



RELIGION AND SCIENCE: DETENTE BETWEEN WHOM ABOUT WHAT?

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Before discussing the specific theme assigned to me for our committee, I would like to share a few personal remarks which I hope will communicate my sincere gratitude for being invited here as well as to provide you with a better understanding of the perspective from which I will be addressing our topic for today.

It has been many years (at least ten) since I last had the privilege of participating in a conference such as this. This is not to say that I have not attended many other professional conferences in that time. Quite the contrary! I have (as have many of you, I am sure) participated in numerous conferences convened by any number of professional associations representing a myriad of disciplines. For me, these have included programs within the alphabet soup of the AAPA, AAR, ASLME, APA, APHA, ASPCP, ICPP, and ICAS&CR, among others. Yet none of these can compare to the quality of the experiences I have had in any of the ~~the~~ *Unification* conferences I had had the privilege of attending in the past. While a complete analysis of all the possible reasons for this would be beyond the scope of my present remarks, I can say without a moment's hesitation that a chief reason is the spirit in which these conferences are conceived, constituted, and convened. Nowhere else have I found more intelligent or better qualified individuals representing such a diversity of perspectives grappling together to address significant issues with as much sincerity, responsibility, and respect; neither have I anywhere else found as dear of friends. It is with sincere gratitude and heart-felt appreciation then that I thank you for allowing me to be among you again here today.

For those of you who may have known me from the past, and for those of you who did not, it may be helpful to know at least some of what has transpired in my life during the past ten years. Domestically, I have acquired a new wife, two children, and a dog. Professionally, I earned another degree, changed teaching disciplines, founded a national professional association, retired from academe, and entered the "real world" of health care administration. Spiritually, my religious perspective has gone from one of Christian disillusionment to Buddhist non-existence. At my core, I still count myself a "philosopher" but one who, recalling Plato's cave¹, has had to come back down into the shadows to deal with the problems faced by those still chained to the wall.

What has all this to do with our topic for today? For me, everything! I am sure that in the past I would have approached this assignment from a broad philosophical perspective energized by a zeal to construct a synthetic harmonization of "science and religion" appropriate to the general theme of our committee: "Constructing Theories for a Coming Age of Global Family." Worse yet, I may even have already tried.² Yet now, in all practical honesty, I cannot see that "Detente between Science and Religion" is an especially appropriate topic for theory construction at all. If anything, the problem (if it is a problem) may only exist *because* it is a theoretical construct, an abstraction -- a shadow of shadows -- which fades away as soon as it is exposed to the light. Is there really a need for "*detente*" between science and religion? Is such a thing even possible? -- necessary? -- desirable?

The notion of *detente* -- "an easing or relaxation of strained relations and political tensions between nations"³ -- presupposes a state of strained relations

between forces of national magnitude. But for whom and about what are there any such strained relations that would justify a call for *detente* between *science* and *religion*? Are there really such things as *science* and *religion* at all such that a need for *detente* between them even makes any sense?

Make no mistake, I am not denying that there are historical examples of conflict between ideas which have been promulgated in the name of one or another of the sciences on the one hand and some religion or other on the other. There are many indeed. But there are *no* such examples involving strained relations between *religion per se* and *science per se* and therefore no examples (historical, hysterical, or otherwise) justifying a call for *detente* between them. How can I be so confident about this? Because there simply are no such things as *religion per se* or *science per se* at all. Both are abstractions. If the task is how to understand or reconcile the pronouncements of certain sciences as they conflict with those of specific religions (or *vice versa*), then what is needed is not an abstract solution to an abstract problem but rather to address each and every specific concrete case as it arises. While an interesting and worthwhile task, I am afraid this would be beyond both the scope of this paper as well as the talents of its author. However, it may not be beyond the scope of the paper (though perhaps still beyond the talents of its author) to examine a few such examples with a view to better understanding what *kinds* of sciences and what *kinds* of religions have come into conflict with each other and why.

