

## **DISCUSSANT RESPONSE**

by

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to Waldemar Molinski's

REMARKS TO THE BASIC POSTULATES OF UNIFICATION THOUGHT

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## ICUS XIX ABSOLUTE VALUES AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

## COMMITTEE III Theoria and Praxis in Unification Thought

response to
DR. WALDEMAR MOLINSKI
by
Dr. Frank Kaufmann

Dr. Molinski adequately intuits the essential thrust of the Unification Thought (UT) position on logic, but chooses to engage the system on the level of comparative theological presuppositions rather than at the level of philosophical content. Although important in the larger context of challenges to which UT must ultimately respond<sup>1</sup>, I feel the chosen point of contact is unfortunate for our process. By positioning his critique at the level of presuppositions Dr. Molinski preempts an occasion for assessing the philosophical merits of the UT contribution to logic. The concern is registered prior to content inviting at best a theological version of the child's argument: "Yes it is." "No it isn't."

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- This caricature is not to diminish the significance of Dr. Molinski's observations. Dr. Molinski 10 does incisively identify a challenge which UT scholars must account for in rigorous philosophical terms. Said otherwise; in the child's argument one is, in fact, right. Either it is, or it isn't. In this particular case UT is brought before the tribunal of Catholic Scholastic dogma and subject to Latin pronouncements which state definitively, and once and for all: "God's reasoning is 15 perfect. Human reasoning is imperfect. They are more dissimilar than similar. This is the way it has been, is, and will be forever more amen." The Unificationist response? "No it isn't." And there you have it. UT with "astonishing optimism" (Molinski p. 10) says, "It is within the power of the omnipotent creator to perfectly reproduce in a creature the structures and content which allow God the privilege and capacity for perfect reason." The Catholic response? "No it isn't." And there you have it. The cute response is: "If your reason is so defective ("only able to arrive 20 at conclusions in a "not proper manner" (p. 10), and "more dissimilar to divine reason [correct reason] than similar" p. 11), how is it that you are able to establish with such certainty what God can and cannot do?"
- The history of intellectual encounter which ultimately resorts to appeals to authority<sup>2</sup> have proved fruitless, if not counter-productive. I suspect that people believe as they do for all kinds of reasons, both biographical and world historical, and for this reason there should be no great urgency to alter the present relationship between *Fundamentals of Unification Thought*, chapter 10, and Dr. Molinski's reaction to that text, which may be described as, "Catholics of a certain

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>On p. 12 Dr. Molinski encourages Unificationists to correctly apply and establish philosophical justification for *wy fidei*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>In addition to an implicit appeal to authority, Dr, Molinski offers moral and practical arguments for his theological position in paragraph 2, page 15.

stripe believe that God cannot fully impart His own capacity for perfect reason, and Unificationists of a certain stripe believe God can."

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The second dimension of Dr. Molinski's critique also occurs prior to content. This appears in the final 3 pages of text beginning with paragraph 2, page 17. Dr. Molinski argues that the UT emphasis on problem solving as the *raison d'etre* for philosophy<sup>3</sup> threatens its capacity to simply appreciate "thinking, theory, and contemplation," for its own sake<sup>4</sup>. On pages 20 - 21 Dr. Molinski writes:

[It is] a value as such to understand that the world with all its imperfections and unsolved and unsolvable problems is a good creation of God, and that He Himself will lead the creation to an eschatological perfection which transcends our possibilities and understanding.

Again, we have here an encounter of differing (on the face of it!) religious convictions. As no amount of words or argumentation has ever disabused two parties of differing religious convictions, I feel disinclined to persist in the tired habit. I submit that 1. a sufficient starting point for harmony and cooperation with people of differing religious convictions is available in every religion, and 2. something other than argumentation is required for the ultimate dissolution of significant theological and religious differences.

In addition to Dr. Molinski's legitimate inquiry into theological presuppositions; "What makes you think you can accurately identify the structure of the original image?" and "What makes you think you can accurately identify the purpose of creation?" I think it would be valuable at some point in the process to approach UT as philosophy and critique its program on philosophical rather than theological or religious grounds. Questions such as: Does logic need or benefit from the claim that correct thinking can only be determined in the context of an explicit account for why we think, and the end toward which we think? Does UT provide a persuasive response to its own demands? Is logic enhanced by the proposal that it be derived from and "original image?" Are there better concepts of original image and subsequent implications for logic than the explicit system proposed by UT? And others.

What Dr. Molinski intuits recommends that UT deal with the larger question of the boundary between theology and philosophy. Can UT in its present state "pass as" philosophy, or is it of its own nature bound to give rise to theological reactions the likes of which we have with Dr. Molinski's present paper? I think UT can pass as philosophy, but to do so requires continuing investment by those committed to its value. Investment such as the encounter in which we are presently engaged.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>The problem solving stuff actually appears in the general introduction to *Fundamentals* rather than in the chapter on logic. In chapter 10 it is explained that we think because God thinks and we are created in His image. And that the purpose for thinking is to actualize the purpose of creation which has love as its motivation. (*Fundamentals*, p. 416)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Dr. Molinski acknowledges that this is not a particularly sever problem with UT, as UT is grounded in the telos of joy.