



THE VALUES AND MOTIVATIONS UNDERLYING SOCIALISM

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The thesis of this paper is that the values and motivations underlying socialism are very different, and depend upon the types of socialism under consideration. With regard to what I shall label coercive socialism, e.g., socialism in the sense of which the word is currently used<sup>1</sup>, the antecedents are envy, greed, power lust, ignorance, resentment, and lack of knowledge of even the most elementary aspects of economics. As concerns voluntary socialism, the phrase I have chosen to connote such cooperative organizations as the kibbutz, the monastery, the family, this is essentially animated by benevolence, altruism and empathy for our fellow human creatures.

Since the most remarkable or provocative aspect of this thesis is that there are actually not one but rather two varieties of socialism, section I is devoted to an explication, elaboration and defense of this claim. Section II explores the basis of voluntary socialism and III does so for the coercive counterpart to this philosophy.

### I. Voluntary vs Coercive Socialism

If there are two types of socialism, then they must share at least one characteristic, by virtue of which they are both to be considered different aspects of one whole. They must also diverge in at least one way, so that they can be considered different species of one genus. In what way, then, are voluntary and coercive socialism similar, and in what way are they different?

They both share at least one common heritage, the Marxian notion that justice consists of creating and distributing wealth or income according to the maxim "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need." See Criden and Gelb (1947, p. 97); Leon (1964, pp. 71-72); Berenberg (1935, p.

103); Ely (1894, p. 256). True, under Soviet style socialism, this claim served more as a pious hope, or as an ideal, than as a reality. There were great differences between the economic well being of the commissar, or the "comrade general," on the one hand, and the street sweeper or Gulag guard on the other. Nevertheless, the statement as to the appropriate income distribution did play at least a superficial role in that society. Lip service, if nothing else, was paid to it; Spokesmen for the U.S.S.R., and Western defenders of Soviet style socialism pointed to it as a virtue, however much it was true that its real purpose was to serve as a veneer for the brutality it hid.

But there are very different institutions in our society which also adhere to this doctrine. In many cases, far more than lip service is paid to it. On the contrary, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need," is a living, breathing vital core of how these organizations actually function. Examples include the family, the monastery, the nunnery, the commune, the Hutterite Colony, and many of the other now extinct experiments in utopianism.

Take the family, for instance. Except in the most dysfunctional of cases, the little girl doesn't eat and live in accordance with her ability to earn income. Rather, she enjoys consumer goods in proportion to her needs -- as determined by her parents. As for the father, who traditionally earns the entire income in accordance with his ability, his well being depends on his needs, which are usually determined by his non income earning wife to be far less than the total family budget.

The difference between the two types of socialism is that in the one case all of this dividing up of the income on the basis of need, and earning

it on the basis of ability, is done on a voluntary basis, and in the other it is done coercively. Kibbutzniks are not forced to join the kibbutz<sup>2</sup>. Every nun in the nunnery is there because she wants to be. Of all of her options, as she sees them, that is the best one; if this were not so, she would leave. Similarly for every other institution of voluntary socialism.

It is very different for coercive socialism. Cuba and North Korea today, and the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe until 1989, were vast jails. Emigration was prohibited, as attested to by the infamous Berlin Wall. Since there were anti-loafing laws on the books, these were, literally, slave societies<sup>3</sup>.

One implication of this analysis is that the usual left right political distinctions must go by the boards. Political economic moral reality is a bit more complex, it turns out, and cannot successfully be depicted on the usual one dimensional graph. Rather, two dimensions are required:

	coercive	voluntary
socialism	a	b
capitalism	c	d

In the traditional political economic analysis, the main contending forces are socialism vs capitalism. From the present perspective this would be to range a+b against c+d.

In this scheme, d stands for laissez faire capitalism, where government is either rigidly proscribed to its traditional function of the protection of

person and property (Mises, 1963; Nozick, 1974; M. Friedman, 1962), or totally disappears, in which case these services, too, are privatized, and provided through free markets (Rothbard, 1970, 1973, 1982; D. Friedman, 1989). In sharp contrast, c is a philosophy which only superficially pays allegiance to the sanctity of person and property. In reality, it violates them, all the while protesting its belief in their value. Examples include Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's Italy, and the many Latin and South American right wing military dictatorships. These two categories, c and d, have nothing in common except perhaps for the ability or willingness of advocates of a to distinguish between them. That they are indeed included together in the left right single dimension spectrum speaks volumes in behalf of the ability of these people to inculcate their views of politics on what passes for the intellectual community.

Now consider the other side of this "debate", a+b. We have seen that they are each socialistic, in that they adhere more or less to the doctrine of "from each according ...". Yet in the more meaningful dimension, they are worlds apart. This is because one is consistent with the initiation of force against innocent persons and their property, and the other is not. Similarly, c and d while conflated by many, actually have very little of importance in common in terms of the most important issue in all of political economy, the issue of the initiation of violence<sup>4</sup>.

Thus, the real debate is not between a+b on the one hand and c+d on the other. The contending philosophies are a+c, both of which, paradoxically, are entirely compatible with one another, and b+d, which are likewise mutually congruent.

There is simply no contention between b and d. One distributes wealth

according to an agreed upon formula ("from each according ...") and the other does so according to a different, but not incompatible one, namely, contract. In like manner a and c are also soul mates. The justificatory verbiage may vary greatly, but in both cases the perpetrators of aggression victimize non initiators.

Having established, at least to my own satisfaction, that there are really two basically different kinds of socialism, I now turn to a consideration of the motivation behind each, starting with the voluntary version.

## II. Voluntary Socialism

Why do people marry, have children and establish families? One answer, an eminently sound one, is for the usual reasons: love, a desire to please parents (especially those of the wife), and to see our genes perpetuated. Given that there are strong motives toward marriage and family formation, they are felt more imperatively by females. The sociobiological literature (Wilson, 1975) explains this largely in terms of the economics of genetic inheritance. The theoretical limit to the ability of men to transmit their genes to the next generation is indefinitely large. Their best strategy for attaining this goal is thus to stay unmarried, unencumbered, free to maximize their ability to propagate the species. The female in contrast is biologically limited to only several dozens of offspring. The medical, economic and social realities reduce this option far below that feasible number. Accordingly, her best strategy is to find a male, typically the husband, the father of the children (insert citation here) who will stay with her, monogamously, and help her raise her progeny.

If the usual reasons for family formation are such important motivating

forces, what accounts for the decline of the traditional family? There are two convincing arguments offered. One is by Murray (1984, 1990) See also Gilder (1981) and Swedish guy from Rockford zxxx In his analysis, which applies mainly to non whites in the U.S., it is not merely that the traditional family has fallen upon hard times, and is in the process of breaking up. Things are far worse: in many cases, the family is failing to form in the first place. Why? Because the state makes a financial offer to the pregnant female teenager that the father of her child is simply not in a position to match. If effect, the government "marries" her. Nor are the sociological factors mitigating against illegitimacy as powerful as once they were. With the decline of religion and its prohibitions of this sort of behavior, and the disarray and despair of the non white community in the inner city, the barriers have not only lessened, in many areas they are all but non existent.