Traditionally, the "pure" sciences have been classified as rational or empirical. Among the rational sciences are logic and the mathematical sciences: e.g., arithmetic,

algebra, geometry, trigonometry, calculus, chaos theory, fractals etc.. Among the empirical sciences are the broad divisions of 1) the physical sciences: e.g., astronomy, physics, chemistry, geology; 2) the life sciences: i.e., biology, including botany, zoology, microbiology, etc.; and 3) the social sciences: e.g., anthropology, sociology, psychology, economics, etc. Some sciences simply refuse to fit neatly into any of these categories. For example, geography (which could be physical or social), or biochemistry (which could be biological or physical), or ethology (which could be biological or social) etc.. Then there are the applied sciences (e.g., agriculture, engineering, medicine, etc.) which draw upon and combine in various ways virtually all of the above, not to mention the "new" science of cybernetics which involves the synthesis of the rational, empirical, and applied sciences all in one!

Now to the best of my knowledge, there are no examples of conflicts between any of the rational sciences and any religion -- though I suppose there could be.⁴ Of course, there have been celebrated conflicts between some of the physical sciences (e.g., astronomy) and some religions (e.g., seventeenth century Roman Catholicism)⁵ though I know of no such conflicts involving chemistry, physics, or geology. Similarly prominent examples can be found within biology (specifically between evolutionary theory and certain sects of Christian fundamentalism) though I know of no such examples for botany, microbiology, or zoology, *per se*. The social sciences have certainly produced their share of "anti-religionists" (particularly from among the ranks of psychology and, of course, Marxist social-economics)⁶ although they have also produced many of its defenders as well.⁷ Among the applied sciences, agriculture

and engineering seem immune from such controversies although medicine has certainly had its share.⁸ So far and to the best of my knowledge, cybernetics seems to have escaped such conflicts although it may be too early to tell. In short, though there have indeed been a few celebrated conflicts between a particular theory proposed within a specific science and a particular sectarian expression of a specific religious tradition, there are no such examples of conflict between *science* and *religion per se*.

Before addressing the question as to why certain scientific theories (or practices) proposed within particular sciences tend to provoke conflicts with certain sects of particular religious traditions, it will be helpful if we make a brief summary review of *religion*, as we have for *science*.

Like the sciences, religions come in many shapes and sizes; some typical textbook categories include: Living and Dead, World and Indigenous, Eastern and Western, Natural and Revealed, Old and New.⁹ On the whole, trying to categorize religions is even more difficult than the sciences. There are so many examples of possible combinations of categories that it becomes an overwhelmingly daunting task even to try. Some "revealed textual traditions" include elements of mysticism alongside decidedly non-mystical expressions of the "same" religion (e.g., Hasidic and Cabalistic Judaism, certain expressions of Orthodox and Catholic Christianity, and Islamic Sufism, in the West). Most, if not all, "new" religions are syncretic expressions of "old" ones and sectarian and denominational differences within even old ones give rise to comparisons that frequently reflect closer similarities *between* rather than *within*

them and more substantial differences *within* than *without*. The larger the religion, the more difficult it becomes to say anything universally true yet distinctive of it and all its expressions; still less so for *religion per se*.

So, what is this thing *religion* which is in need of *detente* with science?

If we accept the above fairly standard set of categories of religions for our analysis, we find some very interesting things. First (though it may seem trivial at this point), I know of no "strained relations" between any *dead* religion and any science. To be sure, contemporary sciences may develop theories which conflict with the views or teachings of such religions but it simply does not make sense to say that such conflicts constitute "strained relations." Hence, there is no need for *detente* between them. As a corollary we may conclude that if any religion is in need of *detente* with science, then it must at least be a living one.

Neither am I aware of any examples of "strained relations" between indigenous religions and science. This is certainly not due to a lack of contemporary examples of living indigenous religions; there are many indeed.¹⁰ Neither may it be merely because these are the religions of aboriginal or tribal peoples with little or no contact with science but rather because of something inherent in the spirit of such religions themselves.¹¹ In any case, it would seem that we can narrow our search still further to living world religions.

Are there any significant examples of "strained relations" between any of the world's Eastern religions and science? It may simply be a function of my ignorance, but I am not aware of any. No, the world historical examples of "tension" between

science and religion seem to be characteristic primarily of religions of the West.

We might next ask whether these conflicts are characteristic of natural or of revealed religions?

