




ONTOLOGY, ORIGIN AND EPISTEMOLOGY

by

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ABSTRACT

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This paper concentrates on the question of knowing in the chapter entitled "Epistemology" in Dr. Sang Hun Lee's book, Fundamentals of Unification Thought. In his analysis of traditional epistemologies, Dr. Lee concludes that they are all inadequate due to their inability to take into account "give-and-receive action." It is this fundamental tenant of Unification epistemology that inextricably links it to ontology. However, this strict dependence of a theory of knowledge on a theory of existence becomes so problematic that Unification epistemology collapses into its own ontology and becomes superfluous. This paper is an attempt to reveal the circularity of Unification epistemology as presented by Dr. Lee. Therefore, it begins with an investigation into the epistemological claims implicit within Unification ontology. It is my conclusion that the "solutions" Dr. Lee provides to remedy traditional epistemologies are neither adequate nor convincing.

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INTRODUCTION

According to Dr. Sang Hun Dr. Lee's, Fundamentals of Unification Thought¹, there is an important distinction to be made between the hiddenness of God and the disclosedness of God. Firstly, God is a being as is man and other "creatures". But God is an "original" being whereas all other beings are derivative. This definition marks what Dr. Lee calls the "fundamental postulate" of Unification theology, namely that the fundamental difference between God and man is one of creator being and created being. Thus creation provides the primary ontological difference in the rank of being. Man can know God as creator through the "likeness" of his creation. Ontology, therefore provides the necessary condition for knowing about God, but that knowing is possible only through resemblance, the resemblance of man to god and the resemblance of god to all other beings. Like can only know like, and it is this ontological bond of being that makes this and all other knowledge possible. Hence, it is impossible to explore Unification epistemology without the primacy of a fundamental ontology of representation.

The question of knowing God is for the Unificationists, a question of what God is like. This question of likeness can only be asked out of a position of the questioner's likeness to the object of inquiry. The questioner already finds him/herself in the position of one who always already has a certain knowledge of the kind of inquiring being that s/he is, for the question of God's likeness could not arise were it not for this kinship of being. It is important to cite

Dr. Lee's unhesitating link of this inquiry to the origin of the universe.

The question of what God is like is generally connected with that of the origin of the universe. (p. 15)

This question is in keeping with the fundamental postulate of God as creator, but, nonetheless, this question reveals an ontological and epistemological leap. Inquiry into the being of the questioner and its relation to Being or other beings need not introduce origins, especially the origin of the "universe." For example, Martin Heidegger's inquiry into fundamental ontology provides a striking difference.

With the move to creating and created being, much is already presupposed, and the inquiry is already directed towards a certain conclusion that necessarily includes the traditional renderings of such concepts as time, history, telos, etc. In equating ontology with the origin of the universe, Dr. Lee claims that the search for such an origin "forms the very foundation of a thought system." (p. 16) But this should give us pause if not a stumbling block. Why the immediate connection of ontology with the pursuit of "origins", or, in the case of monistic philosophy, "Origin?" How does Dr. Lee's unquestioned association of ontology and origin already posit a divinely constituted and knowing self, and what parameters does it set for any normative application of knowledge? It is clear that Dr. Lee sees the connections but, never questions his basic and necessary connection. He concludes:

[T]hus a thought system, in most cases, has an ontology that is unique to itself, and upon that basis, it deals with the problems of human beings and society. (p. 16)

Dr. Lee proceeds to extensively cite the inadequacy of traditional ontologies to provide a "fundamental solution" to human and societal problems, even though most traditional

ontologies have been founded upon God as creator. Consequently, the reader should expect from Unification ontology not only a solution, but a fundamental solution to all human and societal problems. Providing such a solution Unification theology must cast its ontology and epistemology against the traditional ontologies and epistemologies, even those that incorporate its own "fundamental postulate" of the creator/creation of being. Its task must be to reveal their deficiencies and distinguish itself as markedly different in its provision of conclusive and convincing answers. Following this strategy, Dr. Lee is concerned to not only develop a Unificationist ontology and epistemology, but also to revisit the tradition to which it is both indebted and from which it departs in some radical way. While it would be beyond the scope of this paper to trace Dr. Lee's various confrontations with the tradition, it is important to follow his analysis of certain features of the tradition as he understands it. However, it will be the conclusion of this writer that Dr. Lee has no radical opposition to traditional ontology and epistemology, but is rather a harbinger of many of its most entrenched tenants and suppositions.

ORIGINAL IMAGE

Sungsang

Unificationism, via Dr. Lee's interpretation, maintains that God has both form and content. Form is divided into the dual characteristics, "Sungsang" and "Hyungsang", which are called "attributes." These two aspects correspond to one another in endless oscillation. While the very concept of attribute is assumed rather than unexplained, the distinction is certainly one that dominates Western substantialist metaphysics since early Greek thinking and still

maintains its grip in contemporary thought. Form, although invisible, has attributes which are knowable. Original Sungsang, original as it is the attribute of the origin and creator, is "Mind." Its likeness is shared by created being down to plant and mineral life. The degrees of manifestation of Sungsang constitute the varying degrees of the importance of beings.²

Original Sungsang is further distinguished into "aspects," like "attribute" again left undefined and unexplored, and again a concept enmeshed in traditional metaphysics. These aspects are further divided into function and form that in turn support the distinctions between inner and outer, subject and object. These distinctions are likewise taken for granted and used unproblematically throughout Dr. Lee's writing as they were in most of Western metaphysics until the nineteenth century. However, students of philosophy no longer regard these distinctions to be neutral and benign. If we learn anything from Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida and other such kindred thinkers, it is impossible to move on from this point without such overwhelming metaphysical baggage that it has already slowed our arranged means of transport to a crawl.