Let us now consider another type of voluntary socialistic organization, the kibbutz. At first glance, the motivations of those who join must appear to be somewhat irregular, if not downright neurotic. For the practices seem so outrageous to someone not accustomed and familiar with them, that it almost seems safe to conclude that this is a non tenable institution. Consider the following:

. Children live in separate houses from their parents, and a debate of no little heat within the kibbutz addresses the issue of whether parents can tuck their children into bed (the "right wing" or "conservative" position) or must say goodnight to them at the door (the "left wing" or "radical" position)<sup>5</sup>.

."Some of the mothers, particularly the young mothers, having their first babies, resent the power and authority of the nurse. They are worried

and harassed about strangers taking care of their babies. Free from work for the first six weeks after childbirth, they often brood over their inability to see and handle their babies as and when they please. Many mothers suffer pangs of jealousy and have difficulty in weaning their babies because they are aware that once the baby is weaned, it passes over to the complete control of the nurse. They fear that the baby, now also fed by the nurse, would prefer her to the mother.

"When the baby is one year old, it is automatically transferred to the toddlers' house with four or five other children in charge of a woman caretaker" (Stern, 1965, p. 119)

. In one kibbutz, each member with a certain seniority is allowed one two-week all expenses paid vacation trip abroad. But what if only one spouse has already taken advantage of this program? According to a kibbutz decision, "the one who had not yet had his turn could go, but not the other partner " Criden and Gelb, 1974, p. 42.

In addition, privacy is strictly frowned upon. In one case, "Not only was it against the custom of the kibbutz to own a private teakettle; it was a breach of principle. Social activity was supposed to be conducted in the dining room -- with the whole kibbutz family -- and the private drinking of tea in rooms would undermine the whole concept, leading inevitably to a return to privacy in all fields. The same held true of radios -- one radio in the dining room was not only sufficient but also the optimum number" (Weingarten, 1955, pp. 105-106).

Even the individual ownership of wrist watches is problematic. Consider the

"discussion, in which sixty people participated, on what to do about the fact that some people owned watches and others didn't. It was finally decided to rotate the watches every three months with one boy vociferously dissenting on the basis that he was more likely to take care of the watch he had received for his Bar-Mitzvah than the next fellow" (Ibid., p. 107).

In even the most trivial matters, there is the overriding "principle of the individual's subordination to the welfare of the group" (Spiro, 1956, p. 77). This stretches to the "cultural committee's" decision concerning whether or not "it will be ... possible for every member to get his own newspaper" (Criden and Gelb, 1974, p. 94); to the issue of "Smokers get free rations of cigarettes. Is the nonsmoker entitled to a free ration of chocolate instead?"



(Ibid., p. 99). As well the kibbutz must take cognizance of the fact that

"those who are interested in sports may have certain requirements -- whether it be athletic equipment or a ball field or the opportunity to go watch a big game. Others may not care for sports but want to go to a concert instead" (Ibid., p. 99).

In fact these societies are so outre that they may have served as literary parodies for best selling novelists (Rand, 19xx). If the word "totalitarian" control can be used to describe a system which proscribes the behavior of its members in every tiny detail, there is no doubt that the kibbutz deserves this characterization.

Notwithstanding all of the above, and this is only the tip of a veritable ice-berg, there remains one saving grace for the kibbutz. It is still entirely a voluntary<sup>6</sup> organization. No one is dragged there, kicking and screaming, against their will. And the same applies to the monastery, nunnery, utopian commune and all other instances of this phenomenon.

So what if life is regulated down to the tiniest trivial detail. This may not satisfy the taste of the majority, but if it suits the minority of the population which joins, what is the big objection.

In any case, there are other free institutions in our society which regiment their members to any even greater degree, and are not criticized for denying any measure of freedom to them. In a symphony orchestra, for example, if the clarinetist so much as breathes at a time displeasing to the conductor, he is severely admonished; the whole orchestra practice comes to a grinding halt, to his great embarrassment. This is far more "totalitarian" than anything Hitler, Stalin, Mao or the most vicious private slave owner ever imposed on their charges<sup>7</sup>. And yet, because the symphony is entirely voluntary<sup>8</sup>, it fits securely into the rubric of the free society, where theses others do not. If this is true, then the same applies to the kibbutz.

One of the motives cited most heavily in the kibbutz literature is security (Criden and Gelb, 1947, p. 98; Leon, 1964, p. 72). In addition, there must be a fairly strong desire to live in a large extended family<sup>9</sup>, for that is the best way to look at most of these organizations. People would scarcely join, and remain in them, were this not the case. The jarring note in the kibbutz, for non members, is not that they are "totalitarian"; most families are. The dissonance comes from the fact that these people are unrelated to each other, and yet act almost as if they share close blood ties. The whole enterprise would become more comprehensible, and less horrendous, did we but once realize that although not part of a genetic family with each other, kibbutz members consider themselves as part of a political-social-economic family structure.

### III. Coercive Socialism

It is now time to consider coercive socialism. The values and motivations underlying this philosophy are rather more complex than in the voluntary case. The thesis to be offered here is that there are actually two entirely different sets of values and motives to be considered: the ostensible and the real.

The ostensible motivations for coercive collectivism<sup>10</sup> are the ones put forth by the socialists themselves, in order to explain and justify their adherence to Marxism. But it shall be contended that these are so foolish and absurd that they could not possibly have been the real motivating force behind the view of at least significant numbers of them<sup>11</sup>. This will lead us to the real underlying, largely psychological, reasons for the adoption of forced socialism.

#### A. Ostensible Reasons

The best articulator of the superficial explanation for socialist values is C.A.R. Crosland (1957, pp. 103-104) who lists six concerns of the coercivists:

"First a protest against the material poverty and physical squalor which capitalism produced. Secondly, a wider concern for 'social welfare' -- for the interests of those in need, or oppressed, or unfortunate, from whatever cause. Thirdly, a belief in equality and the 'classless society,' and especially a desire to give the worker his 'just' rights and a responsible status at work. Fourthly a rejection of competitive antagonism, and an ideal of fraternity and cooperation. Fifthly, a protest against the inefficiencies of capitalism as an economic system, and notably its tendency to mass unemployment... (Also) was a passionate belief in liberty and democracy. It would never have occurred to most early socialists that socialism had any meaning except within a political framework of freedom for the individual."

If one had to summarize these half dozen concerns in a non pejorative manner, the words of Cole (1935, p. 15) might be very apt<sup>12</sup>: "The will to Socialism is based on a lively sense of wrongs crying out for redress."