Are there examples of living world-class natural religions in the West? I know of none. To be sure, the West has produced its share of nature religions, but none have achieved world-class status. So, our search narrows to the revealed religions of the West. What are these religions? They are Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Significantly, not only are they revealed religions, they are all grounded in beliefs about *revealed texts*

Do all or any of these religions as a whole have strained relations with science? Does Judaism? Not to my knowledge. Does Christianity? Well, at one time one of its major divisions had a problem with a particular scientist, but no longer.¹² More to the point, there is no such example of "strained relations" between the whole of Christianity and even one of the particular sciences, let alone science as a whole. The same may be said of Islam.¹³ So, where are these "strained relations" which call for *detente*?

But wait, we have forgotten to consider the distinction between "old" and "new" religions. Are there examples of new religions for which there are "strained relations" with science? I'll be darned if I know. But I do know that there are no new living world-class religions for which this is so.¹⁴ So again, what's the problem?

The problem is, there is no problem, except perhaps in the minds of some philosophers, of "strained relations" between science and religion. There isn't even a

problem of strained relations between any major division of any major religion and any particular science. So, why are we here today?

I am here to participate with you in a discussion about science and religion, their meaning, significance, and relation to each other and to us. We can do this because we share (to some extent, at least) a common spirit which has brought us together here today. Articulating exactly what that spirit is may be an overwhelmingly difficult task but for all that, it is no less real. At least part of it consists in our sharing some common interests, at least some beliefs, and perhaps most importantly, a willingness, if not desire, to together find understanding and meaning in the forces that shape and affect our lives. In short, we are, in some sense and to some degree, a community of "believers." If we were not, we wouldn't be here.

Of course, each of us belongs to a number of other communities of believers as well. The question as to whether we will continue to regard ourselves as members of any such given community (including this one) depends upon the extent of -- and whether we can tolerate -- any strains or tensions we *may feel* within or between them. The point is that *strain* and *tension* are not properties of belief systems or even of communities of believers but only of the individuals who experience such strain or tension, neither are their opposites: peace and tranquility. This is why it is possible for individuals belonging to the same multiplicity of belief communities to have very different experiences regarding any strain or tension between them. *Detente* then, has more to do with the *attitude* of believers about their (and others') beliefs than about those beliefs themselves.¹⁵ Achieving *detente*, therefore, depends upon

discovering what kinds of attitudes precipitate "tension and strained relations" and what kinds do not and upon practicing the latter rather than the former.

To illustrate, let us consider three examples of "tension" or "strained relations" (for some) between science and religion: 1) The case of Galileo, 2) Evolutionary theory, and 3) Modern medicine.¹⁶ I have chosen these more for their illustrative value in representing kinds of conflicts than for any intrinsic issues they may involve.

The cases of Galileo and Evolutionary theory have some important things in common. First, they would not be issues at all were it not for the existence of and a certain attitude toward the belief in a *revealed text: Genesis*. It is not the text *per se* or even the belief that it is divinely revealed that causes the problem but rather the additional attitudes of how the text should be understood and the scope of authority implied by the belief that it is revealed. Were it not assumed that the text is to be taken as literally (or even approximately) *descriptive* of the order and events of creation, neither of these cases would make any sense what-so-ever.¹⁷ Moreover, even if the text were regarded as authoritatively descriptive (more or less), there would still be no problem except for an additional attitude regarding the scope of that authority: Does it require belief merely from every member of the community of believers or from *everyone!* In short, is there tolerance (let alone respect) for others who do not share the belief but have a different point of view.

Attitudes of absolutistic authority tend to create strain and tension. The "strain and tension" of Galileo's case was not so much an issue about what heavenly body should be regarded as the center of the universe but rather who or what should be its

center of authority. Galileo refused to repudiate the authority of science by refusing to accept the Church's demand that he present his theories as *hypothesis*; the Church refused to repudiate or relinquish its authority by forbidding him to publish or teach them under any other circumstances. Each assumed an attitude of imposing their beliefs upon the other. Neither was willing to allow that the other's view might have some merit; it was ultimately a conflict of power, not ideas.

The case of evolutionary theory is similar to that of Galileo in some respects but importantly different in others. In this case at least, science rather than religion holds the cultural power and the loci of authority are much less clear. Practically speaking, the conflict is one about who shall have authority over what shall be taught in the public schools. At one time (but not now) and in some (but not all) places, certain religious influences exercised such authority. Among the interesting things about this case is that what was once forbidden has now become the custom while what had been mandated is now ignored; the positions of power and authority have been completely reversed. For our purposes it really makes no difference, for the issue is the same: Regardless of who is in what position, the real causes of conflict, strain, and tension revolve around issues of power and authority, not ideas.