But moving right along with Dr. Lee's version of Unification theology, Inner Sungsang and Inner Hyungsang are the aspects of function and form that belong to Original Sungsang. Inner functions are the "faculties" of intellect, emotion and will. Inner aspects of form contain ideas, concepts, original law, mathematical principles and "so forth". (p. 17) The former faculties are subjective or "subject" parts while the latter are objective or "object" parts both within God's Sungsang. The division of the mind into faculties requires that

further divisions must be made. Each faculty has its own function. Intellect is the faculty the function of which is cognition. Intellect is further broken down into perception, understanding and reason. The faculty of emotion is the faculty of sentiment and feeling. The faculty of will functions according to volition and desire. After this classically elaborate and elusive rendering of Original Sungsang, Dr. Lee makes a rather strange claim that is immediately dismissed. In dividing the functions of the intellect, Dr. Lee does not mean that God engages in logical thinking based on understanding and reason. Rather God's intellectual faculties "exist in oneness" and it is only in human beings that they can be differentiated into three different functions. Certainly the reader is left wondering how this is to be understood and known, given the parameters of the divided human intellect. It is, however, obvious that unity and wholeness are understood to be qualitatively better than division and discontinuity, and consequently God must possess it whenever possible. Whatever is divine is less subject to division than is man and other beings.

As far as the human intellect is concerned, Dr. Lee gives an example of the processes within the human intellect. In discovering the law of gravity, Isaac Newton, first, through the faculty of perception, saw an apple fall from a tree. Secondly, he understood that the apple had fallen because he made a judgment that some force had attracted it. Finally, reason led him to discover that universal gravitation exists. (p. 18) From perceptions the human mind derives an "image" from which is obtained a concept of whatever had been previously perceived. This temporal sequence requires that perception is prior to ideas. But God need not perceive and form images from perception in order to have ideas. In the mind of God,

ideas exist without benefit of perception. But then one is left to ask why perception and judgment would even be attributed to such a being. Certainly Berkeley's God would have little need for perception since all that exists is divinely conceptual. While Dr. Lee rejects empiricism in favor of a "real" world, it would seem that perception and judgment would be superfluous to the Unification God. Dr. Lee states that Ideas refer to "concrete representations" within the mind of God. Thus the kind of thinking in which God engages is representational thinking and such representations are the fundamental prototypes of all created things. But it still remains to ask what could be meant by "concrete" with regard to such representations. What do representations re-present if God possesses ideas without need of perceptions? Says Dr. Lee:

It can be said that Plato grasped the ideas and concepts within the Original Image.(p. 19)

But Dr. Lee has to move one step beyond Plato's Forms to locate Forms in a mind that can concretely represent them to itself. Thus knowing in the Original Sungsang is a matter of representing a representation. In like order, knowing is a matter of representing these representations,

and concepts refer to representations of the common elements abstracted from many concrete things. (p. 19)

But clearly this would not be the case for a God who does not, like humans, need to perceive the world before conceiving it.

Relying on a Husserlian interpretation of "Pure Consciousness" equipped with "concrete" representations, Dr. Lee claims that God's intellect is comprised of thinking and the thought

about, a Hegelian-like dialectic of "Zeit" thinking itself, Subject presenting itself to itself for contemplation in an object relation. God thinks in this way, and human beings are created in the image of God, except for the handicap of the temporal and divisional determinations of thinking.³ It is to this account of representational thinking that I shall return after consideration of a few more of Dr. Lee's theses.

Hyungsang

God as Couturier⁴

Unlike Plato, the fundamental ontology of Unificationist theology incorporates an "aspect" of original being that

corresponds to body, and the material aspects of all created beings. (p. 20 emphasis mine)

Original Hyungsang is the

fundamental cause of the material aspects of human beings, animals, plants and minerals. (p. 20)

It is Original Hyungsang that establishes the mental/ material distinction as having its essential place within God, such that matter is not separate from the being of God, or concomitantly outside the essential nature of human beings. Rather, matter is an aspect within the Original Image. Dr. Lee compares this relation to the Chinese interactive aspects of yin and yang, again interpreted as having subjective and objective properties. The interactive "energy", or "Prime Force", gives impetus to the interrelatedness of all things. When considering the interrelatedness of Original Sungsang and Original Hyungsang, Dr.

Lee is careful to stress that these two features are not heterogeneous. Presumably in this two-valued way of thinking it would follow that they are homogeneous. There cannot be the least possibility of disunity or discord. Accordingly, mind and body are common to another, not heterogeneous, so homogeneous. But certainly here we have the makings of the perennial mind/body problem that haunts the regions of the Western philosophical tradition. Dr. Lee presumes to obviate this difficulty by maintaining that their commonality is a certain interactionism, explained by the "eternal garment" theory. (See Lee, ft. p. 23)

Mind does not exist apart from body, its finite garment, and the mind of God similarly does not exist apart from matter. (Original Hyungsang could be considered haute couture compared with the human derivative garment). In the Original Garment District of the deity, defining the boundaries of inner and outer, Sungsang and Hyungsang are united, "essentially one and the same absolute attribute." (p. 24 emphasis mine) It is only in the created fashion show of the world's creation(s) that they are manifest as distinct. Thus it seems that God can be characterized as Sameness. But this cannot mean a strict identity for the two elements of inner and outer constitute a difference. But the difference in God or in anything else is never a difference that is not subject to control and thought in terms of Identity. It is this ontology of the "Same" that inevitably supports a representational theory of knowledge and language.

YIN AND ITS YANG

Dr. Lee's exposition of Yin and Yang in the Original Image equates Yang with essential positivity and Yin with essential negativity. Both Sungsang and Hyungsang have these attributes. They are called "secondary" attributes,⁵ and are related to each other by the subject/object relationship. In the human mind (Sungsang), the Yang is manifest as active and clear, while the Yin is manifest as passive and opaque. In the human Hyungsang, yang is manifest as protrusive while Yin is sunken. (Presumably this vague analogy refers to the sexual genitalia, since it is clear with which sex the yin and the yang are equated). It is somewhat curious, if not surprising, that the anatomical parts of the female reproductive system are understood as passive, receptive of male reproductive activity. This is the typical patriarchal glorification of the phallus and its disseminations, combined with some Augustinian gynecology. It has recently been named "phallocentrism" along with its extensive ramifications.