Although perhaps Crosland was the most thorough, numerous other commentators have contributed to the listing of ostensible values, in an attempt to explain the "need" for forced collectivism. Let us consider their arguments in the order addressed by Crosland. 1. Material Poverty and 2. Social Welfare

The difficulty with this thesis (See also Bauman, 1976, p. 104; Berenberg, 1935, p. 104; DeLeon, 1942, p. 12; Ely, 1894, p. 254) is that capitalism did not produce poverty; on the contrary this is due to statist interferences with that system (Williams, 1982). Laws such as minimum wages, rent control, tariffs, zoning, building codes, price supports, marketing boards, occupational licensing, as well as excess taxes, central banking, inflation and pro union legislation have all contributed to the demoralization of the economy. It is in spite of the best efforts of entrepreneurs, organized under the format of private markets, not because of them, that

pockets of poverty still remain. The Industrial Revolution, free enterprise incarnate, was instrumental in freeing at least one small part of the world's population, and later, through example, much of the civilized part of the globe, from the millstones of poverty, want and physical degradation.

States Mises (1972, pp. 82-83) in this regard:

"The truth is that the accumulation of capital and its investment in machines, the source of the comparatively greater wealth of the Western peoples, are due exclusively to laissez-faire capitalism ... It is not the fault of the capitalists that the Asiatics and Africans did not adopt those ideologies and policies which would have made the evolution of autochthonous capitalism possible. Neither is it the fault of the capitalists that the policies of these nations thwarted the attempts of foreign investors to give them the benefits of more machine production. No one contests that what makes hundreds of millions in Asia and Africa destitute is that they cling to primitive methods of production and miss the benefits which the employment of better tools and up-to-date technological designs could bestow upon them. But there is only one means to relieve the distress -- namely, the full adoption of laissez-faire capitalism. What they need is private enterprise and the accumulation of new capital, capitalists and entrepreneurs. It is nonsensical to blame capitalism and the capitalistic nations of the West for the plight the backward peoples have brought upon themselves....

"The poverty of backward nations is due to the fact that their policies of expropriation, discriminatory taxation and foreign exchange control prevent the investment of foreign capital while their domestic policies preclude the accumulation of indigenous capital."

So much for the first two claims.

### 3. Equality.

There has been more hypocrisy involving this goal than perhaps any other (Tullock, 1992). If the tyrannical socialists were really in favor of this goal, they would call for the forced redistribution of intelligence, beauty, industriousness, musical and athletic ability, charisma and entrepreneurial skills -- the characteristics which account for income disparities in the first place. What real good does it do, even from this egalitarian perspective, to redistribute mere money? No sooner do we redistribute it but that the same "greedy" folk are out there, earning more than their fair share of the earth's goodies. To be sure we can keep redistributing, both those

from whom it is continually taken reduce their effort and feel ill used, while those to whom it is given are never quite sure they deserve it, despite the best efforts of the welfare "rights" movement to convince them that they really do.

Those who are able to earn great amounts of money do so, usually, on the basis of their "unfair" genetic inheritances. Unfortunately, while we can nowadays reduce these endowments (lobotomies for intelligence, zzzx surgery for beauty, etc.) we do not yet have the capacity to transfer them to the more needy. But when and if medical science makes this possible, we should use the new technology to make it so. In the meantime, Kurt Vonnegut, in his magnificent and underappreciated short story "Harrison Bergeron," calls for a "handicapper general" who would affix heavy weights to the backs of strong people (to equate them with the "physically challenged"), force the musically inclined to wear earphones, emitting cacophonous noise (in order to put them on a par with the rest of us.)

Until and unless the Croslands of the world<sup>13</sup> advocate such grotesque positions (see also, Berenberg, 1935, p. 105; Bernstein, 1909, p. 95; Cole, 1947, p. 5; DeLeon, 1942, p. 11; Ely, 1894, p. 257) they are not taking their own ideas seriously. And until they do, there is no reason for us to do so.

Another jarring note in the socialist analysis of poverty is their fear, loathing and hatred of material goods. For example, Ely, an avowed socialist (who gives in his book "that presentation of socialism which seems to him to contain the greatest strength" (1894, p. ix), castigates mammon worshipers (p. viii). If the forced collectivists really favored a reduction in poverty, they would scarcely denigrate the chase after the "unholy buck" or the quest for "mammon."

#### 4. Competition.

Here, Crosland completely misconstrues his subject (see also Berenberg, 1935, p. 106; Bernstein, 1909, p. 95; Cole, 1947, p. 2). Competition and cooperation are not incompatible. Far from it. As it happens, they are entirely compatible. In the market, we compete with each other as a cooperative effort. The market process establishes competitive prices. It is only on the basis of these freely derived terms of trade that we can succeed in cooperating with one another (Mises, 1981). This is implicit cooperation. To be sure, there is also explicit cooperation, as between two men who together move furniture, or between the conductor and all the members of the orchestra. Crosland's mistake is that he thinks that only things that are recognized explicitly, by common, ordinary language usage as cooperative effort can count as such. But there is more. There is also the implicit cooperation of the market, which he completely overlooks.

One opinion of Crosland's as to the deleterious effects of competition deserves special mention. He states (p. 106):

"The worker who exceeds his norm or works too hard, the employer who embarks on a price-offensive, are thought guilty at the least of not playing the game, and probably of flouting the principle of fair shares and showing disloyalty to comrades. To a large extent, security has replaced competition as the guiding rule of economic conduct."

One problem with this is that it is difficult to reconcile it with the supposed socialist opposition to idleness (see point 11, below). Penalizing laborers for working "too hard" is a recipe for enforced idleness. A second problem is that without hard work, it is unclear as to how the much flaunted goals of reducing poverty and helping the poor are to be met. Unless the pie is created, it is a daunting task to redistribute it. Third, how far is Crosland willing to generalize? Would he apply his antipathy to "speedups" to

inventors? to medical researchers? What would he say to a person who stays in his laboratory 100 hours a week, and comes up with the cure for AIDS? That he worked too hard?? Fourth, a "price offensive" can only be interpreted as lowering prices. Why should this be singled out for castigation? Isn't decreasing prices on an item such as bread illustrative of "loyalty" to the proletariat, not disloyalty?