I do not want to enter too deeply into the particulars of this conflict but a brief discussion may help us to better understand its nature.

At one time in certain areas of the United States, the teaching of evolution was forbidden while the teaching of creationism according to *Genesis* was mandated -- the infamous "Scopes Trial" was decided against evolution and in favor of creationism.¹⁸

Many years and Supreme Court cases later, the teaching of evolutionary theory has become standard *faire* in most public school biology courses with creationism (of any sort) typically ignored. Those who, for whatever reasons, believe that evolutionary theory is "bad" and that creationism (i.e. according to *Genesis*) is "good" have argued that the exclusive teaching of evolutionary theory to the exclusion of other theories of creation is unfair and have demanded (to the point of attempting to pass laws requiring) the teaching of the *Genesis* story along with evolution. Whether they are sincere in this, however, is somewhat open to question. Would they, had they the power, mandate the teaching of *Genesis* and forbid the teaching of evolution? Less drastic though no less revealing, would they support the teaching of other creation myths besides those of *Genesis* and evolutionary theory?¹⁹ The answers to these questions would tell more about whether their concern is over fairness and respect for alternative points of view or about power and authority.

Finally, this example illustrates another important point in our examination of the relation between science and religion. In Galileo's case, neither he nor the Church confused religion with science. Yet the view taken by at least some opponents of evolutionary theory is that (their) religion *is* science (fact).²⁰ Not only is this reflected by describing their position as "scientific creationism," but also in their strategy of attempting to have their brand of creationism taught in *biology* (rather than religion) classes along with evolution. Textually, historically, and culturally, the creation story according to *Genesis* is part of the West's religious tradition, not its science. Confusing the two reflects an attitude lacking in understanding and respect for either.

Why is evolutionary theory, say as opposed to chaos theory or quantum theory, the focus of so much attention? Perhaps because its opponents (falsely) believe it to strike at an issue which is for them of significant religious consequence: Whether human beings are merely different in degree than in kind from their fellow creatures and the implications this might have concerning the nature and "immortality" of the human soul. Other religious believers find no such problem with evolution either because they hold views in which such kinship is welcomed rather than scorned or because they recognize that even if true, evolutionary theory does not necessitate the implication that the human spirit is not different in kind from that of other animals -- perhaps even by virtue of divine intervention. Still others are untroubled by the whole affair because they do not believe in an "after-life" in the first place. Others still are untroubled because they reflect an attitude accepting of other people's beliefs even (or perhaps particularly) when they differ from their own. The point of all this is that there is conflict, "strain, and tension" only for those for whom the stakes are viewed as important enough and then only to the degree that they are in a power struggle involving someone's attempt to impose their views upon others. Without these, there may be differences of opinion or points of view but no strain or tension.

The crucial point to recognize in all of the above is that these supposed examples of conflict between religion and science reflect as much, if not more, conflicts between differing religious views than scientific ones. The fact that different believers representing different religious views can assume different attitudes toward the same scientific theory is indicative not of a problem between science and religion

but rather between religions. Therefore, any "strain or tension" a given religious believer feels over some scientific theory reflects not only an attitude contemptuous of science but of the religious views of others as well. A scientific theory or pronouncement, in-and-of-itself, has no religious significance until some believer makes it so. Consequently, any strain or tension such a believer experiences is not really the product of a conflict between *religion* and *science per se* but rather between competing *religious* views! This being the case, the supposed need for *detente* between science and religion really comes down to one for *detente* between religions, not between religion and science.

Except for what can only be described as arrogant attitudes on the part of certain believers, there would be no "strains or tensions" requiring *detente*. What are the stakes, really, of simply allowing people to believe what they will, no matter how much it differs from what we believe? Why do we think we *need* others to believe as we do? So what if they think we are odd, ignorant, or stupid? Or, is it that we fear that their views may actually have something to them and we might have to reconsider some of our own? What practical difference does it make if we are mistaken about what (if any) heavenly body occupies the center of the universe, or whether or how closely we are genetically related to some orangutan? Neither of these issues has any real implications concerning the character of our souls or their salvation; neither is a matter of life or death.