In distinguishing itself from the version of Chinese thought that ascribes substantial existence to Yang and Yin, Dr. Lee insists that they are only attributional and secondary. But what should we make of this distinction? According to Dr. Lee:

A man, for instance, is not regarded as an entity of Yang itself, nor is a woman regarded as an entity of Yin itself: man and woman are each entities with Sungsang and Hyungsang, where man assumes Yang characteristics and woman Yin characteristics. In other words, the male is an entity with Yang Sungsang and Yang Hyungsang, whereas the female is an entity with Yin Sungsang and Yin Hyungsang. (p. 28 emphasis mine)

Both men and women possess Yang and Yin elements but the male possesses more Yang, while the woman possesses more Yin. In their bodily make-up the difference is quantitative,

but in their mental constitution the difference is qualitative. How are we to understand this to cash out in terms of cognition and truth? Since the Yang is held to be normative, the Yin is not definitive of any identity. The secondary attribute of Yin makes no difference and yet all the difference. What difference does it make if Yin does not define her entity? In intellect, perception, understanding and judgment, women are impaired and deficient in both degree and quality. What kind of entity is she if these faculties are not essential to her being? Dr. Lee does not say, but we can certainly speculate about the derivative being that woman must be in her entityhood. Back to phallocentrism.

It would be interesting to pursue the boundaries of Yin. If the dominance of the Yin quality renders the female entity deficient in all the faculties of mind and attributes of body, passive and merely receptive on both counts, is the "natural" inferiority such that female mental faculties recognize less resemblance or understand in a manner that does not fit the likeness of the world in the manner in which male faculties fit the likeness of the world?⁶

The "Original Type" of relatedness between Yang and Yin as it is played out in male/female relations is universal and permanent from the perspective of the creator of the natural order; namely, male as subject and female as object. What is it that fixes this particular relation fundamentally and essentially, when it is also recognized that there are arbitrary assignments of subject and object although they are mostly attributed to the natural world of the non-human order? (See Lee, p. 75) What is the importance of fixing the relation between the sexes such that sex roles are fundamental and, when apparently reversible, only

temporarily and unnaturally? Surely this is the old argument for male superiority as naturally given. It is the foundation of the claim that if there is discord and unrest, it is because of the non-acceptance by the female of her place in the natural order. Why wouldn't man accept his place? So it is only woman who will not accept her subordinate place with dutiful acquiescence. Dr. Lee makes this clear when he blames women's drive for equality as the reason for the breakdown of traditional values and the disintegration of the family. The family, as Dr. Lee describes it, is the cornerstone of the natural order of subjection and obedience.

Let us consider the matter of order between husband and wife and equal rights between men and women. Until today, women have been oppressed and discriminated against by men, but in recent years, the women's liberation movement, which advocates equal rights for men and women, has been promoted strongly. On the other hand, in advanced countries such as the United States, where the women's liberation movement is very active, divorce rate is increasing and family breakdown is widespread. Such social ills came about because the excessive emphasis on equal rights between men and women has created a situation in which the positions of subject and object between husband and wife in the family has been lost. If the wife stands in the subject position as the husband does, the relationship between husband and wife will become as that between subject and subject, which necessarily causes the phenomenon of repulsion. For this reason, the questions of order between husband and wife and equality between men and women are important problems to be solved. (p. 240-41 emphasis mine)

Let us in turn consider the matter of order that Dr. Lee states to be both natural and normative between the male and female. Women have been oppressed and discriminated against by men. Equality, the demand of women's liberation, is excessive. Not excessive because it seeks power over men, but, by Dr. Lee's own admission, excessive through seeking equality with men. But women are not, and must not be, equal to men; and when they try to be, namely, when they assume a subject position, the inevitable outcome is strife.

Therefore, women as unequal should accept their role and accept oppression and discrimination. If they do not do so, they are responsible for divorce and family breakdown. We should then conclude from Dr. Lee's "conclusion" that women, as natural objects, should accept the inevitable and natural place of oppression. Non-acceptance causes discord, not oppression, for oppression is natural to the subject/object position. Women are, no doubt, all too familiar with such "conclusions." They are not only expected to intellectually accept them, despite their deficient mental faculties, they are to live them as well.

The relation between subject and object is called "correlative" but this is clearly a misnomer if it is meant to indicate "equality." According to Dr. Lee a give-and-receive relation emanates from Original Sungsang and Original Hyungsang in purposive action centering on Heart. This "give-and-receive law" dictates the relation between subject and object. But, unlike the dialectic, which posits a struggle between opposites, the relation is one of harmony of purpose. This is assuming, of course, that objects remain objects. If there is no common purpose the two elements are opposites and relate in the manner of strife, as in a natural subject/unnatural subject repulsion. Unification theology sees the latter as a power relation, but it is clear that the former is a power relation as well, no matter if it is claimed to be one of corelativity. The subject and object in harmony are not described in terms of equality, but in terms of privilege. Likewise, the relation is inevitably one of dominion as indicated in the passage quoted above. Presumably we are to take this as the age old "corelativity" between active and passive, reason and emotion, pure and impure, light and dark, good and evil, etc. Presumably, also, it is "Heart" that allows the perspective of

"corelativity" rather than that of struggle. Perhaps women are deficient here, too. Would it follow that women who do not accept their place willingly, lack "Heart"?