#### 5. Inefficiency

This is the protest against capitalism on the ground that it is inefficient, and leads to mass unemployment (See also DeLeon, 1942, p. 16; Ely, 1894, p. 256). The problem here is a historical one. Yes, massive unemployment took place at a time (the 1930s, presumably) when Crosland thinks capitalism was in the ascendancy. And in some regards, it was. But insofar as monetary institutions are concerned, it was the state, not the market, which was in control. Central banking, the Federal Reserve, are hardly elements in a system of laissez-faire capitalism. There are two explanations of the Great Depression which emanate from the free enterprise camp. One (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963) blames the fed for allowing the stock of money to decline precipitously<sup>14</sup> in the early 1930s. The other (Rothbard, 19zx) excoriates the apparatus of the state for pursuing monetary expansion in the 1920s. In this (Austrian) view, a short recession might have been enough to wipe out the capital misallocation which resulted from the previous orgy of inflation; instead, government attempted to prop up businesses embodying the errors in capital allocation<sup>15</sup>, unnecessarily deepening and lengthening the process into a depression. But there is one thing these two sources are agreed upon: whatever the cause and proper interpretation of the decline, it had nothing to do with the free enterprise system; it was rather a creature of

the state.

## 6. Liberty

Crosland's "passionate belief in liberty" is a travesty. A system which forces people to join it, and attacks their person and property in the process, is intrinsically non libertarian. Perhaps the best antidote to this bit of temerity is to reflect upon the liberty enjoyed by Marx while he was writing his anti-libertarian screed in 19th century Great Britain under a liberal capitalist regime, with the plight of a citizen in the U.S.S.R., the country which most closely embodied his ideas. States Mises (1972, p. 96):

"When in 1848 and 1849 (Marx) took an active part in the organization and the conduct of the revolution, first in Prussia and later also in other German states, he was -- being legally an alien -- expelled and moved, with his wife, his children and his maid, first to Paris and then to London. Later, when peace returned and the abettors of the abortive revolution were amnestied, he was free to return to all parts of Germany and often made use of this opportunity. He was no longer an exile, and he chose of his own accord to make his home in London. Nobody molested him when he founded, in 1864, the International Working Men's Association, a body whose avowed sole purpose was to prepare the great world revolution. He was not stopped when, on behalf of this association, he visited various continental countries. He was free to write and to publish books and articles which, to use the words of Professor Laski, were certainly an effort 'to alter in a radical way the property rights of the rich. And he died quietly in his London home...

"Marx, the dissenter, could live, write and advocate revolution, at ease, in Victorian England just as the Labour Party could engage in all political activities, at ease, in post-Victorian England. In Soviet Russia not the slightest opposition is tolerated. This is the difference between liberty and slavery."

Crosland's "passionate belief in liberty" sentiment is similar to Harold Laski's statement: "No doubt in Soviet Russia a Communist has a full sense of liberty; no doubt also he has a keen sense that liberty is denied him in Fascist Italy" (cited in Mises, 1972, p. 96). Of this, Mises had the following to say:

"The truth is that a Russian is free to obey all the orders issued by his superiors. But as soon as he deviates a hundredth of an inch from the correct way of thinking as laid down by the authorities, he is mercilessly liquidated. All those politicians, office holders, authors, musicians and



scientists who were "purged" were -- to be sure -- not anticommunists. They were, on the contrary, fanatical communists, party members in good standing, whom the supreme authorities, in due recognition of their loyalty to the Soviet creed, had promoted to high positions. The only offense they had committed was that they were not quick enough in adjusting their ideas, politics, books or compositions to the latest changes in the ideas and tastes of Stalin. It is difficult to believe that these people had a 'full sense of liberty' if one does not attach to the word liberty a sense which is precisely the contrary of the sense which all people always used to attach to it.

"Fascist Italy was certainly a country in which there was no liberty. It had adopted the notorious Soviet pattern of the 'one party principle;' and accordingly suppressed all dissenting views. Yet there was still a conspicuous difference between the Bolshevik and the Fascist application of this principle. For instance, there lived in Fascist Italy a former member of the parliamentary group of communist deputies, who remained loyal unto death to his communist tenets, Professor Antonio Grazidei. He received the government pension which he was entitled to claim as professor emeritus, and he was free to write and to publish, in the most eminent Italian publishing firms, books which were orthodox Marxian. His lack of liberty was certainly less rigid than that of the Russian communists...."

Although perhaps the most thorough, Crosland was not the only socialist who attempted to explain the felt need for this philosophy. Let us now turn to a series of other ostensible values and motivations which, it has been claimed, account for the need for coercive socialism.

#### 7. Human Nature

"In the last analysis, the attempt to build a socialist society is an effort to emancipate human nature..." (Bauman, 1976, p. 101). The difficulty here is that as the sociobiologists have taught us, human nature, whatever it is, is not easy to change. As the unravelling of the U.S.S.R. has shown, even 70 years of terror have not been sufficient to leach out of the human soul its basic and longstanding desire for family, religion, economic self improvement. In any case, what is so awful about human nature that it calls out for emancipation? Yes, human beings are responsible for some ghastly deeds (most of them traceable, paradoxically, to the attempt to change human nature), but also for many wonderful heroic ones. Where is it engraved in stone that an altered human nature, even were this possible, would be preferable to the

present one?

#### 8. Peace

In his chapter VII entitled "Socialism: the lone foe of war," Benson (1913, p. 99) tries to make the case that greed and the quest for profits, capitalism's main motivating forces, have plunged us into war again and again, while the more humanitarian socialistic values have kept us free of this scourge. This is ludicrous on its face, as even a superficial understanding of the history of the last century indicates. The African countries under their Marxist-inspired rulers have for years engaged in bloody battles with each other, and even more so, inwardly, against minority tribes within their own countries. Socialist Israel and its neighboring socialist Arab countries have been at each other's throats ever since 1947. Hitler's National Socialists, and Stalin's Union of Soviet Socialist Republics engaged in horrific battles with one another in World War II.

And if history undermines the equation of forced collectivism and peace, so do the pro war words of the avowed advocates of socialism. States Ely (1894, p. 156), for example,

"... war, and not private business, has heretofore been the chief school of the social virtues. War has an anti-social character, insomuch as it is waged by one society of men against another; but it is carried on to advance the interest of a country, and the soldier feels that he is struggling for his land, and for it he is ready to give up life itself. His occupation cultivates in him generous habits of mind, and a sense of common danger draws him near to his fellow-soldiers."

To be sure, one can find equal bellicosity on the conservative side of the spectrum. But it should be clear that coercive socialism has no inner track in the quest for peace.

None of this is to deny that there are people passing as capitalists, who eagerly embrace war (See Kolko, 19xx). But these are instances of

coercive capitalism, what we have called category c, not laissez faire or voluntary capitalism, category d.

#### 9. Collective Ownership

Production should be for use, not for profit. This hoary economic fallacy is articulated by Cole (1947, p. 3):

"Socialism, in the broadest and most general sense, is the doctrine that the resources of production ought to be used, not for the profit of a class of capitalists, but for the common service of all people. In order to bring this about, Socialists have urged that the principal and basic industries shall be publicly owned and administered under some form of public control."<sup>16</sup>

This mistake is an elementary one. In the market, the only way to make profit is to satisfy the desires of consumers. The Edsel did not earn profit because it was rejected by its intended customers. The Mustang, manufactured by the same firm, with identical motivations (e.g., to earn a return) did so only because it was eagerly purchased.

