

**Committee III**  
*Theoria and Praxis* in Unification Thought

DRAFT--7/15/92  
For Conference Distribution Only



**ETHICS IN UNIFICATION THOUGHT:  
FAMILY VALUES**

by

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The Nineteenth International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences  
Seoul, Korea August 19-26, 1992

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Ethics in Unification Thought

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Abstract

This paper analyzes and critiques the discussion of family values in Fundamentals of Unification Thought. By focusing on Unification Thought's claim that the heterosexual, monogamous family has a certain ontological necessity, the author attempts to demonstrate that Unificationist concern with family values has a distinctive rationale. This point is made by contrasting Unification Thought with the "constructivist" tendency of much contemporary ethics on the following issues: norms for family life; relations between family, society, and state; and whether there is a universally valid form of family order. The author concludes that Unificationism can find philosophical and political allies in its concern for family values, but recommends Unificationists be careful to preserve their distinctive reasons for such concern. In particular, the author suggests that the instrumental approach to family values characteristic of some contemporary North American discourse is not fully compatible with the Unification perspective.



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Introduction

According to Unification Thought (UT), one who speaks about family values is concerned with the heart of ethics. This is so, not only because families provide a primary context for character development or constitute a kind of "moral training ground" for children. The family is central to UT ethics for ontological and theological reasons. With respect to ontology: The relationships of give and receive love that obtain between husband and wife, parents and children are a microcosm of the Original Image. As many have said, UT proceeds through discussion of the relationships that adhere between, and within, particular aspects of reality. The ideal of unification points to the way particulars "fit" together when they are rightly related.

Just as an individual being in the universe exists as an individual truth body when the subject element and the object element inside it perform harmonious give-and-receive action, so a human being is supposed to perfect his/her personality when the spirit mind and the physical mind engage in harmonious give-and-receive action, centering on God's Heart (love)... (238)

Just as the human being is a substantial being that integrates the universe, or a microcosm miniaturizing the universe, so the family is a microcosmic system miniaturizing the system of the universe. The law that interpenetrates the entire universe is called the "Way of Heaven," or "reason-law." The norm for family life, or ethics, is a direct manifestation of the governing action of the Way of Heaven within the scope of the family. Ethics, so to speak, is the Way of Heaven manifested in the family in miniature form. (237)

The family, we might say, is Reality "writ small." As such, it is not only a functional, but an ontological necessity.

It follows that the family is theologically significant. Indeed, it might be argued that individual human beings do not fulfill God's purpose without participation in families. Thus we are told that

God created man and woman as His objects of love, and God's love is manifested more completely through a family rather than through an individual. Therefore, God's ideal of creation is to actualize God's love through the family. (234)

And finally,

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realize God's love through the family and to complete the family four-position base. Accordingly, the aim of the Unification theory of ethics is to accomplish the perfection of the family four-position base...The persons in each of the four positions of the family four-position base fulfill the "purpose for the whole" and the "purpose for the individual" through relating to three objects, that is, through fulfilling the triple-object purpose.

(235)

This said, one understands why a concern with the form, order, and flourishing of families takes up so much space in the discussion of ethics in UT. To reiterate, UT is not simply making a point about the functional value of the family in the formation of character. Nor does its argument proceed from the practical perception that human beings must find some way to regulate sexual activity and to care for children. If I understand correctly, UT is arguing that the family--we might extend this to say, the heterosexual, monogamous family--is an ontological and theological necessity. "Getting straight about the family" is the key to human flourishing. To put it another way, right order in families is crucial to the restoration of human beings to their original place in God's plan.

This emphasis on the necessity of families puts UT at odds with many of the most important currents in modern thought. In



particular, the "constructivist" tendencies associated with some theorists in the contractarian tradition, feminist philosophy, and contemporary pragmatism suggest that "families" are units of association we create in an attempt to mitigate loneliness, express ourselves sexually, and to provide for children. Such associations are desirable and, in a sense, unavoidable. But "family" is not ontologically necessary, particularly not in the "traditional" form UT envisions. We may create new types of associations that serve some of the same purposes as the traditional family, as our interests and needs indicate.