So much for religious conflicts with scientific theories. Religious conflicts over medicine, however, can be and frequently *are* matters of life or death.

Medicine and religion are now and always have been intimately related. Their histories are tied together in antiquity and their fates are intertwined. Both minister to the afflicted and the dying. Both determine the quality of our well-being and our lives. The stakes of conflicts here are more than mere loss of pride. Our attitudes toward them affect not only the meaning of our lives but those very lives themselves. Here, when conflict arises, the choice between one or the other may mean the choice between life or death. But this *is the* uniquely human choice. No other creature, of which I am aware, has the privilege of *choosing* "to be or not to be." Indeed, "that is *the* question! Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune or to take up arms against a sea of troubles"²¹ is the decision with which we are all faced when confronted with a potentially fatal illness. The choice is not only to live or die, but what that living or dying means, i.e, the *value* of life itself.

The tension between religion and science is often represented as one between facts and values or reason and faith. Moreover, it is frequently assumed that the two are somehow contrary to one another. They are rarely, if ever, viewed as complimentary. In reality, however, they exist in a kind of symbiotic relationship in which each is necessary to the other's continued existence.²² Conflicts between them are the result of a failure to recognize the benefits of mutual complementarity. When such conflicts happen in the context of modern medicine, the stakes can be high indeed.

If either medicine or religion are to truly minister to the sick and suffering, then neither can ignore the fact that human suffering and death are at once both physically

objective and subjectively spiritual. The human person is both body and spirit. Human health and well-being depends upon recognizing and respecting both. Ultimately, the decisions we make concerning our health and well-being are expressions of our faith in certain values and our reasoned understanding of particular facts. Here then, not just *detente* but complimentary mutuality is essential. When conflicts arise, they can produce not just "strain and tension" but confusion, anxiety, despair, and even death. Unlike the examples above, a great deal more is involved in a confrontation between science, in the form of medicine, and religion, in the form of one's most sacred values, than merely what one believes about our physical position in the universe or our kinship to other animals; it affects nothing less than any number of unavoidable choices we must make which literally affect our very lives. Our knowledge of the facts (*science*) and our faith in certain values (*religion*) will determine whether those choices produce what, in our own view, is right and good for our health and well-being, both physical and spiritual. Where either is lacking, the outcome *cannot* be successful. Both are *necessary* and *complimentary* to even the possibility of our making such life-meaning decisions.

What is the meaning of life? Is this a question whose answer is to be found exclusively in science or religion? Surely not. Finding its answer requires the cooperation of both, whether or not we will ever all agree on its particulars. Is it for me to say what the meaning and value of your life is, or for you mine? Some people seem to think so. What more arrogant expression of the imposition of one's views upon another could there be?

Diversities can and do exist *within* sciences and religions as well as between them²³ but it is a mistake²⁴ to view the relation *between science and religion* in the same way. Technically speaking, it simply does not make sense to say that *religious* views and *scientific* ones could even *possibly* be in disagreement. It would be like saying that the sense of *hearing* could disagree with the sense of *taste* about a flavor, or the sense of *taste* disagreeing with *hearing* about a sound. Science and religion are not *things*; they are not even *institutions*, or *systems of belief*. Instead, they are human activities expressive of the human spirit.²⁵ They are as different as the senses of *sight* and *touch*, without both of which -- and their complimentary coordination -- it would be difficult if not impossible for us find our way in the world.²⁶

We live in a religiously pluralistic world. It has always been so and will probably always remain so.²⁷ But this does not mean that inter-religious disharmony is the necessary consequent. On the contrary, such diversity may be the very secret to achieving *spiritual unity*. Learning to tolerate and even respect others of differing faiths and values is essential not only to social harmony, peace, and tranquility, but also to one's own well-being and spiritual growth. Only where there is diversity is it possible to practice this virtue; without it, we remain spiritually immature.

A *community of believers* does not constitute a *world of faith*. Examples of the former can increase and diversify while the latter expands and *unifies*. Only love, trust, and respect can overcome conflict, strain, and tension. We cannot learn the former if we are not confronted with potential examples for the latter. They are one in the same as opportunities; it is only for us to choose how we will respond.