It is all too true that there are very different ways to amass great amounts of riches in modern western "capitalistic" countries. One may be able to use political pull to gain an outright subsidy from government. Influence pedalling may eventuate in a protective tariff, restrictions on entry into one's industry, or occupational licensure. But these methods, it will be readily apparent, are not part of free enterprise, d. Rather, they constitute a government intervention into an otherwise free economy, and are thus part of category c.

#### 10. Individualism

Perhaps the most ludicrous of the socialist claims is that their philosophy promotes individualism. In the view of DeLeon (1942, p. 15):

"... individualism does not deny socialist or altruist or collectivist requirements. For the very reason that the soldiers must be individually well trained, all of them must give up a certain portion of their individualism to the whole, without which there could be no organization. Without altruism in

the army, each soldier would pull his own way, and you might have anything you please, but an army you would not have. It requires individuality, plus the surrender of part of yourself, and that is a point that Socialism teaches -- man is a social being, and the real capabilities of his individuality cannot develop so long as he is not in society, merging part of this individuality into the whole."

In response, one must agree that whatever you have in a well trained and well coordinated army, it is not individualism, except perhaps at the top of the hierarchy. To define individualism in terms of an army where everyone obeys orders almost without question is to define a circle in terms of a square.

Our orchestra example is apropos. In a well coordinated orchestra, there is not room for a scintilla of individualism, except for the soloist, and only during the cadenza. At any other time, individualism must be stamped out, totally, if the musicians are to play synchronously. Individualism, in other words, is not a basic element of the free society. People can choose, voluntarily, to give it up, say, for the purpose of playing a symphony together.

Many fallacies abound on the issue of individualism. It has been claimed that track (or singles in tennis) is a sport more compatible with liberty than basketball (or tennis doubles), because the former is far more individualistic. True, the latter is a team sport. Good athletes know when to pass the ball, when to denigrate their egos for the good of the collective effort. In marathon running or singles tennis, the issue doesn't even arise. Yes, individual sports are more individualist than those played by teams; this is true, almost by definition. But it has nothing to do with liberty. As long as no one is forced to play (sports drafts, despite the claims of those opposed to monopsony, are not coercive), team sports are as compatible with liberty as are individual efforts.

## 11. Idleness

In the view of admitted socialist Richard T. Ely, founder and former president of the American Economic Association, one of the many virtues of socialism is that it will end idleness. He states (1894, p. 154):

"At the present time, we are making some attempt to abolish idleness on the part of poor people, but we have not seriously attacked the problem of the idle rich. Socialism is strong, then, because it attempts to abolish all idle classes, and idleness is morally pernicious."

One difficulty with this proposition is that there is much to be said in favor of idleness. If Marx and Ely and others of that ilk had been a little bit less avid in their professional callings, the world might have been a far better place.

Another problem is how to distinguish (improper) idleness from (presumably proper) leisure. Do we define idleness objectively in terms of the eight hour day or 40 hour week? What then of the inventor who creates a magnificent product with the greatest of ease, and then (member of the idle rich as he now is!) takes off a year or two in order to recharge his batteries? What of the novelist who writes a series of classic best sellers, but only one every decade? What of the inventor who struggles 10 hours a day, 7 days a week, 52 weeks a year, for 40 years, only to come up with -- nothing. Was he idle, or hard working? It would appear that the labor theory of value is lurking somewhere in the wings with regard to this attack on idleness.

## 12. Nobility

Another heavy favorite in the ludicrousness sweepstakes is the claim that socialism (remember, we're now discussing the coercive variety thereof) is, gulp!, "ennobling." States Ely (1894, pp. 154-155):

"Socialists claim that socialism would improve and elevate government, and would raise into prominence a nobler class of men... If Socialism could be made to work, it cannot be said that its claim, that it would bring into

prominence a nobler class of men, and would produce nobler men, is unfounded... Socialists hold that, under socialism, elevation to positions of importance would be based upon moral qualifications, in part at least. They furthermore urge that the nature of public business is such that it is ennobling."

But for the fact that these utterances were made by a supposedly reputable economist, they would hardly deserve a reply. Since they were, we must object. Molotov, Beria, Khrushchev, Pol Pot, Fidel Castro, this is not a list of nobility. This is a list of killers and thugs.

How could Ely go so far wrong? One way to try to determine this is to ask what evidence Ely adduces to support his position. His exhibit A (p. 155):

"A great leader in private business has his attention concentrated upon himself or upon a few stock-holders, whereas public life enlarges the horizon, and the right thinking person who administers public business, does so with reference to the good of the whole people."

Sounds just like Nixon, Carter, Reagan, Bush or Clinton. Now consider his exhibit B (p. 156), a paeon to public service:

"Those who are familiar with the work going on in the laboratories of universities, know that the entire time and strength of those engaged in these universities is given to their work, and, as a rule, the last thing of which they think is large pecuniary returns."

All that can be said about this is that this doesn't sound like any university professor practicing in 1992. Maybe things were very very different in 1894, when Ely published his screed.

### 13. The arts

Not to be overlooked in the litany of the benefits of tyrannical socialism is the enhancement of the arts. Says Ely (p. 157):

"It is likely to awaken surprise on the part of those who have not given attention to socialism, to learn that among people of artistic temperament, it meets with much favor. Poets, painters, and authors of talent are much inclined to view socialism with a certain sympathy, and there are many of them who are even outspoken in their adherence to it. John Ruskin advocates something like socialism, although of an aristocratic kind."

One rejoinder to this stance was penned by Ludwig von Mises (1972, pp. 76-77):

"John Ruskin will be remembered -- together with Carlyle, the Webbs, Bernard Shaw and some others -- as one of the gravediggers of British freedom, civilization and prosperity.

A wretched character in his private no less than in his public life, he glorified war and bloodshed and fanatically slandered the teachings of political economy which he did not understand. He was a bigoted detractor of the market economy and a romantic eulogist of the guilds. He paid homage to the arts of earlier centuries. But when he faced the work of a great living artist, Whistler, he dispraised it in such foul and objurgatory language that he was sued for libel and found guilty by the jury. It was the writings of Ruskin that popularized the prejudice that capitalism, apart from being a bad economic system, has substituted ugliness for beauty, pettiness for grandeur, trash for art.

"As people widely disagree in the appreciation of artistic achievements, it is not possible to explode the talk about the artistic inferiority of the age of capitalism in the same apodictic way in which one may refute errors in logical reasoning or in the establishment of facts of experience. Yet no sane man would be insolent enough as to belittle the grandeur of the artistic exploits of the age of capitalism.