UT's position is closer to others who stress, in one way or another, the "given-ness" of families in human existence: for example, Aristotelians or Thomists who understand the family as a primary example of a natural association. Perhaps most of all, UT is compatible with the notion, articulated in Hegel's fragment on love, that the heterosexual, monogamous family is a necessity for human beings as the fundamental expression of the dynamic of Spirit in the world.<sup>1</sup> Yet even these ways of thinking raise important questions for the development of UT on the family, particularly in terms of its relationship to other human associations (for example, civil society and the State). For purposes of drawing out the meaning of UT's emphasis on the family, it seems useful to create a conversation between UT and the broader philosophical tradition. This I propose to do, making use of three questions: (1) What norms govern (or ought to) the relations between husband and wife, parent and child?; (2) What relations

ought to obtain between the family and other human associations?; and (3) To what extent is "family" a universal or natural category for human relationships?

### Rules, Roles, and Family Relations


UT relates its discussion of family relations to its principal norm: love. The giving and receiving characteristic of all Reality is especially manifest in the family; as we are told, "God's ideal of creation is to actualize God's love through the family." (234)

It is clear, however, that love can have several meanings, depending on which of several relationships one focuses on. Or perhaps we should rather say that love has a single meaning (tied to give-and-receive action in relation to God's purpose), but is expressed in ways appropriate to the variety of relations that occur in family life. UT states:

God's love is an absolute love, but when it manifests itself, it can do so only in a divisional manner, according to the position and direction within the four-position base.

(234)

"Divisional" (or one might say, positional) love is UT's term for the different ways love is manifest in the various family relations: husband-wife, parent-child, child-parent. All these in turn refer to the relationship between God and humanity, so that we might envision the basic system of family relations in terms of the following diagram:



In each case, love is the bond of relationship between participants in family life. In the parent-child relation, love is "parental"; its characteristic expression is (or would seem to be) beneficence; subsequently the chief virtue of parents is benevolence. If we speak of the child-parent relation, love is expressed as respect and obedience; the corresponding virtue is filial piety. Between man and woman (husband and wife), love is expressed in the sharing of burdens and exchange of affection; the corresponding virtue is (or might be) faithfulness.<sup>2</sup>

The crucial idea, according to UT, is that family love shows itself in a particular pattern of relationships over time. Family relations are thus ordered relations. Where the need for order is ignored, family relations disintegrate. Thus order is a necessary emphasis of ethics, even an ethics in which the basic norm is love.

But what type of order does love demand? UT's suggestion that love exists as a pattern of relationships is not very controversial. And even its notion of the "divisional" character of love, with the depiction of specific roles played by the various participants in family life would not draw much argument. Everything depends on how the roles are drawn; in particular, on how the faithfulness characteristic of conjugal love is expressed.

Much writing in contemporary ethics is suspicious of the notion that the roles of husband and wife are given. It believes that these are constructed in accord with the power needs of particular men and women. More than that, it believes that family roles reflect larger cultural patterns concerning the relationships of men and women. Some constructs are oppressive, particularly to women. To deal with this, much contemporary discussion falls back on notions of equality drawn from classic liberalism. When faced with suggestions about the roles proper to men and women in family relations, such discussion asks how the roles envisioned reflect basic notions about the equality of all persons. In particular, contemporary ethics has been concerned with how notions of the order appropriate to family life protect equal regard and equal freedom for women. One of the primary ways to talk about this protection has been through the concept of rights--for example, to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness--that apply equally to men and women.

UT recognizes this as an issue. Its answer invites further discussion. At first, UT seems to say that equality is not the real issue in family relations. Indeed, the emphasis on equal rights for women characteristic of the more industrialized nations is said to contribute to a general breakdown of family life. Family order appears to require a certain hierarchy in the relationship of husbands and wives. Wives must be in the "object" position; that is, they must be in a position of showing respect for their husbands, whose authority in the family is, next to God,

primary. "If the wife stands in the subject position as the husband does, the relationship between husband and wife will become as that between subject and subject, which necessarily causes the phenomenon of repulsion." (241)

According to UT, the difficulty of relating family order to worries about the equality of women is resolved, not through affirmations of equal rights, with their concomitant emphasis on equality of respect and liberty. It is solved through an "equality of love and equality of personality." (241) The second part of UT's answer to worries about oppression in family relations thus suggests that true family order is established by people who have experienced God's love. Those who have such experience, we might say, find in the order of husband-wife something more dynamic than the term "hierarchy" suggests. The reality of conjugal love is fuller than concepts of equal rights comprehend. And thus, while "there can be no perfect equal rights between husband and wife" in a family, it is also true that

there is no superiority or inferiority in value between husband and wife...they are meant to engage in harmonious give-and-receive action from their respective positions of subject and object. If they do so, then conjugal love will be realized in their relationship, and both the husband and the wife will experience joy. (242)

In a society that is fully God's, there will be nothing to

prevent women from occupying high political office or important business positions. But the first step is to establish right order in families--an order that is based on love, and is not less, but more than an order based on equal respect.