Notes

1. Plato, *The Republic*, VII 514ff, in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. Edith Hamilton (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), 747- 750.
2. Paul W. Sharkey, *A Philosophical Examination of The History and Values of Western Medicine* (Lewiston, N.Y.: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1992); "When? The Philosophical Revolution," *Contemporary Philosophy*, Vol XI, 1986; "Science and Religion," in *Philosophy of The Humanistic Society*, ed. Alfred Koenig (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981).
3. *Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged* (Chicago, IL: William Benton, 1966), 616.
4. Some mystical traditions have emphasized the "irrational" or "super-rational" nature of knowledge gained through ecstatic experience but none to my knowledge have challenged the laws of logic or mathematics themselves. To do so would be to declare war on reason itself and not just to declare some forms of knowledge to be beyond rational understanding or discursive articulation.
5. Here I refer, of course, to the celebrated case of Galileo. See note 12 below.

6. Among the most celebrated attacks on religion is of course Sigmund Freud's, *The Future of An Illusion*, tr. J. Stachey (New York, N.Y.: Norton and Company, 1961). More recent examples include Albert Ellis', *The Case Against Religion: A Psychotherapist's View*, (New York, N.Y.:Institute for Rational Emotive Therapy, 1971); Donald E. Sloat, *The Dangers of Growing Up in a Christian Home*, (New York, N.Y.: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1986); Wendell W. Watters, *Deadly Doctrine: Caution – Christianity may be hazardous to your health*. (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1992).
7. Carl Jung, *Psychology and Religion*, (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1961). Both the popular as well as professional literature in psychology are replete with examples of both detractors and defenders of religion.
8. In the United States, the newest of these is probably the current debate over physician assisted suicide. The relation between science and religion in Western medicine's history is discussed in my *A Philosophical Examination of The History and Values of Western Medicine*, 21 - 65.
9. See for example: Mary Pat Fisher and Robert Luyster, *Living Religions*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1991); S. A. Nigosian, *World Faiths*, (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1994); Ninian Smart, *Worldviews: Crosscultural Explorations of Human Beliefs*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1995);

and Huston Smith, *The Illustrated World's Regions: A Guide to Our Wisdom Traditions*, (San Francisco, CA.: Harper, 1994).

10. See for example: Nigosian, *World Faiths*, 40-41; 66-67.
11. It is sometimes said that these traditions represent a kind of "innocence" as reflected in their mythic views of the world. Many, if not all, also emphasize the interconnectedness of all things and seem much more keenly aware of the consequences of upsetting the natural order. Whether these characteristics place them more or less in opposition to "science" depends as much upon what view of science one has as of these religions. Another characteristic of these traditions is their emphasis on the *prescriptive* rather than *descriptive* import of their cultural myths.
12. In October, 1992, Pope John Paul II officially "rehabitated" Galileo with the Catholic Church affirming the opinion that Galileo had been wrongfully condemned in 1633. In so doing, the Pope stated that science and religion are distinct but not necessarily opposite. Interestingly, this was the position Galileo took in his defense before the Inquisition over 350 years earlier!
13. Actually, the history of Islam is associated with support for, rather than conflict with, scientific activity. See for example: Brian Stock, "The Growth of Islamic Science," in ed. John G. Burke, *Science and Culture in The Western Tradition*, (Scottsdale, AZ.: Gorsuch, Scarisbrick, Publishers, 1987), 30-34.

14. It is to the credit, I believe, of the *Holy Spirit Society for The Unification of World Christianity* (The Unification Church, 1982) that it has devoted so much of its attention, time, talent, and resources to exploring the relations not only within and between religions and sciences but also to promoting their harmonization with one another. I must confess, however, to a continuing concern with what appears to be an obsessional focus on "unifying" all religions and sciences into one grand scheme or "theoretical construct." In her *Unification Theology and Christian Thought*, Young Oon Kim characterizes religion as being concerned with "man's internal dominion" and science with his "external dominion" saying that "there has been a gap between science and religion, just as there has been a struggle between the spiritual and the physical." Her solution is for "the spiritual and the physical [to] become one, and science and religion [to] meet on common ground [in a]... new age [of] one world, one kingdom..." Her citation of Einstein's famous quotation that "science without religion is blind and religion without science is crippled" in defense of this view is, however, open to other interpretations. Instead, one could argue that science and religion (though both essential to the human quest) need to remain separate and distinct from one another just as one needs two legs (at least) in order to walk. See Young Oon Kim, *Unification Theology and Christian Thought*, (New York, N.Y.: Golden Gate Publishing Co., 1975), 261-262.
15. By *attitude* I mean a meta-belief, i.e., one's belief about beliefs.