"The pre-eminent art of this age of 'mean materialism and money-making' was music. Wagner and Verdi, Berlioz and Bizet, Brahms and Bruckner, Hugo Wolf and Mahler, Puccini and Richard Strauss, what an illustrious cavalcade! What an era in which such masters as Schumann and Donizetti were overshadowed by still superior genius!

"Then there were the great novels of Balzac, Flaubert, Maupassant, Jens Jacobsen, Proust, and the poems of Victor Hugo, Walt Whitman, Rilke, Yeats. How poor our lives would be if we had to miss the work of these giants..."

There is another possible reply as well. In days of yore, rich merchants or princes would subsidize art out of their own purses. Bach and Handel spring to mind as recipients of such largess. In the modern day, governments have now supplanted this function, and the result is the "Piss-Christ," the homosexual art of Andres Serrano, modern atonal music and the products of the clients of such groups as the Canada Arts Council, which lie stacked up in warehouses for no one is interested in their perusal (citation to be supplied zxxzxx).

Perhaps it is time to turn back the clock on this matter. There may be few merchant princes with ready cash to subsidize artists, but where is the

case for having more art than customers are willing to pay for?

Externalities? One man's homoerotic art is another man's abomination. If there be any third party effects, not only is it unclear as to whether they are positive or negative, we even lack the means by which any such determination can be made.

And it is the same for government tax support for "public libraries, public galleries and museums, public places for recreation" (Ely, 1894, p. 257) and even education for that matter. To some, these facilities enhance learning, promote peace and understanding, and increase civility. To others, the present author particularly included, while there may be some small amount of public benefits, who can tell?, these are vastly overshadowed by the fact that they are used to promulgate Marxism, feminism, deconstructionism, radical environmentalism, and political correctitude.

#### B. The Real Motivations

Having considered and rejected the ostensible values which attempt to account for socialism, we now turn our attention to the underlying or real motivations. We embark upon a course of action which is on its face somewhat problematic. After all, one can never be sure that the motives ascribed to the (involuntary) socialists are the real ones. Our remarks in this section are thus provisional, tentative and speculative.

However, we do not proceed without the implicit blessing of at least one authority on socialism, Edward Bellamy. He makes a statement which he intended to apply to clergy and moralists who felt that poverty was a result of depravity and would disappear if only people mended their evil ways. But this statement may serve instead to help analyze the real reasons why socialists have held their pitiful and counterproductive views. States



Bellamy (1897, p. 155):

"How far the clergy and the moralists preached this doctrine with a professional motive as calculated to enhance the importance of their services as moral instructors, how far they merely echoed it as an excuse for mental indolence, and how far they may really have been sincere, we can not judge at this distance, but certainly more injurious nonsense was never taught."

What, then, is the hidden agenda of socialists? Why are they the wierd way they are? Mises (1972) lists the following:

1. The resentment of frustrated ambition (p. 11)

In medieval days, one's status was almost entirely determined by one's parentage. Little resentment could erupt, since such matters were clearly beyond one's control. Under capitalism, in contrast, there is no such inevitability about place in society. Given that each is paid, and enjoys a prestige level based on the maxim "to each according to his accomplishments" (p. 12), frustrated ambition is much more likely to be created. Coupled with the fact that it is only human nature to overestimate our abilities, and to deprecate our rewards (we always want more than we have), it is of little surprise that most people feel hard done by under free enterprise.

Says Mises (pp. 13,14):

"If a man's station in life is conditioned by factors other than his inherent excellence, those who remain at the bottom of the ladder can acquiesce in this outcome and, knowing their own worth, still preserve their dignity and self respect. But it is different if merit alone decides. Then the unsuccessful feel themselves insulted and humiliated. Hate and enmity against all those who superseded them must result.

"The price and market system of capitalism is such a society in which merit and achievements determine a man's success or failure."

2. Scapegoats

Under such conditions, it is an easy next step to search for scapegoats. And the easiest target are the successful participants in the market, the rich businessmen. It is any wonder that practically the only "politically correct" villains in modern movies and television are middle aged white male businessmen? In this regard, it is no accident that hard working and relatively wealthy groups such as Jews and Orientals (Sowell, 19xx) in the U.S., have been singled out for special opprobrium by inhabitants of the inner cities.

Says Mises (p. 15):

"The gulf between what a man is and achieves and what he thinks of his own abilities and achievements is pitilessly revealed. Daydreams of a 'fair' world which would treat him according to his 'real worth' are the refuge of all those plagued by a lack of self-knowledge."

### 3. Resentment of the intellectuals

If the above considerations are true for the common man, they apply even more forcefully to the intellectual classes, or at least what passes for them, nowadays. The latter, more so than the former, actually interact with rich businessmen in a personal way. The professor, but not the foreman, nor still less the assembly line worker, may be invited to home or yacht. There, he gets his nose rubbed into the gargantuan wealth divide that separates the man of letters from the man of hucksterism, or mammon, or plebianism, as seen by the intellectual.

There is also an "objective" reason for the resentment. The intellectual<sup>17</sup> may have gone to high school with the entrepreneur; he received a 95% point grade average, while the future businessman struggled merely to pass. And now while the writer of books ekes out a precarious lower middle class life style, the "inferior" purveyor of breakfast cereal, or some such, lives in a mansion. What could be more unfair?

Mises (p. 20) gives a perspective on this that is very different than the one given above by (zxzx):

"American authors or scientists are prone to consider the wealthy businessman as a barbarian, as a man exclusively intent upon making money. The professor despises the alumni who are more interested in the university's football team than in its scholastic achievements. He feels insulted if he learns that the coach gets a higher salary than an eminent professor of philosophy. The men whose research has given rise to new methods of production hate the businessmen who are merely interested in the cash value of their research work. It is very significant that such a large number of American research physicists sympathize with socialism or communism."

### 4. Resentment of heirs not involved in business

Some few heirs of the great fortunes use their inheritances as a base from which to launch their own successful business careers. They are able to progress further than they otherwise might have been able to, because they didn't have to start from scratch, like their grandfather. But many if not

most of these heirs join the ranks of the "idle"<sup>18</sup> rich, giving over their lives to "wine, women and song," and to world cruises, safaris, art, and most germane to our interests, politics and charitable giving.

Some of these people bitterly resent their brothers and cousins who stayed with the family business and continued to keep it prosperous. For while their own fortunes are perhaps barely adequate to their grandiose needs, that of their relatives tend to become far greater. They think, along with Marx, that capital, particularly large fortunes, automatically begets further profits. They forget about "from shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three generations."