Such arguments leave one wondering, though: How does the opportunity for women to lead politically or economically cohere with UT's ideas about order in the family? How will women develop the character traits necessary to exercise power over men in a business or as the head of a nation-state, if their primary role model has been a woman in the "object" position to her spouse? At the pre-ICUS meeting, some suggested that there are resources in UT that would not restrict men and women to the roles of "subject" and "object."<sup>3</sup> If these were consistently applied in the discussion of family relations, the result would be to emphasize the dynamic nature of familial order in ways more compatible with the idea of female leadership in society. UT would thereby sacrifice some of the clarity of the depiction of the roles of husband and wife contained in the current chapter on ethics; in my view, however, the gains from such a change--in terms of a more realistic and useful discussion of family values--would be greater than the costs.

One also wonders about UT's apparent lack of worry over an ethics appropriate for a human society that does not yet correspond to the ideal of the Kingdom of God. If equal rights are not all there is to male-female relations, surely they are at least a kind of medicine to deal with some of the problems of human beings who

fall short of realizing the fullness of God's love. In discussions of this point at the pre-ICUS meeting, I suggested that UT address this point by emphasizing that it holds to an ethic of aspiration. In that case, an emphasis on the ideal is critical to fostering a vision of "what might be," in the hope of transforming "what is." While such an emphasis still would not address the need of an "ethic for the interim," it would have the virtue of clarifying the nature of UT ethics.

#### Family, Society, and State

Contemporary ethics tends to say that the structure of family relations reflects broader social and political patterns. Hence, the idea that families are by definition built on heterosexual, monogamous marriages is not simply written in the minds and hearts of human beings. It relates to perceptions about the nature of human, especially sexual relations that pervade the predominant forms of moral discourse in Western culture; perceptions that are in turn reinforced by legal and political institutions. Similarly, the notion that the ideal order for family relations places the husband and father at the head of the household relates to more widespread traditions and practices. If one wants to deal, then, with such "family problems" as domestic violence or unequal distribution of parental responsibilities, one must do so by engaging in political action. Justice in families follows from changes in divorce law; equal respect between husbands and wives is fostered by policies requiring equal pay for equal work.

UT reverses this order. It holds that "human relationships

in society are a projection of the relationships among family members at home." (238) Generational conflicts can therefore be resolved by people trained in family virtues: the elders, in benevolence toward the young; the younger persons, trained to respect the wisdom of experience. In nuce, UT claims that

family ethics is the basis of all ethics. If family ethics is applied to society, it becomes social ethics; if applied to corporations, it becomes corporate ethics; if applied to the state, it becomes the state ethics. (238-9)

The virtues appropriate to family elders are also appropriate to the "elders" who teach, govern, or supervise the "young." The respect children give to their parents is also appropriate for students, citizens, and employees when relating to those in authority. For UT, the establishment of proper order in families as a way of addressing broader social concerns is not a matter to be taken lightly. We read,

Society, the nation, and the world today are all in great chaos. The fundamental cause of the chaotic situation is that family ethics, which is the basis of all ethics, has become weakened. Therefore, the way to save society, which is in such a chaotic situation, is to establish a new kind of family ethics, in other words, a new perspective on ethics. By



doing so, we can save families from collapse,  
and we can save the world. (239)

This account of the relations between families and the associations we call society and state invites discussion at several levels. No one trained in contemporary ethics, for example, will miss the chance to ask how it is that students, citizens, and employees are to be protected from the abuse of authority. And if UT's answer is that its ethics are oriented toward the ideal society (authorities who have experienced the love of God will not abuse their power), then one wants to know about provisions for the interim. Here, as in relations between husbands and wives, provisions for equal rights may be helpful, even if they are not completely satisfactory.