In some of Dr. Lee's discussion he implies that one must take on or "assume" the position of a subject, which demands that one grow to that position through ethical action and by acquiring "Heart". But clearly it is unnatural and harmful for women to take on the position of a subject. Yet Dr. Lee also claims that all human beings possess the potential to occupy either the position of subject or object. Human beings start out in an object relationship to their parents and gradually assume their place or rise to a higher position. But how is this higher position attained? Here, generously, I will say that there is a bit of ambiguity in Dr. Lee's account of subject ascension. Clearly, the language of Unification theology asserts that man (masculine) occupies the subject position "naturally" as a result of his dominant Yang nature, and all the other elements that ascribe the position to him, especially his intellect and sexual organs. And it is generally the case that Dr. Lee states that women are naturally in the object position of subjugation and subservience due again to the lack of intellect and sexual organs. This propriety is generally strict and binding. But what if a woman is more ethical and has more "Heart" than her male counterpart, whether it be in the family, government, business? Why can she not assume the subject position as a rightful and proper place. I go back to the earlier quote in which I emphasize the word "assume" as it were a volitional possibility. This would certainly be a more palatable and less phallocratic rendering of corelativity. However, I would guess that the numerous references to woman make her proper place inevitable objective in nature such that values, like all other things,

share yin and yang characteristics. Consequently, some values are more natural and proper for women and others, more natural and proper for men. The object must submit to "object consciousness" as the mental attitude towards the subject. Woman's attempting to assume a subject consciousness will seemingly result in being a "false subject" akin to a Hitler or a Stalin. (P 128) She will also have false values and false intelligence, understanding, and perception. I fail to see how Dr. Lee's version of "secondary" attributes is meaningfully different from the Chinese version of duality. This has other interesting consequences for his axiology and its epistemological foundations, but I will not pursue them further in this paper.

POST-FALL EPISTEMOLOGY

Since Sungsang and Hyungsang are related by a pre-established harmony, there must be a pre-ordained or "natural" placement of the subject and object. But because human nature is fallen, this natural positioning is undone and the harmony is in disarray. Proper places are no longer in proper position. Understanding of places and their propriety is confused. In Unification mythology, this disarrangement takes place through the hubris of woman. Restoration involves a proper knowing, a knowing of one's true place and one's true purpose in the Original Purpose. Correct knowledge is inextricably bound to this fundamental ontological problem.

In Chapter Nine, "Epistemology," Dr. Lee defines epistemology as:

the theory of how the knowledge of an object can be gained and how correct knowledge can be obtained. In other words, epistemology is the theory that seeks to bring to light the origin, method, development, etc. of cognition." (p. 339 emphasis mine).

Dr. Lee ties epistemology to the fundamental ontological conflict between idealism and materialism. (p. 339) But in order to find a "new" epistemology, the problems of traditional epistemologies must be "solved." With closure in mind, Dr. Lee presents, however ineffectively, his final solution. Relying on the background of Unification ontology, inextricably linked to any future epistemology, Dr. Lee's "solution" must be analyzed against the backdrop of traditional, predominantly Western, metaphysics.

Dr. Lee assumes a very traditionalist definition of epistemology, namely, that it is the knowledge of an "object". Already hidden in such an agenda is the entire Western baggage of the subject/object distinction which is ontological at root, and the pivotal point of Unification theory as well as Western onto-theology. Assuming this distinction is certainly not one of the problems of traditional epistemology in Dr. Lee's eyes, but surely at the end of the reign of traditional philosophy, why should one assume it to remain unquestioned? Should we not also ask what ramifications, both theoretical and practical, it engenders? Some of the ramifications have been discussed above, but there are many more.

In his discussion of traditional epistemologies, Dr. Lee makes a rather shocking statement for most philosophers. He claims that the philosopher who first developed epistemology systematically was John Locke. This would certainly be revelatory to Plato and Aristotle. However, to quarrel with this would be pointless for the purposes of expediting Dr. Lee's agenda. This agenda is what I take to be the reductionary task of pitting epistemology into two opposing and simplified schools of thought, Empiricism and Rationalism. (Perhaps we

are to think of them as correlative). The problem with each is given in Cliff Note fashion:

empiricism finally fell into skepticism, and rationalism lapsed into dogmatism.
(p. 340)

After brief comments on Empiricism via Bacon, Locke, Berkeley and Hume and Rationalism via Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Wolff, Dr. Lee dismisses these traditions by returning to his original epistemological agenda, namely, the question of what the object of cognition is considered to be. (p. 348)

The question to be addressed concerning the object is whether:

the object of cognition exists objectively and independently of the subject [or
if it] exists only as ideas within the consciousness of the subject. (p. 348)

After a comparatively lengthy discussion of Kant's attempted synthesis of Realism and Idealism, and a dismissal of Marx's dialectical materialism which Dr. Lee equates with what he calls a "Copy Theory," Dr. Lee begins to "outline" Unification epistemology.⁷ He offers it as an "alternative" to traditional epistemologies, but casts it in terms of the proceedings of traditional epistemology. Surely, it would not be an option to do otherwise.

Dr. Lee's primary point, that leads to the rejection of traditional epistemology as inadequate, is that the relation between subject and object has not been "clarified". (p. 359)

Secondarily, the "object of cognition (all things) was not clarified".(p. 359) Since former epistemologists

did not know the relationship between the human being and all things, emphasis was either placed on the subject of cognition as in rationalism...or in the object of cognition, as in empiricism. (p. 359 emphasis mine)

Clearly, Dr. Lee, in applying such analysis, does already know the relation, a position presumed throughout Unification ontology, and not taken to be a result of inquiry into knowing. But, to already know is to make epistemology ancillary if not needless. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, Dr. Lee proceeds towards a Unification epistemology. Thus the project from this point and even before is not inquiry, but rather clarity of the relation between subject and knowledge. Certainly, the skeptical reader may suspect a certain dogmatism is already at work, although such is a criticism reserved for rationalism, according to Dr. Lee, and presumably such a reader would be an empiricist. (Would that such categories could be decided so easily.) But Dr. Lee understands Unification ontology to provide the necessary and sufficient condition for a successful epistemology. He writes:

Only when the significance of God's creation of human beings and all things has been clarified, can the necessary relation between human beings and all things become clear. (p. 359)

But what does Dr. Lee mean by clarity and how does this relation become clear? We might guess that one need not be burdened by epistemological inquiry to determine the answer. One need only refer back to Unification ontology to provide the answer already given. Consequently, Dr. Lee's move is to repeat the ontological relation of subject and object. And while he states that experience and reason are both necessary in Unification theory, such a claim becomes questionable at this juncture.