Says Mises (p. 30):

"The(se) cousins are enthusiastic in supporting strikes, even strikes in the factories from which their own revenues originate. It is a well-known fact that most of the 'progressive' magazines and many 'progressive' newspapers entirely depend upon the subsidies lavishly granted by them. These cousins endow 'progressive' universities and colleges and institutes for 'social research' and sponsor all sorts of communist party activities. As 'parlor socialist' and 'penthouse Bolsheviks,' they play an important role in the 'proletarian army' fighting against the 'dismal system of capitalism.'"

Given this analysis, it is thus no accident that such groups as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations support causes which would have the men after whom they are named spinning in their graves.

#### 5. Resentment of movie stars and actors

The denizens of Broadway stage and Hollywood screen earn as much, if not more than, successful businessmen. And yet, with very few exceptions, most of them are avid supporters of trendy lefty causes such as Communism, the left wing of the Democratic Party, radical environmentalism, etc. Why is this?

In the view of Mises, it is because they are very much less secure, psychologically, than those who supply tangible goods to the public. They realize that entertainment relieves boredom, and that -- with some exceptions -- there is nothing so interesting to the movie going, record selling masses as a new face, a new voice, a new body, a new act. The knowledge behind the aphorism "Fame is fleeting," cannot engender much personal security.

States Mises (pp. 32-33):

"It is obvious that there is no relief from what makes these stage people uneasy. Thus they catch at a straw. Communism, some of them think, will bring their deliverance. Is it not a system that makes all people happy? Do not very eminent men declare that all the evils of mankind are caused by capitalism and will be wiped out by communism? Are not they themselves hard-working people, comrades of all other working men?

"It may be fairly assumed that none of the Hollywood and Broadway communists has ever studied the writings of any socialist author and still less any serious analysis of the market economy. But it is this very fact that, to these glamour girls, dancers and singers, to these authors and producers of comedies, moving pictures and songs, gives the strange illusion that their particular grievances will disappear as soon as the 'expropriators' will be expropriated."

#### 6. Resentment of the ancien regime

The three great powers of the ancient regime were the monarchy, the aristocracy and the clergy. It is instructive to compare how each was treated by the communists and the liberal capitalists.

In the U.S.S.R., the monarchs and aristocrats were either killed outright or banished, or fled the country, while church property was seized and the men of the cloth forbidden to practice their religion. In the U.K., the paradigm case of 19th century liberal capitalism, the monarchy still reigns to this day, with a healthy subsidy from the taxpayer, albeit with greatly attenuated powers. The privileges of the aristocrats have been ended, they were allowed to keep their titles, escutcheons, and estates. The clergy, too, had their wings clipped. There was separation of church and state (at least in what emanated from the English colonies in North America) and they were prohibited from dealing with dissenters and heretics in their traditional manner. But they were allowed to follow their other religious precepts.

One would have thought that with such disparate treatment, these three groups would have wildly favored a regime of capitalism over socialism. But nothing could be further from the truth. Prince Charles runs around bad-mouthing capitalist architecture, and calling for more city planning. The Hohenzollern in Germany favored socialism. And the views on capitalism of the Papal Encyclicals, of the Catholic bishops' letters on the economy from the various countries, and of the World Council of Churches are too well known to

require elaboration (see, zxxz.)

Why is this so? States Mises (p. 46):

" "

#### 7. Utopian Socialist Motivations

There beats within the human breast the desire for peace and serenity. Except perhaps for the most rabid of us, people yearn for a rest from the tumult of modern life. For normal human beings, this desire translates into a need for a day of rest each week, and a few weeks holiday at the end of the year. But the abnormal, it becomes transmitted into socialistic utopianism: not the desire for rest and calm, but the demand for it<sup>19</sup>.

In the view of Mises (p. 10):

"In the universe there is never and nowhere stability and immobility. Change and transformation are essential features of life. Each state of affairs is transient; each age is an age of transition. In human life there is never calm and repose. Life is a process, not a perseverance in a status quo. Yet the human mind has always been deluded by the image of an unchangeable existence. The avowed aim of all utopian movements is to put an end to history and to establish a final and permanent calm."

What are the instances of the coercive demand for lack of change? One example are the Luddites, who break the machines which threaten decades and centuries long techniques of production. Another are the guilds of artisans, such as, in the modern day, physicians (Friedman, 1963, ch.9) who place insuperable barriers to the entry of competitors in their field. A third instance are the advocates of the "family farm," a concept no more justified for state favoritism than the "family grocery" or the "general store," attempts to beat back the modern incursions of supermarkets and department stores.

#### 8. Envy

If Mises was thorough and devastating in his probing of the psychological antecedents of socialism, there were others, too, who made significant contributions to this analysis.

One of the foremost of these is Hulmut Schoeck (1966). In his view (p. 249):

"The various forms of socialism have always recruited a large proportion, if not the majority, of their important supporters and theoreticians from among those people who were deeply troubled by the problem of envy in society. These were mostly people in good, if not excellent, circumstances, who suffered from the idea that they gave cause for envy. Their concern was directed equally towards those who were envied like themselves and towards those who were envious. How acute this problem was to many socialists and communists is amply illustrated by their writings, especially their diaries, correspondence and autobiographies.

"The impulse given to socialism by this viewpoint is primarily towards a form of society in which there will be neither envied nor envious. Unfortunately, few socialists were properly aware either of the origin of envy or of its extent, and they failed, furthermore, to appreciate that many of the remedies they proposed and applied would only serve to intensify envy."

Further, envy is like a Frankenstein's monster; easy to unleash, hard to control afterward. Says Shoeck (p. 251):

"... it is very difficult, once the appetite for social change has been stimulated by means of envy, to lull, tranquillize, deflect or even satisfy it, with any measure of certainty. Envy that has been stimulated beyond its normal bounds in a group, class or people is an autonomous force which feeds on its own flames, a dynamic which cannot be arrested. Again, there is something ominous about the fact that those who, on their own admission, intend to use envy as leverage, when asked to what extent and in what sphere of life they propose to establish the envious man as a norm, never give an unequivocal answer, indeed are unable to do so. For once they base their political strategy upon envy, they unleash an independent dynamic of elementary emotions and appetites which is constantly nourished by feelings of self pity, and which no longer permits its instigators to set and maintain a limit."

#### 9. Power

Another important motivating force which explains the impetus behind (coercive) socialism is the lust for power. According to Spengler (1926, pp. 361-362):

"In spite of its foreground appearances, ethical Socialism in not a system of compassion, humanity, peace and kindly care, but one of will-to-power. Any other reading of it is illusory. The aim is through and through imperialist; welfare, but welfare in the expansive sense, the welfare not of the diseased but of the energetic man ..."