Further, the more basic assumption of UT that the virtues appropriate to family life should be transferred to social and political life seems problematic. When Aristotle wrote that it "is a mistake to believe that the 'statesman' is the same as the monarch of a kingdom, or the manager of a household, or the master of a number of slaves,"<sup>4</sup> he pointed to a difficulty that many have tried to deal with: that is, that the virtues of political life and those of family life are not precisely the same. Or are we to think, as UT implies, that the beneficence appropriate to parents of children should be the measure of the love of public officials for the citizens of a state?

Finally, one returns to an earlier point. Contemporary ethics makes much of the power of civil society and the State to shape

family values; UT reverses the emphasis. How then shall we deal with the admonition cited by Hegel: When asked what should be done to ensure that a child grows to be a virtuous person, the ancients replied "Make him a citizen of a state with good laws."<sup>5</sup> As Hegel further suggests, the ways that societies deal with property, taxation, and inheritance have much to do with the ability of families to sustain their common life. Do we not, at the least, need a more interactive account of the relations between family and other associations than UT seems to provide?<sup>6</sup>

Unificationists can answer that UT presumes such an interactive account. That, at least, was the position taken by some at the pre-ICUS meeting. UT's account of family values must be seen in connection with the Unification movement's use of "family" to describe the association of its members. When UT speaks about the relationship of husband and wife, or of parents and children, it assumes the notions of "True Parent" and "True Family" central to Unification discourse. The discussion in UT's chapter on ethics is not abstract, but refers to concrete relations in the community of believers. This, coupled with the Neo-Confucian background of UT's discussion of family values, helps to explain the emphasis on family order as the basis for human flourishing. Presumably it would also indicate an understanding that families exist in a network of associations, and depend in some sense on the health of that network, if they are to flourish.

I shall return in a moment to the suggestion that UT's discussion of family values refers to concrete aspects of

Unification practice. At this point, I want rather to focus on the point about Neo-Confucianism. It is true that texts like "The Great Learning" contain passages suggestive of the UT's special emphasis on family. It is also true that Confucian tradition (and with it Unificationism) has a more expansive notion of family than is typical of Western philosophy.

In my judgment, however, the current account of UT does not make these points with sufficient clarity. This is particularly so when we read UT in a North American context. For example: When Vice-President Quayle made his now-famous criticism of television's "Murphy Brown," saying that the lead character's decision in favor of single motherhood was part of a general devaluation of the two-parent family, he made a number of points that UT might support: Family values are crucial to the flourishing of a society; the ideal family is heterosexual and monogamous; children benefit from the interaction of man and woman in the roles of husband and wife; the two parent family is an important way to address the economic needs resulting from childbirth and childrearing.

But how far would UT's support of the Vice President extend? In an important discussion of marriage and family ethics, Vigen Guroian notes that much of the contemporary discussion of family values in North America demonstrates an instrumental interest in the family.<sup>7</sup> For example, Brigitte and Peter Berger's analysis in The War Over the Family: Capturing the Middle Ground argues that the bourgeois American family provides "the necessary social context for the emergence of the autonomous individuals who are at

the empirical foundation of political democracy." <sup>8</sup> Family values are important because they support the American Way--or so it seems. Similarly, Vice President Quayle seemed to imply that we should be concerned with the family because it prevents poverty--not a bad reason for concern, if the connection can be shown. But is this UT's reason for a concern with family values?

Further, the Vice President's remarks seemed largely to ignore the relationship between single parent families and other public policy concerns. Recall the context: Mr. Quayle's speech was a response to discussions of the role of poverty in motivating rioters in Los Angeles. To focus on "Murphy Brown" was really beside the point. If Murphy **chose** single motherhood, she could afford it. Many do not so choose. Single parenthood, and the consequent economic difficulties are thrust upon them. Such realities do less to express alternative notions of family order than to define the limits within which some people must live. In this context, is it enough to preach to the "cultural elites" who write for television or produce and direct the movies? Do we not also have to ask questions about the economic realities of south Los Angeles? If we want to foster family values in south Los Angeles, do we not have to think about opportunities for residents to find employment, or to obtain credit to begin small businesses? Economic opportunity helps to define one's consciousness, as surely as television shows. If the latter can foster our sense of what families **should** be, might we not entertain the notion that the former affects our sense what families--in particular, our own--

can be? If UT holds that families not only contribute to, but are affected by legal, economic, and political institutions, it needs to say so. Otherwise its focus on family values begins to sound like a way to put off addressing other social problems-- particularly, as mentioned, in a North American context.