The subject/object relation is the vehicle by which "we can know all things perfectly." (p. 360 emphasis mine.) Thus the agenda is further clarity of those positions.⁸ Dr. Lee hopes to achieve this clarity through a further explanation of the principle of give-and-receive activity,

which predictably shows itself to be the paradigm for the Unification epistemological method, and is appropriately called "give-and-receive epistemology." Through an understanding of this "method," the unification of Realism and Idealism are realized and can now be seen as really correlative and not antagonistic. Thus, Unification epistemology seeks to unify the traditional theories and to clear up their inadequacies, rather than provide any radical deviation. But, certainly this unity has been sought in the past and similar "solutions" invoked. The example are many from Aristotle, Aquinas, Plotinis, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Kant, Hegel, etc. Whether it be the Unification god or the god of the gaps, what makes Unification solution any more satisfying? Obviously, this is already answered in the conclusion which one has already reached in accepting Unification ontology. This acceptance provides knowledge before ever engaging in epistemological inquiry. Of course, many may wonder at such a satisfying solution. Nonetheless, all pursuits lead back through circularity to ontology. The give-and-receive "law" always already operates between ontology and epistemology.

RESEMBLANCE AND REPRESENTATION

According to Unification philosophy, the natural world is created in a "symbolic resemblance" to man. (p. 360) Seemingly both mind and body, human subject and object, serve as models. But the human body is in turn created in resemblance to the mind. (p. 361) This resemblance, as noted earlier, rests on a more basic and primary resemblance, man to god, and inward to the very constitutive components of the Divine Image. Thus the means of unity, namely real resemblance, makes possible an interaction between mind and body,

and vice versa. In such a domain of uninterrupted resemblances, there are no "real" gaps and difference is always held in place by likeness.

Resemblance provides the connecting tissue by which cognition forms images internally of the external world. Image and object are "collated". (p. 361) This cryptic "explanation" of collation falls into doubt. If the way we know is through "images" that conform to the external world, namely, through resemblance, then we have no internal image of collation. The prerequisite of resemblance supposedly provides the adhesive, but it still cannot take care of the lack of a cognitive image of collation itself.

Dr. Lee's further remarks only heighten the failure of this epistemology. In order for the subject to be a knower, (and what is known is always the object), the subject must have "prototypes." But Dr. Lee spends little time on explanation. The first definition of "prototype" in the OED reads:

The first or primary type of anything, the original (thing or person) of which another is a copy, imitation, representation, or derivative, or to which it conforms or is required to conform; a pattern, model, standard, exemplar, archetype.

Presumably this means that the subject must always already possess these universals to which all particulars conform, and to which they are mentally typed. It alone is the standard of judgment. These original images resemble images in the cognition of the Sungsang of the Original Image, or divine "Protoconsciousness." The "protoimage" of the object is "reflected" in the protoconsciousness, which serves as a "mirror". (p. 364)

Dr. Lee asserts that the second element of a prototype is the "image of relation" or "the form of thought". (p. 364) This claim remains extremely vague, even though Dr. Lee goes on to state that it is the image of the "form of the object" which is "reflected in the protoconsciousness, forming the form of thought." (p 364) But what is this "image of relation"? Clearly Dr. Lee has stated time and time again that concepts are images of objects in the subject/object relation, and since relation or resemblance is not an object, but the supposed means of the interconnectedness between subject and object, how are we to understand a mental image of relation and how would an object conform to it? Dr. Lee continues:

The fact that a protoimage is produced in the protoconsciousness can be compared to the fact that a material object is reflected in a mirror, or that a material object is caught on film through exposure (p. 367)

Presumably this statement refers to the content or the attributes of the object, while the "image of relation" refers to the form of the object, since the object of cognition must possess both form and content. But why does Dr. Lee call this the "image of relation" when seemingly in a form/content distinction, the form is the means of recognition of a certain type of object such that objects are distinguishable one from another. Since these forms already exist within the mind of the knower, this cannot be an image of relation, because by Dr. Lee's own account, there can be no image of anything that is not an object. Relation is not an object, but the very fixative presupposed in ontological resemblance, the mainstay of all representational theories of knowledge. What cannot be represented in Dr. Lee's version of the "Copy Theory" of knowledge is the representation of representation. So, like its characterization of Marxist epistemology, Unification epistemology is itself copy theory,

a theory of representation anchored in resemblance, that in no way radically departs from the tradition of Western epistemology. Similarly, it fails to be healing, unifying or convincing.

Dr. Lee continues his discussion on protoimages by stating that the images of relation in the protoconsciousness are

passed from the peripheral nerves to the lower centers as bits of information and gather together at the upper center (cortex center). In this process, the images of relation are synthesized and arranged to shape the form of thought. That is, the form of thought is created as a mental form corresponding to the form of existence in the external world and determines our thinking. The forms of thought are the same as categories, which refer to the most fundamental, general, basic concepts. (p. 368)

Throughout his discussion of Unification epistemology there is much reliance on Kant's venture of synthesizing Idealism and Empiricism. Unification epistemology sets for itself a similar project. But while Kant claims to leave God out of the picture,⁹ Dr. Lee seeks a similar but more inclusive theory that inextricably relates God to a real world of objects. The result is, in my estimation, a collage of epistemological fragments that overlooks the very real problems and conflicts of traditional epistemology.

