:**
Are the main characteristics of the capitalistic economy not in contradiction with the main characteristics of freedom (not only of individuals but also of peoples) and of welfare for the whole of population?
Axis 2:
Who will indicate the priority between e.g. the objective of an unspoiled nature and the need for government interventions in order to mitigate the threatening freedom of markets?

Axis 3:
Is the author aware of possible tensions between (individual) freedom and wealth on the one hand and the 'new goals' on the other?
One should be conscious that there are many definitions of freedom according to the varying 'images of man'.

Axis 4:
Is democracy really a servant of free market economy?
Is this type of economy including both its preconditions and its image of man) worth to handle the conductor's baton and to subordinate a very precious social and political value which is 'democracy'?

Axis 5:
It is even more crucial to answer the question whether education has to meet the norms set by whatever economic system. Does education and its system have an own (relative) autonomy including its own rationality and objectives which are not necessarily to be sculptured according to the requirements of the economy and its system?

3. Facts and norms
Repeatedly Bernholz claims to have 'empirical evidence' concerning e.g. the erosion of the motivation to work efficiently by high taxes (the welfare state with its social security system) (p. 5) or concerning creativity which has to be driven by competition and the hope of future profits (p. 6; 17).
Are these 'facts' not too soon promoted to the status of 'immutable laws' (p. 18) legitimating the authority of 'realism' meaning the rule of 'economic rationality'?

4. The role of the state
Bernholz preferential free market economy prefers a state with limited jurisdiction of government and not too many government interventions (p. 3). On the other hand he also wants adequate government measures in order to solve environmental problems and to provide for the basic needs of those disfavoured by economic developments, for the poor, unemployed and sick (p. 5).
A solution to this contradictory expectation can be found only if a consensus on priorities will be reached. The principals of a human society may be in a state of great tension vis-à-vis the requirements of a meritocratic economy.
And what about the increasing influence of multinationals eroding the correcting role of the nation-state? Are the
goals, both the essential and the new, not menaced if international agreements or regulations imposed by a kind of world government fail to come?

5. The meaning of democracy

As already mentioned in 2. (axis 4), the author prioritizes a free market economy over the worth of democracy. The economic system has to be protected against the weaknesses of democracy. (The opposite thought is disregarded.) Economy as a means seems to be taken over by economy as an ultimate goal: "... not a democratic but only a restricted government and the role of law are necessary to maintain a productive free market economy" (p. 10). Is democracy a potential danger in that it either could call for more state interventions or give birth to collective movements jeopardizing both the capitalist market regime and the domain of freedom for citizens? Why is the concept of democracy put between two artificially polarized extremes, viz. the intervening collective state and the free individual citizen? Is the freedom of each 'individual' more important than certain collective interests (e.g. ecological)?

6. The international system

Reading Bernholz paper the question arises whether we have to educate towards the unchangeable (Hobbesian) realism of
- an international system pervaded by the "law of minimal morality";
- competitive capitalist market economies;
- the negative consequences of government regulations and interventions;
- politicians and states obsessed by and competing for power ...?

If this is the case, then once again facts are promoted to norms for what in education has to be done. In his 'summary and conclusions' it seems that Bernholz follows this line of thought resulting in handling some very doubtful assumptions concerning human nature, human behaviour and the tasks of education.

7. Human behaviour and educational tasks

Especially from a (social) psychological and educational point of view the following two comments seem to be very important:

1. Bernholz’s 'image of man' is pessimistic

Since the author changes facts into norms, equally his realism tends to turn into pessimism:
- The creativity of people is driven only by competition and the hope of future profits (p. 6).
- Individuals are motivated only if they can reap profits, incomes or wealth (p. 17).
- Human nature cannot be changed fundamentally (p. 17).
- The fundamental nature of preferences of most people cannot be altered much by moral appeals and education (p. 17).
- A change of human behaviour can best be brought about by change of institutions.

Bernholz tends to belief that these 'facts' could be taken as 'immutable laws' (p. 18).

My comments are related to the uncountable debates on this issue in human and social sciences. In short I put forward the following questions:

- Is it psychologically/sociologically true that human motivation works only as suggested by Bernholz?
- Is the distinction between 'human nature' and 'influential institutions' (p. 17) not only artificial but also 'empirically' wrong? The author seems to belief that on the one hand there is something like a skin-locked individual, with his own aims and preferences, and on the other hand a reality influencing this individual from outside (called institutions, environmental restrictions or conditions).

It needs some explanation to state that concepts, such as 'individual' or 'individuality' do not exist. The empirical fact is that in casu a human being is 'a nodal point of relationships'. The intentionality of human beings is never to be separated from the environment (other people, nature, institutions, norms, dominant ideologies, etc.). To be is to be related.

- Do economists not too quickly and too one-sidedly suppose that all (un)intentional behaviour of people has to be interpreted only in terms of a maximization of private benefit/profit/use/utility? For them the only type of human being seems to be the 'homo economicus'. Development and well-being is seen as economic progress and welfare. Rationality is translated into economic remunerativeness/productiveness. To study is to invest. Values are restricted to exchange-values...

Is the rationality of the economy not colonizing too much all other dimensions of life and society? Do we have to introduce this dominant rationality in all domains of education? Is this normative economic realism going to turn into another 'supreme value movement' not much different from the totalitarian movements or ideologies which economists are afraid of?