16. Perhaps similar examples could be provided on a *public* scale representing what some see as a general assault by modern technology upon the environment. However, whether such examples would be more the product of political or commercial interests than scientific ones, is open to argument. Moreover, such examples run the risk of confusing *science* with the employment of certain *technologies*. In the case of medicine, however the mere existence of its technologies poses unavoidable dilemma's of *personal* existential concern. Whether these concerns should also be regulated by *public* policy is a matter of politics, not, strictly speaking, science or religion.
17. An interesting question, I believe, is why other religious traditions with other creation myths have not found similar fault with science. Could it be perhaps because they do not regard the *descriptive* details of those myths to be as important as their *prescriptive* message? See note 11 above.
18. See: Richard Milner, *The Encyclopedia of Evolution: Humanity's Search for Its Origins*, (New York, N.Y.: Facts on File, 1990).
19. David A. Leeming and Margaret A. Leeming, *A Dictionary of Creation Myths*, (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1994).

20. See for example: Creation Science Institute, *Scientific Creationism*, Public School ed. (San Diego, CA.: CLP Publishers, 1974) and Philip Kitcher, *Abusing Science*, (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1982).
21. Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, act III, scene *i.*, emphasis added.
22. Carl Jung, *The Undiscovered Self*, (New York, N.Y.: Mentor, 1963), 85ff.
23. That is, there can be, have been, and are competing theories *within* and *between* given sciences and *within* and *between* given religions but, strictly speaking, not between science(s) and religion(s) *per se*. Those controversies usually described as such are actually either disputes over issues of *descriptive fact (disputes of science) or faith and values (religious disputes)* but not *between facts and values*.
24. In the parlance of contemporary language philosophy, it is an example of what is known as a "category mistake": confusing properties appropriately attributable to things of one kind with those of another, for example: What color is sweet?, How does blue taste? etc. Though such usages are not uncommon in ordinary language, they are metaphorical at best and achieve what meaning they do through common associations of properties of objects actually belonging to different conceptual categories (e.g., Red may be thought of as "hot" because of the color's association with fire, or a "red, hot, poker" etc.) These literally mistaken usages are relatively harmless (perhaps) except when they reflect

and/or lead us to adopt views which are not only misleading but potentially harmful to us. See: Plato, *Phaedo*, 115c-e wherein Socrates warns that such misstatements are not merely errors of grammar, but also do harm to the soul.

25. A recurrent theme in many mystical traditions as well as reports from individuals who have had "near death" experiences is their focus on *love* and *learning* as constituting the meaning and purpose of life. See: Raymond A. Moody, *Life After Life*, (New York, N.Y.: Bantam, 1988). Is it merely a coincidence that these are the virtues of *religion* and *science* respectively?

26. Like *sight* and *touch*, it is sometimes easy to confuse the objects of *science* and *religion* with one another despite their inherent differences. For example, we may judge a shape both by sight and touch, though they are quite literally different senses. What we do in actuality is to associate a certain visual sensation with a particular tactile one as expressive of a "unified" coherent experience of the world. When such associations are contrary to our expectations (e.g., touching something and finding it to feel rough although visually it had appeared smooth) we may become startled and confused. If the dissociation is severe enough, we can even become disoriented and frightened as when walking across a glass floor high above the ground. Similarly, dissociations between scientific and religious views may be frightening and disorienting for some, especially if they are unaware of the inherent differences of perspective between the two. As with sight and touch, the trick is to pay

attention to what both may be telling us about ourselves and the world in which we live; indeed, as Einstein has said: Science without religion is blind, and religion without science is crippled. See note 14 above.

27. While the trend in *religion* appears to be toward greater pluralism and diversity that in *science* has been more and more toward greater coherence and uniformity. From the "big bang" to the "human genome," the perspective of science is increasingly characteristic of a "single piece of cloth." Rather than take alarm and despair at the apparent differences between these trends, it may be more enlightening to consider why they are different and what those differences mean to our better understanding and appreciation of both science and religion and to their essential inter-relatedness in the human quest to know who we are, where we are, and why we are here.