#### Family, Nature, and Convention

Here we address the most difficult of our questions. Is "family" a universally valid category? UT assumes it is, by virtue of the theory of the Original Image and Original Human Nature. To expand the points made at the outset of this essay: UT speaks of humans as beings constituted by complex interactions between *hungsang* and *sunsang*, *yang* and *yin*, subject and object. In the giving-and-receiving that characterizes these interactions, human beings mirror an analogous set of interactions in the being of God and in the universe as a whole. In one sense, the task set before humans is to bring the interactions that constitute their being into a set of harmonious relations. In performing this task, human beings participate in the providential design of God, who desires to order all things according to their proper relations to God, and to one another.

According to UT, the interaction between man and woman is crucial to the human task. One could even say that this relationship has a certain priority over others. The disorder currently characteristic of human affairs flows from disorder in the relationship between man and woman. Correspondingly, right order between man and woman will result in right order in other

aspects of existence.

We can be even more specific. The peculiar relation that must be made right, if human affairs are to be restored to God's original plan, is that between husband and wife. For it was the disordered relations between one husband and one wife (Adam and Eve) that led to chaos. According to UT, human beings need to cultivate the understanding that

husband and wife each, originally, represents one of God's dual characteristics; accordingly, their conjugal union signifies the manifestation of God...husband and wife each, originally, represents one half the universe; therefore the unity of husband and wife signifies the completion of the creation of the universe...since husband and wife each, originally, represents one half of humankind, the unity of husband and wife signifies the unity of humankind...originally husband and wife, individually, are beings representing one half of the family; therefore, the union of husband and wife signifies the perfection of the family...(116-17)

If the husband-wife relation can be rightly ordered, other relations will follow. Or as UT puts it, "the union of husband and wife is the key to solving social and world problems." (118)

One way to understand this aspect of UT is as follows. UT is

making a claim about the way things "hang together." Human beings, themselves complex entities, are one part of a set of relationships far broader and deeper than they are able to comprehend. The failure of human beings to order their relations rightly affects the larger network, which in turn makes things more difficult for human beings. If we like, we might say that the universe is a kind of eco-system in which the behavior of each affects the welfare of all.

That being the case, the justification of UT's particular notions of family order relates to its sense of the universe as a whole. People everywhere strive for happiness, says the Divine Principle. To achieve happiness, individual human beings must find their place in the whole. Created in the providence of God, and in accord with God's purpose, they must accept certain limits, or perhaps better, accept the necessity of certain boundaries. Human beings were made male and female by God, Who intended that they live in the relationship of husband and wife, mirroring the complementarity present in God's universe, and even in the being of God. Family order of a particular type is thus a given of human existence. Attempts to escape or ignore it lead not to human flourishing, but to despair.

We can understand the radical nature of this claim by comparing it with the position I have previously identified as characteristic of much contemporary writing in ethics. It is as follows: "family" is a category constructed in the service of particular human needs. It is universal only in the most formal

sense: all human societies make some provisions for the regulation of sexual behavior, for the care of children, and for the distribution of property, and thus have some institution that parallels the Unification notion of family. But this institution is not necessarily monogamous, and need not involve the settled preference for heterosexual relations characteristic of "traditional" depictions of the family. Indeed, it is not necessary, in the strict sense, that children be raised by their biological parents. We can (and human beings have) devised associations the present alternatives to the family, according to our interests and needs. "Family," in the UT sense, is not given; and the emphasis of discussions of family values should therefore be on questions like: What are the varieties of family order, historically and sociologically? How do these fit with various types of political, legal, and economic order? What is the impact, over time, of various models of family order on women? Children? Men? What is the role of religion in legitimating particular notions of family?

There are of course a number of positions in between the one just sketched and UT. And UT is not without allies, even among contemporary ethicists. Yet I think it useful to focus on the opposition present in these two ways of thinking about family values. For the gap between them points to a major challenge for UT, at least in its philosophical form. If I am right, the challenge would be best met by focusing on a different form of discourse--less philosophical, more religious; and in the case of



family values, more focused on concrete example of Unification family life than on abstract discussions of the ideal family order.