PRACTICAL KNOWING AND POWER

In taking this analysis further, especially with regard to the practical effects of epistemology, which is also very much the concern of Dr. Lee, I will draw on Michel Foucault's discussion of traditional epistemology, which of all the many contemporary analyses seems the most useful for this purpose. Foucault does not forward an alternative theory of truth or a new explanatory structure of knowledge as many of his readers have often concluded. Instead his

works copiously survey the social, economic, political and epistemological conditions that lead to the emergence, transformation and demise of historical configurations of knowledge. Foucault's strategy is to describe the play of specific differences that take place in structures of power and knowledge, without positing a subjective or objective adhesive which imbues them with a transcendental unity or fixed points of reference. Foucault's task requires a different discourse, one that he sees to have strived for earlier articulation in Nietzsche and Heidegger.

In the Order of Things, Foucault analyzes the history of the human sciences (a comparatively new phenomenon according to him) through the concrete possibilities by which they arose and laid claim to "truth". The human sciences constitute a new configuration of knowledge and power, compared to the natural sciences which constitute an older configuration of knowledge and power. All ideas are brought to and from prominence through discursive practices. Even the very ideas of reason, truth, identity and unity have personal histories. Discourse is not, for Foucault, a sign system whereby a sign is representative of a non-discursive state of affairs. The privileged discourse is no longer one of resemblance and representation. Indeed, it is no longer epistemological. Along with the demise of such discourse, a representational theory of language has also reached its closure.¹⁰ Instead, for Foucault, discourse is a series of discontinuous segments whose tactical function is neither uniform nor stable. To be more precise, we must not imagine a "world" of discourse strictly divided between accepted and excluded discourse, or between dominant discourse and the dominated ones, but "world" as a multiplicity of discursive

events.¹¹ It is this distinction that he seeks to reconstruct.¹²

For Foucault, all exercises of power employ discourses of "truth."

We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth.¹³

Truth is the ensemble of rules, regimes and propositions. Power is instituted according to the separation of the true and the false. Regimes of truth both sanction and suppress discourses. As an "archeologist" of knowledge Foucault is concerned to unearth and chart the old regimes and their power effects of "true" discourses.

In The Order of Things Foucault chronologizes the Classical Age of Western thought (17th and 18th c.) to conform to a rather distinguishable period, due to its adherence to the theory of representation. Language, presumed to be the vehicle for order, is taken to be a form of re-presentation and repetition. The relationship between words and world is one of resemblance. Things in the world have an implicit order made explicit by the deployment of signs, and non-discursive "things" or objects in that world are correctly reflected in a conceptual and linguistic system.¹⁴ The link between knowledge and language is

the power of the word and the concept to leap from its position as sign to the being of the thing signified.¹⁵

Seeing and naming unite words and things in a reflective manner that permits certainty. Underlying the thrust to get it all right by re-presentation is the quest for certainty and, according to Foucault, the method of its disclosure is the "table".

The Classical period is governed theocratically. All that is thought and said is reflective of the natural order and, in turn, God stands invisibly behind the natural order as the essential logos. God is the primordial and necessary truth towards whom all things ultimately point. Thus all representation is wedded to an ontology of the Divine.

Foucault depicts the Classical Age through his analysis of the Velazquez painting, "Las Meninas." For Foucault, this painting represents the very activity of representing. Velazquez's canvas substitutes for the table. In the scene, the painter's work is momentarily halted by his glance at the subjects who occupy a position outside the canvas' visible frame of reference, in the space shared by the spectator who gazes at the almost complete work. One must imagine that the painter will proceed to look away from his subjects in order to return to his portrait of the royal family. For the painter or representor to maintain both visibilities is simultaneously impossible.

The painter is observing a place which, from moment to moment, never ceases to change its content, its form, its face, its identity.¹⁶

While the subjects of the portrait are the sovereign, King Philip IV and his wife, Mariana, their visages are not given a place within the overall canvas, but are reflectively captured in a mirror on a back wall. The spectator is similarly absent from the setting although the surrogate spectator stands in, seemingly unnoticed in a doorway next to the mirror. The subjectivities that organize the scene are rendered necessarily elusive. The spectator/king is presumably to be objectified on the canvas, but his presence is merely reflected. The other spectator/subject is the one who is never captured within the painted scene, but for whom the scene is objectified by the gaze. The organizing feature and subject of Velazquez's

painting is the act of representation itself. Foucault states:

Perhaps, there exists, in this painting by Velazquez, the representation as it were, of Classical representation, and the definition of the space it opens up to me. And, indeed, representation undertakes to represent itself here in all its elements, with its images, in the eyes to which it is offered, the faces it makes visible, the gestures that call it into being. But there, in the midst of this dispersion which it is simultaneously grouping together and spreading out before us, indicated compellingly from every side, is an essential void: the necessary disappearance of that which is its foundation of the person it resembles and the person in whose eyes it is only a resemblance.¹⁷

"Las Meninas" represents its own futility, the impossibility to represent all there is to be known. The inability to represent the subjective act of representing results in a "profound upheaval" in the epistemological drive for certainty. Foucault marks this crisis around the close of the eighteenth century. Once severed from resemblances, knowing and speaking lose their connection with the visible. As with Alice, one is no longer reflected in the mirror but is through the looking glass. Language turns back upon itself to become its own object of analysis. Before language had simply been considered an operation.

From an extreme point of view, one might say that language in the Classical era does not exist: it functions. Its whole existence is located in its representative role, is limited to the role and finally exhausts it.¹⁸

In the Classical Age, knowledge wedded to resemblance had positioned "Man" as the atemporal and privileged place granted by the co-determinations of representation and the metaphysics of the infinite. With their co-termination, knowledge takes on an new arrangement in modernity. Man's concrete, finite and limited existence is announced through Nietzsche's death of God.¹⁹ The eventual result of Modernity is that discourse previously ruled by representation is overcome. "Knowledge takes up residence in a new space."²⁰ With the death of God, man finds himself with a hidden past, groping for unapproachable

origins. Knowledge and language are severed from transparency.