In like manner, although a socialist himself, Cole (1935, p. 173) discusses the "sense of power" enjoyed by the "real (Socialist) agitator." And the same applies to Crosland. Another man of the "left," this author is not above ascribing various psychological sources for this philosophy. He cites (p. 100) the Swedish socialist Per Albin Hansson who talks of collectivism as a "dream"; he mentions (p. 99) "a crusading spirit ... almost reminding one of a religious movement; he alludes to the joy of fighting the

"struggle" itself, not so much the victory thereof<sup>20</sup>; he sees it as a way of psychologically ensuring that the socialist's life makes sense:

"... for the working class activist, devoting his entire energies to the socialist movement, both his social status and emotional certainty depend on the conviction that militant struggle is necessary; it is only on this assumption that his life makes sense." (p. 98)

Then there are the quasi philosophical explanations. These include fighting "isolation" and the "essential loneliness and incommunicability of the human plight" (Ash, 1964, p. 135. Support is given for this hypothesis by Berenberg (1935, p. 102) who sees man's plight in the "lack of joy in work," and the solution in, of course, socialism.

#### IV. Conclusion

There have been many furious debates within the psychological community as to whether homosexuality is or is not a disease. With the decline of the world wide communist movement, and with the obvious disarray of government interventionism as an economic policy, this may well be the time for psychologists to take up the question as to whether coercive socialism is or is not a disease.

1. It's probably a naive hope, but perhaps the world may one day adopt the terminology of the present paper. If feminism can succeed in changing linguistic usage, perhaps there is hope for logic as well.

2. They cannot take 1/n share of the communal property with them when and if they leave; but this is not a coercive infringement on their property rights as they are appraised of this stipulation as they join (Leon, 1964, p. 33).

3. Hoppe, 19xx makes the further point that "private enterprise" slavery (actually, as he points out, this is a misnomer: to the extent that forced slavery is allowed in a society, it does not qualify for the "free market" appellation) was far better for its victims than the state socialist version. In the former, the profit maximizing owners were compelled to treat their human property no worse than their cows and horses. If they brutalized them too much, they lost money thereby. No similar considerations, unfortunately, limited socialists such as Mao or Lenin, who killed millions of people (Conquest, 19zz)

See also point 11 below.

4. For a book which takes sharp issue with this claim, see Posner (1986).

5. On this, see Chertoff, undated, p. 7; Leon, 1964, p. 32; Liebllich, 1981, pp. xii, xix

6. Voluntary, that is, insofar as its members are concerned. However, since it is subsidized out of tax revenues (Criden and Gelb, 1947, pp. 40, 95; Leon, 1964, p. 35; Spiro, 1956, p. 71), one might claim that these organizations are not true instances of voluntary socialism. This is true; nonetheless, the idea of the voluntarily socialist kibbutz is still defensible; that is, we can conceive of organizations run exactly like the present kibbutzim, which are not subsidized by government. These would fit our bill. It is important to distinguish subsidy from government from all other subsidies. The monastery or the nunnery or the utopian commune might be subsidized through voluntary donations from outsiders. We could then say that these groups were not economically viable, but they would still be instances of voluntary socialism, as would a family which receives numerous gifts and donations from a rich uncle.

7. Setting aside, of course, the fact that these worthies caused thousands and millions of people not to breathe at all.

8. Again, we must abstract from the fact that musical organizations are in many countries heavily subsidized by government.

9. The size ranges from several dozen members to several hundred to several thousand (Criden and Gelb, 1974, p. 98.)



10. For our purposes, the distinction between bolshevism and menshivism (communism and social democracy) are irrelevant. One wanted to achieve its goals through force and revolution, the other through democracy and the ballot box. But their (forced collectivist) goals were the same, even though their means were different. Further, both sets of means, albeit different, were coercive. Let there be no mistake made about it: democratic socialism, like its communist cousin, is also disruptive of persons and their private property. The theft now takes place with a veneer of democratic legitimization, but it is no less coercive as a category, even though the democratic process sometimes tends to stem the degree of the coercion. Would Stalinism have been any less coercive had he been popularly elected, and then carried out an identical regime of terror? As it happens, Hitler did come to power through the democratic process, hardly an argument for it. For a critique of the view that democracy lends moral legitimacy to the activities of the duly elected, see Spooner, (1870) 1966. For a critique of the view that there are important economic differences between socialism and communism, see Mises, 1972, p. 63.

11. On the other hand, one wants to be fair. Socialists of the coercive stripe have never been known for their economic sophistication. It is quite likely that large numbers of them really know nothing whatever about economics, and were thus motivated by what we have called the "ostensible" reasons.

12. See also Bauman, 1976, p. 104

13. Crosland's book was written by an obviously intelligent, sophisticated, learned and hard working man. Thus, the entire work counts as a performative contradiction (Hoppe, 19xx). On the one hand, he calls for equality. On the other, he exhibits intellectual qualities far in excess of the average man. Most denizens of the planet are simply incapable of writing anything nearly so compelling (even if totally wrong-headed). Therefore, if Crosland took his argument for equality seriously, he would not have written that book. Instead, he would have engaged in some plebian activity, such as collecting the garbage. Or, if he was for some strange reason compelled to write on his subject, he would have purposefully done a far worse job than he did.

14. Interestingly, however, they have not (is this correct???) called for the abolition of the fed, merely for its reform.

15. For further elaboration on this, see Hayek, Garrison.

16. It is no accident that this sentiment is found in the voluntary socialist literature as well. Socialism, whether of the voluntary or involuntary stripe, is still socialism. States Leon (1964, p. 35): "The kibbutz aims to fulfil certain national purposes like colonization, development of agricultural resources, increase of agricultural production, transition of people remote from physical labor to work on the land, and the defence of the country. Together with this, it wishes to attain a decent standard of living for its members. All these tasks have priority over the striving for profit. A kibbutz will settle in a new and undeveloped area, rather than a populated area where economic prospects would be better. It will increase production and continue development as long as the average return pays minimum expenses of living and interest on outside capital." Here is a hatred of profit, and a program of work on the land reminiscent of the one put into place by the Khmer Rouge. But there is still a crucially important difference between the socialism of Leon and Cole. The one enacts its policy with its own funds (subject to the caveat mentioned above) and without physical force; the other

does, or attempts to do so, in behalf of all people, even those who do not subscribe to the plan.

17. See also Schumpeter (1947, p. 325) who points to "exasperation" on the part of the intellectuals as an explanation for their embrace of socialism.

18. No normative economic claim to the effect that these people do not deserve their gifts is implied here. Hence, the word "idle" is now used in a different sense than the one criticized above.

19. If one merely desires this, in additions to vacations, the purchase of insurance and investment in blue chip stocks, only, one can join a voluntary socialist utopia. If one demands it, and, worse, demands it for everyone else as well, then and only then does one become a coercive utopian socialist.

20. Had they enjoyed the battle itself, and not the specific goals, they might have been just as well off had they taken up chess, or karate; certainly, the world would have been better off without its 100 years plus flirtation with coercive socialism.

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