Here I am recalling a line of thought developed in my essay last year. There the problem was the implicit foundationalism in UT ethics. While I am sympathetic with the aims of foundationalists in ethics, and have sometimes tried to argue the position myself, I think the best arguments for foundationalism are negative. For example, in response to arguments that proscriptions like "Do not torture" are "merely" socially constructed, some writers suggest that such arguments diminish the sense that there is a moral imperative to prevent the activity in question. While the point can be disputed, there does seem to be a sense in which it is true: Part of the appeal of moral discourse for "people on the street" lies in the notion that moral standards are objective and apply across the lines of culture and history.

When we get beyond such negative points, however, the foundationalist case is more difficult to make. In the case of proscriptions of torture, one can argue that all known human societies have found ways to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate infliction of pain, and thus have incorporated something like the proscription of torture in their moral systems. That does not prove the existence of a foundation for said proscription, however. And if such be true with respect to something so basic as judgments against torture, what shall we say concerning judgments about the proper order for family life? In this sphere, more than many others, we find diversity: the

existence of polygamy, notions of tribes as "collective families," societies that legitimate homosexuality all constitute a challenge to the notion that the heterosexual, monogamous family constitutes the ideal arrangement for all humanity. From a constructivist point of view, that arrangement is one (very important) possibility for addressing human needs for affection, sexual expression, and provision for the young. It may be the best of the available alternatives, but that judgment can only be supported by an analysis of results: What form of family life best addresses such needs? Once we begin to reason this way, we are on the playing field of constructivist thought. We begin to talk about the family in instrumental terms, and some of UT's most characteristic reasons for an emphasis on family values get lost.

I suggest that UT does not emphasize family primarily for instrumental reasons. Perhaps I am wrong in this, but it seems to me that UT's emphasis on family values owes less to philosophical discourse per se than to the connection of the Unification movement with a particular narrative that presents a grand, sweeping view of human existence. The Unification Principle purports to explain why it is that humans exist, and to answer the question "What are people for?" It does so through the story of the first man and woman, created by and for God, who yet act against God. They thereby frustrate God's design, but God uses the opportunity to reveal the depths of God's love. In particular, God raises up providential figures to carry out God's mission. Even more, God provides an indication of the original pattern of creation through

the institutions of True Parents and the Family formed around them.

In this narrative, and in the community formed by it, there is power that is not revealed in philosophical discourse. That power can compel moral vision, and thereby affect moral judgment. Like its biblical source, the Unification narrative has the potential to shape the minds and hearts of human beings, who then order their lives accordingly. In effect, the community of believers is the primary witness to the practical truth of the Unification cosmology. All human beings everywhere seek happiness...and the community of believers offers, in its common life, a testimony to the value of one way to implement this search.

I believe I understand the impulse of the Unification Movement to attempt a transformation of philosophy, and indeed of all aspects of human existence. Yet I think that UT must be careful to maintain the distinctive nature of its argument for family values, as on other matters. UT can find common cause with any number of persons who think that a "focus on the family" is an important priority in the late twentieth century. But it has distinctive reasons for adopting that cause. It can best preserve those by staying close to its particular vision of the world; to the narrative that motivates the Unification "family," and which finds concrete expression in the life of the Unification community. The ultimate test of UT is not its philosophical perspicuity but the life of the Unification Family. And, like believers in all ages, that Family's witness to the world is not a logical abstract, but an admonition: "Taste and see that the Lord is good. Happy

are the ones who trust in God."<sup>9</sup>

## NOTES

1. Included in Early Theological Writings, trans. by T.M. Knox (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 302-08.
2. In listing these behaviors and virtues, I am extrapolating from UT. The text is not always clear on these points.
3. As I recall, the reference was to a passage at p. 75, in which various types of subject-object relations are described. The "temporary" type of such relations allows for instances in family order when "the wife may sometimes take on the responsibility of the husband..." The point seems to be, however, that such alterations are exceptional; the husband-wife relation's primary classification on p. 75 is as an "original" type of a subject-object relationship, in which the husband occupies the subject, the wife the object position.
4. Politics I.1.2, from the translation by Ernest Barker (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946).
5. In Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942), p. 109.
6. Further questions arise when one considers the argument of many political philosophers (for example, Aristotle) that the state has an interest in regulating the institution of marriage (as in

Politics VII.16.2), or the upbringing of children (as in Plato's Republic).

7. "An Ethic of Marriage and Family," chapter 4 of his Incarnate Love: Essays in Orthodox Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987).

8. (Garden City, NY: University of California Press, 1983), p. 172; cited in Guroian, p. 80.

9. Ps. 34:8