(ii) Tasks of education

From the foregoing I conclude that Bernholz's rather pessimistic view on man is a very doubtful inspiring basis to start from when tasks for education have to be formulated. Regardless this 'economic image of man' I could agree on most of the tasks as forwarded by the author, provided that education as a whole is not perceived as a servant of economy. 'Economic determinism' implies the overall dominance of the economic structure. The (relative) autonomy of other structures, such as the
educational subsystem, is neglected and negligible. 'Economism' does not consider the specific rationality and finality of other domains of society. Another condition to be fulfilled before I consent with the author is that in education not only the transfer of information and knowledge is important but even more the critical analysis and interpretation of facts, theories, underlying presuppositions, ideologies and paradigms. It must be very clear that this view on education does not include an unconditional positive attitude either towards a free market economy, or towards a centrally planned (socialist) economy.

A critical (but constructive and creative) education will provide economy with a relative place in an always debatable and changeable value hierarchy. 'Immutable laws' (p. 18) in human and social sciences as well as some crucial concepts, such as 'individual', 'competition', etc. are shifting considerably. Moreover, the discovery of the threatened well-being of the planet (Gaia, seen as a self-regulating system) poses very fundamental questions not only to economy as a reality but also, and even more, to the underlying presuppositions of economy both as a theory and a practice.

Indeed, education is much more than an obedient servant of economy, it is its critical questioner! Whether, and to what extent, economy could become a reliable guide to educational (inter)nationalism will depend on the outcome of this critical examination!

LAWSON'S EDUCATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

SUMMARY

Lawson's intentions are clearly stated in his introduction (p.1-2) viz. he focusses on two countries, the U.S.A. and Canada, and he intends to deal with political tendencies which affect scholarly communication and institutional response in education.

In the U.S.A. the main tendency is a renewed public concern for national identity. In Canada recent decades have called for stronger nationalism and stronger internationalism. In both countries these patterns affected social messages and school curricula nationally, and public policy internationally.

The premise of the paper is that both tendencies (nationalism and internationalism) are taking place but these tendencies are linked to, but not consistent with, internal intercultural tendencies.

Consequently, socialization goals and messages are confounded, with the likely result that political socialization is more diffuse and unpredictable than it was thought to be in the past.
The author's argument is based
- on aspects of the U.S.-Canadian relationship
  - to establish the differential effect of institutional variables and
  - to establish anomalies in the international orientation of both countries;
- on the development of comparative education in North America in order to question whether an organized field in education, directly committed to international study, will exhibit leading tendencies in international education.

He concludes (p. 18-20) by saying that
- socialization is primarily local and national;
- immigration and world communication
  - have opened up the body of cultural information available to North Americans
  - and have to some extent opened attitudes as well;
- (but) there has not been a convergence in any new synthesis;
- (rather) the information and attitudinal changes have tended to be incorporated into the institutions and behaviours of the national society;
- there is no indication that nationalism has been awokened, but it is now subject to international constraints and it has been reshaped to accomodate differences in culture;
- (probably) the behavioural effect of responding positively to different cultures in the mainstream schooling of North America has been more important and influential toward internationalism in the long run than have specific changes in the content of textbooks or teaching;
- an ideology favourable to openness and internationalism has influenced the bases of curriculum and of scholarly communication;
- political advertising is too sophisticated for direct school practice to have much effect on socialization;
- nationalism has been connected with values in North America (in Canada usually someone else's nationalism);
- education oriented towards internationalism in the 21st century needs the integrity of absolute values which can guide such a development.

COMMENTARY

Lawson's paper tends to carefully describe excluding as much as possible any ideological statement. This is one of the reasons why my comments are confined to the following questions:

1. p. 4: Lawson calls the effect of the two Canadian complementary principles, viz. The 'mosaic' and political federalism, 'conservative'. Does he have an alternative in mind? How could the opposite ('progressive'?)) look like?
2. p.6: 'Americanization' seems to have a positive meaning among Americans. In many countries (West-European among others) it is perceived as having a rather negative influence to keep away from. How is this influence valued in Canada? What are the main characteristics of 'Americanization' related to the topic of nationalism-internationalism (choseness, dependency-thinking ...?) and how are these main features legitimized both in educational (critical?) theory and practice?

3. p. 9: Could I conclude that a lack of strong nationalism in Canada contributes to
- a greater inequality of (educational) opportunities;
- a lower motivation and a weak commitment to national institutions and ideas;
- individualism and narrow 'groupism' which is to the detriment of the nation as a whole?
Or is the considerable influence of the U.S.A. compensating for all this?

4. p.9: Is the author suggesting that the U.S.A. carries control mechanisms (moral, political, economic) in its relation with Canada resulting in an erosion of the Canadian (weak) foundations of nationhood?

5. p. 13: Is international and comparative education in Canada mainly preoccupied with American issues if not ethnocentrically with America itself?
p. 16: Is comparative education in general too ethnocentric in North America. And, if so, why? Is it because of strong nationalism in the U.S.A.? Does 'academic' comparative education requires the elimination of nationalism in the 'mental state' of the comparative researcher?

6. p. 18: Do the (comparative) educationists in North America try sufficiently to understand policy in international terms by bringing honest criticism to the misuse of international data?

7. What is still the educational value of nationalism and/or internationalism in the U.S.A. and in Canada if both countries are 'united' much more by an underlying common 'rationality', viz. the rationality of the technical, instrumental, free market economy? Is the emphasis on nationalism/internationalism in education not blurring the influencing power of a much stronger factor which is predominantly of an economic nature including its specific (economic) 'way of life'?

CONCLUDING this first section/chapter:

As I stated in the introduction of my commentary on the three papers of this section/chapter, I could conclude that Rüegg and Bernholz argue along the same lines being influenced by
common premisses and preoccupations, and thus complementing each other. In the foregoing comments I tried to make their premisses as explicite as possible. It is difficult and perhaps impossible to link Lawson's approach with the arguments of the preceding authors. Lawson is more specific in that he is focussing on two countries only and dealing with political tendencies (nationalism and internationalism) which affect scholarly communication and institutional response in education.