ORIGINS AND GENEALOGY

Since the origins of man's past history are irretrievable for Foucault, they did not take place, they are not events.

...man is cut off from the origin that would make him contemporaneous with his own existence: amid all the things that are born in time and no doubt die in time, he, cut off from all origin, is already there.²¹

Modernity thrusts the meaning of origin into an apocalyptic future. The myth of origin is remythologized into the myth of escatology. At the very moment it discards past origins, Modernity established a "new origin" whose revelation is incessantly deferred into the future. While modern man recognizes the futility of retrieval, he, nonetheless, promises them to himself at the end of history.

Foucault's analysis of the history and dissent of knowledge and power is called, in his later works, "genealogy".

Genealogy is gray, meticulous and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times... Genealogy, consequently requires patience and a knowledge of details and it depends on a vast accumulation of source material... Genealogy does not oppose itself to history as the lofty and profound gaze of the philosopher might compare to the male-like perspective of the scholar, on the contrary it rejects the meta-historical development of ideal significations of indefinite teleologies. It opposes itself to the search for 'origins'.²²

Genealogy rejects linear views of history and the history of ideas. It follows the discontinuity resultant from the breakdown of epistemic certainty based on resemblance and

representation and calls into question the traditional values of conformity, causality and teleology.

It has all too often been the case that the rejection of truth claims that rely upon an absolutist epistemology, have been said to be necessarily some form of "relativism". Such a charge is misconceived and irrelevant, for it is to leave absolutism in place. I do not want to spend time "saving" Foucault from such charges. Foucault needs no such salvation. Such charges are enmeshed in a discourse that participates in maintaining an epistemology that regards itself impervious to genealogy. It is part of the discourse of representational knowledge which has come to exhaust itself. Foucault refuses the appeal to truth claims. Genealogy understands itself as post-epistemological. For Foucault all such appeals to truth will be erased "like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea."²³ However, I do think it important to briefly begin an investigation of how Foucault's genealogy may affect traditional values and what practical impact such a timely confrontation may have.

APPLIED GENEALOGY

According to Foucault, fascism expresses itself through the formation of Western ethics and the centrality of the power of subjective privilege. Nietzsche finds the ethical structures of the West to show their force and power in appeals to Truth, Knowledge and Goodness. To radically question these edifying edifices engages one in a transvaluation of values and self-overcoming. Foucault's indebtedness to Nietzsche is clear in this analysis. His commitment to self-overcoming renders the privilege of the subject/object relation ineffectual. Thus

Nietzsche and Foucault, along with many other contemporary thinkers, would emphatically depart from the linchpins of Western ontology and epistemology. Accordingly, they would refuse the ontology and epistemology of Unification theory, at least as Dr. Lee portrays them. But even further, they would consider the practical effects of traditional Western thought in a different light than Dr. Lee has in his axiology and ethics.

According to them values are a matter of how human beings constitute themselves as selves. But with the lateral move away from the subject/self that stabilizes traditional thinking, Foucault cannot be said to be about the task of authenticating, developing or defining a new subjectivity. According to Charles Scott:

Rather than arguing for a position regarding what people ought to do, who they ought to be, or how the world should be changed, he engages in a process of 'constantly checking' the regulations, procedures, and constellations of power that make up our inheritances for identity and commitment. The Western phenomenon of the ethical self is always in question in his work.²⁴

Foucault is most concerned to locate the divisions from which normative ethical prescriptions find their foundations. These foundations are usually anchored in ontology and epistemology, as is the case with Dr. Lee as well. For Foucault these are the traditional practices of dividing opposites into categories of well and sick, sane and insane, normal and abnormal, but these divisions have more rudimentary divisions such as subject and object, male and female, light and dark, right and left, with their hierarchial arrangements of propriety, privilege and discrimination. The history of Western values is merely a replacement of one kind of subjectivism with another. It is this process of subjectification that Foucault submits to genealogy, a process from which he hopes to keep a very well-

regulated distance. Thus Foucault is engaged in locating the power mechanisms by which human beings are made subjects.²⁵

Foucault puts into question the particular processes by which power determines the very ideas of the subject and the self. The regulatory machinery of the subject and the objectification of its object can no longer be taken as an ontological and epistemological givens, and the ramifications of such divisions are not normatively benign. Totalizing systems of value unmask themselves to be absolute determinations of power. Such power is always dangerous. The extremity of this power, the danger of fascism, is the first to pronounce its own hierarchizing demands of ethical imperatives. Such totalizing movements appear to Foucault to share the conditions that make fascism possible, although the latter may be the very danger that they seek to overcome. Passion for truth and goodness is not the sole property of those who seek answers to moral questions through peaceful and non-violent means. Says Foucault:

The search for a form of morality acceptable to everyone, in the sense that everyone would have to submit to it, seems catastrophic to me.²⁶

For Foucault, knowing is no longer simply a matter of Absolutism vs. Relativism, Idealism vs. Empiricism, or the synthesizing or reparation of such theories. These tensions presuppose a schematic of metaphysics and epistemology that has closed with the Modern Era. Incessant drives for unity, completion and wholeness are simply nostalgia for a controllable world by a controlling knower. But the dangerous holdovers from that world view too easily resonate with real and practical dangers.

But it is also clear that Foucault's genealogy will not lead to any essentialist metaphysics or foundationalist axiology. Genealogy returns to the tradition of ontology and knowledge to pay ancestral homage and to uncover the discrepancies in the family tree. Focused on disruptions within the chains of being and knowing, genealogy reveals lesions in epistemic orders and methodologies that have been sutured and then forgotten or ignored. As earlier stated, the disruption that is of primary concern to Foucault is located in the fissures of self-identity and self-constitution as knowing subject. Foucault readily admits that such a task requires a new disclosure, one that is now on the horizon. New configurations of knowing and doing are taking up residence in a new space that has no measurable parameters.

Foucault's genealogy is necessarily enmeshed in discontinuity, but that does not mean that events are unintelligible. Intelligibility need not be derived from continuity or progress. For Foucault it is discourse that provides the keys to intelligibility. Language, although incapable of being objectively known by a subjective knower, is "known" in a more immediate manner. It is practiced through inheritance and repetition. But repetition is no longer understood to be re-presentation.²⁷

Genealogical discourse abandons all claims to "progress". Claims to progress presume a "horizontal" approach to history while genealogy proposes a "vertical" analysis. It is a procedure that studies descents and dissents. Discourse that submits to, and even embraces, discontinuity is the discourse of what Foucault calls "counter-memory". It allows for a discourse that defines for itself a new space, a space that has been non-existent in the

dynamics of Western philosophy. Foucault refuses to make truth claims, for he sees his work as unmasking the rudimentary judgments of truth and their intimacy with power. However genealogical knowledge must always place itself in the position of self-overcoming, critique, parody and irony. It cannot by its own admission offer an alternative.

While we may want to provide something better, Foucault's genealogical analyses demand that we put into question the self that we take ourselves to be. This anxiety and frustration is part of the genealogical discourse in its Nietzschean exhilaration of exploring uncharted and dangerous seas. If we are looking for comfort in Foucault we will no doubt be disappointed. Foucault repeatedly cautions us about the very hope of comfort and the mechanisms of power that operate to assure us such hope. The newly opened space of genealogy "lies almost entirely in the future."²⁸

Clearly Foucault's analysis of the Western philosophical tradition does not attempt any consideration of Eastern thought. But in the sense that much Eastern metaphysics shares common concepts with its Western counterpart, one might consider a similar analysis that would include a genealogy of an extended family. It is obvious that Unification theology, with its dependence upon numerous onto-theological orders, both Western and Eastern, would fall under the purview of Foucault's genealogy. It is also clear that the hierarchy of the subject/object relation would be the first to be considered in any genealogical investigation. The relation of power and knowledge in Unification thought would also be brought into question. Indeed, Foucault sees this complicity to be present in all

epistemological claims.

In closing, it is important to reiterate that Foucault is not doing epistemology and our consideration of his thinking should take seriously this refusal. This calculated avoidance should be considered important and we should carefully avoid making him another contender in the long line of theorists of knowledge. His method is not one of argument, and this makes it difficult to listen to and speak with Foucault on his own terms. So there is not a matter of disagreement here, nor a matter of who wins out as right or wrong. There is no victor and no triumph, and those should not be the stakes of this encounter. The importance is the consideration of many voices and many perspectives in concerned conversation.

ENDNOTES

1. Sang Hun Lee, Fundamentals of Unification Thought, (Tokyo: Unification Thought Institute, 1991). Hereafter indicated by page number after quotation.
2. It is important to note that in this discussion Dr. Lee makes no distinction between beings and things, but only makes a distinction regarding the levels of mindedness. There seems to be no dichotomy between beings and things.
3. It appears that women would be doubly handicapped here.
4. The French "couturier" means ladies's tailor such as in a dress rehearsal or fashion show. "Couture", the feminine noun, means "sewing, seam or needlework". The verb "couturer," from which these nouns originate, is "to scar or to seam". In medical language it means to suture. "Coutumier" is an adjective meaning "ordinary, habitual or customary." All of these words derive meaning from the Fr. "coup," meaning "cut or blow" that forms the basis of many French idioms. God is the one who creates human existence, but must also divide the sexes according to a seam, a line or a scaring. They are sutured together into harmony but the cut or wound remains.
5. It is certainly unclear what an attribute is, much less a "secondary" one.

6. Perhaps the fault or the cut is in the unlikeness between the Original Sungsang and that of woman's. What inquiries would we follow to pursue this question?
7. Marx's "Copy Theory" presumes the independence of the external world to the human mind, and ideas in the mind are mere copies of the real world.
8. While this calls for a review of certain aspects of the Unification narrative, I will not develop those aspects within this paper.
9. In my estimation, Kant always has God at work as "telos."
10. Although Lee has little to say about language, he would have to have a representational theory of language to make his ontology and epistemology consistent.
11. It would be helpful here to review Heidegger's "worlding of the world" in Being and Time, but such a discussion is outside the scope of this paper.
12. Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, (New York, Vintage Books, 1980) p. 100.
13. Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, (New York, Pantheon Books, 1980) p. 93.
14. The theory of language would be such that language re-presents the conceptual world that is itself a re-presentation of the real world. We should perhaps remember Plato's warning concerning the artists who are thrice removed from the truth. (Republic Bk X)
15. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1973) p. 46.
16. Ibid, p. 5.
17. Ibid., p. 16.
18. Ibid., p. 79.
19. For Foucault, it is Nietzsche who first ventures into a philosophical consideration of language and its connection to truth and error.
20. Foucault, Op. Cit., The Order of Things, p. 217.
21. Foucault, Op. Cit., The Order of Things, p. 332.
22. Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory and Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977) pp. 139-140.
23. Foucault, Op. Cit. The Order of Things, p. 387.

24. Charles E. Scott, The Question of Ethics: Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990) p. 54.
25. Michel Foucault "The Subject and Power" in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics eds. Herbert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983) p. 231.
26. Michel Foucault, " Le retour de la morale" in Les Nouvelles, June 28, 1984, p. 37.
27. Much importance has been placed on the theory of repetition since Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle.
28. Foucault, Op. Cit., Power/Knowledge, p. 33.

